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Abstract  
This aim of this research project is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
republican credentials of the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To this 
end I have launched an extensive enquiry into the main ancient and modern theories of 
the republican ideology including detailed surveys of the most prominent literature of 
the relevant field accompanied by individual enquiries into the conceptual line of 
argument of the main theoreticians of this school of the political philosophy in order to 
come up with a basic framework of analysis for any system claiming to be steeped in 
any levels of the republican credentials. 
I have then moved on to evaluate the main theological doctrines of state and sovereignty 
within Islam with specific reference to the dominant Shiʻa school of the political 
authority in Iran trying to identify their point of convergence and divergence with the 
basic republican political discourse. 
 
I have also provided a detailed institutional analysis of the Islamic Republic trying to 
highlight their implications and interactions with regard to the previously identified 
republican criteria.  
 
The final chapter of this project scrutinizes the role of the republican citizens and the 
institutional and constitutional provisions to empower and protect such fundamental 
building blocks of the republican doctrine of state. 
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Introduction 
The history of the socio-political state administration in a framework of the republican 
doctrines is more than two millennia old.  The core building blocks of this ideology 
could be traced back to the works of Cicero (106-43BC) and other scholastic 
philosophers who strived to lay the foundations of their res publica on two core concepts 
of jus (justice) and libertas (liberty) endorsed and protected by overarching state 
institutions and actively involved citizens.  Notwithstanding, as many scholars have 
noticed: “the concept of the republican government is indeed a spacious one and many 
particular ideas can comfortably nestle under its big tent”1.  In spite of these valid 
observations, from the outset, one notices the centrality of two main concepts of the rule 
of law and the importance of republican freedom as conceived by the main ideologues of 
this doctrine in particular the so-called civic humanists.  This was upheld as a system 
which would be based on a basic notion of mixed constitution whose main function 
would be to promote and protect the commonwealth values of liberty and citizenship.  
Most of these fundamental classical cornerstones of republican thought have survived to 
our day having undergone various stages of mutation and adaptation ranging from the 
Lactantius religious interpretations to more modern Leonardo Bruni treatises and 
Machiavellian school and other so-called neo-Roman or the revisionist variants found in 
the works of contemporary authors like Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, Maurizio Viroli, 
John Maynor and John Pocock.   
 
     To this neo-republican school of political philosophy, I have to add other significant 
strands of this doctrine notably the one identified with the French Revolution whose 
basic convictions are driven by a significant revolutionary rupture with the previous 
order of the Ancien Régime towards a more egalitarian system of popular sovereignty
2
.  
As I will demonstrate throughout this research project, these regicide trends and ensuing 
egalitarian claims and implications would later play an important part in the conception 
of the Islamic Republic’s initial ideology whose main ideologues were trained and 
inspired by this very school of republicanism.   
                                                 
1
 See for instance Reed Amar, A. (1994),  The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular 
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Problem of the Denominator, University of Colorado Law Review vol 
65.749 
2
 See for instance Grange, J. (2008) L’Idée de République,  Paris Agora pub. pp.56-57 
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     In spite of all these variant interpretations, the core idea of freedom “by” a 
representative government rather than freedom “from” government has made up what 
one could identify as a deep-seated non-domination component of the republican 
freedom based on the rule of just laws to guarantee the citizen’s basic “positive” liberties 
and safeguard the “negative” ones to cast off possible arbitrary interferences leading to 
domination
3
.  Hence the vincula iuris or legal framework that protects and promotes 
citizens’ rights and requires them to place their allegiance in the sovereign laws, could 
be conceived as the basic building block of all modern republican systems. This, 
together with the republican elected accountable institutions which represent and 
embody the public will could be regarded as the core principles of all narratives within 
the republican schools of thought. Thus liberty in the form of non-domination, rule of 
law and republican institutions that could guarantee these basic individual freedoms and 
promote public virtue and common good, could all be considered to be the fundamental 
contributions and most importantly the distinctive features of the republican thought 
throughout history.  
 
     Furthermore in particular from the Italian Renaissance onward, the central role of 
“contestatory citizenry”, as Pettit puts it, is persistently endorsed as the basic criteria to 
qualify any political system to advance any degrees of republican claims
4
. This notion is 
also well-grounded in the French republican narratives with the previously mentioned 
emphasis on the inalienable right to revolt against the oppressive institutions
5
.  Thus 
regardless of various historical mutations and adaptations in different, mainly western, 
schools of the political philosophy, One could identify a constant stream of thought 
based on the core elements of the republican ideology grounded in such distinctively 
republican ideas of rule of law, mixed constitution and republican freedom. As it could 
be seen in Chapter 1 this fundamental concept of liberty has multiple implications at 
various levels of socio-political administration of the power both at individual and at 
public levels of the exercise of authority.  
 
                                                 
3
 For a comprehensive discussion of these types of liberty see Berlin, I. (1969) Two concepts of Liberty, in 
Four Essays On Liberty. Oxford University Press. pp.122;129-130. 
4
 Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government Oxford: Oxford University Press 
5
 Grange p.68 
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     The other end of my paradigm of study will concern the dominant Shiʻa doctrine of 
the political theology.  From the outset I need to clarify that by “political theology” I do 
not wish to mean the Carl Schmitt’s original denotations of this term in the sense that 
“all concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts”6.   
Whereas the doctrines that attempt to bring the sacred back to the political are intended 
in my specific context of study
7
.  These types of ideologies by demanding a total loyalty 
of the community of the faithful to a divine law-giver, and placing sovereignty in the 
hands of unelected ecclesiastical institutions, have historically been inclined towards 
refuting the contingency of power based on non-metaphysical nature of the political 
reality.  These ontological and epistemological assumptions have unsurprisingly been 
the prevailing trends in the Shiʻa doctrine of state and, dare I say, in the entire Islamic 
political discourse, although in certain cases due to strong secularizing processes and 
pragmatic necessities a considerable level of ideological coexistence has been achieved
8
.  
These metaphysical or divine interpretations of sovereignty lie at the heart of all 
narratives on the God given or inherited exclusive privileges such as the monarchic ones 
that leaves little place for what Jean Bodin (1530-1596) calls souveraineté temporelle
9
.   
The humanist republican consciousness based on the practical and pragmatic political 
liberties by appealing to the will of the people seems to be at open discord with the 
religiously grounded theories of power administration.  These observations would well 
account for the ideological struggles and inconsistencies that one could seamlessly 
observe in one particular context, that of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In this context it 
is not difficult to highlight various attempts on the part of numerous religious institutions 
to transfer the source of right and authority from the republican constitutional 
repositories to the ecclesiastical divine entities that enforce total allegiance to their 
ultimate divine source of legitimacy
10
.  
 
                                                 
6
 Schmit, K. (1922)  Political Theology, Chicago, Chicago University Press p.36 
7
 See for instance Laborde, C. The Return of Political Theology, The Scarf Affair in Comparative 
Constitutional Perspective at: http://vimeo.com/63324716 
8
 See Chapter 2 for more details 
9
 Bodin, J (1993), Les Six Livres de la République, Paris, LGF Pub. p.1-9 
10
 The history of the western political thought is full of such instances. We could mention the Vatican’s 
numerous attempts to usurp the temporal power as mentioned in most classical works of the renaissance or 
the contemporary conflicts in modern states such as the USA and obviously the Middle East between the 
religiously grounded ideologies and the secular notions of sovereignty.   
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     In contrast, the essential republican belief in the centrality of the consent of the 
governed, voluntas (free will), inexorably institutes the foundations of the authority and 
the state’s coercive power in the hands of the citizenry.  Liberty, rule of law and popular 
sovereignty, in a sentence, law being more powerful than any individual or institutions
11
, 
all seem to be at least secondary concerns, if not existentially incompatible, with a 
noteworthy part of the religious teachings.  
 
     Based on these fundamental republican assumptions, my chosen case study - Iran, 
presents one with a very interesting instance in which the constitutional republican 
doctrines seem to be doomed to be in an eternal quest for legitimacy with the influential 
conservative religious power sources who through their universalist claims of authority 
undermine the very existence of the state’s elected political apparatus. This at times 
seems to be going as far as an utter repudiation of a certain manmade basis for legal 
legitimacy which would in turn effectively challenge the parliamentarian basis of the 
republic.  Hence the “Islamic Republic” of Iran appears to embody numerous conceptual 
inconsistencies in its definition of the popular sovereignty claims and its basic 
assumptions of the alleged divine sources of right, acclaimed by the father of the Islamic 
Revolution
12
.  A quick overview of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s speech under the title 
velāyat-e faqih (the rule of the jurisprudent) would readily reveal a total exclusion of the 
res publica as a source of sovereignty and authority
13
.  The introduction of this concept 
was aimed at legitimizing an exclusive dominance on both legislative and executive 
powers of the state in the hands of divinely appointed restricted circle of ecclesiastical 
representatives of the religious doctrine
14
. This could be regarded as the most blatant 
repudiation of the raison d'être of any republican concepts rooted in the basic notion of 
popular sovereignty, non-domination of individuals or groups and the rule of 
collectively endorsed constitutional laws.  In line with these inherent contradictions, 
which could be seen both in the Iranian constitution and in the declarations of its ruling 
elites
15
, in recent years there have been various debates and at times persistent  calls to 
                                                 
11
 Skinner, Q. (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.84  
12
 See Ch.2 for instance 
13
 Khomeini, R. Velāyat-e Faqih va Jahād-e Akbar, Collections of Najaf Speeches Tehran, Markaze Našre 
āsāre Emam Khomeini  pp.45-46 
14
 See Ch.2 below 
15
 See Ch.2 & 3 
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abandon the few republican elements of the ruling system including radical 
modifications to the judiciary system, total dominance on the electoral procedures, 
various arbitrary exercises of power and dominance over the parliamentary proceedings 
and even proposals to change the official name of the state from: “Islamic Republic of 
Iran” to Hokumat-e Adl-e Eslāmi (Islamic Justice Rule); which all clearly underscore the 
discomfort that the republican suffix generates in the minds of the ruling class in Iran. 
Ayatollāh Khomeini himself consistently compared his understanding of the ideal 
Islamic state with the early Islamic political systems in which the ruler was the 
embodiment of the divine will, monopolizing control over judiciary and all coercive 
forces of the Islamic ommat.  As I will expound later, this might well account for certain 
political symptoms such as the constant struggle for power between the Office of the 
Supreme Jurist and the seat of Presidency as the most prominent embodiment of the 
republican institutions.  
 
     All this would amount to a doctrine that “in theory” leaves no space for the 
aforementioned concepts of constitutional liberty and freedom based on the republican 
principles.  Whereas in practice one could easily identify various surviving republican 
elements, which paradoxically seem to have been deliberately maintained and at certain 
junctures, even prioritized over the religious doctrine of the political not just due to 
practical and pragmatic necessities but also to provide and sustain claims of legitimacy 
of the whole system both internally and before the inquisitive eyes of the international 
community. 
 
     As discussed above from the outset it is possible to identify two major currents of 
thought regarding the republican doctrine, namely the French school as recognizable in 
the works of the contemporary scholars such as Claude Nicolet and Juliette Grange, and 
the so-called “civic republicanism” school as labelled by Philip Pettit16.  Although I will 
make significant reference to the French school of republicanism due its paramount 
influence on the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic, the neo-republican 
strand as elucidated in chapter 1 would constitute the core platform for the current 
research.  The choice of this school of republicanism has been due to its theoretical 
                                                 
16
 See Ch.1 below 
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coherence and conceptual comprehensiveness together with its systematic efforts to 
uncover the resilient republican ideological foundations and show their relevance to the 
modern world’s civil societies.   
Literature Review 
There are numerous works carried out on the history and the principles of the republican 
ideas both classical and modern variants. These include such historically influential 
treatises as the Cicero’s De Republica and Machiavelli’s “Discourses on the First Ten 
Books of Titus Livy” to more modern interpretations of the Republican ideologies. These 
range from the renaissance persuasions to the trends initiated by the Enlightenment and 
revolutionary concepts to other liberal or communitarian readings.  In particular, as the 
current predominantly Anglo-Saxon liberal version of the political philosophy seems to 
be increasingly proving incapable of providing adequate solutions to the modern 
polities’ problems; the republican ideas demonstrate a perpetual relevance to the new 
world’s multi-cultural and diversified communities17.  The secret seems to be lying in 
the republican strive to actively cultivate elements of civic virtue, common good, and 
public institutions that could nourish and uphold principles of libertas.  Accordingly one 
could notice a significant return on the part of the scholars to endorse and appreciate the 
ancient republican notions, which up until some decades ago were deemed outdated with 
regard to the modern era’s political necessities18.  
 
     Unsurprisingly this body of academic research has been at the centre of debates in 
various schools of the political science and has generated significant enthusiasm and 
sometimes hot debates amongst the modern political theoreticians
19
.  In spite of all this 
significant body of research and articles on the main conceptual fundamentals of the 
republican political philosophy, as far as I am aware, very little work has been carried 
out to study the mutual interaction of the republican systems of the political sovereignty 
with regard to their implications and interactions with the religious dogma.  These trends 
                                                 
17
 By liberal ideology the main current of thought in this school, such as those in the works of Rawls is 
intended. Some more recent versions in the form of the perfectionist liberalisms indeed do contain 
significant conceptual overlap as far the principles of individual liberties and their scopes are concerned 
18
 See for instance Grange, J. ibid pp.11-13 
19
 Indeed the main treatise of Juliette Grange is actually a response and a refutation of the ideas put 
forward by the ideologues of the “civic republicanism” and the major works of Pettit and Skinner in 
particular follow this trend.  
15 
 
in the political theology include both historical and contemporary socio-political 
alignments of the Islamic world in which the whole ideological confrontation and debate 
appears to have a very brief and unchallenging history on theoretical and academic 
levels. 
 
     Furthermore a great part of the modern western schools of the political philosophy, 
notably the French one, have proven to be more categorical through the outright 
refutation of any legitimacies grounded in the metaphysical sources of authority deemed 
conceptually incompatible with most manmade sources of right and legitimacy.  
Nevertheless in the recent years more challenging theories have been put forward which 
go against these traditions of existential refutation of the possibility of coexistence to a 
certain level of collaboration between religion, in this case Islam, and the republican 
principles of the political.  L’Islam Republicain by J F Bayart is a good attempt to 
favourably define the Islamic doctrines’ interactions with the republican concepts in a 
comparative framework.  Nevertheless all such studies fail short of providing a 
systematic academic basis of analysis with a clear criteria of research and evaluation.  In 
other words: what are the exact elements of comparison? What are the scales of such 
measurements? And most importantly what are the republican principles against which 
they are comparing the consistency of the theological foundations of the state and 
sovereignty?   
 
     This indeed constitutes the major setback of most literature treating similar 
arguments.  Important works carried out by the likes of Enayat, Arjomand, Abrahamian, 
Haʻeri, Katouzian and many others have scrutinised and addressed various aspects of the 
political theology
20
.  These have all produced significant contributions towards 
enhancing our understanding of the complex interactions of the religious ideologies with 
the secular sources of the political authority.  Nevertheless, it appears that, there have 
been few direct academic treatments of the “republican” credentials of a system 
claiming to be upholding religious values in particular with regard to this specific 
dominant Shiʻa version of Islam21. Hence in a time span that extends to at least a couple 
                                                 
20
 See Ch.2  
21
 One of these rare attempts to study the other side of the dichotomy that is to evaluate the treatment of 
certain aspects of religion in a republican state could be found in the works of Cécile Laborde (2008) 
16 
 
of centuries, one does not seem to be able to identify many systematic and analytic 
studies of the major republican principles of the socio-political organization of a society 
and their relation to the religious sources of the political governance.  Hence most 
existing scholarships in this field of the social sciences provide very little insight 
regarding the actual interaction of the founding principles of these “western ideologies”, 
in particular the republican ones, with the local centres of legitimacy.   
 
     Certain narratives such as those cantered around the notions of “oriental despotism” 
or “pick-ax society” by shifting the emphasis upon the social peculiarities of each 
context and placing them at the centre of debate, have even engendered significant 
potentials of misunderstanding with regard to the overall political processes involved; 
some of which could have universal validity with closely matched global historical 
experiences
22
.  Nevertheless some authors such as Abrahamian have gone the route of 
providing general overviews of the socio-political processes by trying to identify 
common driving engines behind numerous global political phenomena which otherwise 
appear to be fundamentally distinct.  In spite of this even in such cases very little 
attention seems to have been paid to providing an academic framework of study and a 
clear structured definition of those processes to frame a political system with such 
significant claims of having republican credentials
23
. 
 
     One interesting work recently accomplished is the one by Ran Hirschl which is aimed 
at studying the constitutional foundations of theocratic regimes.  Although very 
marginally treating the Iranian context, and in spite of focusing primarily on the juridical 
and constitutional aspects, it is still a very precious addition to the otherwise poor 
literature of the studies on the state-religion relationship.  Other similar studies such as 
those by Cecile Laborde, Simon Cabulea May and Andrew March are mainly centred 
around the western manifestations of the religious ideologies, scrutinizing their modus 
operandi within the context of the mainly European and American societies.  
                                                                                                                                                
notably in her book entitled: Critical Republicanism, The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy,  
Oxford, Oxford University Press  
22
 One such arguments is the notion of resilience of the social structure in the form of the alleged short-
term versus long-term societies, See for instance Chapter 2 & 3 of Katouzian, H. (2003)  Iranian History 
and Politics, London, Routledge Bips Persian Studies Series 
23
See for instance Abrahamian, E. (1993) Khomeinism Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press 
17 
 
     More relevant to my study case, other existing studies are mostly either entirely 
dedicated to a historical analysis of the democratic movements in Iran or are merely 
providing a chronological account of the events with a very poor scientific methodology 
employed in the study of the political systems and in support of the hypothesis and 
conclusions drawn
24
.  Moreover due to the ever present state sponsored or even self-
inflicted censorship, the partial studies completed inside Iran have been unable to both 
carry out scientific firsthand researches that could incorporate an acceptable amount of 
the historical resources on the one side, and the views and convictions of the current 
ideologues of the republican doctrine on the other.  All these inadequacies, besides 
providing a great amount of observational and sampling errors, lack unbiased verifiable 
conclusions that could be backed up by scientific empirical data collection and analytic 
procedures. 
 
     Most importantly numerous, and sometimes opposing, definitions of the basic 
republican elements, and a distorted image of all aspects of any “western” related 
systems of governance and civil society organization in the east, have all resulted in a 
quasi total predisposition towards repudiation or at least ignorance of the core values of 
these ideologies deemed alien and irrelevant, if not utterly hostile and antagonistic to the 
perceived “local” values.  At the same time the existence of an immense amount of 
unprocessed and at times contradictory sources of data in the form of discourses and 
written materials within the religious camp and the intelligentsia, have markedly 
contributed to this significant misunderstanding and confusion.  This ideological 
bewilderment could even be perceived in the policies put forward by various competing 
sources of public power, and the aspirations advanced by the population based on 
unrealistic or even erroneous interpretations and expectations.  This might explain the 
reason for which the Iranian contemporary history is bursting with episodes of profound 
disillusionment or at times popular uprisings and violent raptures with the past and the 
hitherto accepted social norms.  In various critical historical junctures these have 
determined the fate of the prevailing repositories of power which were all in a way or 
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another affected by this all-embracing conceptual uncertainty over the very basic 
components of right and sovereignty.  
 
     Thus departing with the basic conviction that “the data does not speak for itself” I 
hope to provide an innovative research framework which might even be defined as an 
unprecedented attempt with two major objectives in mind: initially to survey the 
prominent republican schools of thought by closely collaborating with the main 
theoreticians of this school of the political philosophy to precisely identify the defining 
criteria of such a political doctrine.  Once the foundations are identified I will proceed 
with an analytical study of the pertinence of such principles in my chosen context.  It is 
apparent that every study of forms of the political ideology would draw upon a 
significant amount of linguistic and discourse analysis combined with the knowledge of 
other social sciences, psychology, speech-act theory and obviously the study of political 
philosophies underpinning such ideologies
25
.  Thus every effort has been undertaken to 
provide numerous elements of such a thorough conceptual and theoretical analysis on 
various grounds.  This would prove mandatory in order to identify the main distinctive 
features of the republican principles of government and come up with the minimum 
requirements for “any” political order to be able to advance republican claims.  I will 
then proceed with a quick overview of the prevailing Shiʻa religious doctrine 
scrutinizing its recipes for the administration of public power and perceptions of the 
temporal authority.  These would provide a working platform to scientifically evaluate 
the republican credentials of the Islamic Republic and examine their success in 
promoting and protecting the basic republican principles that I will outline in the coming 
chapters. 
 
     Finally in the face of international crusades of exporting the democracy and 
principles of individual rights by the west, and a universalist mission of human salvation 
by the advocates of the religious dogma, it appears ever more compelling to carry out a 
comparative analysis of such apparently opposing systems of values at the heart of these 
doctrinal divergences.  Additionally in the light of the 2009 major unrest due to the 
electoral controversies over the most emblematic symbol of popular sovereignty, namely 
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the institution of presidency in Iran, which brought to the fore major ideological 
inconsistencies within the religiously inspired political system, the need for a critical 
study of such ideologies becomes even more pressing. Comparatively in an era marked 
by a universalist comeback in religion and belief in God
26
, this could bring certain 
elements of national and international conflicts into a new light of appreciation which 
could make an interesting contribution to a better appreciation of the processes involved 
in such global events as the so-called Arab Spring and the rise of various fundamentalist 
fronts with their outright repudiation of some of the principal elements of the republican 
doctrine
27
.  
 
     Thus the current study would not only add a significant deontological value to the 
field grounded in the collective responsibilities of the academia, but could also be of a 
certain utilitarian value in the promotion of social well-being and minimizing conflicts 
and sufferings
28
.  Furthermore I hope that this would provide another important 
contribution against the so-called prospectivism or “anything goes” in the field of 
politics which in my view has resulted in taking for granted a significant body of the 
achievements of the political philosophy through the claims of the socio-cultural 
relativism and idiosyncratic peculiarities of each context.  
     
Methodology and Research Structure 
My current research project is intended to set out a major study of the republican 
ideology and analyse its impacts and implications on the Iranian civil society. This 
would entail a basic qualitative research framework that could lay the groundwork for 
further quantitative analysis of comparable contexts
29
.  In order to embark on such a 
daunting task I will initially be looking into the major republican schools of thought 
trying to identify the core fundamental distinctive features of the republican discourse.  
Thus Chapter 1 could be regarded as the cornerstone of this project in which I will 
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attempt to develop further notions of the political authority and popular sovereignty in 
the republican doctrine of state.  In order to set a reliable baseline for these studies I will 
embark on a diachronic and synchronic journey to pinpoint the building blocks of the 
republican thought both through a closer look at the classical works of the republican 
schools and the modern day adaptations of such notions. This would be primarily an 
analytic documentary study of a major republican current of thought which in my view 
provides the highest level of theoretical consistency and conceptual adaptability of the 
core republican concepts.  The ideas of the major proponents of this so-called new-
Roman school of republicanism will be reflected both through a systematic evaluation of 
their utterances by closely examining all relevant existing literature and firsthand 
personal enquiries into the main thrust of their doctrinal convictions.  Wherever possible 
I will also draw upon my examinations of other prominent sources of this school of 
political philosophy most notably the French school of republicanism with its 
fundamental impacts on such notions as the public education and participatory citizenry.  
This would provide further comparative grounds for the appreciation of various 
republican principles from constitutional and institutional viewpoints.   
 
     Hence it becomes evident from the outset that the guiding principle of this research is 
reposed within the domain of the normative political philosophy based on a pursuit of 
discovering justifiable norms of political theory.  I will then proceed with a critical study 
of the religious, in this case Shiʻa, doctrines of sovereignty as manifested in the major 
current of thought which came to dominate the Iranian political arena.    
 
     Chapter 2 therefore, will shift the attention to the religious ideologies and try to 
identify the centralities of the ecclesiastic dogma, in these cases Shiʻa Islam, and their 
interactions or overlaps with the secular sources of authority and political sovereignty.  
This will again be an analytic survey of the principal ideas behind the state management 
of authority as conceived by the main scholars of the Islamic Shariʻa.  There will be an 
extensive analysis of the constructivist religious ideologies based on an oral and written 
documentary study of the most relevant theories of the state within the Shiʻa doctrine in 
an attempt to evaluate various implications of such notions on the fundamental 
republican concepts of individual liberty and popular sovereignty.   
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     It is important to note here that I have decided to ignore the important distinction 
between the actual Shiʻa ideology and the religious hierarchy in my specific case study.  
The important separation of the actual religious ideology and the clerical power structure 
has shown to be significant towards providing a thorough appreciation of the role of the 
religion in the modern day political systems
30
.  Nevertheless I have come to the 
conclusion that I could safely ignore distinguishing between “religion and the Church” 
as found in such studies as the one by Marcel Gauchet. The main reason behind this 
conscientious choice has been the fact that my principal interest here has been to analyse 
the prevailing religiously inspired structure of power and its implications for the basic 
principles of the republican ideology, rather than opening an unmanageable field of 
enquiry into the conceptual and theoretical validity of such doctrinal claims on religious 
grounds.  Hence any attempt to distinguish the two would inevitably prove to be 
extremely challenging and distracting for my current study whose objective is to 
scrutinise the interactions between the republican and the religious forces of sovereignty 
in their entirely as materialised within this specific domain of enquiry.  Thus the 
arguments in Chapter 2 regarding the religious readings of the principles of sovereignty 
will go as far as their political implications are concerned regarding the structure of state 
authority and their repercussions on the basic republican principles of liberty.   
 
    Moreover my main focus in Chapter 2 will be on the dominant Shiʻa philosophy and 
its hegemonic political discourse, as institutionalized in Iran.  I have chosen to provide 
only a brief overview of other concurrent traditionalist and modernist currents of 
political Shiʻism for illustration purposes only.  The reason being is that all, as I will 
demonstrate, these seem to have predominantly fallen short of providing a coherent and 
unambiguous political discourse to impart a comprehensive set of principles for their 
advocated political theology.  This holds true not only in the Iranian constitutional and 
institutional political structures, but also in the wider Shiʻa political contexts such as in 
Lebanon and Iraq.  Therefore the first two chapters would be dedicated to a documentary 
study of the doctrines underpinning the constitutionalist republican and religious 
foundations of the Islamic Republic including a constructivist analysis of the major 
pronouncements of the theoreticians of these fields.  
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     Subsequently from Chapter 3 onwards I will be focusing on the actual political 
system in Iran through an empirical in-depth analysis of its republican manmade 
elements of popular sovereignty and their performance with regards to the conservative 
and religious inspired doctrines of the political power.  An inevitable point of departure 
to study any political system would be to perform an analytic study of its national 
constitution. This would make up the principal theme of my third chapter. Therein in 
order to arrive at a deeper appreciation of the concepts under examination, I will attempt 
to adopt a comparative approach to illustrate the argument with an analogy to other 
global contexts.  This I hope would serve the purpose of enriching my observations on 
the Iranian Constitution with more quantitative credentials.  
 
     The rest of the chapters follow the same conviction that a comparative method would 
be the most efficient way to draw inferences regarding the hypothesis on a particular 
case study that could be tested and maybe falsified
31
. 
 
     In Chapter 4 I will take a closer look at the fundamental republican concept of 
sovereignty within the political structure of the Islamic Republic.  There I essentially 
agree with such authors as Jonathan Fox sustaining that when coming to measuring 
motivations versus measuring actions, it is much easier and more accurate to evaluate 
the latter.  This would be due to the fact that the latter provides empirical criteria which 
are not obfuscated by unknown complicated personal factors
32
.  In spite of this, being 
also aware of the basic republican conviction that “motivation matters”33, I will try to 
illustrate the fundamental notions of sovereignty in the Iranian political system both 
based on a process of critical discourse analysis and on the practical execution of such 
ideologies in the actual formulation of the state structure of public sovereignty.  
 
     It is a well established concept within the political theory field that a closer analysis 
of a country’s institutional layout would prove to be extremely valuable towards 
obtaining a better understanding of the viability and the degree of success of the 
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underlying philosophical groundings. This is the essence of the so-called institutionalism 
which makes up the fundamental defining feature of the political science as compared to 
the study of the public law for instance
34
.  Thus I have dedicated Chapter 5 to a 
systematic analysis of the Iranian political institutions and organizations and a closer 
evaluation of their republican credentials and functions. This is also firmly grounded in 
the republican recipes for the political institutions, which underline the very core 
conviction that the institutions do matter in the formation of individual choices and 
towards the preservation and promotion of certain basic republican values.  I will strive 
to provide a comprehensive image of the Iranian political institutions which, as one 
could notice, provides important insight into the doctrinal convictions underlying the 
entire political apparatus.  All three powers of the state together with the overarching 
Office of the Leader would be critically analysed in order to provide a thorough 
evaluation of their republican credentials.  Various notions of the prevailing political 
ideology would be analysed to study the essential republican guarantees against the 
encroachment and concentration of public authority.  These include such ideas as the 
effectiveness of the separation of powers and the openness of those institutions to public 
accessibility and accountability together with other tools of monitoring and political 
checks and balances. 
 
     I have chosen to reserve the final section of my research project to the most central 
element of the republican thought i.e. the people themselves.  At this stage of analysis I 
will focus on the state processes concerning the endorsement and promotion of public 
participation in the political affairs of the society.  This would entail a closer 
examination of the actual channels of empowerment of the individuals in the Iranian 
political system and the existence of active contestatory citizenry. Chapter 6 therefore is 
aimed at providing a critical analysis of the socio-political provisions of the Islamic 
Republic with regard to this essential republican principle.  
 
     As it could be seen I have strived to include extensive elements of discourse analysis 
in various chapters both based on textual examination of printed and audio-visual 
material and direct interviews with the main theoreticians of the field.  I have been lucky 
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to be able to draw upon my personal academic training as a linguist and a professional 
journalist which at times proved essential towards a better appreciation of the dominant 
narrative as indeed “the politics proves to be the struggle to dominate the current 
political language”35.  
 
     It is evident that what I am concerned here with is not a dry and sanitized attempt at 
falsification or otherwise proving certain credentials of my case study, whereas as Karl 
Popper rightly wrote I am concerned with the “degrees of testability”36 .  It is banal to 
reiterate that this arises from the obvious deficit in the empirical validity of the analysis 
in the social sciences in general.  Nonetheless in an attempt to overcome potential 
pitfalls in sampling, analysing and interpreting various observations, I have opted for the 
so-called triangulation method which denotes the simultaneous employment of various 
tools and methods available to the academic study of the social sciences. These include 
amongst others a sustained study of both documents and the literatures together with 
certain elements of field work observations, elite interviews and discourse analysis 
which would make up the foundations of a qualitative case study that will hopefully 
provide interesting insights towards subsequent quantitative projects. 
 
     As far as the stylistics considerations are concerned, for the bibliography I have 
adopted the sixth edition of the APA system.  With regard to the transliteration of the 
Persian and Arabic words a specific adaptation of the International Phonetic Alphabet 
similar to those used by the Encyclopaedia Iranica and other modern Latinized 
transcriptions of the Persian language, has been utilized.  This is nonetheless an 
improved version of the transcription system which has been modified and extended 
based on my personal experience as a linguist and direct involvement in principal 
linguistic and literary circles of the Persian language.  An appendix to this end has been 
devised to report the complete table of the letters which include such novelties as /x/ 
representing /kh/ (palatal fricative sound خ), /q/ for /gh/ (palatal stop  غ ق ), /š/ for /sh/ 
(voiceless fricative ش ) and others37.  Well-established names, places and other nouns 
have been kept as known in the West such as Khomeini and Shariʻa.  Also the Persian 
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pronunciations of the Arabic terms have been preferred as currently used within the 
Iranian socio-political contexts, for instance jahād, elm, mojtahed, maslahat and ommat 
have been utilized instead of the Arabic pronunciations jihad, ilm, mujtahid , masleha 
and umma. 
 
     Finally I have to acknowledge that a specific attention has been dedicated to both the 
epistemology of my research in the sense of the nature of the concepts under study and 
the social ontology of such ideas in a visibly different social reality.  Nevertheless it 
remains my firm conviction that a significant body of the republican discourse as laid 
out here will remain transferable across different social contexts.  This might in turn 
explain the reason for which various essentially different political systems insist on 
advancing comparable republican claims.  Hence while being mindful of not endorsing 
perfectionist principles of the political theory, the underlying conviction at the heart of 
my entire project could be traced back to the so-called “behavioralist” school of the 
social sciences with the claim that “there are discoverable regularities in politics which 
can lead to theories with predictive value”38.  Hence I hope to provide a significant 
contribution towards the appreciation and maybe even resolution of numerous 
ambiguities and ambivalences inherent to any comparative cross-cultural theoretical 
observations in the field of the political science. 
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Chapter 1 - Republican Freedom 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Few ideological concepts in the history of political philosophy appear to have been as 
influential and ground-breaking as the republican political doctrines.  The generation of 
such humanist principles of the political in the framework of the Florentine civic 
humanism is widely regarded to be the precursor to the entire modern western political 
philosophy
39
. Yet in spite of their fundamental role throughout the ancient and modern 
political philosophy one would struggle to identify a universal agreement on centrality 
or even the coherence of various notions put forward by the scholars of this field.  It is 
interesting to note that this shortcoming has not stopped a significant portion of the 
political systems to endorse or even advance exclusive claims over the various principles 
of the republican school of thought.  It is not difficult to identify analogous claims not 
only within the authoritarian political systems of the modern era but also within the 
democratic and liberal counterparts globally.  This confusion seems to have been 
exacerbated by rival concepts put forward by other sources of the political patterns of 
social arrangements such as liberalism, socialism and other communitarian doctrines.  
Fortunately over the last few decades some interesting research has been carried out in 
this field laying down a systematic analysis of the core republican concepts that could be 
claimed to coherently make up the fundamental bases of the res publica.  Although a 
significant portion of such notions are traced back to the Italian Renaissance of 
quattrocento and cinquecento, it is interesting to notice a certain presence of the 
scholastic political philosophy reaching as far back as early as the early Roman 
Republics
40
.  
 
     As I stated in the Introduction I will be drawing upon these modern theories of the 
contemporary republican thought via a text-based analysis of all relevant sources 
together with a critical study of the contemporary readings of such principles by the 
prominent contemporary political philosophers. This at times entails a direct engagement 
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with these scholars’ line of argumentation which will be cited in due course.  My 
objective would be to initially identify the main idiosyncratic features of the republican 
ideology and use those criteria to assess my chosen case study to evaluate its republican 
credentials.  It is important to emphasize that I do not wish to enter the current debate 
between the so-called liberal and neo-liberal theoreticians; including John Rawls, Hillel 
Steiner, Mathew Kramer and Ian Carter on the one side or the neo-Roman ideologues, 
whose ideas would constitute the main ideological thread of the current research on the 
other
41
.  There are numerous reasons to support this theoretical choice.  First and 
foremost I consider debates on the “distinctiveness” of the republican principles of 
liberty that the liberals have labelled “pure negative freedom” to be a great distraction 
and an unnecessary challenge advanced by the so-called neo-Hobbesian scholars 
towards the republican school of thought.  This is primarily due to the fact that 
undoubtedly certain principles of the republican ideology, as it will be shown below, 
could certainly trace their roots to a timeframe that would prove to be significantly 
anterior to the appearance of any modern liberal political philosophies.  This would 
automatically render the need for including subsequent theories of freedom which would 
at best render a small part of the entire republican political edifice, redundant.  Indeed 
most scholars agree that the republican doctrine proves to be much more parsimonious 
and capable of connecting various notions of socio-political interest such as the rule of 
law, the common good and popular sovereignty with its core principles of liberty
42
.  
More recent authors such as Anthony Langloise with their emphasise on the diversity of 
the liberal school of thought and advancing certain “perfectionist” liberal notions, do 
indeed overlap significantly with the comprehensive republican theories of liberty as 
non-domination.  Nevertheless these theories appear to be still failing to capture 
significant republican constitutive provisions to uphold and promote such an individual 
status as liber (free) versus servus (slave).  These republican principles provide 
necessary theoretical tools and criteria not only to safeguard the very notion of liberty at 
the heart of the republican political discourse, but also as I will demonstrate below, 
powerful means to evaluate any political systems claiming a degree of popular 
sovereignty and accountability. 
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     Besides these historical and theoretical considerations it is evident that my case of 
study namely the Islamic Republic of Iran, clearly advances specific republican 
constitutional claims which would provide interesting grounds for theoretical 
qualification and evaluation.  Conversely, at least theoretically, one would struggle to 
find any traces of the liberal ideology as it is known in the field of the political 
philosophy in various political formulations of my reference political system of Iran.  
Indeed as it will be demonstrated later, a significant portion of the republican 
revolutionary discourse here was aimed at denouncing specific liberal and capitalist 
principles.  Furthermore various efforts towards the institutionalization of these political 
principles in the Islamic Republic would definitely be reminiscent of the republican 
institution building endeavours as compared to the liberal decentralisation tendencies.  
Thus I assume that I could safely conclude that a framework of analysis based on the 
republican ideology would indeed prove to be more pertinent and productive in 
providing a solid framework of reference for the evaluation of various principles of 
liberty and the institutional provisions in place to protect and promote them in my 
context of reference.   
 
    In spite of these premises, I will have no alternative other then providing a brief 
comparative overview of other concurrent theories of liberty - particularly this same 
parallel liberal school, in order to better elucidate the core principles of the Republican 
non-domination philosophy of freedom.  This would in turn prove useful towards a 
better understanding of various aspects of my political framework of reference.  I hope 
to be able to empirically demonstrate that these principles of the political philosophy 
could provide sufficient means to critically study various republican aspects of “any” 
political system in a comparative framework of analysis of the constitutional and 
institutional provisions for protecting and promoting individual liberties.  
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II. A Genealogy of the Republicanism 
Based on the neo-Roman interpretations of the republican doctrine, the first dialectics of 
liberty and domination could be attributed to the writings of the early Roman 
philosophers and legislators such as Sallust, Livy and in particular the statesman and 
lawyer Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC-43 BC)
43
.  In his seminal book De Republica, 
Cicero clearly equates the “res publica” with “res populi” (public business) in contrast 
to “res private”(private business), whose major concern is conceived to be to manage 
the affairs of sovereign citizens bound together in an agreement for justice and common 
good
44
. There is no doubt that these are rudimentary considerations whose clear 
beneficiaries were initially understood to be an elite class of male propertied citizens of 
the republic as consistent with the practice of time
45
. Nevertheless the emphasis placed 
upon the centrality of the laws and institutions and most importantly his legacy as a 
defender of the republican liberty, was inspirational to later generations of republican 
theoreticians in particular the so-called neo-Roman school of republicanism
46
.  This is 
arguably the dawn of a political tradition rooted in the essential notion of libertas which 
underpins every Ciceronian judiciary and institutional concepts.  In De Republica one is 
constantly presented with counter examples of different forms of government in which 
the basic liberties of the citizens are being waived either by the will of an individual or a 
group or by other communitarian tyrannies considered too unstable and indifferent to 
individual merits and virtues
47
.  An example of the former is claimed to be the Persian 
king Cyrus, who throughout antiquity was interestingly regarded as a just and wise ruler.  
Nevertheless Cicero cites him to underline the fact that even under such a clement 
judicious king the populace was subject to the voluntary will of a single person
48
.  He 
continues to proclaim what most neo-republicans consider as the core message of the 
Roman republican libertas: “the freedom is not being ruled by a just ruler, it is not 
having a ruler in the first place” 49.  
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     As Pettit and Skinner have pointed out
50
, the clear emphasis here is on the 
“possibility” of being coerced arbitrarily with one’s will being waived, not the actual 
“interference” being exercised against this will.  The recurrent example mentioned is a 
slave who avoids coercion by his master just because the master is benign or unwilling 
to impose his “potestate domini” or the arbitrary domination51.  Here it is obvious that 
the slave cannot claim to be a free man since he remains under the “possibility” of an 
arbitrary intervention of his master
52
.  Thus according to the ancient Roman writers and 
their Renaissance disciples, the lack of the republican liberty will materialize when the 
agents are subject to the arbitrium (arbitrary will) of another individual or group.  Livy 
for instance has provided an exact definition of this condition of public servitude, 
namely “being dependant on the will of someone else rather than one’s own will”53.  
 
     One aspects of the republican political philosophy, which does not seems to have 
encountered adequate treatment in the works of the contemporary ideologues of the 
republican thought, is the philosophical implications of the Florentine civic humanism 
with fundamental impacts on all aspects of the modern political philosophy.  This is 
more so as these Renaissance ideologies would manifest a clear departure from the 
ancient scholastic realism founded on the assumption of pre-existing onto-theological 
transcendental truth only to be uncovered by the human reason.  Every aspects of the 
human life were regarded as a result of his worldly experience and innovative 
contributions, and not part of the hitherto assumed premises of the metaphysical 
arrangements
54
.   Once the entire human experience was considered contingent and 
independent from cosmic or divine orders, every aspects of the political philosophy were 
open for negotiation and interpretation.  This very philosophical mechanism rests at the 
heart of the entire republican doctrine of the political based on the principles of active 
participation of human in all aspect of his social life.     
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     Clear manifestations of such convictions could be identified in the works of 
numerous Renaissance thinkers such as Leonardo Bruni, Marsilius of Padua and 
Coluccio Salutati.  Nonetheless it is Nicolò Machiavelli who is credited for being the 
first author to provide a comprehensive and coherent treatment of the modern republican 
ideology
55
.  Throughout his scholarship one could encounter clear references to such 
concepts as cittadi liberi (free republics) from servitù (slavery) which are only those 
governate per loro arbitrio (governed by their own will)
56
.  Thus in line with Bruni 
before him, it was Machiavell’s firm conviction that people can preserve their liberty 
only through a system of self-government
57
.  Hence vivere libero for him is “to be able 
to enjoy one’s property without any suspicion” and when “each person is free to pursue 
his own ends and not others’ ” with a regard for all the social diversity and pluralism that 
such principles could entail
58
.  As Viroli wrote: 
 
To be a free person means for Machiavelli not to depend on the will of others and to be 
able to live under the laws to which citizens have freely given their consent. 
Accordingly, an individual is free when he is not dependant on the will of another 
individual but is dependent on the laws only. Hence, to be at liberty means to be in full 
agreement with the Roman republican tradition, the opposite of being enslaved or in 
servitude59.   
 
Interestingly this notion of liberty could well be traced in all subsequent schools of 
republicanism.  The French school for instance, by subscribing to the republican 
fundamental right to revolt against the oppression and also its egalitarian perceptions of 
the social justice, endorses and promotes numerous republican political principles. The 
highest manifestations of such ideologies could be seen in the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.  Voltaire (1694-1778) one of the main philosophers 
of the Enlightenment, reportedly declared: “to learn who rules over you, simply learn 
who you are not allowed to criticize”, which is again in line with the previously 
mentioned republican concepts of freedom from arbitrary domination.  The American 
school of Republicanism on the other hand, seems to have gone even further than this by 
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considering any domination, even those by a democratically elected government as a 
potential source of corruption and loss of liberty
60
. 
 
     Moreover this French variant of the republican political philosophy seems to strongly 
associate the notion of the republican state with the projects of creating “we the people” 
which hitherto did not exist as there were merely masses of oblivious individuals at the 
mercy of the arbitrary interference of the monarchs. Thus this newly founded notion of 
the citizens sharing a moi commun is claimed to be an unprecedented concept which 
could not be traced back even in the Renaissance Italian republics let alone the ancient 
Roman ones
61
.  Nonetheless here again, the main achievement of the Revolution, these 
scholars claim, has been to refute the source of the legitimacy or even the auto-
legitimacy of the monarchs based on a divine predilection and to substitute it with a 
system deriving its legitimacy from the voluntary choices of its citizens.  Furthermore an 
interesting distinction here is made between a democratic system in the sense of the 
direct democracy and a system based on the republican doctrine of state which are even 
considered to be totally incompatible, as the direct democracy is claimed to entail the 
lack of the separation of power which would be the antithesis to the republican 
principles.  It is not difficult to trace back parts of these ideas to the philosophers such as 
Kant who is even being labelled as an anti-democrat republican
62
.   
 
     Hence the major objective of the French Revolution is regarded as being this strive to 
locate the source of the authority in the citizens. As I mentioned above by citizens they 
meant the sufficiently educated individuals who have departed from the ranks of the 
vulgus (ignorant masses) to become “the people” who would most importantly never 
completely alienate their powers to any political entities external to themselves
63
. Thus 
unsurprisingly the fundamental cornerstone of this ideology appear to be its strong 
aversion to any centres of power and privilege in particular the religious one which 
would result in the refutation of any systems based on the eschatological legitimacies
64
. 
An eloquent manifestation of this conviction could be seen in the famous declaration of 
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Leon Gambetta one of main theoreticians of the French revolution who famously 
declared: “Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi”!65 Most interestingly some contemporary 
scholars like Juliette Grange have gone as far as identifying two types of French 
republican doctrines, namely maximal and minimal republics.  Maximal republics are 
those based on the fundamental notion of the revolution and the break with the past, a 
fundamental anti-religious component and a strong aversion to the powerful individuals, 
together with the republican institutions and laws; whereas the minimal republic requires 
only the sovereignty of the laws
66
.  Thus this strand of the republican ideology would 
obviously provide substantial predispositions towards incorporating stronger egalitarian 
elements of power sharing to guarantee a certain level of distributive fairness of the 
resources, without which the personal freedom and independence could not be 
conceived
67
. The very idea of the revolution and the destruction of the structures of the 
oppressive power would inevitably result in more egalitarian systems which by 
definition result from the act of the revolt against the despots. It is even claimed that a 
republic is nothing more than institutionalizing the violence of the revolutions and its 
achievements
68
.  In any case as argued above, the direct democracy is categorically 
excluded from this definition as it could well result in a despotic system in the absence 
of the basic republican institutionalist principles of separation of power and 
representation.  The main thrust of this ideology could be identified in the firm 
conviction that no levels of the alienation of power by the citizens could be supported 
under any system of political values.  In particular based on Rousseau’s teachings the 
role of the republican constitution would be to prevent people from a total transfer of 
rights to external entities as this would result in the loss of freedom and slavery
69
. 
 
     From the above considerations on the republican political heritage, interesting 
inferences could be made concerning the relation of these doctrines with other sources of 
authority rooted in alternative repositories of legitimacy.  This fundamental rebuttal of 
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any sources of public power falling beyond and above the republican prescriptions for 
vivere civile, would in theory exclude the centrality of universal notions of truth and 
submission to an ultimate law-giver.  Hence in line with the Florentine civic 
republicanism, The French school of this ideology seems to have clearly identified this 
existential incompatibility as noted in the above cited anti-ecclesiastic and anti-
monarchic trends. Here the clerical class was perceived as pertaining to the same 
privileged groups of the ancien régime, hence forcefully targeted by the overwhelming 
processes of laicization and dechristianization which eventually ended in a total 
separation of state and church in 1905.  Thus clear vertical processes could be identified 
in this context aimed at subordinating the church to the state which ended up in such 
state sponsored variants of the faith as Catholicism Social or Démocratie Chrétienne!
70
 
 
     In any case I am under no illusion that there have been divergent interpretations of 
the republican doctrine as well.  For instance within the same French school of 
republicanism one encounters the so-called “liberalist republicanism” endorsed by the 
likes of Jules Ferry (1832-1893) with the emphasis on the importance of the protection 
of the private space and a minimal level of state intervention
71
.  On the other hand there 
is also a strong strand of the so-called “radical republicanism” by the likes of Ledru-
Rollin (1807-1874) within the same tradition of the French republicanism which 
proposes a more interventionist role for the republican state to safeguard and promote an 
equalitarian society
72
.  Nevertheless one could still clearly distinguish the republican 
doctrine as a two-layered socio-political project whose main objective is to free people 
from the domination of the powerful, be it private or organized ideological groups
73
.   
 
     As I will be expounding in the upcoming chapters, significant traces of this variant of 
the republican ideology could be found in the political agenda of the forerunners of the 
Islamic Republic.  These stemmed not only from a strong anti-monarchic agenda, but 
also the very idea of revolution and the ensuing egalitarian claims and attempts at 
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massive projects of social mobility which impacted numerous social domains in 
particular the sectors of economy and education for years that followed. These 
considerations coupled with the main republican guiding theme of freedom as non-
domination would constitute the main thrust of analysis for this study of various 
republican credentials of the Islamic Republic.   
 
III. Freedom as non-domination      
This deep-seated republican notion of libertas has been extensively addressed by the so-
called neo-Roman authors, in particular Pettit and Skinner.  In his most prominent 
contribution to this field, Pettit introduces the concept of “non-domination” to endorse 
this fundamental condition of being free from arbitrary interference of an alien or an 
alienating power
74.  Skinner’s idea of “independence” also seems to be providing a 
similar definition for this distinctively republican theory of citizenship.  I will take a 
closer look at these concepts to reflect the centrality of these ideas to the republican 
cause. 
 
     Pettit examines the non-domination principle by identifying two types of domination 
in the Roman intellectual tradition.  This first type of dominatory relation is called 
dominium which denotes the mastery of the private power of individuals or a certain 
group within society.  The second type of domination is labelled by Roman philosophers 
as imperium which was the exercise of domination on the part of the state
75
.  If true 
liberty was going to materialize in a state, both these types of domination had to be 
avoided.  Therefore it was claimed that one needs to guard against both private 
domination within the society caused by ethnic, religious, financial, educational and 
other social disadvantages among the citizenry, and also the possibility of the state itself 
to become a dominating power.  
 
     It is importance to underline here what Pettit sees as the major difference between his 
non-domination principle and the liberal’s “non-interference” concept.  The fundamental 
distinction here is that an agent might not be subject to the actual interference of a 
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dominating alien power and no real physical limitation might be imposed on his actions; 
nevertheless the mere possibility of others being in a position to be able to interfere 
arbitrarily with his choice would make one an unfree individual
76
.  In this case no actual 
coercion might take place against his arbitrium, but the licenza (available possibilities) 
to choose or behave in a certain way might be influenced by the existence of a potential 
power that could remove or influence the existing options before the dominated person.  
One of the potential outcomes of such a relation of power could be self-censorship in the 
hope of obtaining a reward of the dominating power or to avoid a potential retribution.  
Thus even in the absence of an actual physical interference the goal might be achieved 
by efficient threats or by the so-called “anticipated sanctions”.  This might well take the 
form of the subject refraining from exercising a certain power they have, even for the 
fear of being watched or subjected to invigilation
77
.  
 
     On the contrary, not every interferences could be regarded as detrimental to liberty.  
In a republican system similar concepts are endorsed in the form of positive versus 
negative sanctions - to use Pettit’s terminology78. These include the sanctions of a just 
law or when a subject actually participates in the process of decision making and his 
interests are being accounted for.  Some everyday life examples of such processes could 
be identified in cases whereby someone asks a caregiver to keep him away from certain 
unhealthy food or cigarettes at his will.  These are all instances in which the agent’s 
arbitrium has been accounted for and the overall pattern of domination does not reduce 
the agent’s freedom, i.e. interference without domination79.  Thus to summarize these 
points: one could notice that it is possible to lose freedom in the absence of any actual 
interference as well.  These are typical situations in which one’s choice is being made in 
the absence of the dominating power’s actual exercise of his coercive force.  It is said 
here that one acts cum permissu or “chooses by their leave”80.  A parallel could be drawn 
here with various manifestations of auto-censorship, for instance in the case of the 
public media which might sometimes impose restrictions on the expression of their 
opinions even without any actual interference by the authoritarian governments.  
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     Considering the centrality of the notion of liberty to my research, it would be 
important to further illustrate the parallel concepts of “positive” versus “negative” 
liberty put forward by Isaiah Berlin following more classic authors like Tocqueville and 
Benjamin Constant within the liberal tradition.  Positive liberty is described as the 
principle of “self-mastery”, that is “the wish on the part of the individual to be his own 
master... and a wish that his life and decisions to depend on himself” 81.  Negative liberty 
on the other hand is being defined by Berlin as below where the coercion is also 
described as the “deliberate interference of other human beings”82: 
 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes 
with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can 
act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could 
otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree83.  
 
Although one notice a significant conceptual overlap between Berlin’s definition of the 
negative liberty with the concept of non-domination, in particular the new formulations 
of such concepts in the framework of “pure negative liberty”84; it is clear that the 
republican non-domination concept provides a significant extension and improvement to 
the principal of non-interference underpinning the negative liberty
85
.  One could claim 
that the Republican liberty is more “demanding” than the liberal counterpart in the sense 
that it does not stop at the mere absence of interference
86
.  To be sure, the non-
domination freedom a fortiori requires the removal of even the “possibility” of 
interference caused by the very existence of arbitrary powers that could interfere with 
the citizen’s liberty when they wish to do so; even though they might not actually decide 
to do so.  As stated above, this could materialize not only by removing or hindering one 
or more of the options but also through: 
 
 ..burdening the choice of the option with a penalty or wrapping my capacity for 
reasoned choice or giving me misleading information….I may be subject to the alien 
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control of others without their actually interfering with me; if I think that the absence of 
interference in such a case means the presence of freedom, then I am deluded87.  
  
 
These observations would undoubtedly give rise to numerous socio-political 
implications with fundamental impacts on all aspects of modern polities such as the 
domains of public information and education that I intend to scrutinize in my specific 
context.    
 
     For republicans therefore, this condition of “dependence” would effectively reduce 
agents to a state of slavery and servitù living in potestate domini - that is under the 
power of a master and not one’s own jurisdiction.  Another good example mentioned by 
Pettit is the state’s welfare system which could easily be reduced to this state of 
dependence.  Here the required financial needs are being collected through the coercive 
collection of taxes but this could not be regarded as an arbitrary interference as the 
greater good they pursue will override the domination they ensue.  On the receiving end 
of these services however, the potential inadequacies suffered by the recipients could 
lead to the previously mentioned condition of dependence and hence domination in the 
absence of any actual interference by the state
88
.   
 
     In line with these principles one of the most intriguing republican benchmarks that 
Pettit has endorsed is the so-called “eyeball test”.  Based on this criteria one is free in 
relation to other individuals, groups or state elements if she can look them in the eye 
without fear in a shared consciousness of being in an equal status with everyone else 
commanding their respect and the dignity of an equal amongst equals
89
; pares inter 
pares as opposed to the unequal situation of primus inter pares (first amongst equals) to 
use the republican terminology.  Thus for Pettit “freedom requires the sort of immunity 
to interference that would enable one to stand tall on an equal pedestal with others and 
look them straight in the eye
90
.  Therefore one cannot live under constant threat of 
possible interferences and still be regarded as a free person.  Hence as long as there is 
the potential of another more powerful subject to coerce him at will or to cause him to 
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adopt a servile attitude for fear of possible arbitrary intervention, one could not claim to 
enjoy any levels of the republican freedom
91.  To summarize this point in Skinner’s 
words: 
If you wish to maintain your liberty, you must ensure that you live under a political 
system in which there is no element of discretionary power, and hence no possibility that 
your civil rights will be dependent on the good will of a ruler, a ruling group or any 
other agents of the state.92 
 
Interestingly one could identify similar pronouncements in the Montesquieu’s Spirit of 
Laws which yet again underlines the importance of this fundamental republican 
principle.  There it is declared: 
 
The political liberty of a citizen consists in the tranquillity caused by the conviction that 
each person has towards his own security, and in order to have this liberty the 
government needs to organize in a way that it removes the possibility that a citizen 
might be afraid of another one
93
.  
 
And finally as John Maynor emphasizes, the important rule of thumb to determine 
whether an interference has been arbitrary or not, is not to see if that intervention has 
been harmful to the subjects undergoing such interference, whereas it should be judged 
in the light of whether in the formulation of that interference, “the interfering agent has 
consulted and tracked the opinions or the interests of the agent subjected to the 
interference”94.  
 
     These non-domination principles could be achieved through two separate means, 
what Pettit labels as the “reciprocal form” and the “constitutional form” of non-
domination power
95
. The former type of non-domination is when every agent can in turn 
interfere with other interfering agents which in practice places them on equal footing to 
defend themselves against the arbitrary interference of each other.  There is no doubt 
that this form of protection could efficiently help to reduce the possibility of dominating 
interference by parties through the appreciation of the fact that they themselves could be 
subject to arbitrary interference and domination
96
.  It is evident that here one is required 
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to constantly be watchful and ready to retaliate against every dominating act of 
interference which could inevitably cause many direct conflicts and a constant anxiety of 
possible interventions.  Nevertheless one could readily perceive that throughout the 
history of the republican thought the preference has persistently been given to the second 
method of control towards the non-domination of power, i.e. to institutionalize and 
encode the ideals of liberty into the republican laws and provisions to protect subjects 
effectively, impartially and verifiably against the threat of arbitrary interference
97
.  
Furthermore these would help to reduce inter-subject apprehension and uncertainty and 
the degree to which the agents have to always be prepared to defend themselves against 
arbitrary interference
98
.  Thus a closer examination of the republican institutions and 
laws would be of prime importance here as they prove to be playing a central role 
throughout the classic and neo-Roman republican literature.  
 
IV. Republican Institutions and the Rule of Law 
There should be no doubt that the classical definition of various republican concepts 
with their specific interpretations of certain political concepts would not be entirely 
compatible or even desirable in a modern day political system.  Nevertheless as it was 
argued before, numerous pioneering principles could be singled out that have made up 
the core convictions of the republican school of thought which could still have a 
significant degree of pertinence.  The powerful idea of the republican liberty would 
undoubtedly constitute the core of all republican discourse for which various elements of 
protection and promotion seem to have been devised by the theoreticians of the 
republican doctrine of state.  Principles of mixed constitution, or a mixed form of 
government together with the prescriptions on the absolute centrality of the sovereignty 
of laws would undoubtedly play a central role in this regard
99
.  As it was argued above 
Cicero seems to have been amongst the first political philosophers to unambiguously 
endorse many of these principles in the context of a complex political system that went 
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beyond classic city-state politics
100
.  In his recommended form of political sovereignty, 
an ideal government was based on the shared rule of a monarch combined with the 
authority of a group of oligarchs and most importantly strong participation by the people 
who enjoyed a certain form of equality and would take important decisions and 
judgments
101
.  In On The Republic after mentioning various possible political forms of 
government we read: 
 
only in that form of the state where people hold the reins of power there is the true 
liberty, which is the most precious good, and this liberty would not be worthy of its 
name if it does not entail an absolute equality of rights for all
102
 
 
Here again one could easily identify principles with significant resemblance in nearly all 
modern republican systems.  In the Roman example the monarchs were two consuls 
chosen by the people for a period of two years, the aristocrats were the city councils 
called Senates composed of the leading citizens.  There were then the famous Roman 
people’s assemblies, the so-called plebeian tribunes in which people had the power to 
adopt or reject laws proposed by the Senate or the Consuls
103
.  
 
     Aside from the classical republican ideologues, as the so-called revisionist 
republicans sustain, it should not be difficult to identify a coherent republican line of 
thought from the Italian Renaissance to the present day
104
.  In this pursuit the originality 
of certain concepts put forward by the likes of Bruni and Machiavelli needs to be 
highlighted again.  One could even claim that some of these ideas could be regarded as 
the true precursors of the modern day societal pluralism by acknowledging that 
individuals are always thought to be driven by their own umori (desires) and ambizioni 
(ambitions)
105
.  Also within the neo-Roman school of republicanism it is claimed that 
this Machiavellian endorsement of the individual diversities and in particular the 
imperatives of striving to prevent the so-called “tyranny of majority” would make this 
civic concept of republicanism more adept to the modern day multi-cultural and 
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diversified societies and proves a fortiori capable of securing individual liberties and 
independence
106
.  
 
     Unsurprisingly within the same republican tradition, it is argued that to be able to 
preserve this community of diversified people, there should be a control over this 
unlimited licenza to ensure that the individual interests do not jeopardize the common 
good of the overall society
107
.  This would bear a clear resemblance to the original 
Ciceronian concept of concordia ordinum denoting that the common good should take 
precedence over factional or private interests
108
.  Thus in order to accomplish this civic 
republican concept of vivere civile, which basically means putting the common good 
above the individual interests, as compared to vivere libero based on the previously 
discussed principles of the republican freedom, one needs to ensure that the community 
lives under the strict rule of law and that no one can claim to be superior to the law 
based on political, social or other ethnic or religious advantages
109
.  This, seen in the 
context of Machiavelli’s era in which the “materia umana” or the quality of the human 
material of the society seemed to have undergone a process of “deterioration” in the 
sense that private and factional interests were prevailing over any common concerns, 
made the need of an overarching system of safeguarding liberties ever more pressing
110
.  
According to Machiavelli the formula to address such concerns, were good laws and 
institutions, citizenship values and virtuous principles.  Hence, as Viroli observes, 
Machiavelli’s vivere civile concept combined with vivere politico are alternatively 
served to ensure that no exceptions to the laws and privileges are to be tolerated in a 
republican open and inclusive system and that everyone is treated under the same civil 
equality applicable to every individual in the society
111
.  
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     One could seamlessly identify this strong emphasis on the centrality of laws in nearly 
all treatises of the so-called western political philosophy, but this seems to have a greater 
centrality in the pronouncements of the main contributors to the republican doctrine such 
as Cicero, Machiavelli, Bodin, Rousseau and Montesquieu.  In the case of Rousseau for 
example, the centrality of the rule of law is taken to the level where it is even claimed 
that any form of government grounded on the sovereignty of the laws - regardless of the 
actual political form that it could assume - is a republic
112
. 
 
     The critical point here is not just the ability to participate in the process of law-
making - which in any case constitutes the basic foundations towards avoiding the 
arbitrary will of other agencies or even the majority.  Rather it is more importantly, to be 
able to subscribe to universal non-arbitrary norms that are applicable to every individual 
and are endorsed and promoted by them in a spontaneous manner that tracks the agent’s 
interests and concerns. This undoubtedly is a reminiscent of the Roman principle of 
quod omnes tangit, namely that any decision which regards the multitude should be 
decided by the universal process of decision making in conformity to the laws and 
sanctioned political processes
113
.  
 
     It is interesting to note that in the context of the French revolution of 1789 which was 
heavily inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and Montesquieu, a greater emphasis seems to 
have been placed upon the so-called principle of positive liberty as self government
114
.  
Thus it comes as no surprise to observe that the essential character of the French 
republic is claimed to be its anti-monarchic and anti-ecclesiastic nature as mentioned 
previously
115
. The fundamental principles were declared to be “equality” and 
“fraternity” as endorsed by the fathers of the French revolution such as Voltaire, Mably 
and Condorcet
116.  Mably’s scholarship in the field of social equality and acute analysis 
on what he regarded as the source of all societal problems being that of the private 
property, appears to be truly pioneering.  He is sometimes even credited for being one of 
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the original ideologues of socialism and even later communist ideologies
117
.  This was 
aimed at rooting out any special privileges that some individuals or groups were 
enjoying through paving the way for direct participation of the people in the political 
processes.  It is not difficult to observe that this specific approach, besides providing 
obvious republican advantages, could also justify recourse to a tyrannical state with 
strong interventionist tendencies
118
.  Indeed the previously discussed contemporary 
Anglo-Saxon theoreticians of the republican ideology, particularly Pettit and Skinner, 
consider this as a major diversion from the traditional republican ideology in which the 
priority was given to the centrality of laws and institutions and particularly the 
advantages that a system of mixed constitution could offer in terms of spreading the 
repositories of power rather than self-mastery
119
.   Such a categorical rejection of the 
French school of republicanism by Pettit, on grounds that it has shifted emphasis away 
from the core republican principles, seems to be a slight overstatement as one could still 
identify a strong republican tradition of the promotion of individual liberties through a 
typically republican process of sovereignty of laws and equality before it together with 
extensive efforts towards the institutionalization of rights.   
 
     This emphasis on having strong laws and institutions was deemed to be the only 
viable means to guarantee that the citizens were not dependant on others for their liberty 
and only actions regulated by such laws could be regarded as free actions.  On the other 
hand what Pettit defines as the “communitarian misreading of the republican 
freedom”120 denotes this same egalitarian character of the Franco-German republican 
schools which is regarded as according minor importance to the principle of a mixed 
constitution that underlies the basic needs for checks and balances in a republic that 
could eventually lead to tyranny and domination
121
.   Nevertheless as highlighted above, 
a closer look at the French republican literature reveals a much more complex treatment 
of these concepts with different republican core principles being at the heart of the 
political discourse in various eras.  Most interestingly the main theoreticians of the 
French and German republics insistently warned against this “democratic danger” of the 
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republics
122
.  As cited above such instances as labelling Kant an “anti-democrat 
republican”123 clearly demonstrates how far these philosophers were prepared to go to 
distinguish and safeguard the republican principles.  The same idea could be perceived 
from the famous declaration by Louis Blanc (1811-1882) a French republican ideologue 
who famously declared: “the people are the universality of the citizens and not the 
majority”124. 
 
     Therefore it follows that a fundamental function of the state would be to prevent 
powerful institutions and organizations to dominate individual freedom by arbitrarily 
reducing their sphere of rights, power and the available social options.  Examples of 
such entities include, but not limited to, large economical corporations, military 
organization, religious institutions and other exclusionist ethno-cultural or socio-political 
congregations.  In line with this objective, the notion of a “mixed constitution” seem to 
have been the republican’s answer to the question of how to balance power to address 
the interests of various groups through the basic tools of power distribution and the 
separation of deliberative and executive branches of the government.  Here again the 
ground-breaking Machiavellian notion of checks and balances in a respublica mixta 
(mixed constitution) come to play a crucial role in keeping a watchful eye on various 
power repositories by allocating equal rights and means to other entities to fight 
imbalances and the concentration of power in the hands of certain privileged individuals 
or groups
125
.  One could certainly postulate that the basic prerequisite for all these 
institutions and republican elements is to be elected entities in a constitutional 
democratic context in the first place.  This would provide for the possibility that the 
citizenry can have effective control over them to enable individuals to, directly or 
through their representatives, exercise their influence over their process of selections, 
deliberation and employment of public coercive forces.   
 
     Thus one could certainly claim that one of the most important functions of the 
institutions and legal provisions is to facilitate the public participation in every single 
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step of deliberation to register their interests in the process of policy making and 
executive administration of authority.  Hence these institutions need to be open to all and 
their very foundations should be open to debate and contestation, this is the exact nature 
of the refutation of the arbitrary power in a republican system.  
 
    To this end, the state’s judiciary apparatus plays a vital role in supporting not only the 
basic rights of appeal but also to solicit issues of public and private concern and 
scrutinize instances of arbitrary interference - not only by other individuals and groups 
but also by the government itself.  The basic requirement of such a capability is to have 
independent legal and judiciary infrastructures in place that play a disinterested 
oversight role to scrutinize the instances of domination in a fair and impartial context.  
This judiciary component of non-domination is yet another powerful instrument to 
safeguard the private interests of the citizenry and provide a further layer of checks and 
revisions at a practical level; both a priori and also after the public deliberations and 
procedures are operative.  Hence the independent judiciary system plays a fundamental 
role not only in stopping the arbitrary interferences of the people themselves, but also to 
guarantee that other branches of the government do not become dominating powers in 
the life choices of the citizens
126
. 
 
     One last important notion to emphasize before closing this section is the definition of 
“constitution” that I have referred to on numerous occasions thus far127.  A closer look at 
various strands of the republican ideology clearly highlights the salience of the 
constitution in terms of the republican political layout of power and the actual form that 
the state assumes under the republican “mixed constitution” definition.  This seems to be 
at odds with our present day perception of the constitution which commonly denotes a 
written document containing the rules and laws needed to run a democratic system.  As I 
have argued so far the greatest bulk of the republican discourse is centred on the first 
interpretation of the constitution defining the ideal government as a balanced system 
composed of various power centres and numerous bodies, with different and 
counterbalancing functions to obtain maximum checks on the sovereign authority and 
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prevent the concentration of arbitrary power in individuals or groups’ hands.  This 
prevailing sense of a political constitution as compared to the legal one is closely linked 
to the procedural perception of democratic systems as opposed to the output based 
approach which will be discussed further in the next section
128
.  Nonetheless I would be 
using both perceptions of the term in the sense of the actual form of the government 
when discussing the republican institutions in Chapter 5 and also the very legal 
document aimed at upholding various articles of the republican liberty, also through the 
designation of the form of the government itself in Chapter 3 dedicated to the republican 
constitution. 
 
     In any case, the equality before the laws, individual liberty, centrality of the role of 
the citizens and an egalitarian access to the resources, all seem to be firmly at the heart 
of all republican narratives, as I argued so far.  Nevertheless the emphasis on the 
egalitarian prescriptions of the republican ideology has demonstrated to have significant 
implications on the anti-oligarchic and anti-monarchic traditions in some schools of 
republicanism, notably the French one.  This at times seems to have created a degree of 
conceptual confusion regarding the actual form of a republican political state which 
needs further illustration. 
 
V. Republicanism versus Monarchy 
It is important to address a common misreading by some scholars that consider certain 
trends within the republican tradition, notably the above discussed French school, as 
evidence that a republican order would only come into existence in an absence of a 
monarchic system of government
129
.  It is true that one of the main components of the 
early western republican ideology was its regicide nature such as the one seen in the 
early Dutch republican tradition
130
.  Nevertheless this could be regarded as the outcome 
of the conclusion that in certain junctures of the European history of political thought the 
monarchic system was considered as the main embodiment of the despotism inimical to 
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the core principle of the republican liberty
131
.  In spite of this strong tradition, 
throughout the main body of the literature of the republican discourse one could observe 
that most authors have constantly reiterated that the actual form a government may take 
does not necessarily bare any consequences against its republican credentials
132
. As 
Radford correctly argues: 
 
Cicero maintained that the state’s moral and philosophical foundation is consent (or 
participation) of a whole people united in their conceptions of justice and their common 
good.  According to Cicero, this is not a function of the particular type of constitution a 
state might develop because a state may be a monarchy, aristocracy or a democracy133. 
 
Indeed it is not uncommon to encounter such affirmations as the existence of a 
republican liberty or even the republican concepts of “mixed constitution” in the 
monarchies such as the Dutch or the Spanish ones
134
.  In line with these considerations 
we encounter affirmations by the likes of Marsilius of Padua in his major work defensor 
pacis who deems all secular regimes including the system of segnori and hereditary 
monarchies as legitimate form of government
135
.  More pertinent to the republican cause 
is the Machiavelli’s remarks in the Discorsi, underlining that a community could well be 
ruled based on its free will in a civitas libera (free state), both under a republic or 
monarchic system
136
.  One could well have a principalibus which is enshrined in the 
context of a constitutional system that guarantees fundamental rights for the citizenry by 
providing adequate “tribunes” for tracking their interests and providing basic egalitarian 
conditions required by the republican system to ensure that the “interventions are not the 
impositions of an unchecked master”137.  Alternatively one could well conceive of a 
communitarian system of government in which the lack of the aforementioned 
institutions of checks and balances or good laws effectively reduces the people to the 
condition of slavery
138
.  Thus the tyranny of individuals, groups or the majority would 
all fall into the aforementioned Roman concept of imperium that is regarded as the most 
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inimical to freedom.  More recent Philosophers like Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) 
have expostulated even further with claims such as: 
 
“.... I remind you that for Kant, reflecting on the political questions, a strong distinction 
is being made between the forms of the sovereignty (Pouvoir) and the forms of 
government. Now, democracy is a form of government as is the monarchy, but as 
regarding the forms of sovereignty, there are only two, republics and despotism...”139  
 
Thus based on my close examination of the relevant republican literature, I could be able 
to conclude that the entire anti-monarchic nature of the republican ideology could be 
safely summed up in a struggle against the unchecked sources of power, whether 
hereditary, as in the case of a monarchy or other extra-constitutional status accorded to 
certain public figures, groups or seats of power.  
 
VI. Identifying the Common Good 
Central to the republican ideology is the notion of the common good
140
.  To go back to 
the classic principles of republicanism it is interesting to note that in Cicero’s definition 
of a republic the emphasis is placed upon two main constituting elements.  On the side 
of the populus there should be a shared sense of justice, an agreement on the principles 
of law and common good.  Cicero explicitly defines the state as: 
 
something which belongs to the people.  But by people it is not meant as a random 
aggregation of men, rather it is an organized society that these have founded for 
upholding justice and promoting their common interests
141
 
 
All the above mentioned processes aimed at fighting off domination would relate in one 
way or another to the identification of a greater good that could embrace the interests of 
a greater number of individuals.  It is obvious that there are fundamental utilitarian bases 
inherent to this concept that underpin its centrality in the pursuit of the republican ideals 
of egalitarian access to the resources and equal opportunities based on the will of all as 
opposed to private or factional interests.  Pettit defines the common good as: “the 
interests of the community as a whole that all members can recognize as having a certain 
importance, at least if they are prepared to live on equal terms with others”142.  That is, a 
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greater good that can even justify the state’s use of coercive power to moderate and even 
override individual liberties to achieve a greater value extendible to a greater number of 
individuals whilst at the same time watching against the tyranny of majority and the use 
of demagoguery to create domination. 
 
     In spite of the centrality accorded to this notion from the time of Aristotle to nearly 
all classical and modern schools of the political philosophy, the exact nature of this 
common good and the procedure to attain it has been at the centre of most heated 
debates; in particular those amongst modern advocates of liberalism and republican 
ideologies.  There is no doubt that what could be regarded as the ultimate good for an 
individual or a group might well be considered to be the absolute evil for others to be 
avoided by all means.  And unless one claims to be holding the absolute truth, as in the 
case of religious dogma, one can never be entirely certain that what is being promoted as 
the common good is indeed the ultimate desired result under all circumstances.  Indeed 
many modern republicans see the acknowledgment of this inescapable discord and class 
conflict as an extraordinary contribution of Machiavelli to the entire political discourse 
that sets him apart from all previous authors and signals the start of a new era in the 
philosophy of politics
143
.  While the previous generations of political authors 
unanimously highlighted the centrality of concordia ordinum, the Machiavellian school 
of politics seems to have come to terms with the inevitability of the social pluralism and 
the need to provide an entirely new definition for the society’s universal common 
good
144
.   
 
     This relativism and uncertainty seems to be casting a serious shadow of doubt over 
the very viability of a political system allegedly geared towards objectives that seem too 
contingent and idealistic.  How can one ensure that the rights of weaker groups are 
protected and the identified public objectives are not results of illusory consensus or 
efficient rhetoric in the absence of the “ideal speech situation”, to use Habermas’s 
terminology?  This could then result in the employment of public power and resources to 
obtain and even coerce the reluctant citizenry to endorse objectives that do not mirror 
their interests.  This seems to have been one of the main preoccupations of a great 
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majority of the theoreticians of the republican ideology.  For instance within the French 
tradition of republicanism, one could not overlook the persistent emphasis that Auguste 
Comte (1798-1857) places on the various forms of tyranny which could well materialize 
in a republican system.  He goes on to define two specific types of such tyrannies, 
dictature collective and dictature militaire
145
.  Yet surprisingly this very same paradox 
here appears to present us with a scenario that provides compelling evidence for the 
superiority of the republican ideology to address this apparent contradiction.  
  
     The most interesting solution to this issue by the neo-Roman republicans - as 
opposed to those provided by the liberal versions of the participatory democracy based 
on positive liberty, seems to be the one outlined in an essay by Richard Bellamy
146
.  In it 
he argues that the Republican non-domination concept examined above can provide two 
distinct methods against the dominating practices.  The first one is the so-called “output 
based” method whereby all efforts are concentrated on identifying the non-dominating 
outcomes towards which the republic needs to direct its overall efforts.  The second 
method is the “process based” approach in which, regardless of the actual outcome of 
policies, the procedure to reach that objective needs to be free from domination and 
arbitrary input.  The output based view - directly linked to the participatory version of 
the republican thought, requires that by “treating citizens in ways that track their 
common interests and offer them equal concern and respect” 147the end results should 
closely reflect their collective interests. This would in turn enable them to autonomously 
identify values that reflect the interests of the greatest possible number of individuals 
within the society.  This is closely linked to Rousseau’s “general will” as opposed to the 
“will of all” which is simply the product of private and groups’ interests.  However, with 
this approach the critical issue is the difficulty of identifying and measuring these 
common values whilst at the same time striving to accommodate the individual’s 
interests without falling into the tyranny of majority on the one hand, or the practical 
impossibility of coming up with any decision whatsoever - which could easily lead to an 
impasse and the maintenance of the status quo, on the other.  Here again the non-
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dominating process-based republican approach seems to be providing the necessary 
safeguards.  If one is unable to identify the end results and the outcomes that are free 
from domination and arbitrary influence, he could instead focus on the process and path 
to obtain those results and make sure these procedures are non-arbitrary and in line with 
non-dominating principles. Thus the processes of selection and contestation of public 
deliberation need to be fair and legitimate, including the right of appeal and debate to 
ensure that the concerns of all individuals are correctly accounted for regardless of the 
ultimate good that might not be universally shared by everyone.  This approach not only 
endorses the basic egalitarian concerns of the republican systems to reduce private and 
public dominion, it also acknowledges the epistemological principle that there can never 
be an absolute unalterable right or wrong in the public sphere.  Therefore those on the 
losing end of the deliberation could also “hold onto their integrity”148 and share the end 
results for having satisfied the legitimate procedural norms in conformity with the due 
processes that they have also contributed to conceive.   
 
     This is an unsurprising product of the previously mentioned Renaissance humanist 
heritage with its fundamental refutation of the existence of the ultimate source of truth 
by endorsing the notion of common good which were closely tied to the human political 
activity rather than the epiphenomena of transcendent realities
149
.  In line with these 
observations, Bellamy also cites some successful democracies like Australia based on 
this republican procedural constitutionalism, even in the absence of such fundamental 
republican guarantees as the citizens’ bill of rights enshrining basic articles of individual 
liberties.  Here, he observes, the constitution merely outlines the procedures and the 
machinery for decision making and specifies the various state infrastructure to safeguard 
such processes and power management and administration
150
. 
 
     And finally there is no doubt that there will always be cases in which one comes to a 
deadlock of incompatible interests and fundamental discords on the desired ends.  In 
such a challenging case one of the raisons d’être of the state would be to actively and 
sometimes even aggressively confront those ideologies that seek to dominate others with 
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their arbitrary interferences in order to guarantee the very existence of the liberty as non-
domination.  Nevertheless there could well be cases in which the interested parties could 
identify a third possibility of accommodating the other side’s views and reach a 
compromise.  The primary steps towards reaching such social concord is to learn how to 
negotiate and accept other’s views and promote their goals in a non-dominating manner 
that complies with the procedural republican requirements and social skills needed to 
that end.  This will be partially realized through the active education of the citizenry to 
master certain social faculties of interaction which will be the subject of my discussion 
that follows. 
    
VII. Contestatory Citizenry 
Unsurprisingly then it appears that Cicero was one of the first philosophers in human 
history to advance basic ideas of the legal equality of all citizens
151
.  Livy, Seneca and 
Sallust amongst others, repeatedly remind us that one of the greatest causes of the loss of 
liberty would be “when people submit to the jurisdiction and control of a few powerful 
people in an obnoxious manner living in servitude to them”152.  Thus it becomes 
paramount that the greatest theoretical challenge to the republican theory has always 
been to get the right balance between the scopes and the reach of the state’s laws and 
institutions and the individual’s liberties protected or alternatively restricted by such 
policies.  In short how can one make sure that the state itself does not become a 
dominating force whilst it attempts to fight off private domination?  To this end, it 
becomes compelling that the republican doctrine should be very demanding on the 
people themselves to fulfil all their citizenry undertakings and obligations.  One could 
seamlessly observe that the relevant citizen’s qualifications and commitments in the 
form of their virtue and values of patriotism and active participation have been 
systematically endorsed and promoted throughout the entire history of the republican 
ideology.  What Machiavelli defined as vita activa was fundamentally endorsing this 
proactive engagement of the citizenry to promote virtue and common good.  
 
The virtuous citizens love the security that the vivere libero offers… when necessary 
they know how to observe their duties and respect magistrates and laws, (but) in due 
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time they also know to resist and mobilize against those who aim at the destruction of 
the vivere libero153       
 
Furthermore in the Discorsi, Machiavelli identifies that the social class struggle is 
actually healthy to the republic and that Romans were free people as long as they could 
have these public confrontations of citizens which embody the basic principles of 
libertas
154
.  
 
     It is essential to underline that this concept is different to the ancient Aristotelian 
direct participation of the populace in the ruling system in which the emphasis is placed 
upon being able to rule and directly participate in the law-making process.  It should be 
banal to underline that most citizens might not actually be inclined towards a first-hand 
participation in such law giving procedures.  Whereas the concern here seems to be of a 
system which gives prominence to the existence of an actively interested citizenry 
towards the promotion of virtue and most importantly on a guarantee of an inviolable 
power and right that they need to have in order to challenge the government’s 
deliberations if they found them non-compliant with their interests and desired ends. 
Once more, in line with Florentine civic humanism, the liberty is conceptualized in 
being an active participant of the social life as the political ideals were regarded to be the 
consequences of individual reason and the ensuing political activities.   
 
     Furthermore it is unambiguous that in the modern day’s large multicultural and 
diversified societies one could not expect to have a ruling government comprised of the 
whole of society, rather the only practicable option would be to delegate power to the 
democratically elected representatives: i.e. the republican principles of delegation and 
representation.  In spite of this the critical point here is that the citizenry would never 
entirely “alienate” its power and constantly preserves a contestatory right together with 
the actual power to influence the representatives’ decisions and recall them or even to 
substitute them when deemed inadequate or motivated by other interests
155
.  Here again 
the electoral system alone cannot guarantee such rights and obligations unless the 
previously mentioned system of mixed government is devised in such a way that it 
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accommodates a significant role for the “contestatory membership” 156.  This also 
includes various non-electoral checks and diversified associations and entities of the 
citizenry who actively monitor the performance of the representatives and subject them 
to a constant process of scrutiny and counter balancing normative constraints.  The basic 
hurdle here is to provide alternative “options” for the disadvantaged citizens in order to 
put them on an equal social pedestal with the rest.  For instance in case a serious 
divergence occurs between the individual’s interests and the government’s policies, a 
republican citizen should have the option of seeking the judgment of external bodies 
such as private auditors and legal experts and advisors
157
. 
 
     Therefore the previously discussed notion of mixed constitution together with the vita 
activa of the citizens are the basic requirements for constantly keeping the government’s 
imperium under control and ensuring that the permanently evolving objectives of the 
public policies are always adequately discussed and challenged through social and 
political means such as the Roman’s “tribuna della plebe” and other modern day 
instruments of monitoring and control.  Thus the active contestatory citizens construct 
one of the building blocks of the republican ideology by playing a critical role in 
checking the state’s power to ensure that the risk of the government’s domination is 
minimized.  Again in Pettit’s words, in an inclusive republican system: 
 
There will be continual discussion and disagreement about what government should be 
doing in this area or that….. the people have to be a restless, engaged and critical body, 
if there is to be any hope of keeping the government in check and ensuring that it is not 
an arbitrary presence in their lives.158   
 
Viroli in an attempt to contextualize these classic principles of virtue and active 
participation of the citizens in the modern societies, highlights various aspects of civil 
virtue which empowers the citizens to do whatever they can, and when they can, to serve 
the common liberty
159
.  These include such actions as fighting corruption, performing 
their duties with honesty, being always ready to mobilize against the ratification of an 
unjust law, pushing the government to tackle issues of common interest, actively 
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participating in professional, cultural, political, and other relevant organizations and 
pursuing national and international affairs with interest
160
. 
 
     The idea again here is not only to disperse the power to promote mutual checks and 
balances necessary for the republican state to operate in the first place, but also to 
engage the citizen through an active role to contest and monitor both the government 
and one another.  
 
     Hence these essential institutionalized counter-balancing authorities and dispersion of 
power together with inclusive and freely accessible public forums and tribunes, are 
deemed by republicans to be the crucial provisions to reduce the possibility of individual 
or group domination and also the tyranny of the majority, a common challenge to many 
forms of democracies.  Therefore while the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, 
accountability and rule of law embodied in constitutional systems of periodic public 
consultation are the primary prerequisites for the republican system to exist in the first 
place, they do not appear to be providing sufficient guarantees against the deviation of 
the system towards the monopoly of power by individuals and groups and even tyranny.   
 
     Thus as I discussed above, it is a common republican conviction that such constant 
threats to liberty will only be adequately dealt with when one also includes sufficient 
space for republican elements of popular checks and balances to put the citizen on an 
equal footing with rulers and other individuals to question and challenge any potential 
source of domination.  This is the essence of the previously mentioned “eye-ball test”.  
Therefore, it should be paramount that there be no repository for power and authority 
that can evade this public scrutiny through open and inclusive forums.  The republicans’ 
experience seems to have unequivocally demonstrated that the very existence of some 
entities that could discount and avoid public contestation and invigilation would 
undoubtedly transform these unchecked elements into constant threats of domination; 
even though these might actually be working within the constitutional and legal political 
frameworks or alternatively be reluctant to exercise their overriding authority.  
Therefore it would appear that all roads lead to the inevitable republican conclusion that 
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in order to effectively minimize the possibility of dominium and imperium, not only a 
whole array of democratic requirements should be in place but also an active 
contestatory citizenry needs to be formed that embodies various agencies of public 
debate and scrutiny to empower the diverse interests that make up a polity to play a 
prominent role in advancing the principles of their own non-domination.    
 
VIII. Civic Education 
It comes as no surprise that one of the main battlegrounds of the republican doctrine of 
the political would be to reject the neutrality of the state in playing a positive role in the 
promotion of liberty as non-domination.  In order to achieve this objective the role of the 
republican educational apparatus proves crucial.  Again here I could cite various 
narratives from the progenitors of the republican thought, in all its forms, relentlessly 
underlining the importance of a comprehensive republican education system that 
inculcates and instils the fundamental values of citizenry in the population
161
.  This was 
aimed and enabling the citizens to assume an active role in the enhancement and 
protection of their own liberty.  As mentioned in various occasions, these are rooted in 
the deep-seated republican recommendations of active participation of the citizens in the 
public lives of their polities. This would be the inevitable consequences of the 
fundamental shift from abstract to concrete and from metaphysical and divine to 
practical and contingent that were claimed to be the idiosyncratic feature of the 
republican doctrine of the political.   
 
     It goes without saying that this would in turn engender crucial consequences on the 
role and requirements that its constituting elements, i.e. the people should be prepared 
with. To cite further examples of the classical republican treatises, one could not 
overlook the meticulous emphasis which Machiavelli places upon the public education 
in the Discourses in order to promote such values of rispetto (respect), prudenza 
(prudence), grandeza d’animo (magnanimity), generosità (generosity), coraggio 
(courage), amore della patria (patriotism) etc, all of which are to be employed to fight 
what he globally labels as corruzione (corruption), which could affect various aspects of 
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social life
162.  Indeed most of the examples he cites for these “corrupted” states 
throughout his works are those in which the education has failed to create upright and 
honourable citizens that could contribute positively to their own liberty.  
 
     This explains why such lengthy treatises in particular in the French republican 
tradition have been dedicated to this crucial aspect of the republican thought.  
Condorcet, Voltaire and Rousseau are the prominent examples of such philosophers who 
painstakingly highlighted the importance of the public education as conceived by the 
republican doctrine.  Condorcet for instance, who is regarded as the father of the 
positivist school of philosophy and even considered to be the prominent theoretician of 
“when a republic becomes republican”, retains this republican objective to materialize 
through a meticulous employment of the fundamental principles of the public 
education
163
. 
 
     Therefore in the light of the republican objectives to empower the citizens to fully 
assume their contestatory role in a constitutional system, they need, in the first place, to 
be well informed and educated on their rights and responsibilities and to identify the 
legitimacy of the republican constitutions and endorse their legal sanctions.  
Furthermore the republican citizen needs to know of their liberty and be fully aware of 
their power to question and revise policies free from any arbitrary interferences.  This is 
where the educational and informative role of government, and most importantly the 
independent institutions, play a critical part
164
.  Furthermore this republican citizen 
needs to be aware and well informed of his basic rights and privileges both as reflected 
in the national constitution and recognized as the “rights of humanity” encoded in the 
universal declarations and covenants on the basic human rights. 
 
    Most interestingly I could underline a significant emphasis placed on the importance 
of the private education systems: those emanating from the people themselves rather 
than the state advocated ones, by Condorcet.  This is an obvious safeguard against the 
potentials of domination hidden in all state sponsored educational projects, which in  
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Gramsci’s term, could lead to “cultural hegemony”165.  One of the fundamental 
obligations of the republican state is to provide suitable grounds for “civilizing the 
republic” through promoting widespread civil virtue and acknowledgement of liberty as 
non-domination in all public and private spheres.  
 
     From the outset the civic education serves the republican objectives by teaching the 
citizenry their rights and obligations to live in a society based on liberty as non-
domination and abide by commonly agreed laws and norms of the state as adequately 
encapsulated in John Maynor’s following words:  
 
The primary goal of a republican approach to civic education is the inculcation of values 
and virtues aimed at teaching individuals the necessary skills of non-domination and 
how to cast and express their ends in a non-dominating fashion
166
.  
 
Nonetheless it should inevitably go much further than this by actively promoting deep-
seated republican values of toleration, active engagement and mutual respect.  Also the 
values of critical thinking and relentless pondering on the consequences of their life 
choices will be inculcated in the citizens to deliberate on the overall outcome of their 
actions and whether these might potentially interfere arbitrarily with other agents’ 
choices within the greater social context
167
.  
 
     There is no doubt that a major component of this mutual comprehension and striving 
towards a non-dominating behaviour is to have the means to share a common channel of 
social communication through which the populace can constantly register their interests 
and most importantly come to appreciate the interests and reasons of other social 
stakeholders.  This common language of citizenship is rooted in the fundamental Roman 
rule of audi alteram partem (always strive to listen to the other side)
168
.  This in turn 
underpins the primary rules of mutual understanding based on “communicative reason” 
to use Habermas’ term, which he defines as the “telos of mutual understanding”169.  That 
is an active involvement in the communicative action geared towards problem-solving 
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practices through non-dominating exercise of the common republican reason and values 
of republican citizenry.   
 
     And finally, through this comprehensive public education the citizens come to a full 
appreciation of the basic republican institutions and forums which are open to all and 
learn how to use them and interact with them and most importantly how to challenge 
them if need be.  Hence Maynor’s acute analysis of this profound tradition of the 
republican educational system could be summarized in the idea that a republican 
education not only prepares the citizens to assume their civil roles in the specialized 
social functions, it also instructs citizens on their obligations towards each other.  This is 
also an implicit acknowledgment of the fundamental republican components such as a 
bill of rights endorsing and promoting active role of the people in their own non-
domination
170
.  This would in turn lead to practical instructions on how to articulate their 
private interests and concerns in a “reasonable non-dominating language of common 
citizenry” that could protect and track their concerns through an active social 
engagement and mutual interaction of the republican means.  Therefore the ideal 
objectives here are not merely to educate the citizens to tolerate and respect the 
unavoidable elements of moral pluralism of modern societies, but most importantly to 
inculcate civil values of virtue and capacities to formulate their interests in total 
compliance with the republican non-dominance principles, which sometimes might 
entail “compromise and accommodation”171.   
 
IX. Contemporary Republicanism 
Thus far my main objective has been to demonstrate that the republican school of 
thought enjoys a rich and multi-layered tradition which has historically proven to be 
capable of addressing various socio-political aspects of civil life.  The basic system of 
guarantees that it prescribes to safeguard individual liberties against dominium and 
imperium, seem to be an extremely efficient and flexible means of providing a 
comprehensive recipe for our complex modern societies based on multicultural and 
diversified systems of values.  In spite of this, in particular in recent decades up to the 
onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, in the western political circles - which were 
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heavily influenced by the Anglo-Saxon liberal ideologies, the republican concepts 
strongly had fallen out of interest to the point where they were even considered 
irrelevant and outdated
172
.  Indeed a significant prevalence of the political philosophies 
focusing on the rights of the individual could be readily identified as compared to the 
republican notion of common good, civic virtue and republican institutions to protect 
and promote citizenry rights and liberties.  In this light the republican doctrines were 
even regarded as oppressive and reactionary and their strong connection with the 
modern political philosophy in particular socialism was systematically criticized or 
ignored
173
.  Nevertheless as I argued throughout this Chapter, there have been strong 
adjustments and reorientations of the interests towards the republican ideologies, also in 
part due to the recent setbacks of the financial sector at the heart of the liberal and 
capitalist democracies.  Thus it appears that various republican concepts are once again 
being evaluated in a new light of appreciation.  Most importantly the fundamental 
republican rule of non-domination is increasingly proving to be flexible enough to 
accommodate various perceptions of the common good as long as these do not violate 
the basic criteria of independence and arbitrary interference.  
 
     I am also bound to acknowledge the major republican characteristic of ideological 
flexibility and constant capacity for mutation, namely what George Clemenceau (1841-
1929) defines as the republican capacity to provide the possibility for the “constant 
peaceful and legal revolutions in the society”174.  Consequently it appears that a 
significant repository of the republican political doctrine has been passed down to us 
from the Roman and Renaissance philosophers and matured with the Enlightenment’s 
actualization and elaborations.  These also include prominent contributions by the likes 
of Montesquieu with his emphasis on the separation of powers, Voltaire’s underlining of 
the freedom of conscience and tolerance, Rousseau’s highlighting of the people’s 
sovereignty and Condorcet’s emphasis on the importance of public education175.  All 
these momentous and impressive edifices of the political philosophy could provide clear 
guidelines which regardless of the main centre of focus, could be served as a powerful 
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background to analyse any notions of the political sovereignty and principles of 
individual liberty.  
 
     More relevant to the contemporary questions of liberty is the acute analysis by Philip 
Pettit, and what he regards as the basic elements in guarding against private power
176
.  
These include such factors as having a robust economy, a resilient and impartial legal 
system and a universal and fair welfare system.  Most importantly I highlighted a 
republican endorsement of an active intervention by the state to empower the weak and 
vulnerable and to regulate with efficiency the powerful organizations, ideological groups 
and agencies that always have the tendency to bypass the rules and enforce their 
arbitrary domination on the citizen’s lives177.  
 
    I wish to postulate a practical example here that could elucidate some of these 
principles underlined herein.  Consider the case of a woman who is subject to the 
domination of a violent husband.  The republican’s basic non-domination principles 
require that the vulnerable party here be placed under an active intervention by the state 
to stand up for her rights and obtain justice.  This could materialise through an 
empowering legal system which enables her to trigger the legal procedures to even 
terminate her marital commitments and provide her with resilient legal and economic 
protection.  Such a system of rights would also provide adequate safeguards against 
society’s other powerful cultural and religious convictions and prejudices.  Therefore 
from the outset the republican system requires the existence of sound laws, as I argued 
before, that guarantee the equality of the sexes and limit the arbitrary power of the 
dominating side.  The same considerations apply to an employee who is dependent on 
the will of his boss who can arbitrarily interfere with him and limit his choices by 
burdening some of his options with penalties or even by mere intimidation and 
invigilation that could result in a submissive behaviour to keep the dominant party sweet 
in order to avoid possible retributions
178
.  Here again a republican system provides 
protective laws and provisions to defend the moral and physical integrity of the 
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employee and reduce the domination by providing him with an equal standing to pursue 
his interests and most importantly to have alternative options if he needs to leave his 
current employment in the form of temporary state economic and social support
179
.  
Pettit mentions three elements of rights, powers and options as the necessary resources 
needed to efficiently protect the vulnerable against the domination
180
. 
 
     And finally I came to consider the neo-republican recipe to limit and contain the state 
itself from becoming an arbitrary presence in the citizen’s lives.  As I mentioned 
previously the imposition of the just laws, based on the criteria outlined previously, 
should be exempted from these considerations.  Needless to reiterate that these active 
interventions are not regarded as arbitrarily dominating citizen’s lives, as their end is not 
to attribute an unfair advantage or privilege to a specific group or faction based on 
certain idiosyncratic criteria, such as ethnic, religious or economic privileges.  Thus the 
laws which track the overall interests of all citizens – and they all freely and inclusively 
participate in all the proceedings that affect them, or have the inalienable right to do so, 
should not be regarded as arbitrary interference of an unchecked agent
181
.  Therefore it 
should be clear by now which type of domination is considered here to be inimical to the 
republican ideals.  The imperium is therefore a result of those state initiatives which 
have not been subject to popular scrutiny and comprehensive debate preferably through 
various stages of trial and field experimentation and popular consultation.  Thus in a 
republican system the body politic is being controlled and checked equally by all 
concerned stakeholders which as emphasized before, does not necessarily entail the 
citizenry’s direct participation in all political procedures. The basic prerequisite of such 
a system is that the state itself should be a democratically elected entity which leaves 
ample space for the citizen’s control and contestation and itself subject to various 
counter-balancing checks and verifications.  
      
     It is evident that holding periodic elections does not automatically entail that a system 
is compliant with the republican principles
182
.  A Republican system does not guarantee 
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carte blanche to its rulers even though these might have been democratically elected 
through public consultation.  Therefore the participatory democracy is an insufficient 
condition for the realization of the republican ideals, as this might easily fall into an 
elective despotism
183
.  Therefore there is a requirement to have numerous agencies and 
institutions and spread the power amongst these various entities as much as possible to 
keep one another under constant monitoring and active scrutiny.  To cite again an 
eloquent passage in this regard I could mention Pettit’s considerations on the 
institutional requirements of a republican system: 
 
Institutionally, the effective, equal control of government requires to the mainline 
tradition that government should operate under the mixed constitution in a context of 
civic invigilation. The idea of the mixed constitution and contestatory citizenry… 
remains a centrepiece of republican thought and practice.184  
 
It goes without saying that other third party monitoring systems such as independent 
auditors, human rights watch organizations, autonomous legal advice agencies, public 
media and most importantly proactive citizenry initiatives and grass-roots interest 
groups are all pieces of the overall jigsaw of the republican political philosophy of 
liberty as non-domination.  The fundamental Machiavellian notion of “mixed 
constitution” with its later developments in the republican traditions, not only requires 
the existence of various constraints and entities to ensure the separation and dispersion 
of power and authority, it also places heavy reliance on the rule of law and public 
invigilation in a fully transparent and contestable setting of inclusive social order.   
 
     It goes without saying that even this universal system of checks and balances could 
be subject to constant revision and contestation to ensure that it is always capable of 
addressing the practical requirements on the ground without falling into impasse or 
neutrality
185
.  And once again no element of this overarching socio-political order should 
be immune to the public contestation and accountability, which indeed make up the 
nucleus of the republican provision to circumscribe the interfering power of the 
government itself from degenerating towards the much feared imperium.  Thus 
recommendation such as the separation of the law-related functions, bicameralism, the 
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adoption of a bill of rights and decentralisation of the administration probably even 
through a federal system are all among the provisions to guard against the arbitrariness 
of power
186
. 
 
X. Republicanism and Religion 
One last aspect of the republican doctrine that I wish to highlight here is its relation to 
the eschatological principles in general and clerical institutions in particular.  As argued 
previously the pioneering Florentine civic republicanism was firmly grounded in a stout 
refutation of any metaphysical and abstract sources of transcendent truth central to the 
hitherto prevailing scholastic discourse. By considering the political reality as contingent 
and a result of individual’s direct civic participation, other sources of legitimacy would 
inevitably be dismissed and subordinated to the overriding authority of the human 
reason.  This would at minimum entail a considerable level of religious neutrality within 
the political layout of the state.  In any case it is not difficult to detect a significant level 
of tolerance and even acknowledgment of the religious beliefs in the private societal 
spaces by the republican ideologues both ancient and modern with an exception of a 
considerable corpus of the French republican teachings
187
.  Indeed the French 
Revolution with its egalitarian claims proved to be a radical socio-political upheaval 
against all privileged institutions in particular the clerical one which hitherto enjoyed a 
prominent social standing. The so-called processes of déchristianisation révolutionnaire 
even went as far as forcing the clergymen to take an oath of allegiance to the French 
state rather than Vatican
188
. This was unsurprisingly declined by a majority of them 
which resulted in thousands of priests being forced to abdicate or guillotined
189
.  It goes 
without saying that such vertical inculcation of the revolutionary ideologies predictably 
encountered significant resistance at social levels which eventually ended in the 
Concordat of 1801 in which the government recognises the Christianity as the “religion 
of the majority of the French people”. It is interesting that such ideologues of the French 
revolutions as Robespierre seem to have accepted such acknowledgment of the religion 
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due to the preoccupations that a radical elimination of faith might have “demoralizing 
effect on the population”190. The question seems to have been how to subordinate these 
ideologies to the republican institutions and principles rather than the other way 
around
191
.  Hence in other contexts such as the United States, a traditional solution was 
promoted in the form of the acceptance of the religious beliefs in a completely secular 
political arena to, on the one hand, take advantage of the potential social benefits of the 
religious ideology and on the other, to reduce the possibility that the eschatological 
interests and concerns would jeopardise individual “right to pursue happiness as he or 
she saw fit”192.  Veritably, the tolerance of faith has by no means taken the form of an 
official endorsement of religion in public spheres and any institutional embodiments of 
such ideologies by the republicans.  In fact, quite the contrary, one still witnesses 
significant efforts towards the so-called privatization of religion to lessen the possibility 
that it might become a matter of public order instead of being restricted to the personal 
domains of interest
193
.  The examination of this very theme and the conceptual and 
practical viability of a religiously imbued system of the political within the republican 
framework would indeed make up the unifying thread of the current study. 
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XI. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to provide a general survey of the main 
concepts making up what we come to collectively recognize as the republican ideology.   
As I underlined before this doctrine should not be regarded as a monolithic block which 
has been resistant to mutations and renewals
194
.  Indeed it proves to be a very flexible 
doctrine which comprises various democratic, and even communitarian and liberal 
readings whose unifying thread could well be regarded as the powerful interpretation of 
the fundamental notion of the republican freedom.  Despite all these formal and 
conceptual understandings of the republican thought, one comes to appreciate the core 
distinctive features of this philosophy and their compelling potentials to address most of 
today’s socio-political requirements of modern polities.   
 
     More specifically the contemporary advocates of this school of thought whose main 
ideas and ideals were studied here, have shown that this political system, although its 
foundations could easily be traced back to as early as the Roman Republics, could still 
be relevant to our time in particular when the modern liberal political discourse seems to 
be facing an uphill struggle to tackle current social challenges generating an ever 
growing sense of helplessness caused by their core principles of state neutrality and non-
interference.  
 
     As it was underlined on various occasions in this chapter, throughout this research 
project I have chosen to primarily follow a conceptual framework that generally feeds 
upon and further develops the fundamental republican notions endorsed by three major 
contemporary authors namely: Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, and 
brilliant interpretations of those doctrines by John Maynor.  These scholars, together 
with numerous other political philosophers in particular from the French school of 
republicanism, all had an indelible impact on the arguments addressed here and the 
chosen approach of treatment.  The resulting line of argumentation has been an outcome 
of various individual enquiries into the works of the previously mentioned scholars, in 
particular Pettit, Skinner and Maynor who have generously provided first hand access to 
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their processes of intellectual argumentation and on several occasions provided 
important suggestions and advice. 
     As I argued above the Italo-Atlantic version of republican thoughts, as Pettit likes to 
call it, through some momentous contributions of the neo-Roman theoreticians, most 
importantly the Florentine civic republican ideologues, highlights the centrality of the 
republican elements of the rule of law, mixed constitutions, inclusive public forums and 
in particular the role of contestatory citizenry.  In spite of this I hope to have provided 
enough evidence to underline the importance of other philosophical currents within the 
republican ideology, particularly the French branch, which faithful to the original 
humanist traditions, provided significant contributions to the development of some of 
the core republican ideas namely the equality before law and the importance of the 
public education amongst others.  
 
     On the other hand it was argued that the domination could materialize through the 
interference in the form of intimidation or invigilation rather than an actual physical 
limitation imposed on someone’s choice.  In Pettit’s formulation: interference not only 
includes coercion and punishment, but it is also extended to include manipulation which 
may take the form of “agenda-fixing, the deceptive or non-rational shaping of people’s 
beliefs or desires or the rigging of the consequences of people’s actions”. 
 
     All these expounded concepts provide a workable platform and several resilient 
criteria to assess any current political system and determine to what degree these are 
coherent with the republican claims they advance.  It should be reiterated that the 
objective here is not to advance perfectionist principles to endorse a pass or fail mark for 
any system of thought as these highly rely on the practical necessities of every socio-
cultural setting rather than idealistic philosophical considerations.  Nevertheless at least 
at a theoretical level I should be able to analyse various elements of power and 
administrations entailed by these structures of ideological reasons and determine the 
degree of their compliance with the basic republican legitimacies of the political 
authority that these systems themselves advance.  More importantly in order to provide a 
manageable field of enquiry, by focusing on a more practical analysis of the subject 
under study, this chosen framework of analysis should provide more tangible criteria of 
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evaluation as compared to the equally important abstract socio-philosophical evaluation 
of the role and place of faith in a modern society or other parallel examinations of 
numerous closely related concepts such as comparative studies of revolutions and 
totalitarianism. 
  
     To summarize what was discussed in this chapter I can delineate the following core 
republican elements based on my academic enquiry into the fundamental cornerstones of 
republicanism.  These would consequently form my theoretical framework to treat basic 
republican credentials of my specific setting of reference and would delineate the 
guiding approach throughout this research project.  
 
 -Principle of republican freedom as non-domination in all socio-political situations 
and the “eye-ball test”, the sort of immunity to interference that would enable anyone to 
look each other in the eye and defend his interests without fear of consequences or the 
actual impracticality of the attainment of results for being launched from uneven 
grounds. This is based on the fundamental republican conviction that depending upon 
another’s arbitrary will is what it means to be a slave.  Hence an equal protection of 
liberty is one of the basic duties of government.  Thus the discretionary power must 
permanently be illegitimate and in a republican state no element shall depend upon the 
will and arbitrary discretion of another element which would result in a condition of 
dependence and domination; even though this might be characterised by the absence of 
any actual interference.  The basic expression of this principle in the form of the 
republican safeguards against imperium and dominium would form the main structure of 
analysis throughout my study.  In particular I will extensively draw upon these 
guidelines in the study of the republican sovereignty, state institutions and contestatory 
citizenry within my chosen field of research. 
 
-Principle of rule of law, and independent judiciary system. The so-called “empire of 
law and not of men” is what all republican systems strive to achieve.  No element in a 
republican system could claim to be above the law or fall outside the purviews of the 
overarching legal and normative arrangements of the state.  In this system there is no 
space for idiosyncratic privileges or socio-cultural advantages that could allow a specific 
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ethnicity, religion or group to waive the rule of law and confer themselves specific 
immunity or authority that resides outside the fair egalitarian provisions of a 
democratically instituted legal system.  Thus the rational, unambiguous and resilient 
legal principles should be applicable to every single individual including the legislators 
and leaders themselves together with all agencies of power and administration which 
should follow the established procedures and protocols without exemption.  Furthermore 
people should have an unequivocal sovereignty over every aspect of these normative 
arrangements and their provisions and proceedings.  This includes not only the 
sovereignty over the conception of the constitution itself and all its derived legislations, 
but also over numerous provisions for the exercise of the sovereignty foreseen therein. 
Thus to live in a republican state signifies living under a constitution in which “the body 
politic is never moved to act except by the will of the citizen body as a whole”195.  In 
this regard the constitution and the inclusion of a set of universal principles of rights 
within it would undisputedly to play a momentous role.  It goes without saying that from 
ontological point of view the contents of such laws should be in line with the basic 
republican principles of non-domination on both private and public levels. These 
normative aspects will be systematically analysed particularly in the Chapter 3 on the 
Iranian Constitution and Chapter 4 on the principles of Republican Sovereignty. 
 
-Principle of republican mixed institutions: primarily all offices that confer political 
power on their holders should be elective to be able to track the interests of the people 
and that these agencies should be held in rotation to prevent the encroachment of power 
which would prevent the representatives from acting simply according to their own or 
their faction’s arbitrium and interests.  Thus the extent to which the political institutions 
embody arbitrary or discretionary power corresponds directly to how much they enslave 
and are inimical to the principle of freedom.  Hence any public office in a republican 
system should be freely accessible and open to all the social diversity that the modern 
polities inevitably have. No one should be excluded from registering their interests in the 
public institutions based on gender, ethnic, religious, economical or even moral 
convictions and values.   
 
                                                 
195
 Van Geldern, M.  and Skinner, Q. p. 4 
71 
 
     Furthermore this republican guideline for institution building underpins the basic 
preconditions of the division and separation of power and spread of authority among 
various counterbalancing entities.  This would address basic republican requirements of 
checks and balances which is thought to be achieved exclusively through the 
diversification and dispersion of the offices that hold power to create numerous 
repositories of political sovereignty that could keep one another under constant scrutiny 
and monitoring.  Therefore a republican state should not only have a clear separation of 
the legislative, executive and judicial powers, it should also provide further distribution 
of power within these entities to minimize the risk of domination.  The concentration of 
the legislative, judiciary and executive power in the hands of an individual, group, 
particular belief or even the majority has always been regarded as the most detrimental 
to the basic republican convictions by all theoreticians of the republican ideology.  I will 
include an extensive body of research and observation based on this principle 
particularly in Chapter 3 on the Republican Constitution and Chapter 5 on the 
Republican Institutions. 
 
-Principle of republican contestatory citizenry: This is probably the most idiosyncratic 
feature of the republican ideology which in spite of appearing to be idealistic and 
perfectionist, proves to be the utmost guarantee against the protection of individual 
liberties and the preclusion of various possibilities of domination.  The traditional 
republican core principles require any political system to consider significant space to 
accommodate active participation of the vigilant citizenry through such provision as the 
open and inclusive public forums and financial, legal and intellectual support for the 
citizenry to participate in public debates and proceedings.  This could take the form of 
reviews of the government’s results since the office-holders, as representatives, should 
be responsive and accountable to the criticism and will of those who elect them.  Thus 
the government should not only leave the contestation channels open, It also has to 
provide the citizens with the physical means and provisions to be able to get their voices 
heard in adequate deliberative and inclusive forums.  This principle would form the 
main theme of my final chapter on the Republican Citizenry. 
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-Principle of republican public education and civic virtue:  For a citizen to be capable 
of active participation and promotion of his social interests, from the outset they should 
acknowledge the legitimacy of law and be aware of their rights and duties within a 
republican system.  This objective is mainly achieved by the active intervention of the 
state to instil and promote certain republican core civic values and ideals such as 
patriotism, mutual toleration and respect for different views and critical thinking.  A 
republican system should actively seek to inculcate the republican values of social 
engagement through communication in a non-dominating fashion in particular towards 
those who make incompatible life choices. The republican education system indeed 
underlies all other republican principles as no elements of freedom as non-domination, 
contestatory citizenry and even republican institutions could have any hope of existence 
if the building blocks or materia umana, as Machiavelli used to call them, of a 
republican system are not prepared with buoni costumi (good habits) to assume their 
republican part in their own non-domination.  Needless to say that one of the most 
fundamental roles of the republican education system would consist of informing the 
citizens of their basic rights and liberties as reflected in the principles of the 
Fundamental Law and other universally recognized declarations of human rights. 
 
     In summary, I reiterate again that all main republican schools of thought that I 
examined here were fundamentally rooted in the previously mentioned principles of 
guarding against the imperium which was defined as the state domination and dominium 
that was said to be the instances of the interpersonal dominatory relations.  Thus a close 
examination of these two prominent safeguards towards the protection of the republican 
liberty would form the basic foundation of my enquiry.  I will attempt to extensively 
scrutinize various repositories of public power in the Islamic Republic of Iran by 
initially examining the provisions of the Iranian Constitution from where I will proceed 
to evaluate the structure of the political sovereignty and leadership.  Once these 
conceptual aspects are fully addressed, I will continue my enquiry into the concrete 
Islamic Republic’s institutional structure and their compliance with these republican 
principles.  The last section of my project will be devoted to the actual building blocks 
of the republican state i.e. the people themselves and their rights to public education and 
contestatory citizenry privileges.  
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     It is evident that my case study is also claimed to be firmly rooted in a specific 
interpretation of the Islamic Shariʻa which is declared to be providing compatible or at 
least neutral grounds for coexistence with the above illustrated republican tradition
196
. 
Thus in order to provide an exact analysis of these repositories of sovereignty I need to 
take a closer look at the second cornerstone of the Iranian socio-political doctrine of 
state, that of the prevailing school of the Islamic ideology based on the Iranian 
contemporary Shiʻa political thought.  This will constitute the theme of the forthcoming 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 - Political Theology 
 
 
I. Divine Sovereignty 
 
It could be considered as a well-grounded theological principle that in all western 
religions the ultimate sovereign and true holder of power and authority is God.  The 
whole universe is perceived to be the manifestation of the lotf (grace) of the ultimate 
ruler and law-giver
197
.  As a consequence of this fundamental belief, it comes to no 
surprise to observe that any man-made system of authority should be able to demonstrate 
a degree of compatibility with relation to this ultimate sovereign to claim some levels of 
religious legitimacy.  Traditionally in Islam there seems to have been a higher level of 
interdependence and intricacy between the divine and the temporal power as compared 
to, for instance, certain periods of Christianity
198
, which have shown some degree of 
flexibility towards the recognition of “Caesar’s” worldly mandate199.  This is well 
reflected in the simple fact that the Islamic calendar starts with the Prophet’s hijra 
(emigration) to medina that is when an actual comprehensive political authority was 
established rather than the Prophet’s birth or other ceremonial events.  However, it is 
banal to highlight that the relationship between the Church and state in the Christian 
world has also not been that amicable in particular when one considers the history of the 
European Concordats and the papal reactions to such effective separation of the raison 
d’état from the raison de foi200.   
 
     It is said that from 6000 verses of the Quran around 200 of them explicitly provide 
juridical and legal guidelines to regulate Muslim societies
201
. One could also encounter 
instructions that explicitly recommend believers to follow the example of the prophet - 
and as one of the Prophet Mohammad’s greatest achievements has been to establish a 
political government - this could therefore constitute a worldly pursuit by the 
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believers
202
.  Consequently in Islam the ultimate objective of salvation is achieved 
through a divine system of morality which is rooted in the absolute justice only 
attainable by following the guidelines of the sacred scripture and the Prophetic tradition.  
These provide some of the principal instructions for constructing a society based on the 
divine justice which is the only system capable of providing eternal redemption and 
salvation for mankind.  Hence it may not be an overstatement to conclude that if any 
dividing line between Islam and other western religions could be drawn, it may well be 
based on this search for absolutism on earth as perceived by the majority of Islamic 
theoreticians, which in the absence of a radical reformation process continues to be 
strongly present within the certain prominent schools of the Islamic political theology.  
It appears that this is a salient feature of Islam as compared to other members of the 
Abrahamic religions in which a significant body of interpretations, in particular 
following momentous reformation processes, have postponed the realization of the 
absolute justice to the afterlife with fundamental implications on the acceptance of the 
worldly profane authorities.  Nevertheless as it will be demonstrated below the 
dissimilarity is not always that clear cut with competing ideologies within the same 
Islamic school of thought gaining preference or otherwise losing the interest of the 
scholars of the time.   
 
     In Shiʻa jurisprudence two major rights have been identified which are said to be 
explicitly recognized and endorsed both by the Quran and the apostolic traditions; 
namely Haq Allāh (the right of God) and Haq al-nās ( the rights of people)203.  The latter 
is self-explanatory and is the rights that people might have or acquire against each other.  
These include such inherent rights as those over children and slaves, and other acquired 
rights arising from social interactions and the so-called division of labour and exchange 
of goods and services.  The first type of right, God’s rights, are those aimed at building a 
moral society based on His law by providing ethical guidelines such as the prohibition of 
alcohol, gambling and eating certain foods and so on.  These are all considered acts 
against God’s will as expressed in the Quran and sonnat (the prophetic tradition) 204. 
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     The divine right to absolute sovereignty could be regarded as the main expression of 
the above mentioned Haq Allāh, even though this also includes other acts, or refraining 
from certain acts, that could impact the “common good” of Muslim society205.  This 
undisputed right to sovereignty has been strongly emphasized by Von Grunebaum: 
 
Islam is the community of Allāh…He is the mundane head of his community which he 
not only rules, but governs.  He is the reason for the state’s existence, he is the principal 
of unity, the Staatsgedanke which both upholds and justifies the continuance of the 
commonwealth…the burden of lawmaking rests on Allāh’s shoulders.  Every order 
issuing from him carries the same compulsion.  It is not for man to grade his rulings as 
more or less important, nor is there any differential to separate the sphere of his direct 
interference from a neutral or a purely human zone
206
. 
 
There is no doubt that this act of submission to God, or its authorised representatives  
and the strive to build a society based on this divine will whose objective would be to 
obtain eternal salvation for mankind, is something that one could effortlessly identify 
throughout the history of western religious discourse as well
207
.  In Islam, as I will 
demonstrate below, this preoccupation with the state affair seems to have been further 
enhanced and adapted at various stages to address social and political needs of the 
contemporary nations
208
.  God has given humans the power to reason and free will 
(Extiyār) in order to worship him and establish God’s rule on earth based on justice and 
morality.  One underlying principle of such a belief would be the assumption that there 
are universal notions of justice and “good” which are valid in all eras of human history 
and could only be achieved though a righteous government endorsed and legitimated by 
the divine will.  Hence any government, in order to be regarded as legitimate, has to be 
based on principles sanctioned by the divine revelations.
209
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     Thus there is no doubt that in Islam the ultimate sovereignty always belongs to God: 
“To God belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth”210 or “God is the true 
King”211 are some of the numerous affirmations that the Quran repeatedly endorses to 
reiterate that God is the source of all authority and sovereignty existing on earth.  
Undoubtedly all sacred texts have always shown enormous flexibility towards various 
interpretations which are sometimes totally contradictory.  Nonetheless one could easily 
discover that such perceptions of these concepts based on creating the God’s rule on 
earth, or at least a religiously guided political system in the concerned territory, has been 
the a strong current of thought amongst Muslim theoreticians.  No need to mention that 
due to some obvious practical reasons this might not have found the space for overt 
manifestations.   
 
     This is a fundamental cornerstone of any system of authority and law which is rooted 
in religious doctrines.  Islam also strives to provide a comprehensive set of guidelines 
and tools to materialize such an ideal social order to facilitate societal harmony and 
promote common good which in this context is defined as God’s satisfaction (rezā 
Allāh).  This would in turn translate into the redemption and promise of paradise for the 
believers.  The realization of the divine will on earth inevitably has a personal 
component within it which relates to individual acts of worship and recommended 
deeds, but most importantly it contains some social aspects which inevitably affect 
human society in multiple ways.  As I will expound below, some religious scholars, 
especially within Shiʻism, have gone so far as to define an ideal socio-political order as 
an indispensible prerequisite to the realisation of such an ethical society.  This is a 
community that is exclusively led by a divinely guided leader who acts as the defender 
of the faith and an infallible administrator of the impeccable divine law.  The 
justifications provided in support of the necessity for such a government are all 
fundamentally based on the belief in the inherent flaws in the human reason being prone 
to deviate and lose the right path as warned in the Quran
212
.  As a result of this specific 
interpretation of the religious dogma, the achievement of an ideal society is exclusively 
feasible through divine guidance and sovereignty, Velāyat al-elāhyyat.  The final 
                                                 
210
 The Quran 6:73 
211
 The Quran 20:114 
212
 The Quran 70:19-20 
78 
 
objective of which would be to extend God’s sovereignty on earth by establishing a 
universal Islamic government in order to achieve absolute justice and righteousness 
under the guidance of the ultimate commander and sovereign - the only true leader 
capable of distinguishing what is in humanity’s best interests and what socio-political 
path to follow to attain these universalist values of truthfulness
213
.  It is evident that from 
the outset, the fundamental challenge of this strand of the religious doctrine would be to 
endorse and legitimize an actual authority and sovereignty who would be the 
embodiment and the tangible materialization of the divine will adequately sanctioned by 
the sacred scripture.  The Quran explicitly requires total obedience in three sources of 
spiritual and temporal sovereignty, God, the Prophet and those holding the authority
214
.  
The divine dominion was treated here above hence the other two legitimate sources of 
political sovereignty need to be treated more extensively. 
 
II. Shiʻa Political Theology 
As mentioned above, the Quran explicitly commands the believers to “obey the Prophet 
and those in authority among you”215.  The legitimacy of the political authority of the 
Prophet is derived from his direct lieutenancy of the divinity entrusted upon a chosen 
messenger to be the materialization of the deputyship of God’s presence amongst 
humanity.  The key element here is that of the divine appointment (entesāb) which is 
established here through direct investiture of the chosen figures through sacred 
scriptures and proclamations.  Hence this super human figure of the Prophet, and - in 
Shiʻism by extension, the Imams, are the only legitimate embodiments of the entire 
socio-political divine agenda for mankind.  The element of superiority with which these 
divinely sanctioned figures are equipped is their esmat (infallibility) which makes them 
immune to error and failure in their assigned mission
216
.   
 
     Undoubtedly the sole element of infallibility alone would not suffice if the messenger 
is not equipped with an absolute source of knowledge and wisdom necessary to guide 
humanity and to overcome the intricacies and challenges of the path to salvation.  In 
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Shiʻa this fundamental distinctive feature of superiority is an extension of the heavenly 
knowledge (elm) directly bestowed upon the Prophet and subsequently inherited by the 
Imams.  This crucial distinctive feature is unambiguously underlined by the Quran
217
, 
whereas there is no explicit mention of the Imams in the sacred scripture hence they 
need to possess certain personal virtues that qualify them to be the true successors of the 
Prophet, and as said above, the most obvious candidate for this exceptional characteristic 
would be their super-natural level of elm which turns them into undisputed ālems 
(knowledgeable) par excellence
218
.  
     It comes as no surprise that during the Prophet and Imams’ lifetimes they had to 
delegate certain tasks such as the administration of justice to other close associates due 
to practical necessities.  Indeed as the Muslim nation grew and expanded into new 
territories it became mandatory to have local representatives especially for the collection 
of religious taxes and enactment of the legal functions
219
.  By 941 the Shiʻa community 
was faced with a major doctrinal challenge following the so-called Greater Occultation, 
that is the concealment of the Imam from public appearance.  Hence this deputyship 
entered a new phase as there was a paramount question of community leadership, in 
particular as to who should take charge of the Shiʻa community’s religious and legal 
affairs.  Accordingly the Shiʻa ideology had to adjust and accommodate ample 
interpretations in order to extend the notions of authority to these classes of religious 
jurists who had no explicit mandate to assume such crucial occupations in the absence of 
any direct appointment by the Imams
220
.  On this long path to the recognition of 
authority, the Shiʻa ideologues had to overcome various obstacles, mainly the 
aforementioned lack of any direct delegation of authority or unambiguous deputyship, 
not even in common religious matters.  With the exception of the obscure notion of 
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ololamr (those in authority) which, on closer examination, could easily be extended to 
any authority in charge of the state’s political administration.  There are indeed very few 
and generally vague references to the temporal authority within the traditional hadīth 
which directly or indirectly treat this argument as the below one attributed to the 
Prophet: 
 
When innovation occurs in my nation, a learned authority will expose them through his 
knowledge.  And if he does not do so, then may God’s curse be upon him.221  
 
Or another hadīth attributed to Imam Jaʻfar Sadiq, the sixth Imam, which reads: 
 
The earth shall not remain without there always being a learned authority from among 
us, who will distinguish the truth from the falsehood.
222
 
 
A third hadīth persistently referred to by Khomeini in his justification and extension of 
the role of the jurists into the temporal political authority, is the one attributed to the 
Prophet which postulates: “may God bless my successors”, the Prophet is then asked 
who would these successors be? To which he replied: “those who narrate my hadīth and 
tradition”.  According to Khomeini - based on some other sources not accepted by most 
jurists, there has been a further phrase following this reading as: “and those who teach 
people (my tradition)”223. 
 
     This idea is at the heart of the notion of Faqih (religious jurist) which is central to the 
narratives that endorse the legitimacy of the Islamic jurists to assume religious and also 
temporal authorities.  Nevertheless after careful examination of the Quran and all the 
hadīth concerning this argument, I was unable to find any explicit endorsement of the 
role or even the very existence of the Faqih position in the first hand prophetic and 
Imamate sources
224
.  Indeed one could hardly find overt treatments of any aspects of 
temporal authority in the sacred book of Islam and the sunna.  It is therefore not 
unexpected that this argument has been at the heart of heated debates impacting the very 
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foundations of the Shiʻa ideology and in particular those treating the administration of 
sovereignty in the absence of a divinely appointed authority ever since
225
.   
 
    As I will expound below, a careful study of the argumentation put forward by the 
leaders of the Imamate community in support of the role and authority of the jurists in 
the absence of any direct divine endorsements reveals that the solution to this significant 
challenge has been pursued in two different directions.  The first path seems to have 
followed a line of separation of spiritual authority from the temporal one, and the second 
direction has been aimed at a practice of attributing more prominence to such personal 
qualities as sound belief, sound character, justice and most importantly elm (knowledge) 
to compensate for the apparently insurmountable absence of a direct designation. 
 
    One could identify numerous stages and periods in this regard which all seem to have 
appeared due to practical realities and necessities of the time.  In the long historical 
phase after the Complete Occultation of 941 and under the “illegitimate” rule of the 
Abbasid dynasty, such authors as Shayk al-Mufid (d. 1022), Sharif al-Murtadā (d. 1044) 
and Shayk al-Tusi (995-1067) started to address the argument of the authority and 
political power of the Faqih during the Occultation period
226.  In particular Mufid’s 
emphasis in the “reasoned argumentation” (elm al-kalām) made a ground-breaking 
contribution to the other principles of the so-called Muʻtazaliyya school with significant 
consequences on such sources of jurisprudence and theology as ejmā (consensus), qiyās 
(analogy) and ejtehād (individual deliberation)227.  Sharif al-Murtadā went even further 
by claiming that serving the illegitimate rulers (jaʻer) in certain circumstances might be 
admissible such as under duress or when the position enables the occupant to enact a 
justice
228.  Tusi’s arguments were basically along the same lines emphasizing the fact 
that the legitimacy of rule belongs to the Imam and the service of any illegitimate ruler 
to become acceptable only when this ruler recognizes the authority of Imam
229
.  One 
could clearly perceive an apparent tension and an incessant strive in the works of these 
authors to extend at least some part of the political authority (Velāyat) of the Imams to 
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the Faqih who were de facto controlling the daily affairs of the Shiʻa community.  
Nevertheless one could readily identify a marked limitation on the scope and extent of 
this authority which for obvious reasons could never assume the form of a complete 
deputyship (niyābat) of a formally absent Imam, not least because the Occultation could 
not be interpreted as a complete absence.  The apparent limitations and even 
uncertainties imposed upon the jurisprudence of the Faqih in such matters as offensive 
jahād (holy war), capital punishment and Friday prayer (jomʻa) are all examples of such 
restraint in the attribution of the full niyābat to these new embodiments of the 
ololamr.
230
  
 
     Furthermore two main schools of thought within the Islamic doctrine could be 
identified to have had a fundamental impact on the political discourse of Islam, these 
were the Muʻtazilite and the Ashʻrite schools of theology.  The former is based on the 
line of argumentation that human reason is capable of determining the good from the 
bad based on an actual context of the phenomena
231
.  In other words, the value of an act 
is directly tied to its actual observable benefit or harm.  Whereas the second school, the 
Ashʻrite, retains that the correct ruling on the value of an act could only be derived from 
the revealed law
232
.  Consequently the Muʻtazilite school of theology tended to be more 
receptive to such notions as soltān ādel (just ruler) and the possibility of establishing a 
temporal rule based on the necessities of the rationalistic objectivism arising from the 
day to day running of Muslim affairs.  More relevant to my study of the Shiʻa political 
theology is the distinction between the Osuli and Akhbāri schools which mainly centres 
around the sources of law, the means of attaining the knowledge and authority of the 
Olamā as heirs to the Imams233 with the fundamental difference in the treatment of the 
notion of ejtehād234. 
 
     By the establishment of the Buyid dynasty (945-1055) these Shiʻa scholars were 
faced with the necessity of extending the exclusive legitimacy of the Prophet and Imams 
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to establish a temporal rule to include the Shiʻa sultans of the Buyid dynasty: at this time 
the Shiʻa community had its own temporal power and was not interpreting matters as a 
bystander minority force.  Unsurprisingly this attempt would have proved very 
challenging.  As mentioned above the explicit nasb (appointment) of the Imams and 
their divine designation was the only acceptable source of legitimacy to assume both 
religious and temporal authorities of the community, hence the obvious solution seems 
to have been to separate these two realms to delegate the temporal authority of the 
Imams to the de facto rulers of the Islamic community hence freeing the Imamate 
doctrine from the necessity of having an actual political investiture
235
.  Despite these 
attempts to acknowledge the existing Shiʻa political system even in the absence of an 
explicit divine mandate, the main scholars of the Baghdad school - such as the 
previously mentioned Mufid, continued to consider these temporal rulers as the usurpers 
of the political authority which rightfully belongs to the Imams.  The Imams were 
considered to be connected to a prophetic source of knowledge and believed to inherit 
the authority through the proper channels of nass (designation)
236
.  Therefore since man 
is considered fallible, the true sovereignty would only materialize through the return of 
the Hidden Imam Mahdi whenever such a time as God deems appropriate and all ruling 
Khalifs would be considered unjust, sinful and tyrannical
237
. 
 
    In the centuries that followed, particularly between the twelfth and fourteenth 
centuries the works of the Baghdad school were expanded by such scholars as Muhaqqiq 
al-Hilli (1205-1277), Ibn Idris (d. 1202) and most importantly Allāmah Al-Hilli (1250-
1325) who firmly grounded the foundation of the Shiʻa jurisprudence in such notions as 
ejtehād and taqlid (emulation).  Allāmah Al-Hilli went further by claiming that although 
“no mojtahed is infallible, every mojtahed is right” based on the principles of ejtehād238.   
 
     Another fundamental concept put forward by these scholars was taqlid
239
, namely the 
emulation by the followers.  This is a very interesting concept as far as my area of 
                                                 
235
 See for instance Arjomand, S. (ed.) (1988) Authority and Political Culture in Shiʻism ” New York, 
SUNY Pub. 
236
 Halm, H. p.50 
237
 Ibid p.53 
238
 Ibid p.67 
239
 Ibid 
84 
 
research is concerned as taqlid in practice entails the total obedience and submission to 
the source of emulation (marjaʻ).  Although it is evident that the believers voluntarily 
submit to their chosen marjaʻ, nevertheless this total obedience in the quasi total 
absence or obligation of reasoning would pose a significant challenge to any secular 
system claiming any degree of popular sovereignty.  Evidently these were the first 
attempts towards the extension of the Imam’s prerogatives to the mojtaheds as these 
were deemed to be the least prone to error and corruption as compared to secular rulers.  
Heinz Halm goes as far as to claim that the Allāmah Al-Hilli’s concept of taqlid and 
ejtehād is the main foundation of today’s rule by the ayatollah in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran
240
.  Indeed a closer analysis of these concepts proves their fundamental impact on 
the later development of such notions as Velāyat-e Faqih which were aimed at extending 
the various principles of sovereignty to the class of clergy within the later Shiʻa school 
of theology, as I will detail below.  
 
     Undoubtedly the fundamental change in the Shiʻa jurisprudence was born by the 
onset of the first fully-fledged Shiʻa dynasty of Iran in 1501 by the Safavids.  This was 
the first time in the Shiʻa world that the actual political ruler of the time also claimed the 
highest religious authority.  Here the jurists such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Karāki (d. 1530 or 
1534), and al-Shahid al-Thāni (d. 1558) under the patronage of the Safavid Shāhs, 
significantly extended the works of the previous scholars by allocating numerous rights 
and prerogatives of the only legitimate ruler, i.e. the Imam, to the qualified mojtaheds. 
This was accomplished mainly thanks to the previously elaborated notions of ejtehād, 
which at the first part of the Safavid dynasty happened to coincide with the office of the 
sultan himself
241
.  These efforts were promarily aimed at devolving legitimacy to the 
temporal rulers of the time to manage the daily affairs of the Islamic community.  On the 
other hand the jurists by officially assuming the role of the ololamr, started to assume 
the executive power of interpreting the Shariʻa and enforcing the religious punishments 
under the Quranic commandment of “Commanding the good and forbidding the evil”242.  
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     Nevertheless it would appear that even within the Safavid era one could identify three 
main periods concerning the political relations of the Olamā with the temporal rulers.  
The initial rulers of the Safavid dynasty felt a strong necessity to involve the religious 
authorities in their daily management of state affairs, to the point where they actively 
invited the prominent religious figures from the Arabic speaking regions to their capital 
to help promote the newly founded state religion and faith, the previously mentioned 
Sheikh Al-Karāki, a theologian from Lebanon, was amongst these state sponsored 
scholars
243.  At the second stage, such as during the Shah Abbās rule, the monarch, 
which was by then enjoying a significant spiritual power and authority, did not feel the 
previous urge to involve the religious leaders in the political affairs and even actively 
tried to curb their influence and power
244
.  And finally towards the end of the Safavid era 
when the central government was not enjoying the same power and moral credentials as 
before, the reliance on the religious authorities made its return into the statecraft and 
politics to the point that the rulers actually depended on the Olamā in the daily running 
of their affairs
245
.  This interdependence between the moral legitimacy of the central 
ruling system and its relation to the extent of involvement of the religious authorities in 
political affairs is a fundamental point which, as I will expound below, was accentuated 
during the Qājār period.   
 
III. The Qājār Period and Political Authority of the 
Faqihs  
The Qājār period (1785-1925) seems to have been a very critical chapter in Iran’s 
history as far as the interactions between the religious and secular powers are concerned.  
This era also witnessed radical changes at a global level with the onset of the French 
revolution in which all feudal, aristocratic and religious privileges of the ruling tyrant 
and the religious institutions were severely undermined
246
.  In particular the ideologues 
of the French Revolution such as Leon Gambetta (1838-1882), whose ideology served as 
an inspirational model throughout the world for the centuries that followed, clearly 
identified the ecclesiastic power as the main retrograde source of social oppression 
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particularly through their close links with the tyrannical monarchy that the revolution 
vehemently denounced 
247
.  The monarchic and ecclesiastic powers both were deemed as 
authorities whose legitimacy did not depend on the will of the people and claimed 
supernatural sources of legitimacy, which were at odds with the foundations of the 
sovereignty and liberty that the new system was promoting
248
.  At a regional level one 
can see the appearance of the regional powers of Russia and the presence of the British 
forces which significantly impacted the geo-political layout of the region.  
Notwithstanding, whilst the world around seemed to have embarked on colossal waves 
of radical change and modernist overhaul, one fails to identify significant trends towards 
breaking away from the prevailing forces of tradition in Iran
249
.  The ancien régime of 
Qājārs in Iran was still strongly holding onto the reins of power although challenged by 
numerous external threats such as humiliating defeats in the wars with imperial Russia 
and the British occupation of southern Iran, coupled with numerous internal challenges 
such as the rise of Bābism.  All these ongoing circumstances had a profound impact on 
the socio-political conscience of the nation
250.  Nonetheless while the Qājār rule in Iran 
is synonymous with corruption and cultural and social impasse, one could still notice 
important radical changes in Iranian society due to the ever increasing contact with the 
West and frequent travels of the Qājār elites along with their close observation of 
western socio-political achievements
251
.  In particular during the Nasir al-Din Shāh 
period (1848-1896), one could observe an astonishing move towards modernisation of 
the state’s bureaucratic infrastructure and various other public and social services, which 
Amānat has identified as the beginning of modern monarchic absolutism in Iran252.  
Nevertheless with the exception of the initial decade of Aqā Mohammad Khān’s rule 
(1742–1797) and later the Nāser al-Din Shāh period, it would not be incorrect to define 
the greatest part of the Qājār period as that characterised by an extremely fragile and 
impotent central government in constant need of reaffirming its own legitimacy, as well 
as being under a perpetual external threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
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Hence the question of legitimacy of rule seems to have been more accentuated as 
compared to the Safavid era for instance, in which some of the rulers were actually 
spiritual leaders of their tribes whose rule was constantly referred to as “the shadow of 
God on earth” (zel Allāh)253.  Consequently one notices a very close collaboration and 
reliance on the religious authority by the actual temporal rulers, at least at the initial 
stages of the Qājār dynasty, to the extent that authors such as Zibākalām regard the 
religious authority as one of the main pillars of Qājār’s political power in Iran254. 
 
     From a comparative viewpoint, one could easily identify parallel experiences 
throughout the world history of socio-political developments which demonstrate a 
similar type of relationship.  Indeed the European history of the political progress has 
also registered similar interactions between the forces of secular sovereignty, including 
those based on a popular mandate, and the religious forces of traditionalism.  As it was 
argued previously, the very emergence of the modern republican doctrine of state could 
be regarded as a result of a direct refutation of these metaphysical sources of legitimacy 
that fall beyond and above the human reason.  
 
     In any case in the presence of an organized sacred institution, one could often notice 
a significant growth and enhancement in the religious authority when the central 
governments have been weak or divided
255
.  Iranian experience also follows this general 
tendency and various elements of disunity within the country together with some 
international forces of oppression, which helped to keep the central government weak 
and incapable of upholding social justice; hence the only alternative sources of political 
sovereignty to this inefficient state administration apparatus were sought in the existing 
network of social capital around the local loyalties and authorities
256
.  
 
     Here one could clearly witness the spectacular prevalence of the Osuli School of 
Shiʻism to devolve all prerogatives of the Hidden Imam to the faqih of the time with 
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considerable consequences for the Shiʻa political theology257.  This steady trend of 
political engagement by the Shiʻa jurists was also a result of their increasing wealth and 
prestige due to being the sole agents for the collection of religious taxes and 
endowments, which gave the class of clergy an unprecedented social status and 
significant financial resources
258
.  This social standing and consequent involvement in 
worldly affairs including the socio-political issues of the community, is clearly reflected 
in the discourse perused by scholars such as Sheikh Jaʻfar al-Kabir Kashif al-Ghita 
(d.1813), Sheikh Muhammad Hassan al-Najafi (d. 1849), Vahid Behbahāni (d. 1803) 
and Sheikh Murtaza al-Ansāri (d. 1864).  These scholars embarked on a relentless 
endeavour to lay the foundations of the new Shiʻa doctrine of government by gradually 
granting the complete deputyship (vali al-amr) of the Hidden Imam to the faqihs of the 
time.  Najafi’s assumption of the position of marjaʻ aqlid - i.e. the most learned among 
the mojtaheds whose religious rulings had to be followed by all Shiʻa followers, gave the 
mojtahed’s position an unprecedented status within the Imamate school of theology259.  
This was accompanied by proposing a set of criteria to qualify for this position based on 
personal qualities including piety, knowledge, sound character and so on.  The inclusion 
of other practices of public approval, namely taqlid and other manifestations of public 
approval such as the payment of religious taxes and endowments, further reinforced the 
social position of the specific social class of the Olamā260.  Ansāri also went on to 
acquire significant social recognition both in religious and popular circles to the point 
where he was declared as the “seal of the mojtaheds”261.  His open-ended arguments on 
Velāyat and in particular the institutionalization of ejtehād, set the cornerstones and 
practical tools for ensuing expansions by his students and the subsequent generations
262
.  
In the upcoming chapters I will discuss the fundamental impacts such notions had on the 
republican principles of sovereignty and their implications on the concepts of 
domination and dependence.   
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     One interesting observation made by Halm is that the implicit endorsement of the 
temporal rule by the Olamā was only viable as long as the Shāh acted in accordance with 
Shariʻa law or at least appeared to be pious263.  Hence the claims of an “implicit 
concordat” that some authors have advanced, does not seem to be entirely accurate at 
least from an epistemological point of view
264
.  Consequently a further development of 
the principles of the judiciary prerogatives by Ansāri and his followers into different 
categories of legal administration brought about even more social power for the 
mojtaheds and extended their jurisdiction to any matter where there was even a remote 
possibility of being in line with the Hidden Imam’s authority265.  Thus during this time 
the religious authority was enjoying a significant power and influence, which could 
easily overspill into political activism in an era characterised by the previously outlined 
elements of the weakness of the central government
266
. It is evident that the field of legal 
administration (qazā) had the potential to become the most fundamental drive for the 
growing political involvement of the religious authorities by vesting them as the 
“protectors of the people against the unjust conduct of those in power”267. Therefore, as 
one sees throughout the centuries that followed this further development elevated the 
position of the mojtaheds to a higher level of leadership (riyāsat) which turned them into 
natural delegates to manage daily affairs of the avām (laity).  
 
     One can not overlook the extensive employment of the principles of ejtehād within 
the relevant literature aimed at extending the authority of the jurists to assume all 
Imam’s prerogatives with significant potential to extend to the political authority.  This 
resulted in a momentous redefinition of various principles of Velāyat to actually include 
temporal political authority
268
.   Indeed here one can see a significant move from the 
fundamental notion of the Velāyat al-qazā (legal jurisdiction) into the Velāya al-ʻāmah 
(general deputyship) of Imam in all matters
269
. From there it was easy to imagine the 
realisation of the full potential of powerful notions of ejtehād, taqlid and niyābat.  
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Indeed the failure of the secular rulers to administer justice provided the theoretical 
justification for the now all-powerful office of marjʻa taqlid to argue for assumption of 
the actual political power in the vest of the sultan al-ādel (just ruler) to replace the 
corrupt secular rulers
270.  As Amānat reiterates the centralisation of power achieved by 
the mojtahedin in this period was not just as a result of the personal qualifications or 
allāmiyyat, it was more a notion of riyāsat endorsed by public acclamation and through 
the payment of religious taxes
271
.  Furthermore this in turn helped to intensify and 
strengthen the authority of the Olamā rooted in a substantial amount of rudimentary 
popular mandate.  Hence one should not underestimate the role of the moqalled 
(follower/imitator) in legitimization of both dini (religious) and consequently donyavi 
(temporal) authority of the Olamā.  In any case one would struggle to identify any clear 
procedure of consulting popular consent and any active and efficient supervision organs 
by the same moqalled aimed at providing any transparent means of monitoring the actual 
process of the administration of power by the Olamā. 
 
     Thus to summarize various political implications of this traditionalist strand of the 
Shiʻa political theology, I could highlight numerous salient convictions that the 
proponents of this fundamentally Osuli school of theology endorsed.  The most 
important aspect of this doctrine which eventually prevailed in the Islamic Revolution of 
1979, was the idea that Islam already adequately provided all the necessary laws and 
regulations and it is the role and prerogative of the mojtaheds to extract and interpret 
already existing laws of Shariʻa272.  Unsurprisingly this had fundamental implications 
not only on the very act of legislation but also on the authority and role of the people in 
being the source of such constitutional legitimacy.  Furthermore as I will discuss below, 
the principles of liberty and equality proposed by the proponents of the constitutionalism 
in Iran were regarded, by these scholars, to go against the explicit rulings of the Shariʻa 
in which not all subjects of the Islamic state are considered equal, based on religious, 
gender and some other social considerations
273
.   
 
                                                 
270
 Sachedina, A. A. pp.235, 236 
271
 See Amanat, A. (1988) In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: the Designation of Clerical 
Leadership in Modern Shiʻism in Arjomand, S. (1988)  
272
 Hoseinzādeh, M. ibid p.80 
273
 Ibid p.81 
91 
 
     This specific understanding of the role and authority of the mojtaheds - which was 
perceived to include all purviews of the Hidden Imam, considered all political 
arrangements of the hitherto Islamic community as lacking complete legitimacy and as 
the result of mere zarurat (necessity).  This doctrine eventually led to an actual call for 
the establishment of a legitimate political order headed by the religious authorities as the 
ones envisaged by the influential group of Fadāʻiān-e Eslam which had fundamental 
impacts on the political doctrines of Khomeini
274
. 
 
     Moreover this political authority of Olamā in the Fiqāhati Islam which was deemed 
to be both collective and impersonal
275
 underwent further extension as the Shiʻa leaders 
were subjected to a new wave of intellectual assault arriving from external sources of the 
political culture.  This not only included the constitutionalism but also other liberal 
ideologies and most importantly leftist and nationalist philosophies with significant 
socio-political implications on all aspects of the Shiʻa political theology.  This cultural 
onslaught of both external ideologies and a revival of the ancient Iranian identity and the 
response of the mojtahedin to it - with their implications on the notions of the political 
sovereignty, will be the subject of my next analysis.  
 
IV. Constitutional Revolution Modernism 
To claim that one of the major social upheavals in Iran towards the end of the 19
th
 
century was built on two main grievances is not misleading.  The first cause was directly 
connected with the mercantile and economic issues and the second element could be 
traced to the social calls for reforms in the educational and judiciary systems
276
.  An 
additional factor could be identified in the close interactions between the external 
powers and the self-consciousness generated due to greater exchanges and sometimes 
hostile interventions of foreign powers within Iran.  Indeed the so-called “print 
capitalism” which started centuries before in Europe was creating existential 
transformations across Europe itself with the results of its technological achievements 
through Enlightenment and industrial revolutions felt across the peripheries of these core 
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empires
277
.  Although Iran was relatively distant from the epicentre of these socio-
cultural upheavals, it could not remain indifferent even to the tiniest waves of these 
cultural onslaughts which managed to penetrate into its conservative society.  
 
     Certain intellectuals including Abd al-Rahim Talebof (1834-1911), Mirza Fath Ali 
Ākhondzādeh (1812-1878), Yusuf Khān Mostashār Aldowleh (1823-1895), Mirzā 
Hosein Khān Sepahsālār (1828-1881) and Mirza Malkum Khān (1833-1908) went out of 
their way to adopt and spread these new ideas coming from the west.  They regarded 
them as the main engines of change and the ultimate remedy for the disastrous situation 
that the Iranian society found itself in
278
.  These pioneers made desperate efforts to either 
fundamentally reject the religious ideology as the main cause of all Iranian malaise as 
was the case with Akhondzādeh, or try to reconcile the religious doctrine with western 
notions and even to claim that most western ideas of freedom and democracy were 
actually taken from the Islamic concepts accredited by the Quran and sunnat, as was the 
case with Mostashār Aldowleh279.  After years of serving as an Iranian diplomat in 
Russia and Europe, Mostashār Aldowleh made his first attempt to formulate a 
comprehensive comparison between the western, and in particular, the French codes of 
law with the Iranian Sharʻi system of laws and identified the major following 
differences:  
 
The French “code” is made through a process of consultation and agreement between 
the ruling system and the people and not based on one individual’s will.  
The French code is comprehensive of all practical laws which are provided in a simple 
language understandable even for common French citizens, unlike the religious law 
which prove hard to decipher even for the religious authorities.  
The French law is about the affairs of this world and applies to all French citizens 
regardless of their religions or beliefs
280
. 
 
There are numerous interesting arguments put forward by this influential article.  Whilst 
one could readily identify a clear attempt at separating the spiritual and secular aspects 
of an ideal constitution, an explicit reference to the egalitarian concepts advanced as the 
basis of a universal legal system applicable to all citizens regardless of their religious 
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and social status, could also be identified.  Furthermore one can also appreciate the 
acknowledgment of the simplicity and transparency of a legal system which is easily 
understandable without ambiguity and space for different interpretations, such as those 
required by the religious dogma making up a great portion of the prerogatives of the 
mojtaheds.  This is yet another major characteristic of a constitution which is made by 
and could apply to, every single individual in all their mundane affairs and social 
interactions in a clear and unambiguous manner.  It is also intriguing to see how he goes 
into detail in order to praise the superiority of the French Code, even though it is not 
obvious what is the exact counterpart of comparison he is referring to? As understood by 
the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, Iran did not have any officially formulated body of 
legal legislature, besides the traditional religious sources.  Even as far as the existing 
corpus of the legal structure was concerned, these were managed by the mojtahedin with 
a great amount of autonomy and largely based on their individual interpretations of an 
open-ended collection of traditions in the Shariʻa jurisprudence281.  Hence the very basic 
question that one might have after reading Mostashār Aldowleh’s articles would concern 
the appropriateness of using a comparative method in his analysis, both qualitatively, 
regarding the nature of comparison, and also quantitatively concerning the amount of 
local “codes” in the Iranian legal system comparable to the French constitutional 
articles. 
 
     Similar reflections are proffered by the previously mentioned Malkum Khan, again as 
a result of his observations of the French legal system.  He engenders an interesting 
linguistic effort to distinguish the fields of law (qānun) with the religious based legal 
concepts (urf).  He proceeds to declare that the principal function of “law” would be to 
provide for public welfare and citizen’s equality282. 
 
     A closer look at Mostashār Aldowleh and Malkum Khān’s statements reveals some 
more interesting aspects of their pioneering analysis.  Whilst their works were 
undoubtedly amongst the first real attempts to study and unravel the secrets of the 
western constitutional systems and hence should be evaluated as such, one could easily 
identify some apparent shortcomings which cast a shadow of doubt on the true 
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understanding of the western system of government by the forerunners of the Iranian 
constitutional revolution.  This is an important theoretical deficiency which as I will 
demonstrate further below continues to haunt the political ideologues of Iran even in the 
modern era.  Although in these studies the priority seems to have been given to the study 
of a body of legislation of a western country, one fails to identify a clear distinction 
made between a “code” and the real underpinning factors that actually do generate such 
a code.  In other words, it is obvious that this legal system has not been created in a 
vacuum and is the result of many other socio-political factors, the principles of the 
sovereignty of people and parliamentarianism being one of them.  Most importantly 
there does not seem to be any clear distinction between the connotations of these terms 
denoting the body of laws and those referring to the actual constitutional arrangements 
of a country.  Conversely even in the analysis of this body of laws, it would prove 
extremely difficult to identify adequate attention being paid to the various forces 
involved not only in a legislation process but also in the supervision and most 
fundamentally, the execution of these codes, what one might otherwise label as the 
separation and independence of the political powers.  Even when one examines the 
reference to the egalitarian treatments of the citizens in the eyes of the western legal 
system, a more elaborate treatment of the subject is expected which could be extended 
not only to the followers of the different religious faiths, but also to the minority rights 
and gender equality which were, at least partially, covered by the French code of the 
time.  And finally the fundamental discussion on civil systems including the legal and 
educational ones, political parties and freedom of expression are all left out. These 
obviously all form the basic structure of the French code - even from the time of 
France’s first republic which was firmly grounded in the philosophical doctrines of the 
ideological fathers of the French Revolution including Montesquieu, Rousseau, Bodin, 
Voltaire, Mably and Condorcet, to name but a few
283
. 
 
    It is reasonable to argue that this significant shortcoming in the ideas put forward by 
the Iranian reformists might well be due to the authors’ extreme caution and meticulous 
endeavours to demonstrate the compatibility of the western constitution with the Shariʻa 
to avoid causing too much resistance or even a direct confrontation.  Coincidentally one 
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could see similar shortcomings in the works of the other prominent authors of the time 
who likewise tried to demonstrate the compatibility of the western constitutionalism 
with the religious doctrine, who all seem to be failing to advance a coherent argument 
based on a consistent body of evidence and logic.  
 
     One could safely exclude Ākhondzādeh from this category who seems to have 
proposed a more coherent analysis of western political thought and strived to provide the 
roots of its radical difference with the Islamic political thought.  Unlike most others he 
never made ostensive efforts to prove the compatibility of the western legal systems with 
Shariʻa law and openly criticized Islam as the main reason of the Iranian backwardness 
due to its existential incompatibility with the occidental legal systems and some 
fundamental aspects of the citizens basic rights
284.  Ākhondzādeh himself underlined the 
influence of some western intellectuals such as France’s Ernest Renan in his works 
which were a combination of secular anthropological notions of the ethnicities and most 
importantly his strong criticism of the religious ideology with his famous declaration 
that Islam is “the heaviest chain that humanity has ever borne”285.  In his major book 
dealing with this argument called Maktubāt, Ākhondzādeh directly points the finger of 
blame at the religious doctrine for being the source of various social injustices such as 
the treatment of women, especially shown in forced marriages.  The radical solution he 
offers is the total eradication of all aspects of Islamic laws and culture.  He further 
extends the argument by proposing substituting the Arabic writing system used in Iran 
with either the Latin or Cyrillic script as a way of purifying the Iranian social 
conscience, from what he calls, “Arabic customs”, a philosophy which was most notably 
adopted by the Kemalist ideology of a secularist Turkish political establishment 
286
.  
 
     Furthermore some acute analysis can be found of certain characteristics of the 
western political system by other intellectuals such as Mirzā Abdul Rahim Tālbof (1834-
1911) who provided a detailed observation on the concept of freedom which 
demonstrates his impressive power of observation and evaluation.  In his seminal work 
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called Masāel Al-Hayāt, he describes six types of freedom in a western society287.  The 
first type is what he calls “freedom of existence” meaning everyone is free to do 
whatever they wish as long as their freedom does not violate another individual’s 
freedom.  This is reminiscent of the famous quote which also underpins the main theme 
of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty which reads: “Your right to swing your arms, ends just 
where the other man's nose begins”288.  Other types of freedom in Tālbof’s analysis 
include: freedom of expression, belief, assembly, choice of profession, personal pursuit 
and press
289
.   
 
     Despite all this detailed analysis and impressive interpretation of some of the western 
political ideology’s intellectual products, as I expounded before, few seem to have 
provided a comprehensive study of the very foundation of the western political doctrine.  
They seem to have mainly dedicated their analysis to the eventual fruits and “aftermath” 
of these systems. Whereas as I briefly mentioned before there are momentous scholastic, 
Renaissance and Enlightenment intellectual heritages in the field of the political 
philosophy underpinning the modern western constitutional systems which need to be 
studied in order to provide a full appreciation of the nature of the western systems of the 
political authority.  These include constitutional, juridical and individual rights which I 
briefly referred to in Chapter 1 and will analyse in detail in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
     Other prominent intellectuals of the time including Hassan Taqizādeh (1878-1970) 
and Mirzā Hossein Khān Sepahsālār (1826-1881) largely fall into either of the above 
two intellectual camps.  On the one hand those seeking to adapt a new modernist 
discourse of constitutionalism to Islam by trying to provide examples from the Quran 
and sunnat to prove a similarity or to attempt to demonstrate that these were taken from 
Islamic cultural heritage.  On the other hand there is indeed a modernist group who 
acknowledged a radical incompatibility of the Shiʻa doctrine with the western notions of 
democracy, parliamentarianism and individual rights and either demand a total 
separation of the dini from donyavi affairs, such as Tālbof, or a total elimination of the 
religious culture from Iranian society, the solution advocated by Ākhondzādeh.  
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     Unsurprisingly these new waves of violent intellectual assaults inevitably challenged 
the old social orders based on local and religious loyalties together with the traditional 
economic arrangements which formed the cornerstone of those entities.  It is evident that 
this trend directly impacted the interests and the influence of one specific social class, 
namely the Olamā.  This encounter can be observed in many other so-called “peripheral” 
societies exposed to western economic and consequently socio-political hegemonic 
influences.  Reactions to these cultural onslaughts in the various peripheries of these 
new socio-economic power centres were very different from one country to the next.  
Moaddel’s comparative study in this area is very instructive290.  In Turkey under a 
similar threat it was deemed appropriate to devolve a part of the authority to some type 
of ministers who shared the burden of decisions and attempted to launch some processes 
of reform.  In India it was deemed more appropriate to enact the imposed British 
political and economic agenda.  Whereas in Egypt Muhammad Ali (1769-1840) tried to 
persuade the Olamā to share the process of reform and modernisation, an attempt that 
was later tried as well by the Pahlavi dynasty.  However, the reaction of the Qājār 
monarchy did not embrace any of these trends wholeheartedly hence possibly explaining 
the reason for all the impasse and stalemate shown in every direction
291
. 
 
V. Theologians’ Response to Constitutionalism  
It should be underlined that the Olamā’s response to these all-encompassing waves of 
modernism was not a unanimous rejection.  As I will argue below there were indeed 
significant divergences in the understanding of the role of the Shariʻa in the political 
sovereignty of the state.  In some cases without an active support of some prominent 
mojtaheds of the era, one might not have been able to even think of such a radical 
upheaval as the Tobacco Protest (1891-1892) and most importantly the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution
292
.  Nevertheless as Lahiji amongst others has shown, 
Olamā’s initial support for the constitutional revolution mainly arose from their partial 
understanding of the real implications of such transformations as none of them seemed 
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to have any profound comprehension of the true message of constitutionalism, the rule 
of law and a parliamentarian system of government
293
.  
 
     This becomes clearer upon closer examination of the statements and declarations of 
the religious leaders released during the Constitutional Revolution.  Furthermore the few 
supporters of the various new movements for change seem to have been dragged into 
political action due to the great popularity for such ideals and the fear of losing their 
own popular support and prestige
294
.  In fact some authors believe that it was indeed this 
contest for popularity and the urge to attract the much desired support of the laity that 
shaped the political orientation of the Olamā295. In spite of this some prominent 
members of the Olamā indeed recognised the existential threats of various aspects of 
western modernism and tried to contrast its diversified means and modes of propagation 
by issuing religious edicts.  This happened against the use of the rail road, for instance, 
or the outright condemnation of other social developments and economical 
advancements which they identified as the vehicles for the spread of western 
modernism
296
. 
 
     As there is a significant body of research and study dedicated to the role of the 
religious authorities in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution; I could quite safely avoid 
providing a detailed analysis of this subject here.  Nonetheless it would be instructive to 
briefly consider the actual understanding of the constitutional fundamentals by the 
religious leaders, as this would adequately demonstrate their exact position vis-à-vis 
such new concepts of parliamentarianism, popular sovereignty and the rule of law, all 
fundamental to the republican doctrine of state subject to this study.  Two main 
representatives of the principal schools of the political theology within the religious 
camp could be identified with Sheikh Mohammad Hosein Nāʻini (1859-1937) as a pro-
constitutionalism figure and Sheikh Fazlollāh Nuri (1842-1909) as the religious mentor 
of the opposition group to such ideas.  The point on which most authors agree is that the 
majority of religious authorities, at least initially, saw constitutionalism as the least 
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harmful of two possible systems of government in Iran, the other being the endemic 
tyranny embodied in an absolutist monarchy where the will of one individual was above 
any sacred or secular laws and collective concerns
297
.  Nāʻini saw the possibility of 
power sharing as a way of reducing the corruption and oppression on the people in a 
period when the actual materialization of the rule of the infallible Imam was not 
possible
298
.  Therefore the underlying perception one gets from his statements is that one 
is still facing a crisis of legitimacy, as any government not headed by a divinely 
appointed authority would be considered a usurper of the divine right of sovereignty 
regardless
299
.  Thus the question here has shifted towards how to address the necessities 
of the time and provide the best “possible” solution to “protect the core of Islam” in an 
era where the Occultation of the last Imam made the realization of the divine rule on 
earth materially impossible
300
.   
 
     Nāʻini’s crucial contribution to this literature was that - unlike Mostashār Aldowleh, 
he belonged to the class of clergy.  Therefore his acute analysis could have a much 
deeper impact on the ongoing argument of the compatibility of the religious doctrine 
with the temporal contractual proposals of the constitutional system in a society proved 
to be more responsive to, and under extensive influence of, the religious authorities.  
Indeed one could safely claim that he was one of the main forerunners of the analysis of 
the theory of tyranny within the Shiʻa political philosophy.  He even went so far as to 
declare the religious tyranny as being much worse and more destructive than a temporal 
tyranny, as it would be easier for the former to legitimize its claims in the vestments of 
religious dogma and infiltrate to a deeper level of the individual’s conscience301.  
Whereas a “political tyrant” cannot easily legitimate his claims, hence it would be easier 
to cast off, in an era where the “eyes and ears of the people are open”302.  In his seminal 
work called Tanbih al-Ommah Wa Tanzih al-Mella - published approximately a year 
after the destruction of the first Majles (parliament) by Mohammad Ali Shah in 1908, 
Nāʻini divides the government into two different types: Tamlekiyyah (tyrannical 
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absolutist system), and Wilāyatiyyah (a constitutional government)303.  In a tyrannical 
government the ruler considers the public as its own personal property whom he can 
treat as he wishes without any protection for life and private property.  People in such a 
system are slaves, oppressed and servants whom the government can treat as animals 
and use for its own pleasure as they so desire.  The existence of such a system, Nāʻini 
claims, is based on two fundamental elements, the first being the ignorance of the people 
of their basic rights and the monarch’s basic duties, and the second being the absence of 
any structure of accountability and “checks”, to use Machiavellian terminology, on the 
ruling class’ deeds304.  
 
     This is a truly fascinating attempt along the lines of those made by Rifaʻa al-Tahtawi 
(1801-1873) and in particular Abd Alrahmān Al-Kawakebi (1855-1902) who clearly 
influenced Nāʻini’s understanding of the fundamental attributes of the western political 
notions, particularly as defined within the republican systems
305
.  The fundamental 
difference is that Nāʻini was clearly not proposing a fully pronounced western system of 
individual rights, as some authors such as Haʻeri seem to be claiming306, and indeed at 
certain points his argumentation concerning the individual civil liberties and duties seem 
to have been left unfinished.  It is evident that with all Nāʻini’s fascinating, and in some 
ways pioneering efforts to conciliate the Shiʻa’s political thoughts with the western 
concepts of individual space and social contracts, one is still faced with a significant 
deficiency and inconsistency put forth even in his most fundamental arguments.  He 
does mention the need for a written constitution which explicitly defines the role and the 
framework of government and the necessity of imposing limits on the scope and extent 
of its power together with a publically elected parliament which prevents the 
encroachment of power and does not turn “authority into ownership”307. Nevertheless 
readers of Nāʻini’s work may impatiently expect the pronouncement of an exact 
structure of power, in particular the scope and boundaries of his concept of individual 
space and the amount and nature of the personal awareness needed to establish such a 
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system, an expectation which does not seem to have been satisfactorily addressed.  Most 
importantly there is no exact definition of the means and modes of creating and 
maintaining such a political system and obviously no mention of various institutions and 
authorities to maintain such an order.  These institutions, as I expounded in Chapter 1, 
form the foundations of a constitutional system which goes to the heart of any 
republican system of government as was intended.  One possible explanation might be 
that his readers may have held too high expectations from a religious figure whose 
formal training had little to no relevance to the actual political requirement of a modern 
state.  Nonetheless there are certain aspects of his doctrine, which if not inimical, are 
certainly great restraints on the basic foundations of a parliamentarian system.  Certainly 
Nāʻini could not be regarded as a revolutionary figure in the sense of inciting to full 
social action aimed at the establishment of a desired political system.  Indeed his 
principal objective seems to be the preservation of the Islamic ommat particularly in the 
face of foreign threats to Muslim lands and the grandeur of Islam
308
.  In other words how 
to protect the Shariʻa best in the face of the ever-growing internal threats - such as those 
posed by various religious sects including the Bābis, and the external threats, mainly 
from salient foreign influence.  Therefore here again the final objective and raison d’être 
of any man-made social construction appears to be to uphold and protect the Shariʻa and 
to expand the divine rule in the era of Occultation where the rule of a divinely appointed 
power, which is the sole legitimate holder of political authority, is not possible due to 
practical impossibilities.  
 
     Indeed, even the parliamentarian elements that Nāʻini endorses are permanently 
subject to a watchful control of a religious group of supervisors which ensure that no law 
could be ratified which is not entirely compatible with Shariʻa.  This would effectively 
result in a constitutional theocracy in which the role and authority of the religious 
leaders and indeed the Shariʻa precepts itself, would be prone to various possibilities of 
arbitrary interpretations due to the extremely flexible religious reading of the principles 
of political sovereignty.  This could in turn be contrasted with the basic fundamentals of 
western political thought built around notions of common good to promote individual 
fulfilment in their worldly pursuits.  On the other hand any constitutional system should 
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hypothetically be able to legislate in the areas which are not entirely compatible with the 
religious doctrine; hence the existence of an unelected, or not democratically and 
transparently elected and accountable body of mojtaheds would existentially go against 
the very spirit of the parliamentarian republicanism.  As I demonstrated in Chapter 1 in a 
constitutional system, and ideally a republican structure, the role and scope of every 
single institution should be precisely defined by law itself and the framework of the 
operation of such an entity should be constantly checked and balanced by other civil 
bodies to avoid the possibility of the encroachment of power.  Obviously all these 
agencies need to be democratically elected and inclusively open to all members of the 
public for participation and scrutiny.   
 
     I could also identify numerous fundamental concepts to which Nāʻini and other 
religious theoreticians of the Constitutional Revolution do not seem to have been able to 
provide adequate answers.  Amongst such basic constitutional rights are: the freedom of 
expression, minority rights, gender equality and equality of the citizen rights in general.  
Nāʻini even advances a claim that the relation of the rulers to its people is like the 
relation of the shepherds to their flocks which is yet another conceptual inconsistency 
with his emphasis on the protection of individuals’ rights that was discussed 
previously
309
.  If one compares this with the republican fundamental belief in the human 
rational capabilities that should serve as the foundation of the political sovereignty, it is 
not difficult to appreciate the immense ideological gap separating these worldviews. 
 
     Thus it appears that these all make up various desperate attempts by all religious 
proponents of constitutionalism towards providing theological justification for a 
parliamentarian system of rights which obviously fall far short of addressing basic 
fundamental concepts of liberty by subjecting them to a permanent supervision of an 
unelected and unaccountable non-transparent religious body.  It goes without saying that 
other explicitly sanctioned religious formulations such as those regarding the genders 
and the rights and duties of non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state could not even be 
treated by such ideologies leading to various levels of domination that I will examine in 
the forthcoming chapters.   
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     Even the assertions by other prominent figures of the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution such as Seyyed Mohammad Tabātabāi (1843-1920) and Seyyed Abdollāh 
Behbahāni (d.1910) and even the pragmatic Mohammad Kāzem Khorāsāni (1839-
1911)
310
 who most notably warned against the vicissitudes and risks of political 
governance, all seem to have overlooked or even misunderstood the prominence of the 
basic civil elements of the constitutional systems or have treated them in a very 
superficial and incoherent manner.  Khorāsāni in particular, in his notorious dialogue 
with Nāʻini on the Islamic authority and request for creating an Islamic government, 
expounds in details the numerous harms the creation of a government headed by 
religious authorities could cause and the preference for the separation of religious 
authority from the temporal rule
311
.  Nevertheless here again he takes it for granted that 
the Olamā would play the role of supervision and active opposition which entitles them 
to hold the main social controlling apparatus to ensure that all the products of such a 
government are in full compliance with the Shariʻa law.  This should be in place mainly 
to protect the faith in a better fashion due to the “impurities and untruthfulness” inherent 
to the practice of political administration.  Khorāsāni  Further argues that if religious 
authorities assume the temporal power, this on the one hand could pave the way to 
sanction and legitimise such capital sins inherent to the political practice and on the 
other, to point the finger of blame at the religion itself if the provisions do not yield the 
desired ends
312
.  This is the essence of the doctrine echoed by many contemporary 
theologians within the Shiʻa world such as Ayatollah Al-Sistani (b. 1930) and others 
which I will analyse further below.   
 
     One could seamlessly observe that a more coherent analysis of the constitutional 
theocracy, both conceptually and epistemologically was the one proffered by Sheikh 
Fazlollāh Nuri who could be regarded as the ideological mentor of the group of 
mojtahedin, who put up a strong opposition to the constitutionalist ideas.  A close 
examination of his ideas has been of great importance to my current study as these 
significantly influenced such currents of conservative political theology as the Fadāʻiān 
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Islam and consequently Ayatollah Khomeini himself.  Nuri went as far as condemning 
the constitutionalism by publically denouncing its anti-Islamic implications and 
unconcealed incompatibilities with the Shariʻa.  He did this particularly in the field of 
legislation, even by wielding a certain amount of emotionalism and appeal to popular 
sentiments based on his radical interpretation of the Islamic doctrine
313
.  Evidently 
authors studying Nuri’s role with hindsight have underlined various other factors such as 
his direct financial interests and connection with certain social groups notably the Bāzār 
or his principal concern to win the contest of popularity against two other major 
mojtaheds of the time, namely Behbahāni and Tabātabāi314.  Notwithstanding, what is 
interesting for my analysis here is his entrenched resistance to the idea of parliament and 
constitutional concepts embodied through a detailed reasoning based on the religious 
scripture and even ejtehād.  It comes as no surprise to observe that his major concern 
was that the Constitutional Revolution introduced the principles based on the will of the 
people taking precedence over the will of God.  Nuri’s main objection to a constitutional 
system was that a parliament would promote the creation of three kinds of bedʻat 
(negative innovations) in the Islamic nation: The first one being the very act of 
legislation, which is first and foremost considered unnecessary with the existence of the 
Quran and sunnat which have all sufficiently provided the whole legal framework for 
human society only to be extracted by the qualified mojtaheds
315
.  The second problem, 
in Nuri’s opinion, was the act of coercing people to follow a legislation which was not 
divinely inspired and consequently even punishing them for not complying with such 
man-made laws
316
.  He even challenged the very concept of representation in parliament 
which in his view is an absurd concept as one chooses a representative to perform a 
specific task - such as purchasing a property, whereas in the case of parliament the 
object of representation is undefined and the task of law-making is on the shoulders of 
the mojtahedin to extract the already existing laws from the sacred texts
317
.  Furthermore 
as regarding other issues overtly contradicting the Shariʻa - such as gender equality and 
the rights of minority groups and so on - Nuri had a much easier task to discredit the 
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proposals with explicit reference to the religious dogma in which these ideas have been 
clearly treated. 
 
VI. The Pahlavi Era 
After the downfall of the Qājār dynasty, this strand of the political theology, most 
interestingly, vigorously fought against the attempts to establish a republican system and 
vehemently rejected its principles due to the numerous reasons treated above.  Hence 
Reza Shah’s (1878-1944) reinstatement of the monarchy has actually been partially 
attributed to the considerable pressure of the Olamā fervently arguing against a 
republican order based on the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty
318
.  This 
theoretical endorsement of a centralised authoritarian Leviathan is a feature that one 
could seamlessly trace throughout the entire political discourse of the conservative 
political theologians with significant implications on the layout of the political power in 
the form of praetorian authoritarianism, as I will demonstrate in the upcoming chapters. 
 
     On the one hand the Pahlavi period was in many respects the actual beginnings of 
cultural modernism in Iran
319
.  Also noted is the rise of various state institutions and a 
centralised government apparatus which was certainly a significant departure from the 
Qājār era in which the country was divided in many tribal sections with local authorities 
which were de facto autonomous
320
.  Undoubtedly the main victims of such a 
centralisation of power were not only the local tribal Xāns (local chieftains) but also 
other traditional forces of influence existentially inimical to most values of modernity.  
Hence one sees the start of a period in which all these local forces were either 
completely eradicated and substituted by modern state services, or side-lined with a 
drastic reduction of their power and influence
321
.  The hostility towards religious power 
in Iran was based on various factors which were not only due to the Olamā’s traditional 
entitlement to administer justice and education - which were now under titanic efforts of 
modernisation, but most importantly because the roots of Iranian backwardness were 
claimed to be linked to the arrival of the Arab Muslim culture in the Iranian plateau.  
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     Such a hostile climate predictably alienated many of the younger generation of 
mojtaheds particularly those as politically driven as Ayatollah Khomeini who strongly 
felt the exclusion and resented the silence and submissive attitude, not to mention the 
implicit endorsement of the temporal rule, by the major religious authorities
322
.  His 
harsh criticism of the Shah for his anti-Islamic policies and championing the grievances 
of the bāzāri who by then were also subject to the fundamental reforms in taxation and 
regulations - and the mostazʻafin (dispossessed) further enhanced his position as the 
ideal candidate to assume the religious leadership of the community of the faithful
323
.  
As I will discuss in the coming chapters, these social concepts made up the main pillars 
of Khomeini’s socio-political program which were actively pursued and implemented 
throughout the political agenda of the Islamic Republic.  His uncompromising stance 
against the Shah Mohammadreza Pahlavi’s (1919-1980) numerous attempts towards the 
western style modernisation of the country - such as the so-called “White Revolution” of 
1963, brought him to a frontal clash with Pahlavi’s regime which eventually resulted in 
his exile
324
.  Once in France with the help of Iranian intelligentsia like Banisadr (b. 
1933), - who by then had recognized Khomeini’s strong popular appeal, he carefully 
formulated his idea for an Islamic state while carefully being ambivalent on many 
secular notions such as popular sovereignty and respect for individual freedom
325
. 
Indeed it was not until he had the firm reins of power in his hands that he seriously 
advanced his most prominent concept of Velāyat-e Faqih based on his original treatise 
called Velāyat-e Faqih (or the Islamic Government) first published in Najaf in 1970326.  
Undoubtedly this had radical consequences not only for the Iranian Revolution of 1979, 
but also on the very political doctrine of the Shariʻa, which as some scholars have 
pointed out, could be regarded as nothing less than an ideological revolution in 
Shiʻism327.   
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     To be sure, this concept had already been pronounced by the likes of Mohammadreza 
Golpāyegani (1898-1993) amongst others, a middle statue cleric of the time, who 
promoted the mandate of the jurist based on a semantic interpretation of the word 
hokumat
328
 which could have either a juridical sense relative to the administration of 
justice or a political sense meaning to rule
329
.   Amānat notices that this was also an 
attempt to institutionalize the so far loosely defined notion of marjaʻiyat which was 
directly dependent upon the endorsement of the laity through such practices as taqlid 
and the payment of endowments.  Hence he retains that the “Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
thesis of the guardianship of the jurist is an innovation as much as a revolt against the 
authority of a secular ruler as it is against the hegemony of the emulator”330.    
 
     In Spite of this one could find clear line of normative political philosophy which 
could be traced back at least to the Nuri and Fadāʻiān Islam political theology who were 
among the early proponents of such a comprehensive political mandate of the religious 
jurists.  In line with these convictions, other prominent figures most notably the 
moderate Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariʻatmadari (1905-1986), while rejecting the 
principles of Velāyat-e Faqih, unambiguously declared that the notion of “Render unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's” is 
exclusively valid for the Christian world as such separation of the raison d’état from the 
raison de foi has no place in Islam
331
.  Other non-religious leaders of the liberal Shiʻa 
political discourse such as Mehdi Bāzargān (1907-1995) also endorsed such 
inseparability of the religion and politics in Islam affirming that Islam is indeed a 
political religion
332
.  In spite of this Khomeini could undoubtedly be credited with 
pioneering the move from the religious notions of the state to the actual politicization of 
theological doctrines going as far as making the establishment of the Islamic political 
order a religious duty of all believers
333
.  
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     It is interesting to note that comparatively this ideological revolution, as compared to 
other prominent currents within the wider Islamic world such as the Wahhabism in the 
Arabian peninsula, conceived the figure of valiy-e faqih to assume a full political 
authority rather than endorsing the actual secular rulers which was till then the de facto 
norm within the majority of Shiʻa and Sunni schools of political theology334.  The 
spectacular interpretation here was not just the fact that this type of government was 
viewed to be the best possible option compared to other temporal systems for being both 
compatible with the Shariʻa and less oppressive, rather it was the very attempt of 
upholding an innate right to govern for the supreme jurist by the extension of the 
authority of the Prophet and Imams
335
.  This was a truly novel extension to the scope and 
authority of the Olamā under the new interpretation of Velāyat al-hokm (authority to 
rule) as “no Shiʻa jurist before him ever extended the very limited application of legal 
Velāyat to include public affairs, let alone the assumption of political power”336.   This 
extension indeed devolved all prerogatives of the Imams to the mojtaheds which in 
practical terms signalled the end of various conceptual significance of the Occultation of 
Imams
337.  Again as Amānat has observed the use of the word Faqih instead of mojtahed 
or marjaʻ is interesting as this seems to have been formulated to include Khomeini 
himself whose juristic qualifications were certainly not as high as many other Olamā of 
his time
338
.  Furthermore the crucial implication of such claims was the centralisation of 
both dini and donyavi powers under a single figure of Valiy-e Faqih.  Indeed the 
sporadic voices within the Shiʻa doctrine that treated this argument, always intended it 
as a “collective rule” of the jurists and not the concentration of the religio-legal and body 
politics in a single figure of supreme leader
339
.  Whereas here one sees a radical 
extension of the authority of a religious leader based on the notion of marjaʻiyat-e taqlid 
to have velāyat even over other major religious authorities, regardless of their juridical 
qualifications and public stand. 
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     It is not hard to notice a very gradual introduction of this line of argumentation by 
Khomeini who might have been initially cautious in introducing such a radical notion 
even to the religious establishments
340
.  Indeed in his first major book Kashf al-Asrar 
(1943) He even indirectly endorsed the monarchy and only called for the observance of 
religion by the state and refutation of the Western values
341
, in modern terminology one 
might call this a “reformist” approach.  Whereas by the early 1970s, he utterly rejected 
the legitimacy of the saltanat equating it with the despotic system which was introduced 
into the Islamic world through the Umayyad adoption of the Iranian pre-Islamic and 
Roman “pagan” systems342. He then goes on to fully pronounce his new notion of the 
Velāyat-e Faqih which he equates with the embodiment of “those in authority” 
(ololamr) in the Quran, concluding that it has the same religious and temporal 
legitimacy as God and the Prophet
343
.  This significant extension bestowed upon the 
Shiʻa clergy the actual right to enter politics and even to assume such titles as the 
“supreme leader” or even the Imam itself with even potentials to claim a divine mandate.   
 
     This radical interpretation of the Shiʻa doctrine of power could well be observed in 
other contexts of the region particularly in Mesopotamia where at certain stages one can 
even notice the actualization of a complete domination of the clergy on all socio-
political affairs of their communities.  The example of Mohammad Hasan Najafi (d. 
1849) is a clear instance in which a religious authority has a de facto and de jour 
mandate to administer the entire social affairs of his community
344
.  Another Shiʻa cleric 
Mohammad Taqi al-Shirazi (d. 1920) went even as far as raising an army to combat the 
British in Mesopotamia
345
 noticeably by drawing upon the very notion of jahād found in 
this specific tradition of the Shiʻa political discourse.  Thus although the position of 
Khomeini is widely regarded as unprecedented and revolutionary in many respects 
throughout the history of the Shiʻa political narrative, one could still encounter 
numerous instances of such endorsements of the complete socio-political mandates 
within the wider Shiʻa community although in smaller regional scales.  Indeed it not 
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difficult to encounter similar precedence in the works of other theologians such as 
Mohammad Baqer al-Sadr for instance in his prominent treatise Preliminary Legal Notes 
on the Project of Constitution
346
. All these would undoubtedly highlight the potential 
and indeed the actual extension of such basic religious purviews to include all socio-
political affairs of the community of the faithful.  Hence it might not be an 
overstatement to conclude that the lack of any tangible processes of the so called 
interiorization and privatization of religion in the Shiʻa political ideology might well be 
at the heart of such potentials for comprehensive dominations in all spheres of the civic 
life
347
.     
 
VII. Shiʻa Leviathan 
A brief comparison with the western schools of thought and in particular the 
Machiavellian “prince” or the Hobbesian “leviathan” would readily reveal that this 
divinely endorsed authority of the Shiʻa political discourse would entail an even deeper 
level of allegiance and dependence.  The concept of government in this ideology seems 
to be firmly grounded not only on  the necessity of establishing peace to avoid a “violent 
death” by protecting the individual’s life and property, but most importantly to create the 
proper setting for the attainment of a higher good that is the salvation and eternal 
beatitude
348
.  Even though both regard the temporal government as a necessity of living 
in a human society, one readily notices here that in Islam there is a serious question of 
legitimacy which does not seem to have ever been entirely settled.  This seems to be a 
prevalent characteristic of all classical and modern schools of siyāsa shar‘iyya (Islamic 
political theology)
349
.  Indeed a closer examination of all Islamic schools of political 
theology readily reveals a fundamental absence of all principles of human sovereignty 
underpinning any contractual societal agreements.  In the case of the Western ancient 
sovereign, the subjects delegate their power, often spontaneously, at least initially, in 
order to be able to live in social harmony and protect their lives and properties 
sometimes extending to an endorsement of principles of individual liberties, even though 
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this might well be the ancient definition of the liberty as we know
350
.  In contrast in this 
radical Imamate doctrine of government one could safely claim that people do not 
possess any sovereignty in the first place to alienate and delegate to the omnipotent ruler 
to obtain peace and protection. Furthermore the limited notion of beyʻat (approval) 
based on a vague notion of religious acclamation would certainly fail to satisfy many 
republican criteria for public consultation and transparency.  
 
     Most importantly it appears that this radical interpretation of the political theology 
does not endorse in any levels of the checks and balances on the administration of power 
as the central feature of the Velāyat-e Faqih, or even the more restricted concept of the 
assembly of supervising theologians’, are perceived to be the overarching authorities 
which effectively supervises all state legislative and coercive forces.  Even the 
legislative function of the parliament is defined as a simple planning organization as all 
the laws are already believed to have been provided by the Shariʻa351.   
 
     In addition throughout this research I failed to isolate any authentic Shiʻa sources 
endorsing the individual right to sovereignty, which could lead to the conclusion that in 
such an existentially different system the knowledge to determine a just ruler only 
belongs to God and by extension to an specific social class of religious scholars, or at 
best to the right type of ommat.  Such authority would then sacralise the secular 
authority by appointing or endorsing a precise system of authority as worthy of 
obedience to lead the way and show the path of salvation to the oblivious masses
352
.  To 
conclude this point one could say that undoubtedly part of the notion of sovereignty 
could be shared with a leviathan, the holder of a sword who protects the community and 
establishes the peace.  Nevertheless even the figure of a temporal “sultan” arising from 
practical necessities, would not be given the comprehensive legitimacy to manage the 
secular affairs of the Islamic community.  Indeed the prevailing strategy within the Shiʻa 
school of thought vis-à-vis the temporal rulers, seems to have been the adoption of the 
previously mentioned taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation)  which by no means could 
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be interpreted as their total - and in some cases not even partial - endorsement of the 
temporal rule.   
 
     Most notably it is interesting striking to see the juxtaposition of these political 
narratives to the western achievements in the field of the humanities which were all 
denounced as corrupt and stranded which needed to be fought and eradicated from the 
Islamic societies
353
.  This might well explain, as I will argue in the Chapter related to the 
republican education, the meticulous supervisions and suppression of most socio-
political discourses of the western philosophy throughout the social sciences’ textbooks 
while demonstrating great inclinations to accept other achievements of the western 
culture in the fields of science and technology.  As a curious result, as some scholars 
have noted, the main secular proponents of this strand of the political theology were 
from among the educated elites with scientific background rather than humanities
354
.  
 
     It comes to no surprise to observe that even the reformist strand of the Shiʻa political 
theology while adopting certain terminology from the western schools of the political 
philosophy such as “people” as compared to ommat or ambiguously endorsing such 
notions as the rule of law and sovereignty of people, never seem to have systematically 
evaluated all implications of such notions and their very compatibility with the precepts 
of the radical theories of a religious state that it was advocating. This has unsurprisingly 
led to several inconsistencies and inherent contradictions which gave rise to numerous 
concurrent interpretations of the same religious principles of the political theology not 
only in Iran but also in the wider Islamic world which I will briefly survey here below.   
 
     More interestingly it is instructive to notice that a prevailing trend within the 
modernist and more recently reformist strand of the Shiʻa political theology were mainly 
concerned with material well-being of the Islamic community and the need to acquire 
the western technology and science to that end without complying with the actual 
philosophical underpinnings of such achievements in particular in the field of the 
political philosophy.  Such predominant narratives could seamlessly be identified not 
only in the pioneering political discourses of the Seyyed Jamāloddin al-Afqani (1838-
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1897), but also throughout the more recent reformists’ pronouncements by the likes of 
Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934). 
 
VIII. Contemporary Shiʻa Modernism 
It is worthwhile observing that within the contemporary theoreticians of the Shiʻa 
ideology, in particular in the recent years, there has been a great opening towards the 
previously mentioned concepts of the Shiʻa modernism355.  Interestingly this trend 
follows a similar experience that the republican ideologues and their religious 
interlocutors witnessed throughout the history of the evolution of the republican 
ideology
356
.  One interesting example is the utter rejection of the doctrine of the Velāyat-
e Faqih by the prominent scholar Mahdi Haʻeri357.  Haʻeri is among the political 
philosophers within the religious camp who advocated a complete separation of the 
religious and political authority by claiming that these two fields are existentially 
separate and the government is totally outside the purview of religion
358
.  To this end, he 
not only challenges Khomeini’s semantic extension of the word hokm to include the 
actual governing connotations, but also provides a detailed study of the religious 
scripture to conclude that the notion of Velāyat-e Faqih has no religious basis and 
justifications
359
.  More interestingly he continues in details to provide a new 
interpretation for such concepts as “state of nature” and “social contract” and tries to 
provide new interpretations of such notions within the socio-political context of Shiʻism.  
The bottom line claim is that the government is an artificial entity which is bound to be 
contingent and in constant mutation due to the ever-changing requirements of social life, 
hence it is predestined to be considered independent from the immutable divine law
360
.  
It is not difficult to draw clear parallels to the Florentine civic humanist ideologies at the 
heart of the modern republican political philosophy.  Haʻeri’s claims, even though not 
unprecedented, certainly provide a significant contribution to the overall narratives of 
the political philosophy within Shiʻism.   
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     Another interesting claim in this regard has been advanced by Abolhasan Banisadr 
the first Iranian President and one of the main theoreticians of the original principles of 
the Islamic Republic.  In an exclusive debate we had for this research, he illustrated his 
views by identifying human “independence and freedom” to materialize only in an 
absence of “Velāyat” among individuals: that is the absence of any “power” relation 
between them.  He then traced the roots of these principles to the Quranic teachings as 
the main advocate of individual freedom
361
.  These innovative affirmations could be 
regarded as yet another important endeavour towards demonstrating the compatibility 
and even the pioneering role of religious dogma with the basic republican concepts 
illustrated in Chapter 1.  Nevertheless in Banisadr’s view the realisation of such a 
“perfect” system with a total absence of Velāyat is possible only in paradise as 
illustrated by the Quran, which regardless does not prevent one from moving in that 
direction in a Habermasian pursuit of the ideal objectives
362
.  
 
     A more conservative line of argument was pursued by Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943) 
another former Iranian President who, while acknowledging the centrality of the 
Leadership Office within the framework of the Iranian Constitution, insistently 
promoted the importance of the rule of law and that every institution should be firmly 
compliant with the guidelines set forward in the Iranian Constitution.  This included 
every seat of power within the Iranian political system as it was claimed that the major 
historical malaise of Iranian society has resulted from the exemption (evasion) and 
hostility towards the state laws (Qānun gorizi va qānun setizi)363.  I will elaborate more 
on this subject when scrutinizing the Office of the Velāyat-e Faqih and its extra-
constitutional prerogatives in the relative chapter. 
 
     More recently, in line with these affirmations, other important concepts have been 
advanced by the main scholars of the so-called Green Movement
364
 such as Mohsen 
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Kadivar (b. 1959) - a theoretician within the framework of religious ideology, who has 
tried to propose an alternative Islamic governance by questioning once more the very 
validity of the notion of Velāyat-e Faqih within the Imami jurisprudence365.  Kadivar as 
a prominent student of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri (1922-2009), further claims 
that the Islamic state should be based on popular consent and approbation and that: “if a 
government is not accepted by the people, even if its laws are in congruence with 
Shariʻa it lacks legitimacy”366.  Furthermore he distinguishes two different 
interpretations of the Islamic laws which he labels as the traditional and modernist 
understandings of the Shariʻa law, the latter being in complete agreement with the 
universal articles of human rights, although less developed than it, due to its historical 
and cultural predicaments
367
.  Kadivar underlines that there are divergent understandings 
of the role of the Valiye Faqih  within the Shiʻa school of thought, endorsing the current 
which subordinates this seat of power to the legal and constitutional structures of the 
Islamic state
368
.  
 
     Another interesting observation is the line of argumentation which questions the very 
validity or even centrality of religious ideology in the Iranian contemporary body 
politics.  In fact some authors have argued that most of the actual political guidelines 
and state’s socio-economic orientation are actually being dictated by necessities of the 
moment driven by other propagandistic and populist agendas rather than by the apparent 
facade of the religious doctrine
369
.  Whilst there could be no doubt on the validity of 
such claims, one should not overlook the centrality of the religious ideology for the 
qualification and justification of such principles within the Iranian contemporary 
political discourse.  Although ideologies could be used for populist ends, which indeed 
have been the case, the importance of the religious argumentation and theological 
reasoning could not be discarded in a system where the entire state machine is heavily 
reliant on a certain interpretation of the religious ideology and its various manifestations 
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and symbologies
370
.  In other words, one could argue that here the religion is again being 
used as the same “social glue” or even the “opium of the people” as postulated by the 
fathers of the modern western political thought.  However, the crucial difference which 
one could seamlessly perceive in this context has been a systematic shift beyond this 
“social necessity” to actually build a vision of the state and a political order based on the 
appropriated Divine Will.  Furthermore this specific vision of authority seems to be 
employing various religious justifications to sacralise the political power and 
monopolize and legitimize the use of violence to suppress other dissenting ideologies 
with specific Quranic and Shiʻa discourse and the relative terminologies such as 
mohārabah (fighting against God)371.  In addition even other parallel or competing 
ideologies underlying the Islamic Republic, such as those by philosophers including 
Ahmad Fardid (1909-1994), Jalal al-Ahmad (1923-1969) and Ali Shariati (1933-1977) 
were all predominantly concerned with a Shiʻa Imamate religious narratives372, as the 
main source of normativity, which once again underlines the importance and centrality 
of such concepts in the formation of the world’s first Islamic Republic.   
 
     I need to underline here that as far as the Islamic and in particular the Shiʻa political 
theology is concerned I tend to disagree with such scholars as Ran Hirschl who claims 
that the politicization and constitutionalization of religion would inevitably lead to a 
significant demarcation and even containment of the religious ideology which would be 
bound to act within the limits of the constitutional authority, similar to the limits on the 
democratic authority itself imposed by the constitution
373
.  It is evident that restraining 
the religious dogma to abide by the rules of the constitution could play a significant role 
in limiting the scope and authority of such a powerful social source of allegiance and 
authority in particular its radical and fundamentalist interpretations.  Nevertheless the 
official endorsement of a single version of the ultimate truth and the enshrinement of 
such absolute claims of authenticity within a constitution would inevitably lead to the 
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exclusion of other concurrent sources of legitimacy including those based on “we the 
people”.  This would be further intensified by officially allocating a significant portion 
of the state’s resources to the promotion and establishment of the elected religious 
directives and dogma which in some cases becomes “the” source of law and authority.  
Hence the very fact of moving from a theological discourse of a religion into a veritable 
“political act” of such an exclusive dogma, would undeniably provide that ideology with 
significant political means, other than the already existing social ones, to advance its 
hegemonic domination, as the Iranian experience has clearly shown.  Hence any 
comparison between an unalterable, exclusive religious source of sovereignty with 
claims to absolute truthfulness and endorsement of pervasive prescriptions to 
predominantly favour a certain community of subjects, would be existentially different 
from a manmade negotiable, alterable, contingent and inclusive source of authority 
based on human reason and political activity rooted in the inalienable civil and political 
rights. 
 
     This by itself would suffice to conclude that there is indeed a significant current of 
thought within the Islamic dogma, with strong political ambitions, that occasionally 
surge in various social contexts of the region as soon as it finds the space for overt 
manifestations through the popular uprisings seen in recent years, for instance.  The 
Shiʻa version of this strong current of ideology is precisely the subject of this study 
which as I argued previously, and will demonstrate in details in the upcoming chapters, 
has resulted in a political layout which has not always been based on an inflexible 
transcendental religious ideology. Indeed all the institutions of the Islamic Republic, 
have sometimes proven to be flexible enough to be capable of addressing, even partially, 
the pressing bureaucratic requirements of a modern state apparatus.  Thus one could 
readily identify numerous compromises and even outright adoptions of many ideas 
previously rejected on religious grounds, based on the redefined theological concepts 
such as the principle of maslahat (public interest), and many other secular juridical 
principles
374
.  These all reinforce the modernist aspects of a constitution whose 
republican notions were originally taken from France’s Fifth Republic Constitution of 
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1958 under the initial influence of such secular figures of the revolution as Mehdi 
Bāzargān, Abolhasan Banisadr and other modernist ideologues.  
 
     Moreover it is interesting to see a strong return to such discourses by laymen moving 
towards an actual process of secularization of the Shiʻa political doctrine across the 
entire Shiʻa world, from Lebanon to Iraq, Bahrain and Iran.  Veritably a clear example 
would be Iraq which regardless of the fact that it has been one of the main cradles of 
Shiʻa political ideology, is witnessing an astonishing trend towards the separation 
between the political authority in charge of the country’s government and social 
administration and a high ranking clergy, actively refraining from any direct interference 
in political processes.  All signs lead one to the conclusion that the Shiʻa political model 
promoted by the Iranian state clergy seems to be falling out of interest within the wider 
Shiʻa political discourse prompting some scholars to even advance the notion of 
Sunnification of Shiʻa political ideology375.  Hence the major political parties across the 
Islamic world, such as the Iranian Nehzat-e Azadi, the Iraqi al-Daʻwa and SIIC, 
Lebanese Amal, and numerous religious authorities and intellectual laymen within these 
circles seem to be voicing their convictions towards at least a relative separation 
between the political and the religious authorities to limit the interference of the clergy 
in the field which is deemed out of their area of intellectual purviews
376
.   
 
     Thus one should not undermine significant attempts by numerous exponents of 
different schools of thought within the Islamic theology, who were even supportive of 
temporal rule and some went even further by endorsing the creation of a constitutional 
system, as shown above.  This is apparent in particular within the circles of the non-
clerical members of these currents, such as the Iranian Shariati, Banisadr, Bāzargān and 
Iraqi counterparts like Nuri Almāleki (b. 1950) who even went as far as assuming full 
political responsibility enjoying an explicit endorsement by the grand Ayatollāh Sistani.  
Notwithstanding an apparent conceptual inconsistency could still be recognized in the 
works of more recent proponents of the Islamic democracy such as Abdolkarim Soroush 
(b. 1945), Mohsen Kadivar and even Ayatollah Montazeri who do not seem to have been 
able to provide an adequate and final answer to these competing sources of the political 
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legitimacy in Islam either
377
.  Others such as Mojtehed Shabestari (b. 1936) like 
Abdolkarim Soroush, even talked of the incomprehensiveness of the principles of fiqh 
and the need for updating and modernising these doctrines which are deemed to be 
contingent and based on the necessities of the time.   
 
     At a wider Islamic world level similar ideas have been put forward by Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi and Mohammad al-Mahfuz who although significantly undermining the role 
of the clergy within the Islamic political theology, sustain that an Islamic democratic 
state should still declare Islam to be the official religion of the state and that no 
parliamentarian law would be passed against the Shariʻa378.  In Qaradawi’s view the 
resulting system would still be a democratic one as here only “some of the options 
available to the demos” have been removed and the actual process of decision-making is 
open and representative
379
.  Hence for Qaradawi the democracy is a structure that could, 
and indeed should, be deployed within the Islamic system steeped in an inherent 
transcendental values and absolute truth
380
. 
 
     Once more I need to underline the importance of such works as those by Kadivar and 
the Tunisian scholar Rashid al-Ghannushi 
381
(b. 1941) who made significant efforts to 
distinguish the various modernist and traditionalist approaches within the Islamic 
political discourse trying to promote a more spiritual version of the religious doctrines 
by significantly reducing the role of the Shariʻa in the changeable social 
circumstances
382
.  The Spiritual Islam model proposed by Kadivar, for instance, is 
nothing short of a radical reformation within the Shiʻa political discourse that goes far 
beyond the previously discussed solutions provided by Nāʻini and Tabātabāʻi for 
example, based on a simple distinction between constant and adaptable Shariʻa 
principles.  Interestingly this closely resembles some secular processes within the 
republican doctrine particularly in the French school of republicanism to relegate the 
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religion to an “interior” space by initially demoting it to a “state religion” from being a 
“religious state”383.   
 
     Most interestingly prominent figures of the same dominant doctrine of the state of 
Iran in particular secular theoreticians such as Banisadr, seem to be unambiguously 
moving in the direction of relegating the religion to a private space by emphasizing the 
need for the “separation of power and faith” in the public domain384.  Indeed Banisadr’s 
acute analysis of the structure of power and its potentials for degenerating into 
despotism rooted in the endorsement of any ideologies including the religious ones, 
appears truly impressive and pertinent once numerous historical and local instance of 
such constant threats of the state’s ideological imperium is considered385.  Nevertheless 
one still needs to see whether such fundamental reform tendencies could seriously take 
root within the dominant religious establishment who have currently monopolised all 
socio-political means of the Islamic Republic.  Hence whether the rationalization of the 
separation of secular and religious fields is enough to provide a comprehensive political 
doctrine or at least produce unequivocal narratives for the “privatization” and 
“interiorization” of the faith in order to pave the way for the pronouncement of such 
ideas, is yet to be shown within the Islamic political discourse. 
 
     Thus as the current state of affairs stands in Iran, the political system continues to be 
stoutly rooted, in this specific interpretation of the Shiʻa dogma, which has had a radical 
impact on its entire socio-political apparatus vis-à-vis the republican doctrine of state, 
which are still claimed to underpin the structural governance of the Islamic Republic.  
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IX. Conclusion      
All observations lead to the conclusion that the crucial predicament throughout the 
history of the political philosophy within the Islamic community has been, and continues 
to be, the question of the legitimacy of the temporal rule.  Indeed some authors such as 
Zibākalām even trace this as far back as the third Islamic Caliph Othman and the fourth 
Imam Ali, which faced fundamental social unrest and challenges to their rule due to the 
lack of a charismatic temporal and religious authority comparable to the one embodied 
by the Prophet himself
386
.  On the other hand some have even questioned the legitimacy 
of the principles of government arising from human reason and its various 
manifestations such as the parliamentarianism for being at the heart of the crisis of 
legitimacy in Islam after the Prophet’s death by selecting the Khalifs based on human 
reason and assembly rather than the explicit divine mandates
387
. 
 
     Nevertheless as discussed previously due to practical necessities of the time one 
could notice a certain level of acceptance and even collaboration between the religious 
authorities and de facto rulers of their time.  An obvious contemporary example cited 
could be the emblematic one of Iraq mentioned above, where the so-called effendies (the 
laymen within the religious schools of thought) seem to have arrived at a certain 
acceptance of the division of authority between the temporal and religious fields.  
Regardless of this, as many scholars have underlined, the presence of the clergy in the 
centre of the structure of power has always been and continues to be a defining feature 
of the Shiʻa Islam388.  For instance a significant part of the doctrine of state in the wider 
Shiʻa community such as those advocated by the so-called Shirāzies and the al-Sadr 
families
389
 had already computed significant steps towards the politicization of the Shiʻa 
ideology long before Khomeini, endorsing even stronger universal claims for their 
theories of Islamic governance
390
.  
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     Moreover while certain rationalistic strands of the Shiʻa proved to be more inclusive 
and sympathetic towards the non-religious sources of political power and in particular a 
popular basis of sovereignty, this seems to have been mainly due to considering them as 
the least harmful out of multiple worse options available to the Shiʻa community at the 
time of Occultation and never extended beyond the community of the faithful.  As a 
result they still fall short of providing any significant contribution to the fundamental 
question of the theoretical legitimacy of the temporal rule based on an inclusive popular 
mandate. 
 
     The overall observation to make here is that while in Sunni Islam the central political 
discourse seems to have been centred around such terms as xelāfat (succession), ejmā 
(consensus) and beyʻat (approval, acclamation), in Shiʻa the key political discourse has 
been built upon such notions as Imamate, Velāyat and esmat which as shown, have 
historically had a fundamental impact on the concept of legitimacy of the temporal 
rule
391
.  Moreover it became apparent that certain modern ideologues of the Shiʻa school 
on some occasions appeared to have actually endorsed the legitimacy of the secular rule, 
as we saw above.  Nevertheless these prevalently tended to demonstrate a very limited 
understanding of the various aspects and implications of the sovereignty of people, let 
alone a comprehensive system of the political reposed on the civic humanist values as 
the republican one.   
 
     Thus it appears that the Shiʻa discourse on the political authority, predominantly 
concerned with the question of the legitimacy, has shown a great disinterest for all other 
elements of popular sovereignty entailing the protection of individuals against the 
imperium and dominium as required by the republican principles of governance.  To be 
sure, as argued in Chapter 1, the modern republican principle of individual rights would 
fundamentally be based on inherent values which are independent and indeed often 
incompatible with even the constant core of the religious principles, and sometimes there 
would be no option to choose between two competing systems of canons each providing 
profoundly different interpretations of the issues at hand.  To reiterate some of the 
examples mentioned above, I could add that the basic republican principles - such as 
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gender equality, the rights of minorities, private space, separation of powers and of 
course the very legitimacy of the mandate of the secular rules, do not seem to have ever 
found their exact collocation within the Shiʻa political discourse.  This has convinced 
some authors like Arjomand to come to the outright conclusion that: 
 
A Shariʻa derived Islamic state cannot be a modern constitutional state without serious 
contradictions.  There is no way to modernise the traditional system of the two powers 
by exempting one of them as sacrosanct
392
. 
 
In addition there seems to be even less treatment of the necessary institutions by the 
Shiʻa modernists to uphold such a system of values in their proposed religious 
governance.  Furthermore as argued above, the fundamental notion of the separation of 
power based on the basic rule of checks and balances does not seem to have any place in 
a system centred around an unelected supervisory institution which monitors and even 
rejects any popularly ratified laws and regulation if deemed incompatible with the ruling 
of the sacred scripture.  More interestingly the provisions of a supervising authority to 
decide on the boundary between the politics and ethics, or scopes of the textual sources 
of law and the secular ones seem to be leaving ample space for interpretations which 
could constitute another potential thrust for domination.   
 
     The basic rights of selecting rulers, the methods of selection and most importantly the 
right to participate, contest or even to remove an errant sovereign, do not seem to have 
been a central preoccupation of the majority of these theoreticians of the political 
theocracy.  As discussed above in recent years some scholars like Banisadr and Kadivar 
seem to be moving towards treating such aspects of the political theology - which are yet 
to prove comprehensive if at all consistent or viable, with the religious dogma
393
. In 
other words, the mere separation of the religious and political authorities advocated by 
these ideologues, does not automatically provide adequate conceptual credentials for the 
legitimacy of the state apparatus on the one hand, and the objective validity of the 
principles of popular sovereignty of such a political order on the other.  Both religious 
circles and most importantly the secular schools of the political within the Shiʻa world 
need to come to a clear understanding of the basic principles of legitimacy based on 
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popular mandates, or otherwise the resulting system could well be a tyranny claiming 
sources of authority which might not necessarily repose or be compliant with the 
principles of individual sovereignty. 
 
     In practical terms, as shown previously, the dominant Shiʻa ideology of recent 
decades - possibly also adding certain currents of the Sunni world to this conclusion, has 
been far from adopting such a neutral stance regarding the political authority, which has 
resulted in theoretically challenging entities such as the Islamic Republic or various 
other religiously grounded political movements of the region
394
. Despite the historical 
fact that most scholars of the Shiʻa doctrine actually chose the path of political 
indifferentism
395
, one could identify an enormous ever-present potential for such direct 
involvement arising from immense social power that the dominant Osuli school of Shiʻa 
has provided for the Olamā, in the course of centuries of constant mutations and 
developments.  The previously discussed concepts of ejtehād, taqlid, marjaʻiyyat and 
most importantly the exclusive rights on the administration of justice and collection of 
religious taxes had obviously elevated the Olamā to become the natural pretenders to 
assume the all encompassing socio-political authorities of the Islamic state.  Hence the 
current which came to dominate the centuries of religious debates was unsurprisingly 
this politically active brand of the Shiʻa Islamism who had all the necessary means to 
justify its appropriation of all prerogatives of the Imams also based on a the popular 
endorsement, not only in the form of public acclamation but also the actual devolvement 
of financial resources and support.  
 
     Notwithstanding, as I will expound in the upcoming chapters, while one expects the 
natural outcome of Islamic Republic’s political doctrine to be a total denial of the social 
contract and all republican elements in the regime’s political discourse, one could 
readily identify the existence of various institutions and practices that vest at least part of 
the sovereignty in the nation
396
.  This might indeed be inevitable result of “secularizing 
religious law by sacralising the political”, but could also be interpreted as the 
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consequences of  the practical necessities of the time due to conceptual deficiencies 
inherent to the Shariʻa law to address all problems of a 21st century nation.  In any case 
this has resulted in an extremely complex network of power and resource management 
based on revolutionary ideologies, nationalist propaganda, and of course sometimes 
incompatible socio-political requirements of the moment all justified through a vigorous 
narrative of the theocratic governance.  Such a system which, while sharing many 
aspects of third world movements, in particular the Latin American populist ones
397
, has 
some unique features due to its religious matrix and divine claims.  
 
     I should reiterate once more that the principal scope here is not to critically analyse 
the actual religious truth or validity of the principles of this dominant school of the 
political theology but to study the implications of such an ideology on the political 
theory underpinning the state structures subject to this analysis.  More precisely the 
consequences of such an accumulation of an unbalanced authority in the political 
repositories of power with significant social and financial resources is what I aim to 
scrutinize in the light of the republican non-domination principles.  Hence the fact that 
certain members of this dominating ideological strata might at times chose to refrain 
from exercising the acquired power, or even went down the path of political aloofness
398
 
- in the style of the ancient republican paradigm of the kindly master, does not 
automatically render their sanctioned ideology compatible with the basic principles of 
individual liberty and sovereignty inherent to the republican doctrines.  It is banal to 
reaffirm that the strand that actually came to dominate the Iranian political scenery did 
in fact chose to advance a comprehensive version of the Shiʻa political theology.   
 
     In the forthcoming chapters I will carry out a detailed analysis of the various 
implications of such religio-political doctrines on the formation of a state which also 
advances republican credentials and claims to be feeding upon the principles of public 
sovereignty.  To commence with a practical and epistemological examination of my case 
study, I will initially endeavour to take a closer look at these inherent divergences and 
compromises between the religious jurisprudence and the republican ideology.  I will do 
this by analysing various components of republicanism within the context of the Iranian 
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Islamic system, in order to provide an analytic evaluation of their republican credentials 
and their adaptability to this specific version of the dominant Islamic Shariʻa.  My 
enquiry would inevitably depart by scrutinising the current Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic which by itself could be considered as the direct result of a long process of 
sacralisation of the political sovereignty with explicit influence of a religious ethos that 
has since characterised the essence of the Iranian political creed. 
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Chapter 3 - Republican Constitution 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the main purpose of the republican governance would be to 
prevent two types of domination.  On the one hand the state should organize its forces to 
inhibit all types of private domination and at the same time guard against the state itself 
becoming a dominant force in the citizen’s lives.  As I expounded there the republican 
protections towards both forms of domination was also achieved through the provisions 
of a fundamental constitutional form of non-domination which will be the main theme of 
the current chapter.   Hence in this section I will provide a thorough overview of various 
implications of these basic republican principles and other theological concepts that 
were laid out in Chapter 2 to scrutinise their direct reflections and manifestations 
specifically pertaining to the Fundamental Law of the Islamic Republic. 
 
     In Chapter 1, I discussed the difference between the republican use of the term 
“constitution” in such phrases as “mixed constitutions” and “constitutional division of 
power”.  I referred more to a conceptual notion - in the sense of political principles of 
the government endorsed by the republican system, rather than what is usually 
understood by the term constitution as an official legal document containing basic 
principles of sovereignty, individual rights, liberties and other relevant concepts.  
Traditionally, numerous distinctions have been made between various types of 
constitution which include monarchical and republican, parliamentary and presidential, 
and flexible and inflexible constitutions
399
.  Regardless of these historical inclinations to 
classify the constitutions as such, it is evident that a significant amount of these socio-
political principles are normally captured in a specific written formal document.  These 
manuals then serve as the cornerstone of various modern day political systems and are 
the locus where not only the doctrines of sovereignty and rights are defined but also 
where the actual form of the various parts of government and their relations to the 
people are laid out
400
.  Hence a closer study of each country’s constitution would be very 
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revealing towards a better understanding of the state’s convictions on the modality of the 
arrangement of power and the safeguards to guarantee the survival and continuity of 
certain repositories of social values.  The importance and centrality of such legal 
provisions have been one of the main themes of the political narratives spanning from 
ancient times and - as I demonstrated in the first two chapters, have given rise to 
fundamentally or partially opposing schools of thought.  On the one hand there are 
certain secular schools which accord the ultimate source of power and authority to the 
people, as in a republican system and on the other the religious systems with their claims 
of Divine sovereignty as seen in Chapter 2.  These tend to attribute the ultimate authority 
to God which could eventually be extended to human agents, in this case exclusive circle 
of religious theologians or alternatively to the protectors of the faith in the form of 
sultans and monarchs.  In modern day societies the extent and the legitimacy of such 
powers has been at the heart of all secular and divine narratives on the exercise of power 
in the state.  At any rate the very existence of an inclusive constitution in any society 
could be regarded as an important step towards the realization of the basic republican 
concepts, such as the separation of power, the equality before law and in general the 
protection of the citizen’s rights and duties subject to such a system. 
 
     Thus it is paramount that for a government to be capable of advancing any republican 
legitimacy, one should assume that a proper legal foundation of rights is in place or at 
least the fundamental notion of legal sovereignty is observed throughout the 
establishment and administration of such a system.  Thus the building block of every 
country’s political arrangement is its universal embodiment of such an outline of the 
structure of power and rights, as reflected in its national constitution.  This is usually 
where the basic guidelines are drawn to lay down the foundations of various 
organisations and structures to preserve and promote certain values and convictions 
deemed to be central to the world view underlying a certain political vision.  Evidently 
in some cases this might well be an unwritten document based on established traditions 
and customs as is the case with countries like the United Kingdom
401
 for instance.  
Otherwise in the majority of cases it is a well-defined body of guidelines, which ought to 
be hardly alterable and resilient enough in time, to serve as the basis for all subsequent 
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developments of the civil society.  Nevertheless one could find a great variety of 
constitutional formats with different degrees of flexibility, such as the North Korean 
Constitution, which seems to be easier to amend and modify than many others, but 
which regardless is proclaimed to be the cornerstone of their “republican” system402.  In 
any case there are universal functions which one could observe in a great majority of the 
world’s constitutions, such as being general by not entering into details, or being 
enforceable, clear, free of internal contradictions and most importantly being superior to 
all other legal provisions and directives in the country
403
.  In order to safeguard these 
basic purposes of a national constitution, various provisions and institutions need to be 
tirelessly at work to interpret any possible obscurities and make sure the entire political 
system is compliant with such provisions and, if need be, provide for the possibility of 
amending the constitution in certain exceptional situations that might arise out of 
unforeseen circumstances. 
 
For the sake of simplicity one could claim that the main role of any constitution is on the 
one hand to manage the structure of power in a society and on the other to protect and 
promote individual’s rights.  This would provide a clear framework to study these two 
aspects of any constitution and try to pinpoint the main concerns of the authors of such a 
document.  
 
II. Constitutional Background 
Throughout Iran’s history one could identify various royal acts and directives aimed at 
designing the socio-political order deemed essential to the correct functioning of various 
social structures, but it was not until the early years of the 20
th
 century that the country 
adopted what one could unequivocally define as a modern national constitution
404
.  
However, a closer scrutiny of various discourse, correspondences and public articles by 
different proponents of the first Iranian constitution and parliamentary systems reveals 
that each contributing source had a fundamentally different understanding of the 
epistemological nature of the concept of constitutionalism, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Nevertheless these struggles resulted in the drafting of the first Iranian Constitution in 
1906
405
.  The final result was a five chapter constitution with 51 articles together with a 
detailed Preamble in 107 sections which was signed by the King in December 1906.  A 
closer examination of the first Iranian Constitution, which was predominantly based on 
the western legal sources, particularly French and Belgian constitutional law on the one 
hand and alternatively certain Islamic Shariʻa principles on the other406, shows that this 
was a groundbreaking achievement in the direction of establishing a system based on the 
rule of law and a relatively restrained system of political sovereignty in which the 
monarch was forced to make significant concessions with respect to the basic rights of 
the citizens.  Indeed it is argued that through this process for the first time in Iran’s 
entire history the people of the country acquired the actual legal status of citizens and 
significant restrictions were imposed on the scope and extent of the king’s hitherto 
unlimited power
407
.  
 
     In spite of this substantial achievement one could readily notice various shortcomings 
in this initial document of early 20
th
 century.  First and foremost one would struggle to 
find a coherent order in the drawing of various sections of the constitution and a great 
portion of the content seems to have been dedicated to the actual running of the 
parliament.  Most importantly various articles seem to be in clear contradiction to each 
other, for example Article 26 on the national sovereignty seems to be at odds with 
Articles 35 to 55 in which the rights of the monarchy are laid out.  One also fails to 
identify any clear guidelines regarding the basic constitutional notions as the separation 
of power and independence of these sources of authority.  In Article 27 for example, 
both legislative and executive powers are subjected to the king, whereas Article 28 
emphasizes the need for a clear separation of powers.  Furthermore there seems to be 
some confusion regarding the roles and scope of the authority of both national 
parliament and the senate
408
.  Nonetheless the Iranian constitutional monarchy witnessed 
numerous changes and amendments to the text of the constitution in particular during the 
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Mohammad Reza Pahlavi era which were mainly aimed at including more secular 
notions, such as the new provisions on the choice and place of work of the court judges 
in Articles 81 and 82, and conversely to pave the way for the succession within the 
Pahlavi dynasty
409
.  In particular this period witnessed the institution of modern 
government structures based on the European patterns and in particular fundamental 
transformation of the judiciary system, traditionally under the strict control of the clergy 
and tribal leaders, towards secular national judiciary institutions
410
.   
 
     Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 a new constitution was drafted to embody 
the doctrinal convictions of the new religious elites.  The initial text was prepared over 5 
months and put to popular vote, although this timescale does not reflect the considerable 
amount of time Ayatollah Khomeini had dedicated to the formulation of his personal 
theory on the nature of an Islamic state.  Veritably, as I briefly discussed in Chapter 2, 
various elements of the Iranian Constitution could easily be traced back to Khomeini’s 
original treatise on the Islamic Government
411
.  In fact a brief reflection on both texts 
reveals that Khomeini had been significantly consistent, although sometimes willingly 
ambiguous, in his fundamental convictions on the Islamic government.  In spite of being 
a rudimentary article, the Islamic Government - originally a collection of 19 lectures, 
was an attempt to elucidate his exclusive concepts of the government entirely 
legitimized through a spiritual and religious qualification reserved for prophets, Imams 
and by extension to the clergy
412
.  Therefore the limited circle of the clerical class was 
regarded as the only true guardian of the “Islamic order” who could prevent any 
“innovation” in the Shariʻa law, “keep the people on the righteous path of Islam”, fight 
against the oppressors and protect the oppressed throughout the world to establish social 
justice
413
 and eliminate the western encroachment and influence on Islamic land
414
.  
Moreover the unquestionable capacity of the Shariʻa to address all human societies’ 
modern day needs is eloquently outlined by Khomeini as below: 
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A complete guideline for government and administration, together with necessary laws, 
lies ready before for you.  If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has 
made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. ... 
Everything is ready and waiting….. The Islamic Laws were laid down for the purpose of 
creating a state and administering the political, economic and cultural affairs of 
society
415
. 
 
Thus it comes to no surprise to notice that the Iranian Constitution closely reflects 
Khomeini’s ideas on the necessity of establishing a government firmly rooted in the 
Islamic Shariʻa which would in turn be placed under a direct control and supervision of 
the guardianship of the jurist. This stemmed from the conviction that all non-Islamic 
systems of government were considered to be instances of Kofr (disbelief) and Taqut 
(tyranny) and it is “our duty to remove them from the lives of Muslim society (all traces 
of kofr) and destroy them”416.  In short, as Hamid Algar expounds, the main themes of 
the Islamic Government’s book is to subordinate the political power to Islamic goals and 
precepts, and to define the duty of the religious scholars to establish such a government 
and to assume the legislative, executive and judiciary powers within it
417
.  Khomeini 
appears to go even further than that by actually denying the very necessity of a 
legislative power by underlining that “in Islam the legislative power and the competence 
to establish laws exclusively belongs to God Almighty”418.  Thus he concludes that in an 
Islamic government “a simple planning body should take the place of the legislative 
assembly…Who draws up programmes for different ministers in the light of the 
ordinances of Islam” 419. 
 
     As it will be demonstrated below most of these radical views were incorporated into 
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution with profound implications not only on a 
political level but also at all stages of the cultural and social life of the nation and 
beyond.  Although numerous constitutional notions introduced both under the strong 
presence of the secular elements within the revolutionary forces and also as an inevitable 
result of the moderate ideological elements within the Shiʻa school of the political 
theology
420
, the ideology that eventually prevailed throughout the Constitution, proved 
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to be this very same narrow and exclusive interpretations of Khomeini of the mandate of 
the jurists and the constitutional role and rights of the people in the Islamic Republic. 
 
     The electoral law was thus drafted by a restricted group of predominantly religious 
scholars that was to be called the “Assembly of Experts” during June and July of 1979.  
Elections were also held at the same time to choose 73 members of parliament to 
represent different regions and religious minorities of the country
421
.  This eventually led 
to the formulation of the Iranian Constitution in twelve chapters and 175 articles which 
were put to a public vote in November 1979.  The Constitution has since been amended 
once in April 1989 following a formal request by Ayatollah Khomeini detailing the 
sections to be reviewed and the reviewing committee who were to carry out the 
amendments
422
. 
 
III.  Constitutional Preamble 
 
a. Constitutional Stylistics   
A closer scrutiny of the Iranian Constitution reveals that it does, to some degree, follow 
the same standard format of all western-style national constitutions.  That is, it starts 
with the customary Preamble followed by the main body of the constitution which is 
divided into different sections detailing the authors’ convictions on the sources of 
legitimacy, form of the government, individual rights and duties, modalities of the 
division of power and other relevant institutions and centres of social-political 
administration. 
 
    The Preamble - which is not an indispensable part of the constitution and could be left 
out, as is the case for instance with the Constitution of the Italian Republic, could prove 
to be very articulate at illustrating the world view of the ideologues of the constitution 
and the very nature of the expected political system arising from such convictions. 
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     In support of this argument I will provide a very brief comparison with two other 
political systems both claiming to uphold republican credentials, namely the French and 
the North Korean ones.  The comparison with the French Constitution is very interesting 
as both “republics” supersede respective monarchic systems through shattering 
revolutions followed by significant internal and external conflicts.  Unsurprisingly both 
constitutions deplore the tyrannies of the Ancien Régimes; for instance the French 
Preamble of October1946 glorifies the “victory achieved by the free peoples over the 
regimes that had sought to enslave and degrade humanity”423.  Similarly the Preamble to 
the Iranian Constitution denounces the tyrannies of the monarchic regime and glorifies 
the Ayatollah Khomeini’s role in guiding the nation towards the victory and against the 
conspiracies of the US “puppet regime” of Pahlavi.  The Preamble continues by 
providing a detailed description of the various stages of the Iranian Revolution and the 
asserted wisdom, resoluteness and unshakable determination of Ayatollah Khomeini 
who “grasped the necessity of following the line of the true religious and Islamic 
movement” and the role of the clergy in public awakening and uprisings424.  In this 
regard the Iranian Preamble closely resembles the Preamble of the North Korean 
Constitution.  Here too one could encounter a detailed description of the foresight and 
individual virtues of “the great leader” Kim Il Sung who was reportedly: 
 
.. a genius in ideology and theory, a master of leadership, an ever-victorious iron-willed 
brilliant commander, a great revolutionary and a great man….who wisely led various 
stages of social revolution and construction to strengthen and develop the Republic into 
a social country centered on the masses..” 425.  
 
The Preamble to the Iranian Constitution appears to be more a recollection of the events 
that lead up to the revolution by illustrating detailed stories with colourful representation 
of the atrocities and the chaos reigning before the revolution and even citing the exact 
dates of certain events.  Sensational superlatives have been employed to describe the 
sufferings, the deceits, the tyrannies, the bloodshed and eventually the victory with an 
underlying implication of a groundbreaking achievement with the promise of 
repercussions not only inside Iran but also for all the oppressed people of the world. 
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     From a purely stylistic point of view interesting observations can be made.  As 
mentioned previously all three nations drafted their constitutions and implemented the 
amendments following significant internal conflicts and foreign aggressions, hence the 
very act of drafting a constitution after considerable struggles have been highlighted as 
significant achievement per se and persistently reflected throughout these documents.  
The French Preamble dedicates only the opening sentence to this “accomplished” 
achievement.  Interestingly, the Iranian and the Korean Preambles prevalently use verbs 
in the past tense to underline the results that both nations have attained to date and 
glorify the actions undertaken by their respective leaders and nations to get to this 
prominent stage of liberty, independence and human development: 
 
The great idea of Comrade Kim Il Sung and the great achievements made under his 
leadership are the lasting treasures of the Korean Revolution and the basic guarantee for 
the prosperity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.426”  
 
and:  
 
The Islamic Government is designed on a basis of "religious guardianship" as put 
forward by Imam Khomeini at the height of the intense emotion and strangulation (felt) 
under the despotic regime.  This created a specific motivation and new field of 
progression for the Muslim people; and opened up the true path for the religious fight of 
Islam.
427
 
 
The French Preamble of 1946 is much shorter than the Iranian one and by contrast uses 
short predicative sentences with a forward looking style designed to establish what 
“should” be the basic guarantees of the upcoming constitution.  This gives the reader the 
feeling that a significant amount of the task is yet to be accomplished in order to fulfil 
the basic convictions of the republic.  This simple yet informative style could be a great 
source of insight towards predicting what type of system could be expected to emerge 
from such declarations.  The republican ideas of contestatory citizenry, checks and 
balances, striving constantly to keep the values pertinent and alive and most importantly 
the need to direct all the resources of the state towards the fulfilment, development and 
safeguarding of the republican values, could all be affected by style and the approach 
that these fundamental documents adopt. 
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     Thus the adopted style seems to have significant repercussions on the content and the 
message the text would convey.  If a significant part of the liberty is already achieved 
what need would there be to have the republican contestatory citizens to keep a watchful 
eye on the potentially dominating elements of the political authority or society in 
general?  Also if the foundations of the political sovereignty are claimed to have been 
laid upon the already perfect and faultless religious sources, or alternatively on the 
personal virtues of an individual’s super-human visionary abilities, what need would 
there be to have any public forums and open debates on the fundamental principles of 
such an order?  Unless, these are foreseen to treat the secondary issues of the day-to-day 
running of social affairs without allowing for any fundamental questioning of the 
legitimizing sources of power administration.  As I will demonstrate these contradictions 
lead to a significant amount of redundancy and inconsistency which would cast a great 
shadow of doubt over the very basic republican convictions of the Islamic Republic.   
 
b. Legitimizing the Constitution 
Beyond all the revolutionary rhetoric, the similarities of the above cited constitutions 
rest primarily at the formal level as the content of all these documents could not be more 
different.  It is paramount that the “new” constitution needs to qualify its credentials, in 
other words: what is the purpose of drafting a new corpus of normative guidelines?  
What also should be addressed are questions like: what makes these newly founded 
systems superior to the previous orders and what are the guarantees that these will not be 
more despotic than the previous ones?  This quest for legitimacy which substantiates the 
distinctive identification marker for any political system has been addressed by the 
French Preamble by elucidating references to the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 
and other charters and secular sources which repose the source of sovereignty in the 
hands of the people.  Indeed here one sees numerous references to the republican nature 
of the political system and a list of the provisions to be taken to ensure that the essential 
republican values are upheld and promoted.  
 
     Similar notions could be perceived from the North Korean Constitution with its 
emphasis on the socialist values of people’s sovereignty.  In fact the country is qualified 
as “the Democratic People’s Republic” and one sees an exaltation of the restoration of 
the “national sovereignty” and the creation of a republic “centred on masses”.  The 
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famous sentence of the late leader, Kim Il Sung is also presented stating: “The people 
are my God”, this statement further underlines the virtues of a leader who “always 
mixed with the people and devoted his entire life for them”.  This renders a great part of 
the text into a eulogy of the semi-divine figure of Kim Il Sung who provided the 
constitution for the Korean people.  Indeed the constitution is called “the Kim Il Sung 
constitution” who is glorified as the eternal president of the Republic!  
 
        Most remarkably the Iranian Preamble and the first section of the constitution cite 
the religious sources of the Quran and Shariʻa as the basic cornerstones of the 
constitution and the place of sovereignty is accordingly deemed to be with God 
almighty.  Numerous lines are dedicated to citing Quranic verses and constant religious 
arguments are put forward to underline the Islamic foundation of the constitution that 
follows.  Indeed all the revolutionary struggles are interpreted as a struggle to establish 
the “law of Islam”.  Unsurprisingly the title of the Preamble to the Iranian Constitution 
is a Quranic verse which reads: 
 
We have sent Our apostles with veritable signs and brought down with them scriptures 
and the scales of justice, so that men might conduct themselves with justice.428 
 
The emphasis on the Islamic principles of the Iranian Constitution could be fully 
appreciated by the fact that the word “Islam” or “Islamic” is repeated 50 times 
throughout the three pages of the Preamble, together with various other religious 
references and arguments.  Indeed the overall impression one gets when reading the 
Iranian Preamble to the Constitution, is that this is going to be a document entirely or at 
least primarily designed to uphold Islamic values as interpreted by the ideologues of the 
Islamic Republic.  Any social, political, economic and military arguments are subjected 
to this prevailing religious theme.  
 
     In the section related to the Islamic government, although a Marxist style rejection of 
the class or group domination is upheld, it is claimed that the political authority would 
be reserved only for devout men of religion: 
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In creating the political structures and foundations for organizing society on the basis of 
acceptance of religion, devout men have the responsibility for government and 
administration of the country: “The earth will be inherited by my pious followers". 
(Quran: 21:105 ) 
 
Obviously the devout men of religion within the Iranian socio-political context are 
interpreted to mainly include the Olamā and closely related religious circles which by 
themselves make up a certain social class which at times proves to be very exclusive to 
certain currents of thought within the same congregation
429
.  This could in turn pose a 
conceptual challenge to the classless society which at times seems to have been endorsed 
herein.  It is important to underline that there is no attempt here to extend these 
affirmations to include the hereditary system of privileges which one expects to be the 
case in a monarchy, rather a more Communist style system of guilds or social groups 
sharing common values would make closer candidates with comparable exclusive 
structures.  In an arguably Marxist style an ideological leader at the summit of this 
political system can be found who shall be “a security against the deviation of all 
organisations from their genuine Islamic responsibilities”.  Moreover as far as the 
economy is concerned, one encounters a similar line of argument with an open attack on 
“materialistic” schools of economy in which it is claimed that the economy is an end to 
itself which would lead to “destruction, corruption and decay”.  Whilst the economy in 
Islam is presented as a system which is not an end-goal within itself, rather it is an 
instrument to provide for a human’s journey towards (spiritual) development.  Strikingly 
one could identify very similar arguments put forward by most constitutions following 
the Marxist ideology, the Cuban Constitution being a very eloquent example of this430. 
 
     As I demonstrated in Chapter 2 this world vision of politics and the economy is only 
one of the several competing currents of thought within - not only the Islamic world 
view, but also the same Shiʻa school of thought.  Most importantly the abstract notions 
of “human development”, “moral perfection”, the “journey towards God” and to 
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“emulate God’s morality” are extremely fluid and spacious arguments hardly 
quantifiable to capture and regulate unequivocally in any “non-divine” ideological 
repository.  This has resulted in many ipso facto ambiguities and inconsistencies arising 
from the fundamentally different interpretations of such notions that will form the 
subject of my analysis in the final part of this chapter.  
 
c. Foreign Dominance and the notion of Peace 
One of the striking features of the Preamble to the Iranian Constitution is its constant 
reference to the role of foreign influence, its meddling in Iranian’s affairs and the 
importance of liberating the nation from external dominance.  In fact for someone not 
acquainted with Iran’s contemporary history, they would get the impression that it was 
actually a colonized or at least directly dominated country at the hands of the 
international hegemonic powers before being delivered to freedom by the Islamic 
Revolution.  Evidently this is the very characteristic of the so-called third-world 
nationalizing states which gained their independence and national sovereignty against 
the ancient world “empires”.  This rhetoric becomes more remarkable when one 
considers the case of Iran as the country that has largely avoided a direct colonial 
experience like most comparable nations in the developing world.  No doubt there has 
been significant foreign competition for a greater political and consequently economic 
influence over Iran, in particular by Great Britain and Russia, but this has never 
translated into such things as direct national awakenings and the wars of independence 
against these hegemonic powers.  Hence this historical record renders the great emphasis 
of the Preamble on national independence to sound at times somewhat overstated.  
 
     Identical expressions of liberty are being addressed in the preamble to the North 
Korean Constitution, here again the “anti-Japanese revolutionary” struggle is being 
highlighted and the emergence of a new era of independence is being announced which 
would make “an imperishable contribution to the cause of human independence”.  
  
    Yet again in the Iranian Preamble one constantly encounters the recollections of 
“international imperialism’s role”, particularly the United States and its “international 
oppressive and arrogant world policies” which the Islamic regime intends to fight in and 
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outside the country
431.  Hence the Islamic Republic’s mission is declared to be the 
unification of all Muslims and indeed beyond this to liberate all oppressed people of the 
world!  
The Constitution…was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the 
arrogant, provides a basis for the continuation of that revolution both inside and outside 
the country.  It particularly tries to do this in developing international relations with 
other Islamic movements and peoples, so as to prepare the way towards a united single 
world community…432 
 
Thus it is claimed that: “A new chapter opened up in its own way for popular 
revolutions in the world”.  Interestingly these militant declarations sound so radical that 
one could barely find any comparable notions in any formal constitutions around the 
world.  Even in the revolutionary communist Korean Preamble one could notice the 
emphasis placed on the contribution made to the “world peace and for friendship among 
the peoples”433.  
 
     In fact the utter repudiation of all the non-Islamic doctrines in the Preamble to the 
Iranian Constitution - which defines them as corrupt and decaying, would in theory 
leave no space for any peaceful coexistence of diverse ideologies.  Although the text 
falls short of any direct threat or proclamation of hostility, it could well inspire various 
ideological conflicts which would be difficult to settle in the light of this inflexible 
doctrinal conviction arising from specific interpretations of the religious doctrine.  
Furthermore, the republican non-domination concept, as discussed in Chapter 1, is 
strongly extended to international relations, as well and in particular the possibility of 
negotiating and in certain cases renouncing, to a certain degree, the arrival at a mid-way 
compromise to accommodate contrasting viewpoints.  Whereas the moral mission that 
the Islamic regime has set for itself to inspire and liberate all the oppressed nations of 
the world and to create “one single Islamic nation” seems to be at open conflict with the 
non-domination and mutual respect for the diversity and pluralism of the international 
intellectual heritage which is an integral part of the republican ideology.  Such 
proclamations based on the convictions of transcendental truth inherent to the religious 
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dogma would indeed prove to be at odds with the basic republican rational, contingent 
and most importantly negotiable principles.  Consequently the obvious question at this 
stage would be how such an international union for the oppressed would materialize in a 
voluntary manner without recourse to any form of domination?  
 
     Similar ideas are reflected in the paragraph related to the role of the military within 
the system of the Islamic Republic.  This very eloquent paragraph shows the importance 
of religion and ideology in the formation of the military apparatus and underlines and 
indeed declares that the role of the Iranian military forces would not be limited to the 
safeguarding of national frontiers, but it is also most importantly extended to include the 
mission of expanding the rule of God on earth and performing the ideological fight in 
the form of jahād for the divine cause434.  As mentioned above this is yet another 
ideological conviction which could hardly be compatible with the republican respect for 
the diversity of opinion and the strive to resolve the points of disaccord through dialogue 
which would often entail making significant concessions to promote principles of 
international peaceful coexistence amongst nations without having to resort to military 
settlement of ideological differences.  It appears extremely difficult to conciliate the 
fundamental republican tolerance and the core ideas of openness and inclusivity with 
such threats of preparing an organized structure of the armed forces, whose main 
function would be to establish the presumed law of God at a global level.  This great 
emphasis on the intention to export the Iranian political and in particular religious 
agenda abroad, could indeed constitute a very challenging argument that could 
potentially be exploited against any global attempts towards the promotion of peace and 
appreciation of pluralism and diversity. As expostulated before, these are integral to the 
multi-layered nature of the human civilization, fully appreciated by the republican 
fundamental principles based on the human reason.  To provide another comparative 
analysis I could cite the clear safeguards against this danger within the French 
Constitution which is based on this basic republican conviction:  
 
The French Republic, faithful to its traditions, shall conform to the rules of international 
public law.  It shall undertake no war aimed at conquest, nor shall it ever employ force 
against the freedom of any people. 
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d. Women in the Constitutional Preamble 
Another important concept treated in the Preamble to the Iranian Constitution is the role 
of women within it.  Here it asserts that women have been the main victims of 
oppression by tyrannical forces therefore benefitting the most by the restoration of 
human rights brought about by the construction of a progressive Islamic social structure.  
Nevertheless I can highlight a marked reference to the concept of family, as if the 
reinstatement of the rights of women is closely linked to the role she is expected to play 
within the family union.  Thus I could not find any consideration for the individual 
rights of women outside the traditional religious and cultural values attached to the 
sanctity of the family.  Hence this appears to be more of a derivative privilege by 
extension rather than a normative individual right; that is to say it is accorded on a 
functional basis and not a fundamental intrinsic right of humanity.   
 
     In the Preamble’s next paragraph this concept is extended further by underlining the 
idea of “motherhood” by claiming that the status of working women had been reduced to 
that of mere “objects” and “instruments of work” by “being drawn away from the family 
unit”.  The inevitable impression one gets regarding these declarations is that potentially 
one of the major causes of the oppression of women has actually been their participation 
in the working environment instead of being devoted to the sacred task of “the 
development and growth of mankind” achieved by the assumption of the responsibilities 
of motherhood.  A brief look at the treatment of the same argument by the French 
Constitution is again instructive here.  Indeed this is the first argument treated in the 
1946 Preamble to the French Constitution which demonstrates the great importance 
accorded to this subject highlighted in the unambiguous declaration: “The law 
guarantees women equal rights to those of men in all spheres”435. 
 
     Thus as far as gender equality is concerned, in the Preamble to the Iranian 
Constitution there does not seem to be any concession made to women who fall outside 
the family union and who do not fulfil the all-important responsibilities of motherhood 
as required by the Islamic Shariʻa.  This could potentially provide another source of 
domination in which women’s role is reduced to the auxiliary role of raising children 
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and marginalized from the direct participation in social and political life.  Although this 
might not be the automatic consequence of such proclamations, one could certainly 
claim that the paragraph on women’s rights in the Preamble would certainly provide no 
significant republican guarantees towards “empowering” the women by protecting their 
fundamental human rights and promoting the fundamental non-domination rule of the 
republican doctrine against the private dominium of inter-personal relations. 
 
e. Liberties in the Constitutional Preamble 
Throughout the Preamble to the Iranian Constitution one could also identify numerous 
references to various notions of liberty.  There are also references to the republican 
character of the new political system and the freedom that the Iranian people have 
achieved by ridding themselves of the monarchic system: 
 
Having regard to the intrinsic nature of this great movement, the Constitution guarantees 
to oppose any kind of despotism, intellectual, social, and as regards monopoly 
economics, and to struggle for freedom from the despotic system, and to entrust men's 
destiny to their own hands436 
 
Despite these affirmations, it would appear that the entire human society has been 
divided into two main classes of the oppressed and the oppressors.  The latter seems to 
be a term referring to both internal despotic regimes and also international hegemonic 
powers.  Hence the achieved liberty seems to be reduced to, on the one hand, liberty 
from foreign oppression and dominance and on the other liberty from internal tyrants 
who are in turn agents to their “international masters”.  
 
     Veritably this treatment of liberty would at best partially fulfil the imperium notion of 
republican liberty while containing a significant omission of the individual spaces of 
societal expressions of liberty i.e. freedom from dominium.  Again as shown in Chapter 
1, the fundamental concept of the republican liberty with this sphere of dominium would 
largely account for such individual liberties as the freedom in the inter-personal 
relations, gender equality, equal access to public services and resources, labour rights 
and in general the absence of any dominating situation in all individual domains of 
social life.  The famous republican eye-ball test
437
 that was discussed previously is not 
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only in relation with the state, but also at the personal level amongst various members of 
society regardless of gender, wealth, religious and other idiosyncratic backgrounds.  I 
will be providing a more detailed treatment of this argument in the forthcoming sections 
related to the analysis of the actual content of the Constitution. 
 
     Another important point here would be that the Iranian Preamble of the constitution, 
like the North Korean one - by reducing the notion of freedom to the liberty from 
foreign dominance and the absence of the internal despots, seems to become complaisant 
with the fact that a significant amount of these social objectives are thought to have 
already been accomplished.  Thus there should be no need for the constant public 
participation and watchful scrutiny of the political processes as significant gains are 
claimed to have been made in attaining such objectives.  In any case freedom is never 
claimed to be a self-standing principle with intrinsic values attached to it.  Again if one 
considers the French Preamble to illustrate this point, it appears to be attributing an 
epistemological value to the concept of liberty as a value and an end in its own right.  
Obviously this is not only with respect to the foreign aggression and domination, which 
was also the case in France, since the initial Preamble was drafted in 1946 a few years 
after the end of the German occupation of the French territories.  Nevertheless in the 
French Preamble there are clear distinctions of individual rights and freedom by 
including various articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by 
explicitly putting forward provisions to uphold such values.  
 
     To put it another way: one could observe that the Iranian Preamble seems to be 
providing an inadequate treatment of the concept of “freedom from” and hardly any 
reference to the notion of “freedom to” and the empowerment to provide equal access to 
the resources which is what should be expected in any system claiming to have 
republican credentials.  Thus it should be highlighted here that in the Preamble to the 
Iranian Constitution the emphasis seems to be on the liberty from the internal and 
external forces of domination but not much details provided on “what to be done”, not 
even general references to ways to generate, preserve and promote liberty through 
“positive” means of achieving freedom. 
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     I will discuss the paragraphs related to the judiciary systems and the executive 
powers in the next sections, but beforehand a last section of the Preamble to the 
constitution deserves further analysis as it treats the very important argument of public 
media, which was part of the republican principles declared in Chapter 1.  This principle 
could constitute a very fundamental republican means of access and participation in the 
civic spheres of the republic.  In the Preamble to the Iranian Constitution it is declared 
that the various means of mass communication should be employed “to spread the 
Islamic culture” through benefitting from “a healthy encounter of different opinions and 
strictly avoiding the broadcasting of destructive and anti-Islamic features”438.  At this 
stage it is not clarified what kind of expressions could be regarded as “destructive” to the 
Islamic Republic and who would determine the religious viability of the programmes.  
Nevertheless this lays the foundation for the possibility and even the need for profound 
control and monitoring of the means of mass communication by the state which could 
potentially be inimical to various articles of the republican ideology.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, one of the fundamental elements of the respublica since ancient times, has 
been to guarantee an equitable access to public forums for all citizens of the republic.  
Therefore, at certain levels this would constitute the main channel of participation to 
give individual opinions a voice and in particular make the minority groups’ arguments 
known to a wider public which would otherwise be silenced through the prevailing 
tyranny of the majority.  There is a danger here which could materialize even within the 
democratic systems in particular those with a liberal matrix.  To further clarify, most of 
the republican ideas would not have even had the chance to come into existence if this 
vital element of public forums was not fully established and operational.  In particular 
people with different opinions from the dominant ideology should be guaranteed an 
adequate access to various public means of communication in order to feel themselves 
free from marginalization in a community which would otherwise prove to not pay 
enough attention to their concerns and grievances
439
.  Hence this particular paragraph of 
the Preamble could provide dangerous potential for the suppression of different 
republican elements of social participation and oversight.  Indeed it is not hard to 
envisage a system degenerating into a tyranny where the means of mass communication 
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and information are deprived of their essential role for staging open public debates 
related to all levels of social administration; and to denounce various shortcomings of 
the system if need be, without being banished with the accusation of conducting 
“destructive behaviour”.  
      Now let us turn our attention to the actual text of the Constitution to see how various 
fundamental principles of the republic have been formulated there. 
 
IV. Islamic Republic Constitution 
For the sake of simplicity and in line with the general layout of the constitution, I shall 
consider three main constitutional themes for the current study, namely: the treatment of 
the individual rights and liberties, the leadership, and the separation of power into 
legislative, executive and judiciary systems.  The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to 
the first of these three, i.e. the reflection of different aspects of individual rights and 
liberties in the Iranian Constitution and its compatibility with the basic republican 
principles laid out in Chapter 1.      
 
     It is evident that the main function of any national constitution could be said to be 
centred on the protection and promotion of its citizen’s basic rights and liberties.  In 
Chapter 1, I discussed numerous traditions within the republican school of thought to 
safeguard this essential cornerstone of the republican ideology, which, unlike the ancient 
Greek notions of democracy for instance, could be extended to the majority of the 
population regardless of their ethnic and social background.  As I argued previously this 
idea was at the heart of the arguments put forward by Cicero, one of the republican 
thought’s earliest theoreticians, who by defining the natural right of social participation 
and political engagement, initiated a tradition whose culmination could be traced to the 
French and American charters and declarations of human rights.   
 
     A closer look at the first constitution of Iran  adopted in 1906 shows that Articles 8 to 
25 were directly dedicated to this issue capturing a significant part of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  In spite of this some articles such as Articles 18, 20 and 
21 set out the limits of education, public communication, publication, assemblies and 
public gatherings as not being harmful to the principles of Islam or explicitly banned by 
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the Shariʻa440.  This initial constitution was subject to various modifications and 
revisions until the Islamic revolution of 1979 embarked upon the task of drafting a new 
constitution directly based on the principles of Islam as interpreted by the founders of 
the Islamic Republic.  Here again the citizen’s rights have been endorsed in various 
articles in particular Articles 19 to 42 are entirely dedicated to the individual’s liberties 
under the title “Rights of the People”.  Prior to this part the initial section on “General 
Principles” also treats this argument, in particular Article 2, section 6 stresses the 
“dignity and value of man and his freedom coupled with responsibility before God”441.  
Furthermore in the same article in Section C: (the Islamic Republic is a system based on) 
“the negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction and submission to it, and of 
dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance”.  This very eloquent article is very 
pertinent to this study based on the republican notion of non-domination.  It is evident 
that these two sections of Article 2 clearly set out a solid basis for potential subsequent 
developments of republican principles.  Notwithstanding a clear reference to the 
religious boundaries of freedom based on “responsibility before God” should be 
highlighted as I will expound further below
442
.  
 
a. Constitutional Mass Communication and 
Education 
The third Article of the Iranian Constitution is very broad and addresses various issues 
which are further developed throughout the next chapters of the Constitution.  These 
numerous principles of individual liberties constitute a very useful outline which I will 
use as my point of departure to trace and analyse all relevant articles throughout the 
Constitution and attempt to elucidate how these have been passed down in the form of 
legal provisions and public laws within the Iranian legislative system.  
 
     Section 2 of Article 3 declares that one of the functions of the Islamic Republic is to 
“raise the level of public awareness in all areas, through the proper use of the press, 
mass media and other means”.  This section is fully developed in Article 24 of the 
constitution which reads: “Publications and the press have freedom of expression except 
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when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.  
The details of this exception will be specified by law”.  The concept of freedom of press 
and expression in general in the constitution of 1906 is also referenced particularly in 
Articles 13 and 20 of the constitutional supplements.  As demonstrated previously this 
could be regarded as the cornerstone of all the government’s republican doctrine through 
providing public forums and open circles of debate.  This would inevitably constitute the 
primary source of informing the ruling body of the needs and requirements of the 
citizens, particularly those in a weaker social position, minority groups and those with 
different social, cultural and political convictions whose voices would otherwise be 
unheard without the provision of adequate tribunes for the expression of their 
convictions.  Therefore the importance of the media and means of mass communication 
becomes clear in a system that intends to open public spaces of debate and scrutiny to 
monitor all elements of power in the society.  As I argued in Chapter 1 this includes all 
aspects of legislation as well as all elements of legal execution and political sovereignty 
in the state.   
 
     In our fully specialized world based on the division of labour the role of professional 
news gathering agencies and their unrestricted access to all potential sources of public 
interest would constitute the basic republican instruments for promoting transparency 
and accountability.  Evidently then the notion of mass communication would not be 
limited to certain specialized agencies; rather it should be open and inclusive to all 
members of society based on the republican principles governing the existence of 
popular forums.  It goes without saying that what we are concerned with here is not the 
existence of a total unrestricted and unregulated freedom in all domains of public 
concern.  As I argued in Chapter 1 this is exactly what distinguishes the liberal concept 
of liberty as the total absence of interference and the republican interpretation of 
freedom as non-domination in which not all interferences are regarded as inimical to 
liberty443.  
 
     As already discussed the Iranian Constitution expounds that the limits imposed on 
freedom of press and public expression are determined by law.  A brief survey of the 
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relevant legal provisions reveals interesting aspects of these guidelines within the 
Islamic republican system in an attempt to study whether these provisions respect the 
relevant republican principles.  The Press Law dated March 1986 with the additional 
April 2000 supplement clearly sets out the guidelines regulating the press’ activity in 
Iran.  The mission of the authorized press is stated here including duties to: “increase the 
public awareness, fight against the imperialist cultures of waste, luxury and lust and 
emphasize the culture of no to west and no to east”444.   Importantly one can notice the 
prescriptive instructions that purport “all newspapers need to participate in the 
realization of at least one of the above objectives and not be in contradiction with 
others”445.  In particular the supplement of April 2000 more clearly delineates the 
boundaries of the activities of the press with unambiguous emphasis on the fact that it 
should strictly avoid publishing material which is: 
 
Detrimental to the principles of Islam and against Islamic laws, and public 
morality....should refrain from incitement to take action against the interests of the 
Islamic Republic....should strictly avoid levelling false accusations against the 
leader.....the personalities, organisations and institutions of the Islamic Republic....or 
offending the religious authorities even though this might be in the form of publishing 
their picture or their caricatures”446.  
 
These and numerous other legal provisions are set out in detailed guidelines provided by 
the legislators of Iran to safeguard the principal convictions of the Islamic Republic.  It 
is possible to observe that the foreseen punishment for such violations as “to insult Islam 
and its sacred principles” is actually the same capital punishment as that reserved for 
heresy and the negation of religious fundamentals
447
.  
 
     Therefore, it is easy to recognize various pitfalls in the Iranian Constitution and the 
relative legislations regarding the freedom of press and public means of communication.  
Undoubtedly as shown above there is a very interesting potential for freedom of 
expression within the Iranian Constitution but a closer scrutiny reveals that these are all 
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subjected to various restrictions and supervising organisations
448
 which would provide 
efficient means to any members of the ruling authorities to suppress or severely restrict 
ad arbitrium various modalities of free expression of thought within the Islamic 
Republic. 
 
     Furthermore all relevant articles seem to have been very broadly drafted and vaguely 
worded to the point that they could easily be interpreted to waive even the most basic 
public rights in this domain.  The concept of insult or “false accusation” is so broad and 
the punishments so severe that undoubtedly this would lead to significant amounts of 
auto-censorship or the previously discussed “anticipated sanctions” to avoid various 
harsh consequences of publicly denouncing anything.  Obviously there are numerous 
subjects of public interest which deal with the correct functioning and accountability of 
those holding public offices that should be under constant scrutiny by the public organs. 
Now if the criticism or public denunciation of a perceived shortcoming of any 
“personalities, organisations and public institutions” could constitute a potential for false 
claims, this could easily result in numerous punishments laid out by these regulations, 
not least because free access to information and source verification are never guaranteed 
in the relevant legal framework.  In addition the restrictions on publishing any material 
deemed harmful to the “interests of the Islamic Republic” would leave very little room 
for any act of public expression at all, let alone those following the Republican freedom 
and basic principles of non-domination.   
 
     Most importantly, as shown in Chapter 1, the famous republican eye-ball test - which 
guarantees the possibility of criticizing any authorities in a republican system by looking 
them straight in the eye and expressing a view or concern without fear of consequences, 
could have no place in such a restricted system.  Here one could obviously observe 
several sources of authority, including the seat of leadership and religious figures which 
are placed above criticism and accountability, even though to the contrary, there are 
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other sections of the constitution which clearly guarantees these basic rights and 
apparently puts all members of the public on the same footing of common standing
449
. 
 
     Returning to Article 3 of the constitution one could note Sections 3 and 4 which 
endorses the necessity for providing free education and physical training to all members 
of society.  These sections are further developed in Article 30 with similar guidelines 
instructing the government to provide everyone with free elementary and higher 
education to “the point of national independence”.   As shown previously in Chapter 1, 
public education is one of the basic principles of republicanism which has been 
underlined from ancient times as illustrated by examples from the fathers of 
republicanism such as Cicero, Machiavelli and Condorcet.  This is in line with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights particularly Article 26 and also the international 
covenant on economic, social and cultural rights
450
. 
 
     It has to be recognized that the Islamic Republic has dedicated a significant amount 
of resources into realising these article’s objectives.  Nevertheless a great amount of 
work has yet to be done in particular concerning the content of the educational material.   
I will expound more on this subject in the chapter dedicated to the republican citizens 
but as far as the constitutional provisions and their direct outcomes on the state policies 
and regulations are concerned I could highlight numerous aspects of these fundamental 
guidelines.  It appears that momentous efforts have been undertaken towards giving the 
educational system a specific direction such as limiting the education of the natural 
science.  This direction is particularly apparent when these teachings are deemed 
contrary to the principles of Islam which has resulted in a direct manipulation of 
teaching curricula both at primary, secondary and higher education to censor ideologies 
considered hostile to the principles upheld by the Islamic regime
451
.  This was a process 
that was initiated right after the Islamic Revolution particularly through the so-called 
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“Cultural Revolution” of 1980 to 1983, during which time a complete revision and 
purging of teaching material and academic staff took place in an attempt to re-write new 
syllabi and educational curricula based on the Shariʻa452.  A recent example of this 
would be the suppression of the teaching material on the scientific basis of evolutionary 
biology or the teaching ban on western philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas or even 
the former authorities of the Islamic Republic such as ex-presidents Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani or Mohammad Khatami whose books and articles are severely restricted
453
.  
 
     To better manage the flow of information, and to filter and channel the sources of 
public education and information, the Islamic Republic has instated a dedicated ministry 
called the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.  This Ministry regulates any 
material destined for mass publication and all sources of information and education.  
These meticulous controls, selections, filtering and eventual punishments have resulted 
in significant amounts of invigilation, direct manipulation and even self-censorship 
which is sometimes based on the so-called principle of prior restraint, namely censorship 
before actual expression has even taken place in the public domain
454
.  As various 
observations and reports have shown
455
 this could and indeed has generated a significant 
amount of the anticipated reaction to avoid potential coercion or alternatively 
withholding of benefits
456
.  
 
     Therefore once again I could notice that although this article and relevant legal 
provisions have endorsed the necessity of providing an inclusive system of free national 
education, various manipulations, censorship, filtering and the threat of possible 
punishments have ipso facto reduced the scope and usefulness of such an important 
principle of republican doctrine.  Put another way there is a certain amount of publicly 
available free education for all, but the contents of this education do not reflect the basic 
requirements of the republican system in which the citizens need to be empowered to 
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make informed choices based on all available options and potentials.  Therefore one 
appears to be facing a strictly guided system of education here, providing a limited 
source of information and learning which could easily degenerate into a closed 
oppressive system of values pertaining to one specific source of cultural hegemony
457
.  
Thus as I argued in Chapter 1, one of the primary sources of domination is the supply of 
incorrect or incomplete information or limiting the choice by removing all possible 
available options.  This could eventually lead to dominance as a result of the failure to 
intellectually empower the citizens to make informed choices.  All the constitutional 
evidence that I analysed pointed in the direction that this could be largely the case with 
the Islamic Republic’s policies on mass communication and public education.  I will 
further scrutinise this subject with detailed on the ground data in the section dedicated to 
the role of the contestatory citizenry in the Islamic Republic. 
 
b. Constitutional Individual Liberties 
Moving to Sections 6 and 7 of Article 3 of the Iranian Constitution one encounters very 
important provisions regarding the necessity of “eliminating all forms of despotism and 
autocracy and all attempts to monopolize power” and also “guaranteeing the political 
and social freedom within the framework of the law”.  
 
     These two sections together with relevant articles constitute the main normative 
repository for the protection of the citizen’s basic rights.  An in-depth survey of the 
constitution demonstrates that these concepts are further developed directly in 9 articles 
throughout the constitution with numerous other articles indirectly related to these 
principles.  The first article directly treating these principles is Article 19 of Chapter 3 
under the title: “Rights of the People”.  This article endorses the conviction that “...all 
people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal 
rights; and colour and race and language do not bestow any privilege”.  This is a very 
fundamental affirmation in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
particular Articles 1, 2 and 4 which guarantee the rights and freedom for all “without 
distinction of any kind…” with Article 4 which explicitly forbids slavery and servitude.  
                                                 
457
 Detailed analysis of various mechanisms of Cultural Hegemony can be found in Antonio Gramsci’s 
seminal works notably in Gramsci, A. (1992).  Prison Notebooks. New York City: Columbia University 
Press. 
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It is worth mentioning that Iran is also a signatory of various international covenants and 
treaties upholding these principles which effectively makes the country a proactive 
member of international charters on non-discrimination and the fight against racism and 
apartheid
458
.  The same notion had also been underlined in Article 8 of the first Iranian 
Constitution of 1906.  On a side note I could underline that here there seems to be an 
interesting historical background on this principle dating back to the 6
th
 century BC in 
the Iranian history in the cuneiform cylinder made under the order of the Persian King 
Cyrus, in which it is believed that he explicitly forbade slavery and servitude which was 
in line with and indeed a necessity of a pluralistic world empire composed of numerous 
ethnicities, cultures and religions
459
.  
 
     Despite this impressive track record of the Iranian state, both before and after the 
Islamic Revolution, one could still notice many shortcomings and in some cases 
discrimination and deprivation which could at least be partially attributed to ethnic and 
religious factors.  Foreign observers and Human Rights’ organisations have repeatedly 
accused the Islamic Republic of wide spread discriminatory practices and laws in Iran 
based on ethnic, religious, gender-based or other distinctive features, to which the 
Iranian government has not appeared to be very responsive
460
.  Notwithstanding as far as 
various sources of discrimination are concerned, the Islamic Republic seems to have a 
relatively sound legal and legislative basis, largely in agreement with the democratic 
ones, hence and in that sense compliant with the republican principles of providing equal 
social opportunities to all members of the republic.  Nevertheless in practice various 
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research and observations have demonstrated that there has been a very marginal 
implementation of such principles on the ground, and that there are significant margins 
of improvement particularly concerning republican freedom in the form on non-
domination in all areas of private and public concern. 
 
     The second constitutional article directly related to Sections 6 and 7 of Article 3 is 
the very comprehensive Article 20 of the Iranian Constitution.  It reads: “All citizens of 
the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all 
human, political, economic, social and cultural rights in conformity with the Islamic 
Criteria”.  This is further detailed in:  
 
Article 21 on women’s rights;  
Article 23 on individuals’ beliefs;  
Article 25 on the prohibition of inspection in private communications;  
Article 26 on the freedom of political and professional associations;  
Article 27 on the right to hold public gatherings and marches;  
Article 32 on the prohibition of illegal arrests and detainments; and other articles related 
to the freedom of occupations, residence and so on.   
 
    All these fundamental Articles provide a significant amount of constitutional 
guarantees to uphold various principles of individual liberties protected under the 
republican guidelines against the danger of the imperium of the state which could easily 
degenerate into an arbitrary power if not adequately restrained and regulated.  A closer 
analysis of each one of these articles and their developments within the normative 
frameworks is needed here to see how these constitutional guidelines have been 
reflected in the ordinary laws of the Islamic Republic.  
 
     Let’s contemplate first on the general provisions on the protection of private space by 
taking a closer look at Article 22 and 23.  Article 22 states that “the dignity, life, 
property, rights, residence and occupation of individuals is protected from violation, 
except in cases sanctioned by law”.  Thereafter Article 23 guarantees the right to hold 
personal beliefs by clearly stating that: “the investigation of individuals’ beliefs is 
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forbidden; no one may be molested or questioned for holding a certain belief”.  These 
Articles are clear reflections of the relevant principles of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
461
.  
 
     It is unsurprising that the limits of these freedoms are declared to be set by relevant 
legal provisions; a brief consideration of a selection of these legislations would be very 
instructive here.  The property rights have been endorsed in many relevant legislations
462
 
which seem to be in exact compatibility with the international laws and conventions and 
republican social norms.  Other provisions such as the Article 2 of Iran’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure which states that “the police cannot detain suspects for more than 24 
hours and has to immediately refer the case to the appropriate juridical sources” also 
satisfies the minimum requirements for the protection of individual’s rights in a 
republic
463
.  Nevertheless I found instances of incompatibility and in some cases outright 
contradiction of the existing legal framework, in particular the Islamic Penal Code, with 
the previously stated republican principles.  For instance Article 207 of the same body of 
legislation states that: “when a Muslim is murdered the assassin will be put to death and 
the assistant to the crime will be condemned to 3 to 15 years of imprisonment”.  
Regardless of any considerations concerning suitability of capital punishment, one could 
notice that this protection is provided only for “Muslims” here which is in clear contrast 
with the previously discussed non-discrimination principles of the republican system 
based on religious belonging in this case
464
.       
 
     Article 23 appears to cause even more complication and controversy.  As seen above 
the article guarantees the individual’s right to hold any belief, but makes no reference to 
the actual “expression” of those beliefs.  In fact throughout my research on this 
argument I failed to identify any articles that explicitly and unambiguously guaranteed 
                                                 
461
See Articles 3, 5, 6, 9 and 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 6, 9 and 12 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights accessible on the United Nation’s website at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.  More recently the United Nation’s Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon on an official visit to Tehran expressed the United Nation’s “serious concerns” about the human 
rights situation in Iran as reported by the Associated Press on 29 August: at 
http://www.abcnews4.com/story/19404793/un-chief-to-discuss-syria-with-iranian-leaders 
462
 See for instance Articles 30, 92, 132, 301, 311, 329 and 331 of the Islamic Republic’s Civil Code and 
also Civil Liability laws of March 1960, also Article 9 of the Islamic Penal Code. 
463
 See for instance Articles 22 - 25 and 96 -103 of the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
464
 This article has recently been reinterpreted by the Maslahat Council, see Chapter 5 for details 
157 
 
the freedom of expression for individuals.  The provisions reserved for the means of 
mass communication were discussed previously, nevertheless it is interesting to observe 
that these could not be automatically extended to the expression of personal beliefs and 
convictions at individual levels.  Individual beliefs could include all intellectual 
convictions in the domains of religion, culture, politics and so on which in theory should 
be protected by this Article.  It goes without saying that the ideas should be expressed to 
come to be recognized as such in the public domain, but there are various means of 
expression which go beyond oral and written acknowledgment of convictions.  Such 
expressions of belief could include wearing a cross around your neck for instance or a 
symbol denoting Atheism or any known organisation or association, - as long as this 
does not directly offend others and transgress limits of liberty as set out by republican 
principles of liberty.   
 
     Thus it would appear that this great omission concerning the freedom of expression 
in the text of the constitutional article would cause a significant vacuum which could 
potentially give rise to various arbitrary suppressions of individual freedom in the 
absence of any unambiguous normative guarantee in this matter.  Various authors have 
tried, on the one hand, to interpret the article to cover actual expressions of personal 
belief by logical extension, and on the other, to affirm that it only guarantees the holding 
of personal beliefs and not the actual act of expression, which demonstrates the great 
ambiguity and potential for misinterpretation that exists in this article
465
.  A brief 
comparison with the relevant articles of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights
466
 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would elucidate this point 
which reads:  
                                                 
465
 For a detailed discussion of this argument see Izanloo, M, (2003).  Azadi-e Baian dar Hoquq-e Asasi 
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 Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights:  
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the form of art, or through any other media of his choice;   
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
 
Only such an unambiguous declaration could provide any chance of protecting basic 
rights of individuals which would otherwise be trampled upon and waived in an arbitrary 
manner due to incongruent interpretations.   
 
     One final observation that I could make regarding the safeguarding of individual 
beliefs would involve the protection of religious beliefs in the Iranian Constitution.  
Article 13 acknowledges that Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity are the only 
recognized religious minorities.  Therefore there are no guarantees of freedom for 
followers of any other faiths to practice their religion or to include their religious 
principles in any official social contexts and forms.  This is not only in contrast with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 2 in particular), but also in clear 
contradiction to the affirmation of “all people of Iran” in Article 19 of the same 
constitution which declares “equal rights” for all.  This proves to be yet another 
shortcoming which could have serious consequences on the safeguards of the 
individual’s rights which could easily be discounted by the imperium of the Islamic 
Republic state, which as I will expound in Chapter 6 seems to have indeed been the case. 
 
c. Constitutional Gender Equality 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the prevention of dominium in private relations and the 
empowerment of individuals in a weaker social position to promote their interests and 
concerns, constitutes one of the main functions of a republican government, which 
unlike the liberal counterpart does not limit its actions to a mere non-interference stage.  
One of these areas of potential domination is the historical setbacks arising from 
inequality of the sexes in socio-cultural domains with possible reflections in the 
legislative provisions.  Hence as argued previously, this area is of special concern to the 
theoreticians of republican thought due to its significant potential for violation of 
republican liberties.  Thus in my domain of study, a closer analysis of Articles 20 and 21 
- in particular as far as the “equal protection of man and woman before the law” is 
concerned, would be very instructive here. 
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     This is a very problematic area for any legislation founded on the so-called “Western 
Religions” including the Islamic Shariʻa.  Unsurprisingly the Iranian legal framework 
does not and could not reflect the provision of the above constitutional principles due to 
strict religious guidelines in this field
467
.  A brief survey of the Iranian legislations in this 
regard reveals a significant body of discriminatory laws aimed at privileging the male 
domination in various socio-cultural and private domains.  Article 1133 of the Civil 
Code for instance reserves the right to divorce for men only and provides further 
simplification in cases where the wife suffers from certain types of illnesses; whereas the 
wife does not enjoy equivalent rights even in the case of certain serious ailments of the 
husband. Article 1130 of the same Code defines the rare cases where the wife could 
actually file for divorce, this include such instances as when she can prove to have been 
subject to “continuous and unbearable physical beating and mistreatment”. Thus it is 
unambiguously implied that when the physical mistreatment could be said to be 
“tolerable”, there will be no grounds for a wife initiated requested for the dissolutions of 
the marriage with regards to these legal provisions; and even in this specific case the 
wife is usually required to waive all her legal and financial rights ensued by the marital 
bonds.  In various articles of the Islamic Penal Code it is affirmed that the testimony of 
women has either no legal value or half the witness value given to that of men, or that 
monetary compensation paid in the event of causing unintentional death would be half 
the amount paid to women as that to men
468
.  The striking sections of the Islamic Penal 
Code are certainly the parts related to the rights of the husband to commit manslaughter 
if he happens to discover his adulterous wife with another man.  It is confirmed that he is 
entitled to murder both there and then whereas the wife is not afforded such a right or 
even to that of causing minor bodily harm
 469
.   
 
     There are numerous other discriminatory legislations which are at utter contradiction 
with the provisions of Article 20 and various international charters and covenants.  For 
instance the occupational access of women has been restricted in certain fields such as 
                                                 
467
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160 
 
the military or indeed to work as a judge in the national courts of justice, which is 
reflected in the relevant laws regarding the qualifying criteria to seek employment with 
such organisations
470
.  Furthermore in certain cases the husband is entitled to restrict the 
wife’s access to certain professions or even working altogether considered “detrimental 
to the interests of the family or his own or the wife’s dignity”471.  In contrast I could 
present various examples of the actual protection of women’s rights particularly 
regarding their rights to maintenance, protection from physical violence, legislations 
against physical abuse and prostitution together with some provisions for work 
environment entitlements and various provisions for social and economical assistance
472
.  
Despite this, the majority of these laws, in particularly Article 21 of the constitution - 
which in theory should serve as the basis for protection and promotion of basic women’s 
rights, seem to have adopted a protectionist approach towards the safeguarding of the 
already underprivileged position of women, rather than actually empowering them to 
gain equal social rights
473
.  Furthermore the emphasis seems to have shifted towards the 
protection of the family and motherhood, with significant consequences on women’s 
individual rights, which do not seem to have been derived from their own basic 
principles of human rights independent from the role they ought to play in a religious, 
family-oriented society.  
 
     All these discriminatory legal frameworks would point to the conclusion that the 
Islamic Republic has not been successful in enacting various international charters or 
even some of its own constitutional provisions which it had officially proclaimed
474
.  As 
far as my area of study is concerned this is a considerable deviation from the basic 
republican principle of non-domination.  It appears that very little has been done to 
empower women in the Islamic Republic who seem to be shackled by centuries of 
discriminating socio-cultural beliefs and convictions.  On the contrary all evidence 
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points in the direction that in practice they have actively been restricted and 
discriminated against in a system where the only “dignifying” role for women seems to 
be in the capacity of motherhood.  If one adds to this a significant amount of juvenile 
marriages for underage women, the resulting image would unequivocally represent a 
considerable amount of actual domination in private spheres
475
.  To mention yet another 
instance of such a prevailing individual dominium I could cite Article 1041 of the civil 
code which acknowledges that while the legal marriage age for girls is set to be 13 years, 
the marriage of infants below this age would still be permitted if the father or the 
grandfather of such an underage individual gets a favourable verdict from a civil 
judge
476
.   
 
     One specific recurrent expression throughout the Iranian Civil Code on family laws, 
based on the previously mentioned Quranic verse, is the term tamkin (obedience) which 
provides significant grounds for the subjugation of women to the dominium of their 
husband in all daily life matters.  Hence unsurprisingly the ordinary laws of the Islamic 
Republic driven from these dominatory constitutional and legal provisions prove to be 
providing significant grounds for the violation of the individual liberty and 
independence.  No need to underline the fact that by enacting such a legalized system of 
discrimination ipso facto half of the entire population would automatically fall outside 
the basic provisions of a republican doctrine of legal protection and equality before law.  
This constitutes a precise instance of living under the potestate domini of another 
dominatory force in the personal and private spheres of society.  
 
d. Constitutional Political Parties and Associations 
Other arguments treated in Article 3 of the constitution that I have used so far as my 
basic point of departure for the analysis of the fundamental individual rights in the 
Iranian Constitution, are the guarantees for the protection of individual rights to 
participate or form political and social parties and associations.  Articles 26 and 27 
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attempt to further develop these principles and delineate the framework of these liberties 
in the society.  Article 26 in particular declares:  
 
The formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as 
religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized religious 
minorities is permitted provided they do not violate the principles of independence, 
freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam or the foundations of the Islamic 
Republic…. 
 
Various aspects of this Article deserve further analysis.  First of all one can notice that 
for the religious parties and associations, only the officially recognized religions are 
authorized to have their own associations, which as I discussed previously, seems to be 
extremely discriminatory to the followers of other creeds and faiths.  Secondly and most 
importantly the clear “red line” set out here for the activities of the political parties is 
declared to be the fact that they should not violate the basic principles of the Islamic 
Republic.  This becomes clearer in Article 27 where the freedom of peaceful public 
gathering and marches is guaranteed provided that they are not “detrimental to the 
principles of Islam”.  One can notice that this is a recurrent limit set for most articles 
concerning the protection of the basic principles of individual liberties and all their 
social and political means and modes of public participation.  As seen previously, this is 
a very broad principle that could be interpreted in various ways.  Most strikingly I 
discovered that the Council of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic - who is 
constitutionally the only authorized source of providing interpretation and clarification 
of the ambiguities in the constitution, at least on one occasion, had refrained from 
providing any clarification to this phrase following the official enquiries by the 
government authorities
477
.  Unsurprisingly the ordinary laws of the Islamic Republic 
dominated by the conservative legislative factions have interpreted this to implement 
restrictive provisions both on the formation of political parties and even on peaceful 
public gatherings and associations, to the point where currently there is no single fully 
independent political party authorized within the framework of the Islamic Republic
478
.  
I will return to this argument in the last chapter dedicated to the republican contestatory 
citizenry of the Islamic Republic. 
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     To provide some samples of such legislations I should mention Articles 6 and 16 of 
the law on activities of the political parties, ratified in August 1981.  This law sets 
numerous exceptions to the freedom of activity of various political, social and 
professional parties and associations including: “violating the principles of national 
independence, contact with foreign embassies, receiving money from foreign countries, 
violating Islamic principles and the basic foundations of the Islamic Republic (with) 
anti-Islamic propaganda…”.  Furthermore, various articles of the Iran’s Islamic Penal 
Code are dedicated to punishments foreseen by law not only for those who perform 
activities against the national security (Article 498), but also those who are involved in 
propaganda against the system or promotion of groups and organisations which are 
against the Islamic Republic (Article 500).  
 
     Once again, as with other articles of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution cited above, 
one could not overlook the presence of interesting attempts to include various principles 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 20) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 21).  Nevertheless numerous restrictions 
and provisions and most importantly inherent ambiguities, have rendered these articles 
incapable of protecting and promoting the most basic principles of individual liberty.  
Various republican constraints and guidelines seem to have been jeopardized by the 
significant shortcomings of these articles.  Once again the basic republican principle of 
non-domination seems to have been considerably violated by providing a constitutional 
and consequently legal framework that seems to be incapable of guaranteeing equal 
rights before law for all citizens of the republic.  More specifically the promise of 
republican open public forums in the form of associations and political parties - which 
provide means for promoting various social and political interests, does not appear to 
have been materialized here.  The inimical imperium of the dominant ideology seems to 
have considerably overpowered the republican spirit for an open and inclusive society, 
to the point where the activities of all political parties, even those with the slightest 
tendency for promoting any unfavourable ideologies to those held by the Islamic 
Republic, are currently outlawed with the accusation of being “inimical to the Islamic 
Principles” or “performing activities against national security”479. 
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e. Constitutional Ambiguities and Inconsistencies 
As argued in Chapter 1, the primary concern of the legislative infrastructure of a 
republican state would be to lay down the norms of legal provisions with overriding 
comprehensive applicability in a clear unambiguous manner.  In spite of this, various 
levels of inconsistency could effortlessly be highlighted which seem to have been 
primarily caused by a profound underlying ambiguity in the interpretation of the locus of 
legitimacy and sovereignty within the Iranian Constitution.  As shown above there are 
explicit acknowledgment of the role of the people in administering all “affairs of the 
country” (Article 6). Nonetheless numerous limitations and boundaries imposed on this 
exercise of authority seem to be at unconcealed contradiction with the explicitly 
highlighted rights and purviews of the people.  This point requires a detailed analysis 
which I will provide in the forthcoming chapter. Notwithstanding as far as the current 
argument on the Constitution goes the existence of these numerous ambiguities and in 
some cases even contradictions within the Iranian Fundamental Law, would inevitably 
raise the question of what sources of clarification have been foreseen within the 
constitution itself to treat numerous potentials for misunderstanding?   
 
     Yet another example of such a complication can be referred to in Article 14 of the 
constitution which claims that: “The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all 
Muslims are bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the 
principles of the Islamic justice and equity and to respect their human rights”.  As 
discussed previously, only three religions in Article 13 are officially recognized by the 
Islamic Republic.  Thus it is unclear as to how the Islamic Republic could guarantee the 
“human rights” of all non-Muslims whilst not recognizing their rights to religious 
organisations?  The same would obviously hold true for other non-religious associations.  
 
     Incompatibilities like these and ambiguities like the previously discussed notion of 
being “inimical to the principles of Islam” or “against national security” would 
inevitably call for a strong supervising constitutional entity to interpret the Constitution 
in line with what is perceived to be in the national interests of the country.  The 
existence of such an institution with the power to interpret and clarify ambiguities is 
indeed a fairly common procedure in most modern day republics.  Indeed at certain 
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points, many of the western political systems have experienced a so-called 
“constitutional crisis” in which the ambiguity of the constitution or its silence on specific 
matters has resulted in a certain type of government crisis requiring a significant effort 
both politically and socially, to overcome
480
.  Hence various systems have produced 
different solutions for supervision over the content of the constitution and compatibility 
of the ordinary laws and provisions with the fundamental principles of the 
constitution
481
.    
 
     As mentioned above, within the constitutional layout of the Islamic Republic this role 
is reserved for the Council of the Guardian as coded in Article 98:  
 
The authority of the interpretation of the Constitution is vested with the Guardian 
Council which is to be done with the approval of three-fourths of its members”.   
 
Within the legislative structure of the Islamic Republic Constitution, the Guardian 
Council occupies a very prominent role as it is also responsible for the approval of all 
laws passed by parliament as seen in Article 94.  The constitution further asserts that the 
Iranian Parliament or Islamic Consultative Assembly, does not have any legitimacy if 
there is no Guardian Council in existence, as seen in Article 93.  These and other articles 
endorse the very fundamental role attributed to this council by the constitution.  It is 
worthwhile mentioning that the 12 members of such an omnipotent council are chosen 
half by the Leader of the Islamic Republic and half by the head of the judiciary system, 
who is appointed by the Supreme Leader.  I will discuss the various implications of this 
arrangement in the chapter related to the Islamic Republic institutions.  At this stage 
what is pertinent to my current argument is the constitutional capacity to clarify and 
interpret the ambiguities and contradictions of the Islamic Republic Constitution.  This 
could potentially constitute a significant setback for the basic republican rules of 
transparency and accountability of the republican institutions on the one hand, and the 
clarity and lucidity of the legal framework destined to uphold the basic principles of 
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civic rights on the other.  Hence in my view a semi-elected Council of Guardians with a 
strong religious component of all its members
482
 with such a comprehensive area of 
authority, in a near total absence of any popular supervision and transparency, would 
certainly be against the most basic rule of popular sovereignty and the prevention of 
state imperium, in this case in the fundamental legislative system.  It is fairly simple to 
identify various pitfalls arising from such an arbitrium, in this case religiously grounded 
arbitrary power, that could easily degenerate into a despotic system in the absence of the 
means and modes of direct popular participation and constant supervision on all aspects 
of the political life of a country.  European history of political thought for instance, is 
full of such examples of unaccountable religious institutions becoming sources of 
considerable potestate domini against which many political philosophers have debated 
elaborately.   
 
     Furthermore, I could find examples of comparative republican institutions of this 
quality, such as the French Conseil Constitutionnel or the Italian Corte Costituzionale 
both of which are theoretically open to all members of society and controlled either by 
directly elected representatives or indirectly appointed members, all functioning under 
close popular scrutiny and transparency
483
.  Therefore the basic definition of these 
institutions within the republican system is said to be that of “protecting the basic 
liberties of the citizens against the laws that could restrict them”, rather than acting as a 
monitoring body of the state itself for the imposition of certain ideologies of a dominant 
group or currents of thought
484
.  
 
     As a direct consequence of all these provisions, the essential republican principles of 
checks and balances do not seem to have an adequate place in such a constitutional 
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arrangement in which there are no other sources of public control and appeal.  Even in 
Article 90 of the constitution which is said to be enabling the parliament to investigate 
complaints made against the parliament itself, the executive, and the judiciary systems, 
have proven to be very limited and inefficient on various occasions in which the public 
or the same authorities of the Islamic Republic have called for its intervention
485
.  Hence 
based on these evidences and examples, there are numerous instances where 
questionable verdicts have been delivered, political leaders and activists have been 
silenced or other sentences against the basic principles of human rights have been 
conveyed without there being sufficient republican constitutional guarantees for 
unambiguous protection of individual rights and liberties by upholding and safeguarding 
fundamental republican principles of individual freedom and sovereignty.  Even in few 
cases where the normative provisions are actually present, the inherent ambiguities and 
inconsistencies with other constitutional articles and the absence of the provisions for an 
independent interpretative legal body have all rendered these principles of the 
Fundamntal Law unproductive and inefficient. 
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V. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I attempted to provide a thorough analysis of the Islamic 
Republic’s Constitution and also at times adopted a comparative standpoint to evaluate 
its republican credentials in particular with analogy to the French Constitution.  The 
obvious reason for adopting such an approach was not only the basic fact that the 
original Iranian Constitution was actually based on the French Fifth Republic 
Constitution
486
, but also due to the fact that, as I argued in the Introduction, such an 
approach would be extremely useful in bringing various theoretical aspects of the 
political philosophy into the light of appreciation.  Additionally, to provide a more 
balanced approach I also included reflections on the constitutions of other so-called 
republican systems such as the North Korean one.  From there I proceeded to examine 
the different articles of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, in particular those 
concerning the basic civil and political rights, in order to evaluate their conformity with 
the fundamental principles of republicanism as laid out in Chapter 1, or otherwise to 
identify their religious grounding discussed in Chapter 2.  Again as referred to in 
Chapter 1, one of the main characteristics of the republican system is that there should 
be no element of discretionary power, be it individual or state, on which the basic liberty 
of the individual can depend
487
. Hence I provided a systematic analysis of the Iranian 
Constitution in this regard. 
 
     Based on this analysis of the Constitutions and other manifestations of these articles 
within the Iranian legal system, I could confirm that a significant body of legislation 
could, at least partially, be compatible with the previously discussed republican 
guidelines.  For instance Article 6 declares that “in the Islamic Republic the affairs of 
the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion by means of 
elections…” which sounds extremely inclusive and progressive.  Nevertheless, further 
examinations of all aspects of these constitutional frameworks and their relevant 
legislations readily demonstrates that there is a prominent presence of the religious 
principles and guidelines which would overwrite, or in some cases completely waive the 
basic principles of popular sovereignty, transparency and in general the non-dominance 
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articles of the republican ideology.  Furthermore, even the most basic articles of 
individual liberty seem to have been systematically subjected to the Islamic principles as 
interpreted by the state and its constitutional control mechanisms such as the Council of 
Guardians.   
 
     I also tried to evaluate a selected body of articles and the relevant ordinary laws 
against the republican principles of imperium and dominium in order to provide an 
assessment of their republican credentials.  At the level of imperium a significant 
number of articles failed to comply with the basic republican condition of the state not 
becoming a dominant force in the individuals’ life.  I verified that such state provisions 
as the authorization of a limited number of religions to freely practice their faith or the 
strong discrimination imposed on the expression of personal beliefs, mass 
communication, political parties and so on would constitute momentous shortcomings in 
any system claiming to be upholding republican values.  Furthermore I failed to identify 
any constitutional guarantees for open republican forums in the Islamic Republic in 
which individuals could freely express their views and concerns without fear of 
consequences.  Hence all evidence would amount to the conclusion that the republican 
eye-ball test would most definitely fail against various sources of potential imperium 
arising from these constitutional inadequacies of the Islamic Republic.   
 
     At the dominium level I need to highlight that the significant discrimination within 
the articles of the Iranian Constitution and the relevant legal framework seems to have 
largely compromised the guarantee of an equal standing for women within the Islamic 
Republic.  This would constitute yet another major deficiency according to the 
republican principle of non-domination, in particular the fundamental notions related to 
the actual empowerment of those in a weaker social position to get their voices heard 
and their rights protected
488
.   
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     Finally a great amount of ambiguity and inconsistencies within the Islamic 
Republic’s Constitution on the one hand, and the absence of a transparent and entirely 
elective and inclusive constitutional organ of interpretations and supervision on the 
other, has compromised and undermined various elected elements of the republic.   
 
     In the forthcoming chapter I will attempt to provide a closer analysis of the structure 
of power in the Islamic Republic to verify how this would rate against the republican 
guidelines against the potestate domini of the sovereign power.  More precisely I will 
start by taking a closer look at the various principles of republican sovereignty within 
the Iranian political system, which will be an extension to the observations made in this 
chapter.  This study will proceed into a closer examination of various repositories of 
sovereignty and authority in this system in particular that of the office of the leader with 
its considerable constitutional powers and prerogatives and the powerful concept of 
Velāyat-e Faqih with its profound socio-political consequences and constitutional and 
institutional implications.  
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Chapter 4 - Republican Sovereignty   
 
 
I. Concept of Sovereignty 
Throughout the previous chapters, I identified the basic principles of the prevalent 
school of republicanism highlighting its main idiosyncratic features, the most important 
of which was argued to be popular sovereignty and the rule of law.  Nonetheless, the 
concept of sovereignty proves to be a complex notion to grasp, which needs to be 
qualified and framed before proceeding with further analysis.  In addition, I also 
provided a thorough evaluation of the Iranian Constitution and a brief comparison of its 
principles with other political systems bearing the name “republic”, with their principal 
claims being the people’s sovereignty and the equality of their citizens before law.  Thus 
in this chapter I pursue my enquiry into the compatibility of the republican ideology 
with a religiously imbued doctrine of state by initially providing a precise theoretical 
framework for the study of the structures sovereignty in the modern world’s republican 
political systems.  Consequently, this needs to be extended to provide a systematic 
examination of the structure of power in the system subject to this enquiry, in order to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of its republican credentials.  Therefore, the current 
chapter is aimed at analysing this fundamental arrangement of the political authority 
which as argued in Chapter 1 constitutes the main defining feature of the republics 
throughout history namely: “rule of people by the people and for the people” as 
Abraham Lincoln famously declared
489
.   
 
     To that end at this stage, a primary conceptual clarification should be on order.  My 
aim in this chapter is not to provide a philosophical evaluation of the concept of 
sovereignty, such as the one provided by Georges Bataille, in his seminal treatise 
entitled La Souveraineté, in which he skilfully examines various conceptual and abstract 
ideas defining multiple manifestations of the notion of sovereignty, primarily from a 
socio-cultural point of view
490
.  Furthermore I do not wish to provide a historical, 
comparative analysis of this concept and its political implications here whose best 
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example can be found in the work of Hannah Arendt for instance
491
.  Whereas here, I do 
wish to draw on a more functional approach towards the exact employment of the 
political power by the state authorities and its actual relations, interactions and eventual 
inconsistencies with other elements of the republican structure of power and authority.  
In this pursuit, my point of departure would be the concept of sovereignty provided by 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica as “the ultimate overseer, or authority, in the decision-
making process of the state and in the maintenance of order”492.  
  
     I have already either directly or indirectly treated various aspects of this power 
structure in previous chapters by presenting the unifying thread of the republican 
ideology, progressing to studying the religious notions of the political authority, in this 
case the Iranian Shiʻa school, after which I endeavoured to present a general overview of 
the current Iranian Constitution. This document unsurprisingly contained the 
formulation of basic notions of national sovereignty and the repositories of power within 
the Islamic Republic.  Thus in this and the next chapter, I will strive to inspect each one 
of these constitutional manifestations of sovereignty through the examination of the 
people’s effective power in controlling such political order, specifically the Office of the 
Leader, its political significance, accountability and transparency as defined by the 
Islamic Republic Constitution.  In the next chapter I will be extending this analysis to 
address other public institutions and organizations holding public authority, some of 
which are claimed to be firmly grounded in the basic republican principles. 
 
     In order to qualify the framework for this study of the political sovereignty, I am 
obligated to provide a brief overview of the forms that the sovereignty has taken 
throughout the history of the political thought.  Unsurprisingly, there have been 
numerous interpretations of the basic notions of sovereignty by various schools of 
thought ranging from the ancient divine right of the monarchs - or the Persian equivalent 
farah-e izadi (God’s grace), to the scholastic, parliamentarian or direct democratic 
systems of the administration of public power
493
.  Regardless of these classifications, it 
is widely claimed that the notion of sovereignty is a modern concept as the old world 
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authorities were either not adequately centralised - that is they were unable to impose 
their authorities uniformly across a specific territory, or that these authorities lacked any 
actual structure of power in a hierarchical and pyramidal manner which is ex 
definitionem the notion of sovereignty494.  The famous Ralph Giesey’s quote that “king 
as a judge is medieval, the king as legislator is modern”, could serve as a good point of 
departure here when drawing the line between the modern and ancient understanding of 
the concept of sovereignty
495
.  Thus one is presented with a significant scholarly 
consensus over the idea of sovereignty being closely related to the notion of the state, 
which is in turn, an aftermath of the secularization of power and authority
496
.  This 
would obviously pose an immediate fundamental challenge to my case study as the very 
existence of a modern civic notion of sovereignty is conceptualized in an absence or at 
least a fundamental subordination of the ancient elements of authority feeding upon the 
metaphysical or divine legitimacies. 
 
      It is argued that the very subsistence of modern state systems has been dependent on 
such attributes as the separation of power and the rebuttal of any systems of legitimacy 
not reposed on the people’s podesta, which would be at odds with the religious or other 
ancient world style repositories of authority
497
.  Notwithstanding, in order to abstain 
from entering philosophical and theological discussions, this study has shifted its focus 
on a specific political arrangement of a modern day state i.e. the republican system of 
the authority.  As argued before, such a system is bound to act within a distinct form of 
political sovereignty that I have attempted to theoretically frame and highlight with its 
constituting elements.  Furthermore, in reality there are religious states or at least those 
with strong religious components, already in place in many areas of the world some 
claiming to be based on a conspicuous body of the republican doctrines, even though 
these might actually contain conceptual incoherencies.  Nonetheless as with those 
inspired by the republican values, they are bound to advance certain claims of 
sovereignty, based on a specific structure of power and authority indispensible for the 
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very legitimacy of the republican claims, which could easily be scrutinized and their 
coherence analytically revealed. Thus it is evident that any reference to the concept of 
state throughout this chapter would be the modern notion of the political as originally 
conceived by the likes of Machiavelli and Bodin. 
 
     In line with these affirmations in Chapter 1, I also argued that the republican non-
domination principle of power relation - both in dominium and imperium levels, requires 
specific layouts and guarantees, that could only be achieved in a republican political 
system based on the basic principles of equality before law and other guarantees of 
checks and balances. Thus within this framework  it is necessary to continue my enquiry 
towards providing a detailed study of the imperium principle of non-domination 
focusing on various high repositories of power, both constitutional and religious within 
the Iranian Islamic Republic’s political system.  
 
     Hence in a sense, this chapter brings together the previous three chapters which each 
provided a distinct insight into the main components of the political authority in Iran, 
namely the republican and the religious and their manifestations in the Iranian national 
constitution.  The first Chapter concluded that in a republican system the source of 
sovereignty should lie in the respublica, firmly grounded in the popular consent
498
.  I 
need to examine how this obvious principle of positive right could accommodate, even 
partially, any religious interpretations of sovereignty, which entail absolute obedience to 
the ultimate law-giver and its representation in the state
499
.  It goes without saying that 
any divine sovereignty in practical terms implicates some types of human agency the 
study of which I hope would provide interesting insight into various socio-political 
underpinnings of my case study.  
 
     My point of departure for analysing these aspects of sovereignty within the Iranian 
political context would inevitably start by taking another look at the Islamic Republic 
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Constitution which should be the place where the main guiding principles of the rights 
and authorities of the citizens are encoded.  This inevitably entails that citizens, or their 
representatives, have direct control over drafting and approval of the main document 
containing the principles of sovereignty - with the power to modify any parts based on a 
simple majority rule in compliance with norms and guarantees laid down by the 
constitution itself.  Hence I will start by taking a closer look at the encoded principles of 
popular sovereignty over and regarding the constitution itself, together with the basic 
guarantees of a republican system, to promote and protect such rights.  I will then 
proceed with addressing the highest repository of authority in the Iranian political 
system namely the Office of the Leader, closely examining its various purviews and 
prerogatives to study their compatibilities with the basic republican criteria of imperium 
that was defined previously. 
 
II. Constitutional Sovereignty 
It was argued that the principles of popular sovereignty are encoded in the national 
constitutions which are resilient documents that serve as the foundation for a state’s 
political layout.  Furthermore, regardless of the actual content of Iran’s national 
constitution which I treated in the previous chapter, two aspects could directly impact on 
various notions of sovereignty which I will attempt to analyse in this section.  The first 
one would be the possibility of implementing changes to the national constitution and 
the provisions concerning the potential for its revision or amendment.  On the other 
hand, if our frame of reference is a republican system, then the people’s representatives 
should not only have the ultimate say over the drafting and the implementation of any 
piece of legislation directly or indirectly impacting their well-being, but they should also 
have the power to recall their representatives and even to demand referendums and 
public consultations at any time, if this is deemed to be the appropriate channel of 
enforcing their sovereignty.   
 
     Obviously in order to be able to achieve these objectives the people need to be 
empowered to implement any changes or adaptations to the national constitution, 
especially if some parts are deemed inadequate or outright incompatible with the basic 
principles of freedom as non-domination that was discussed previously.  Hence the first 
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angle of analysis would concern the provisions towards the people’s initiated 
constitutional actions regarding the constitution itself and the possibility of initiating 
public consultation procedures by the citizens themselves.  The second analytical 
perspective would focus on the mechanisms and provisions in place to enforce a 
constitutional compliance with the guidelines of the popular sovereignty included in the 
constitution itself. In other words, who would oversee the compatibility of any part of 
these legislations to ensure that they would not violate the principles of the constitution’s 
legitimacy and how might the ordinary people initiate such a process in the first place? 
 
III. Constitutional Amendments 
The first question regarding the sovereignty over the constitution could be divided into 
sub-categories as to the reasons and purposes of the public consultation in this matter 
and the forms that this consultation could take.  In this regard, three potential channels 
could be readily identified which could serve as vehicles for implementing the popular 
sovereignty to reduce the aforementioned danger of imperium in a republican system. 
The most obvious means would be public referendums concerning any piece of 
legislation or other ordinary laws of the state which could take the form of advisory or 
binding public consultations.  There is then the question of endorsing and amending the 
constitution itself.  Finally the so-called power of recall needs to be examined in order to 
study the possibility of holding the representatives accountable for their actions
500
.  It is 
fairly easy to observe that the important aspect of these fundamental principles of 
sovereignty is the citizen’s ability to trigger and initiate them at any moment based on 
the simple criteria of majority rule, even though in the case of amending the constitution 
this might be a more complex procedure.    
    
     As I argued throughout the previous chapter, the Islamic Republic Constitution has 
indeed acknowledged the basic principles of popular sovereignty in particular in Article 
6 which reads: 
 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the 
basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of the 
President, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the members of 
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councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other articles of this 
Constitution
501
 
 
This is also echoed in Article 56: 
 
Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He Who has 
made man master of his own social destiny.  No one can deprive man of this divine 
right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group.  The 
people are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following 
articles
502
 
 
“the following articles” that the above line refers to could be Articles 72, 91 and 96.  The 
first one acknowledges that all laws should be compatible with the guidelines of the 
official religion of the country and then declares that the authority to determine this 
compatibility will be with the Council of Guardians of the Islamic Republic whose 
composition is defined in Article 91.  This authority is acknowledged again in Article 96 
of the constitution. Thus any piece of legislation proposed by the Iranian parliament, 
needs to be analysed and its compatibility with the Islamic guidelines confirmed by the 
Council before this could have any executive validity.  Furthermore the highest seat of 
authority in the Islamic Republic’s political layout is defined to be the persona of the 
Leader which as Article 57, 107, and 110, amongst others reiterate all sovereign powers 
of the state are run under his supervision who has various prerogatives including the 
power to issue decrees for national referendums.  
 
a. Abrogative Sovereignty  
A closer examination of the Iranian Constitution reveals that one could identify three 
types of processes for returning to the public opinion.  The first one regards the public 
consultation concerning specific laws and legislations.  One reads in Article 59 that:  
 
In extremely important economic, political, social and cultural matters, the function of 
the legislature may be exercised through direct recourse to popular vote through a 
referendum.  Any request for such direct recourse to public opinion must be approved by 
two-thirds of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
503
 
 
Thus it states that the public opinion is consulted in “extremely important” matters, 
however one could readily observe that the constitution itself does not say anything 
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regarding the power to decide which issues are important enough to be submitted to 
public consultation.  This is later defined in Article 36 of referendum law which 
considers the Office of the President as the authoritative power to determine when to 
consult public opinion, whose proposal needs to be approved by at least two-thirds of the 
members of parliament.  
 
     Thus within the Iranian political system as far as the public consultation on a specific 
legislation is concerned, one could notice the existence of the so called “facultative” 
referendum, that is those which could be initiated at the will of a specific public 
authority, in this case the president of the Islamic Republic
504
.  Whereas there is no sign 
of the possibility of direct public initiatives in the form of petitions to trigger such public 
consultations to amend or change any laws within the Iranian political system.  A brief 
comparison with other modern republican systems would be instructive here.  The 
Italian Constitution for instance, in Article 75 allows for popular referendum “to 
abrogate, totally or partially, a law or an act having the force of law” in most cases 
simply when this is requested by 500,000 electors or five regional councils
505
.  Set 
against the risks of political instability and impasse, the safeguards are considered to be 
the fact that a majority of the electorate need to actually participate in these referendums.  
Thus it is clear that this system, unlike the Islamic Republic, is more permissive to the 
public initiatives for the amendment or the abrogation of specific laws, which could be 
considered as a strong safeguard against the state’s imperium that could easily dominate 
the basic republican freedoms by taking away the basic principles of public sovereignty 
in the legislative field. 
 
b. Sovereignty over Constitution 
The second important expression of popular sovereignty, as postulated above, was the 
power to actually amend parts of the constitution itself.  In recent years this has become 
a major source of controversy within the Iranian political establishment as various calls 
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for public referendums on constitutional articles, in particular those mentioned above, 
have resulted in major public debates and even physical confrontations between the so-
called reformists and conservatives of the Iranian political arena
506
.  The original Iranian 
Constitution of 1980 did not include any provisions for the possibility of constitutional 
revisions and as noted in previous chapters this was indeed declared to be a divine 
constitution, grounded firmly in God’s sovereignty, hence any possibility of revision 
would ultimately appear to be inappropriate as it probably could have been interpreted as 
questioning the divine nature of the constitution.  Nevertheless, the possibility of 
amending the Constitution was subsequently added following an order by Ayatollāh 
Khomeini in 1989 on his deathbed, by appointing the so-called “Assembly for Revising 
the Constitution”.  This was to propose amendments to the constitution, in particular to 
ease the leadership criteria to allow for the selection of the Ayatollāh Khāmenei - then 
Hojjatoleslām Khāmenei, to the leadership position despite lacking the main prerequisite 
of being a marjaʻ taqlid (source of emulation)507.   
 
     This resulted in the addition of the important Article 177 to the Islamic Republic 
Constitution, which explicitly vests the Office of the Supreme Leader himself with the 
authority of initiating requests for constitutional referendums
508
.  Thus it is paramount to 
observe that the prerogative for deciding whether a constitutional referendum should be 
held lies exclusively in the hands of the Leader.  Not only do the ordinary citizens 
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appear to have no say in this but nor do the leaders of the other executive, judiciary and 
legislative forces have any authority in demanding a public consultation in constitutional 
matters.  Indisputably in the same article it is acknowledged that the revised constitution 
needs to be submitted to public vote for approval, notwithstanding it is obvious that the 
role of the people in constitutional referendums is very limited and exclusively restricted 
to an expression of approval or rejection in the form of a simple “yes” or “no”509.  The 
interesting aspect of these provisions is that in Article 177 utilises the Persian verb 
pišnehād mikonad that is: the Leader “proposes” the segments to be amended to the 
President of the Islamic Republic. Now considering the fact that in Article 57, for 
instance, we have: 
The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the 
judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute 
velāyat al-amr and the leadership of the ommat... 
 
Hence the use of the word “proposes” seems inappropriate as the orders of the “Velāyat 
al-amr” could not be regarded as proposals that could be evaluated by a subordinate 
constitutional authority.  In other words, the highest constitutional power of the state 
would not impart a facultative proposal to a lower ranking national authority.  Whereas 
the allegedly divinely appointed supreme constitutional authority here enjoys the 
effective power to actually “instruct” the republican head of the state in this matter.  
Furthermore it is explicitly underlined in this article that the referendum could not be 
proposed against “the religious foundations of the Islamic Republic system... or (to 
question) the leadership of the Velāyat al-amr...” amongst others.   
 
     Again for the purposes of clarification, I propose an example from the French 
Constitution, another republican system, to see how this important purview is addressed 
there, precisely in Article 89.  Here one encounters two processes aimed at the revision 
of the constitution.  The so-called “projet de revision” is when the proposal for revision 
is initiated by the Prime Minister and addressed to the President of the Republic.  The 
other alternative would be the “proposition de revision” which is when the members of 
the parliament take the initiative of proposing a constitutional revision. In both cases 
after being endorsed by both the National Assembly and Senate, these would 
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consequently be put to popular vote for approval510.  Here one clearly sees the actual 
possibility of the people’s representatives or the republican head of executive power to 
initiate public consultation towards implementing modifications in the national 
constitution with no conceptual boundaries over the nature and scope of the revisions. 
 
     Hence these observations would lead one to conclude that, as argued above, there is 
an extremely marginal role envisaged for the citizenry in the Islamic Republic of Iran as 
far as the initiatives for the amendments of the constitution or even the ordinary laws are 
concerned.  This would constitute a major obstacle in a system advancing the republican 
claims based on fundamental principles of popular sovereignty and the supervising role 
of the contestatory citizenry that were discussed in previous chapters.  
 
c. Power of Recall 
This fundamental expression of the republican principles of sovereignty will be treated 
extensively in the final chapter dedicated to the rights and authorities of the contestatory 
citizenry that I outlined previously.  Nevertheless as far as the argument on the 
constitutional sovereignty is concerned I could acknowledge that two main channels 
have been predicted in Iran for the so-called processes of recall and public accountability 
within the structure of the Islamic Republic.  These are explicitly articulated in Articles 
90 and 173 of the constitution.  Article 90 of the constitution reserves the right of filing 
protests against the performance of all three branches of the government with the Islamic 
Consultancy Parliament of Iran
511
.  Accordingly a parliamentary organ called the 
Commissions of Article 90 was instated to address such constitutional provisions. 
 
    As far as the question of sovereignty is concerned this article could provide a 
powerful means of theoretically holding all branches of government accountable to the 
people. While the actual performance of such an organization is definitely questionable 
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with regard to its track record in the history of the Islamic Republic, it is interesting to 
note that the Office of the Leader is not subjected to such public accountability.  Indeed 
as I will demonstrate below there are no publically accessible provisions for launching 
any form of recall processes against the supra-constitutional institution of the 
Leadership.  In addition, the actual power and executive guarantees that the findings and 
sanctions of such a Commission are endowed with, need to be taken into account
512
.  
Another constitutional locus dedicated to this question is Article 173 below: 
 
In order to investigate the complaints, grievances, and objections of the people with 
respect to government officials, organs, and statutes, a court will be established to be 
known as the Court of Administrative Justice under the supervision of the head of the 
judiciary branch. The jurisdiction, powers, and mode of operation of this court will be 
laid down by law 
 
Surprisingly the relative law governing the performance of the Court of Administrative 
Justice makes no mention of the organ’s authority which could be regarded as an actual 
power of recall as deemed so in a Republican political system, or any constitutional 
system for that matter
513
.  Indeed this seems to be entirely limited to certain functional 
aspects of public organisations without further authorities concerning the true 
accountability of public representatives of public offices
514
. 
 
     Therefore, one does not seem to be able to identify any unambiguous references to 
the actual procedures and provisions for any eventual process of “recall” of any elected 
member of the political system.  Undeniably one does find actual references to such 
parliamentary provisions to address public “complaints”.  Nevertheless these seem to be 
extremely marginal references without explicit definition of the actual procedures that 
the citizens can launch together with the source and actual power of such authorities to 
promote such claims and hold the public officials accountable.  Needless to say, in an 
ideal republican system the ability to question any public figure constitutes a 
fundamental building block of the political system that was defined under the eye-ball 
test which was defined in Chapter 1.  As argued previously without such fundamental 
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public empowerment, any system could easily degenerate into despotism, which was 
what the forerunners of the republican doctrine repeatedly warned against. 
 
     On the other hand I was unable to identify any precedence for another important 
constitutional process fundamental to the principles of the popular sovereignty i.e. the 
political referendum.  This type of referendum is when a political leader puts an 
important political question to public scrutiny to get public support in that matter
515
.  In 
Article 110, Section 3 it has been acknowledged that “Issuing decrees for national 
referenda” fall under the Leader’s purview as I argued previously. Here there is no 
reference as to the “type” of referendum subject to these affirmations. But again as 
Hāšemi observes since this section has been consequently added in the amendments of 
the year 1989, when the actual revision of the constitution was the objective, it might not 
have been devised to allow for the possibility of a political referendum
516
.  And indeed 
as mentioned above there is no sign of such an initiative throughout the entire history of 
the Islamic Republic, which could yet be another sign of the marginal constitutional 
sovereignty that people actually enjoy within the Islamic Republic’s interpretation of the 
locus of authority in Iran.  
 
IV. Constitutional Courts 
Inevitably, one last constitutional provision towards the protection of liberties and 
popular sovereignty is the existence of constitutional courts.  I have already mentioned 
the power to draft, supervise and, if necessary, modify the constitution together with the 
actual authority to recall the public representatives. Consequently it should be seen what 
mechanisms are currently in place to actually command the compliance with these 
constitutional principles.  It is paramount that in a republican system based on these 
elementary democratic principles, there should be some kind of publically accessible 
procedure to denounce such laws deemed incompatible with both the constitution itself 
or with the principles of individual liberties in particular the rights of the minority and 
weaker social groups.  As was briefly discussed in the previous chapter this could take 
the form of constitutional councils as is the case of the French Conseil Constitutionnel 
whose actual role is to supervise national elections and referendums and most 
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importantly to verify the conformity of the laws and certain regulations with the national 
constitution
517
.  As far as my current argument is concerned I would be interested to 
investigate whether such a resource is foreseen within the political structure of the 
Islamic Republic and the procedures and mechanisms that the constitution itself has 
predicted to empower the citizens to trigger the intervention of such a supervisory 
institution to safeguard their constitutional rights.  Hence this would be a publically 
accessible institution whose role would include the safeguarding of individual rights by 
ensuring compliance with basic constitutional principles against the oppressive laws of 
the state itself, rather than being yet another institution within the government 
apparatus
518
.  The key difference here between this organization with the previously 
discussed constitutional entities such as the Commission of Article 90, lies in the actual 
conceptual and procedural independence of such an institution from all three branches of 
the government itself.  This would provide yet another layer of protection by incarnating 
a separate source of checks and balances that were deemed so vital to the existence and 
survival of a republican order as, I discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
     As a comparative example I could reiterate the provisions foreseen in the French 
system in which such an organ is composed of nine members, each third of which is 
nominated by the President of the Republic, the General Assembly and the Senate. Most 
importantly this would constitute a completely separate and independent operational 
entity whose functions and mechanisms of action are not subject to and bound by other 
state branches.  Another interesting point here is that no specific qualifications are 
required for the membership of the Conseil Constitutionnel and this could theoretically 
open up this important institution to all members of the public regardless of their 
academic, religious or professional backgrounds
519
.  Indeed an interesting example is 
cited by Roussillon as the nomination of an extremely qualified Louis Favoreu who 
wished to be nominated to the council but had little chance of success as his high 
qualifications would overshadow other members of the council!
 520
  Other systems might 
prove more selective on the choice of their members, for instance the members of the 
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Italian Corte Costituzionale called giudici (judges) have got actual legal qualifications.  
Nevertheless this would again be an independent institution open to all member of the 
public with the necessary qualifications to oversee the constitutional legitimacy of the 
laws, rule over the conflicts concerning the attributions of the state powers, the 
accusations against the President of the Republic and finally the legitimacy of the 
proposed abrogative referendum
521
. One could find similar examples in nearly all 
political systems of the world bearing the name of republics
522
.   
 
     Furthermore in France for instance, the intervention of the Constitutional Council 
could be triggered not only by the political authorities of the state but also by the 
minority groups of the parliament. Most importantly common citizens recently were 
given access to such a process not only in electoral matters as used to be the case 
previously, but also in all constitutional matters through the so-called process of 
question prioritaire de constitutionnalité  (priority question of constitutionality)
 523
.  
Naturally this should follow a specific juridical procedure, that is: it should be related to 
a specific tribunal case in front of a judge where the constitutionality of a law or a 
regulation is deemed detrimental to the actual ongoing legal process.  A similar 
procedure has been foreseen by the Italian constitution through the so-called sindacato 
in via incidentale which again emphasizes the exceptional nature of these procedures 
initiated by local judges in relation to a legal judgment at hand
524
.    
 
     Hence this institution would in theory, act as the main guardian of the constitution 
whose intervention could be solicited at any time when there is a fear that the 
constitution’s principles are threatened.  Although its mere existence could not be 
regarded as the ultimate guarantee for the implementation of the constitutionally 
endorsed rights and liberties, its very existence demonstrates that a political system has 
been sensitive towards the protection of the individual liberties, in particular those of the 
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minorities against the potestate domini of the state and the encroachment of unchecked 
power in the hands of the ruling systems. In most cases these would prove to be efficient 
instruments towards upholding basic principles of popular sovereignty by providing 
channels to initiate official enquiries against any piece of legislation or concerning the 
public performance of the highest seats of sovereignty beyond political and party 
interests
525
. 
 
    It is evident that the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran - although it was 
originally inspired by the French constitutional sources
526
, does not provide any truly 
independent mechanisms for the provision of the constitutional conformity of the 
ordinary laws and regulations of the state.  As discussed previously the Council of the 
Guardians performs a thorough check on all laws passed by the parliament principally to 
ensure their total compliance with the Islamic Shariʻa and also the irregularity claims in 
the electoral procedures, nevertheless one fails to identify significant guarantees 
regarding the protections that such an institute should offer against any violations of the 
constitutional liberties of the individuals, less other complaints against the state 
authorities and public officials.  
 
     I need to highlight again the fact that the Council of the Guardians is not an 
independent institution, and as I mentioned previously and will elaborate later, its 
members are vetted directly and indirectly by the very Leader of the Islamic Republic.  
This in turn inevitably transforms the institution into an actual force of domination 
towards the implementation of the state imperium rather than a tool to counter its 
dominance.  
 
     On the other hand it is sometimes claimed that the Office of the President of the 
Islamic Republic holds such constitutional authority to supervise the compliance of the 
ordinary laws with the constitutional provisions and if need be, to refer the violating 
sources to the courts of law to be prosecuted accordingly, or even having the authority to 
issue tazakkor (warnings, reminders) against the heads of other state powers namely the 
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judiciary and the legislative ones.  Nevertheless the extent of this authority, as defined in 
the relative laws and decrees regulating the functions of the Office of the President, in 
particular the one dated 13
th
 November 1986, seems inadequate and vague towards 
defining the presidential prerogatives in enforcing the compliance of the ordinary laws 
of the Islamic Republic with the constitutional principles.  Indeed this seems to have 
been a major source of controversy and misunderstanding that has caused numerous 
debates and requests for clarification to the Council of the Guardians whom as 
discussed, according to the Islamic Republic Constitution is the ultimate authority to 
clarify constitutional ambiguities at all stages of the state’s legislative procedures.  In 
spite of this, the conclusion seems to be far from clear in defining the President’s role in 
implementing the constitution, even though this seems to have been encoded in Article 
113 of the constitution. It is not hard to imagine that such a critical function requires 
explicit provisions and actual resources which do not seem to have been foreseen by any 
legislation within the Iranian political system. Most interestingly few attempts to 
establish a supervising committee by subsequent presidents of the Islamic Republic have 
been ruled as unconstitutional by the Council of the Guardians.  This has effectively 
deprived the Office of the President from any actual means and modes to even 
marginally impose the constitutional compliance of the laws and decrees
527
.  It goes 
without saying that the simple power of tazakkor dādan (reminding) would not suffice to 
provide the Office of the President with sufficient constitutional authority and adequate 
procedural means to uphold elements of constitutional sovereignty.   
 
     It cannot be emphasized enough that a system whose main purpose is to supervise the 
implementation of a national constitution and judge the soundness of its laws and 
pronouncements, needs to be an impartial and independent system itself in the first 
place. This is the essence of what Pierre Sosanvallon called “la légitimité d’impartialité” 
(impartiality legitimacy)
528
.  My close analysis of the Islamic Republic Constitutional 
authorities and the repositories of the sovereignty foreseen therein, fails to identify such 
impartial transparent sources of public power administration at the constitutional level. 
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     Therefore, I could safely claim that based on all these observations, the Islamic 
Republic Constitution does not provide for any unambiguous, accessible and most 
importantly independent public organs to supervise the implementation of the principles 
of the national constitution and uphold the basic articles of individual rights and 
sovereignties, some of which are explicitly endorsed by the Islamic Republic 
Constitution itself. These include the guarantees and entitlements concerning the various 
elements and manifestations of popular sovereignty such as the ability to amend the 
constitution or to ask for direct intervention and consultation of the public in general in 
the form of referendums or petitions. This would obviously result in serious 
shortcomings in a system claiming to be rooted in the republican non-domination values 
of popular sovereignty through state apparatus which themselves prove to have been 
turned into instruments of domination in a total absence of checks and balances that 
could only be provided by independent and impartial sources of power and authority as 
discussed in Chapter 1.   
 
    In the forthcoming chapter I will provide a more detailed analysis of the institutions of 
the Islamic Republic to analytically evaluate their republican credentials, but now my 
enquiry into the principles of sovereignty within the Islamic Republic political system 
would inevitably encounter another prominent repository of sovereignty and authority 
which is the Office of the Leader that deserves a detailed examination. 
 
V. Office of the Leader and Sovereignty 
Throughout Chapter 2, I examined various interpretations of the Shiʻa political ideology 
and identified the strand that came to dominate the political scenery of the Islamic 
Republic. Amongst all aspects of Iran’s political system the Leadership Office is by far 
the most interesting and controversial one.  A closer look at over three decades of the 
Islamic Republic’s history readily reveals that this repository of sovereignty has 
unsurprisingly undergone various levels of mutations and changes.  Two consecutive 
holders of this position seem to have launched numerous attempts towards extending the 
authority of this institution and even to subject not only other state powers to theirs but 
also to dominate the very religious ranks and seminaries to which they belong.  
Ayatollāh Khomeini initially attempted to bring all religiously inspired forces under his 
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dominance by creating the Islamic Republic Party which did not seem to have had much 
success
529
.  Nevertheless, upon abolishing this single party in 1987, he established the 
Special Court for Clerics to keep the religious figures under his control
530
.  This was 
pursued by allocating various other prerogatives to the Office of the Leader such as the 
authority to appoint the Head of the Judiciary system in an attempt to effectively 
subjugate this power to the authority of the Supreme Leader
531
.  These efforts were 
continued in multiple directions also by the successor of Khomeini, Ayatollāh Ali 
Khamenei (b.1939) with significant implications on the political nature of the Islamic 
republic and the conceptual foundations of its doctrine, that I will study in this section. 
 
     As was briefly discussed in Chapter 2, Iran’s so-called first revolution, namely the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1910 was a modernist movement primarily aimed at 
establishing the rule of law and indeed the constitution which is the very place in which 
the limits are set for the monarch’s authorities and the locus of expression of the 
people’s sovereignty.  As argued there, following the view of some of the Ayatollāhs 
before him - notably Ayatollāh Sheikh Fazl Allāh Nuri, Khomeini also embarked on the 
path of denouncing various aspects of constitutional modernism as alien western cultural 
values aimed at undermining Islamic principles and beliefs.  Hence on the dawn of the 
Islamic Republic, Khomeini as the undisputed leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
seized his lifelong opportunity to first and foremost fight the fruits of nearly a century of 
modernism in Iran in particular constitutionalism
532
. Indeed as Iranian author 
Mohammad Amini stated: 
 
 the current of ideology that took the upper hand in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 
culminating in the establishment of a theocratic regime headed by the figure of Velāyat-
e Faqih was not only against all aspects of modernism and western ideology of 
democratic representation, but also was a movement by a certain group of lower clergy 
who denounced the high-ranking olamā’s acceptance of the de facto separation of state 
and religion
533
. 
 
Thus it was in such a climate that the basic fundamentals of the Islamic Republic were 
laid down.  I turn now to a closer analysis of how Khomeini’s ideas and ideals of 
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sovereignty which played a fundamental role in delineating the trajectory of the Islamic 
Republic and its various constitutional and extra-constitutional institutions. 
 
VI. Human Nature and Common Good 
A careful examination of all Khomeini’s recorded pronouncements and declarations 
reveals a very interesting aspect of his understanding of the nature of personal rights 
based on the so-called concept of the human nature.  This proves to be extremely 
pertinent to my current argument as the very foundations of the republican doctrine of 
sovereignty reposes on this fundamental conviction, which as expounded in Chapter 1, 
has been central to the republican discourse and has been extensively treated from the 
time of the ancient republics.  Most notably as I discussed previously, the very concept 
of materia umana, as Machiavelli called it, constituted the essence of what made the 
very existence of a republican system viable and necessary. 
 
     A closer look at all Khomeini’s known utterances readily demonstrates that he 
regarded the human being as an essentially weak and corrupt creature in need of 
constant guidance and coercion to observe the laws and conform to social norms.  One 
sees instances of this profoundly negative outlook throughout the entire intellectual 
career of the Ayatollāh Khomeini.  This is an aspect of his discourse which has been 
relatively overlooked by various scholars in this field as it seems to have been greatly 
overshadowed by other more prominent religious and political narratives.  Hence one 
gets the impression that this concept has not found its deserved treatment despite of its 
fundamental implications on any subsequent socio-political narratives in particular those 
treating various questions of popular sovereignty.  Time and time again a pessimistic 
interpretation of the real essence of human beings and its social and normative 
implications is highlighted. In his Islamic Government treatise we read: 
 
... for we see that men are prey to defect, they are not perfect and need to strive after 
perfection.  Moreover they disagree with each other having varying inclinations and 
discordant states...
534
 
 
He also backs up his statements by recounting religious exegeses and hadith from 
various Imams to underline the notion as being the main reason for which the religious 
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leader have existed throughout history and are still needed for the good of human beings. 
This is even being extended to prescribing a prince, or a leviathan, in this case a divinely 
chosen one to: 
….prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the illicit and transgressing against 
the rights of others.  If no such individual or power were appointed, nobody would 
voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might result in harm or 
corruption to others; everybody would engage in oppressing and harming others for the 
sake of their own pleasures and interests
535
 
 
Indisputably this theme is not uncommon throughout the history of political philosophy.  
Indeed one could safely claim that one of the fundamental notions of the entire socio-
political projects of human intellectual history has centred around this basic theme, that 
is: how to regulate human societies in binding laws and regulations to protect and 
promote the common interests with a regard for the natural essence of such societies.  
Nevertheless a closer examination of all Khomeini’s recorded pronouncements and 
writings reveals that he not only had a different interpretation of the “common good” but 
also the means to achieve this were existentially distinct from anything that has even 
been prescribed throughout the so-called western philosophical tradition
536
.  For this 
purpose, I find this in utter incongruity with Banisadr’s claims that the various aspects of 
the dominant Islamic Republic’s ideology inspired by Khomeinist doctrines have 
actually got their roots in the Western tradition of political philosophy notably the 
Aristotelian one
537
.  
 
     Here it should be noted that Khomeini’s understanding of the common good was a 
more eschatological interpretation of “goodness” in the sense of salvation, redemption 
and the promise of paradise as defined in the Quran
538
.  Thus all material resources of 
society need to be employed towards the attainment of such a higher good through the 
rule of God on earth which would by far overshadow other potential material and 
worldly gains.  Indeed at numerous historical junctures he proved to be ready to sacrifice 
various national interests for the higher moral objectives he perceived for the Iranian 
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nation
539
.  Thus every social means and political power had to be directed towards the 
realization of such a Godly nation based on the ordained commandments, or more 
accurately a certain interpretation of the religious directives.  
 
     Again proceeding through all Khomeini’s public pronouncements and writings, 
before and after the revolution of 1979, one cannot overlook the manifestations of 
contempt with which he held various representations of popular sovereignty throughout 
the western political philosophy.  He even went as far as claiming that: “Other than their 
deceiving appearances, there is no fundamental distinction among constitutional, 
democratic and communistic regimes
540”.  Indeed, as I briefly discussed in Chapter 2, he 
deemed all non-Islamic governments as instances of taqut which need to be fought and 
overthrown.  It seems as if he even considered the absence of an Islamic rule as a state of 
complete anarchy due to the corrupt nature of human beings
541
.  From there the main 
objective of an Islamic government was defined as creating moral and righteous human 
beings
542
. 
 
     Thus Khomeini in his work appears to treat human beings as unreliable, wretched, 
miserable, corrupt, weak, arrogant and ignorant
543
.  Moreover unlike most western 
political philosophers, Khomeini opted for a heavenly source of happiness and 
eschatological objectives who would justify the scarification of any worldly tangible and 
material values.  Indeed the commonwealth that Khomeini envisages is based on a 
negligible component of the voluntary association of the people to promote common 
interests.  In fact as discussed above, people are essentially considered as incapable of 
identifying their own real interests. In spite of this Khomeini’s revolutionary language 
and call for the overthrow of the political order also due to economical mismanagements 
would put all these claims at odds with his otherworldly desiderata.  
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     This religiously motivated perception of human nature by Khomeini envisaged a 
Godly appointed authority to interpret the social rules and norm of salvation from an 
already existing unalterable body of religious dogma.  This is due to human’s inability to 
fully comprehend what is in their real interests, hence in such a doctrine it comes as no 
surprise to refer to people with such expressions as saqir (children, immature), mahjur 
(mentally impaired) and yatim (orphan) which all appear to be part of the common 
terminology employed by Khomeini and many apologists of an undisputed rule of the 
divinely chosen figure of faqih in society
544
.   
 
    These observations lead us to a deeper level of appreciation for Khomeini’s ideology 
as one notices that these would inevitably result in a fundamental crisis in the 
acknowledgment of the very basis of people’s contractual rights.  Indeed as Akhavi has 
observed Khomeini, like many other Sunni and Shiʻa thinkers before him, did not 
believe in the concept of an autonomous individual with natural rights of sovereignty to 
come together to promote their common interests
545
. As I expounded in Chapter 2, 
Khomeini, by selectively citing Quranic verses and certain traditions of Hadith, 
underlined the very conviction that all social contracts were actually initiated by God 
who is the owner of the trust
546
.  Thus the religious school which came to dominate the 
Iranian political scene was firmly rooted in this solid conviction that the mere act of 
beyʻat (approval, acclamation) would suffice to express people’s natural rights of 
sovereignty, which incidentally does not belong to them in the first place. This would 
suffice to delegate their authority to a more qualified and Godly chosen figure of 
superior knowledge (elm) whose primary objective would be to advance God’s purpose.  
 
     Most interestingly, regardless of the conceptual inconsistency between the very act of 
beyʻat and the Divine pre-selection of the Islamic Leviathan, it appears that this 
discourse is founded on a certain form of complete alienation of the authority by the 
subject with little or no space left for the reversal or re-appropriation of the sovereignty 
by the people.  This could well be an expected outcome of the conviction that the 
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sovereignty is not rooted in human nature itself in the first place.  Hence all evidence 
points to the conclusion that here an external source of happiness is conceived as being 
completely distinct from the essence of human-beings in such exterior concepts as rezā 
Allāh (God’s satisfaction) and šādiy-e Emām-e Zamān (delight of Hidden Imam). 
 
     It is easy to imagine how such theoretical ambiguities have had fundamental 
implication on the formation of a political system with strong religious convictions and 
competing republican principles.  As I will demonstrate later even the republican and 
civil institutions of such a system, whilst in theory should be chosen by the people - 
through expressive demonstration of their collective will in the form of free and open 
elections, are in fact directly or indirectly influenced, if not utterly controlled by the 
perceived will of God as manifested in the persona of the faqih.  As a result of such a 
doctrine: “if reason can not be sovereign, then room exist for mandates, which of course 
are not self-evident but interpreted and imposed on behalf of God by not always 
benevolent human beings”547.  One observation to make here would be that such 
doctrine seems to contain numerous points of conceptual ambiguity even from 
theological standpoint as if human beings are so devoid of positive qualities, and are by 
nature flawed and prone to evil, how can anyone interpret God’s mandate in the first 
place? However this conceptual consideration falls beyond the scope of my current 
study. 
 
VII. Khomeini’s Idea of Republic 
As I expounded in the very eloquent declaration above, Khomeini clearly expresses his 
disdain for the concept of “democracy” by rejecting any use of such a word in the 
Iranian Constitution on the grounds that this would mean that Islam is not democratic; 
whereas Islam was claimed to actually include all such principles.  His outright rejection 
of this term might be unsurprising and indeed coherent with his interpretation of the 
principles of sovereignty and the role of the people in his proposed form of government.  
 
     However, in spite of this, as many scholars have noted, at important junctures of the 
Islamic Revolution, Khomeini conceded to a number of democratic elements under great 
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pressure of a sizeable number of intellectuals and laymen within his revolutionary 
coalition. This ranged from the leftist Mojahedin-Khalq and communist Tudeh and 
Fedaʻi parties to the secular and moderate Islamist groups like the Jebhe-ye Melli and 
Freedom Movement.  This might clearly be an expression of what many authors label 
the “recombinant authoritarianism”, namely the idea that the authoritarian regimes need 
to concede something in order to consolidate their rule without having a firm belief in 
those principles
548
.  In my interview with Banisadr, he unambiguously acknowledged 
that it was indeed due to the significant pressure from the secular sections of the Islamic 
Revolutions and also as a result of various cultural and historical heritage of Iran that 
Khomeini did not manage to fully implement his restrictive doctrine of state, and had to 
initially concede to numerous compromises
549
. The obvious example of such a 
concession is the very republican label Khomeini accepted for the political order, which 
was fundamentally built on his ideas.  Despite this another examination of all his work 
clearly shows that he still demonstrated a significant coherence in consistently falling 
short of subscribing to a government based on the rule of the people.  Indeed he rarely 
ever pronounced the word jomhuri (republic), even the title of his most seminal treatise 
is the “Islamic Government” and not the Islamic Republic.  As Takeyh rightly notes:   
    
Throughout his writings and speeches, Khomeini rarely made reference to a republic, as 
he firmly believed that laws should be derived from scriptural sources as interpreted by 
the clerical elite.  Thus traditional democratic institutions and practices such as 
assemblies, the right to vote and referendums were not to infringe on the prerogatives of 
an unaccountable clerical class.
550
 
 
It is interesting to note that even the notion of “republic” that Khomeini eventually 
endorsed was a partial and incomplete reading of the numerous political implications of 
such a concept.  This is clearly reflected in one of his speeches, various aspects of which 
seems to have surprisingly been overlooked by not only the very secular and moderate 
elements of his Islamic Revolution but also by a considerable number of scholars in this 
field. In December 1980 he famously declared: 
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Our nation has not accepted a democratic Islamic Republic.  They said we understand 
Islam and we understand Republic.  But democracy which has changed its guise many 
times throughout the history, in the west it has one meaning, in the east another, Plato 
meant one thing by democracy and Aristotle had another understanding.  We do not 
comprehend this.  Something that we do not understand why should we even mention?   
we understand Islam and we understand the republic which means that people should 
vote.  We accept these.  But we don’t accept this democratic thing, even combined with 
the Islam
551
 
 
He went as far as explicitly underlining the fact that in the Islamic Republic people are 
bound to abide by the Islamic Shariʻa even though they do not vote for it, as they have 
already chosen Islam by giving blood towards the realization of such sacred ideals
552
.  
This is the essence of the total alienation of sovereignty that was referred to above which 
could even materialize through a simple act of acclamation.  Thus one could arguably 
claim that Khomeini himself, at least at the initial stages of his political involvement, 
had a firm conviction and an uncompromising understanding of the true nature of the 
social values he was prescribing for an Islamic government and did whatever he could to 
constitutionalize such an ideology and subject all private and public interests to it. 
       
     It has to be reiterated that there has not been a single homogeneous perception of the 
actual role that people play in the selection, supervision and even removal of this Islamic 
Leviathan within the ruling apparatus of the Islamic Republic itself.  For instance, 
people like Rafsanjani, in particular after the events of the 2009 elections have voiced a 
current of thought based on which this figurehead actually needs to be at least partially 
accountable to the publically elected institution as it is controversially acknowledged in 
the Iranian Constitution
553
.  However, this school of thought and that of many closely 
related scholars, some of whom I discussed in Chapter 2, have lost significant ground to 
the totalitarian perception of the authority of the Office of the Leader and the role that 
people play in this regard as discussed previously. 
 
     It is inevitable to conclude that this interpretation of the Quranic expressions of such 
terms as šowra (consultation) and other related notions, plus a long tradition of hadith, at 
                                                 
551
 Khomeini, R. (2010) in Hokumat-e Eslāmi va Velāyat-e Fagih dar Andišeye Emam Khomeini, Tehran, 
the Center for collection and publication of Imam Khomeini’s work., p.59   
552
 Ibid 
553
 See for instance Rafsanjani’s declarations as reported on the BBC news portal at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/07/090719_si_ir88_islam_election.shtml  
197 
 
best, do not provide adequate grounds for the investiture of the principles of sovereignty 
in the masses.  This is independent from the so-called “persuasive” or “coercive” nature 
of the Islamic Shariʻa as in neither case one encounters unambiguous endorsements of 
the human sovereignty, whilst as one sees in the case of Khomeinist ideology one does 
not need to try too hard to find principles that could be used to justify the contrary.  
Veritably, the instructions on public consultation directed to the leaders of the Islamic 
community do not necessarily and automatically guarantee any degree of individual 
rights to a participatory political system, let alone the natural right to the ultimate 
sovereignty. Thus in the light of an almost total absence of any unequivocal 
acknowledgment of a human’s innate right to sovereignty regardless of such 
considerations as gender and faith idiosyncrasies etc, and in particular considering 
specific perception of a human’s rational ability to identify and pursue his true good, any 
discussion of an undisputed and inalienable human right to sovereignty within any 
religiously inspired ideology would prove superfluous if not outright incompatible.   
 
     To this I could add the observations that this entire doctrine of sovereignty and its 
underlying notion of “the people” clearly do not denote a sovereign community that 
might willingly and purposefully be contracting amongst themselves for founding a new 
civis or a source of normativity.  Here obviously the subject of this connotation appears 
to be the Islamic ommat with predictable implications for the republican inclusive 
notions of popular sovereignty. 
 
     Furthermore in Chapter 1 the idea was put forward that the existence of a simple 
electoral system would not suffice to qualify a political system for being a republican 
order.  Indeed as was argued there, there are numerous socio-political channels among 
which holding regular elections to choose by majority consent constitutes one of the 
many elements of a bigger republican political architecture.  The rule of law, republican 
institutions, an independent judiciary system and an effective separation of power 
coupled with an active body of the contestatory citizenry were some of the distinctive 
features characterising a republican system. This translated into the republican language 
of non-domination - both at the private level and in relation to the government - would 
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provide a complete set of qualifying criteria for any political system claiming to be 
based on the republican values.     
 
VIII. Social Justice  
It has to be acknowledged that Khomeini consistently subscribed to various ideas geared 
towards promoting social justice at a time when the populist ideas - such as fighting 
colonialism and foreign encroachment on Muslim land and struggling against 
exploitation of resources by the dominating powers, was a fairly common trend amongst 
the third-world, middle-class intelligentsia
554
.  As Abrahamian noted in the 1970s, 
Khomeini included such populist themes in all his delivered speeches, words including 
the oppressed, the downtrodden, the exploited and even references to the class 
hegemony, all fundamentally leftist slogans, were extremely frequent in all his political 
discourses.  It was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 that this principle of social justice and 
distributive fairness was indeed at the heart of all schools of republican thought 
especially the French one
555
.  These efforts did not stay at the level of declaration, 
indeed a significant body of these promises were incorporated into the Iranian 
Constitution which amongst others promised to eradicate poverty, unemployment and 
social deprivation together with other provisions such as providing unemployment 
benefits, disability pay, interest-free loans and medical services, to name but a few
556
.  
This might explain why the parties and intellectuals of the left of the political spectrum 
were also counted amongst his revolutionary supporters and also inspirers whose basic 
ideas of a class-struggle and the denunciation of the oppression of the mostazʻafin 
(downtrodden) by the mostakberin (oppressors) became a current reference all the way 
through Khomeini’s political discourse.  Indeed one could identify a subtle line of 
argument based on this theme throughout the entire narratives of the Islamic Republic
557
.  
Whilst this at times seems to have lost its centrality, such as during the presidency of 
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Rafsanjāni (b. 1934), it emerged and topped the political agenda of president 
Ahmadinejād with such populist projects as the widely proclaimed sahm-e edālat (share 
of justice) which in theory consisted of an equitable share that every individual would 
receive from the national economic revenues. 
 
    Indisputably various aspects of a material empowerment of the weaker members of 
the society would obviously make up a significant element of fighting against many 
aspects of interpersonal and at certain levels, state domination.  A significant portion of 
social domination is undoubtedly composed of economic domination steeped in the 
access and control of the resources, as we remember too well from a voluminous body 
of Marxist scholarships.  As discussed in Chapter 1 the republican non-domination 
principle inevitably entails the material empowerment of the vulnerable sections of the 
society by establishing that all socio-economic resources of the common social space are 
fairly and transparently managed and distributed.  In fact this made up the very essence 
of the constant vigilance and fight against the dominium in the private space.  
Nevertheless, this important principle is closely related and even regulated by the second 
important republican principle of non-domination i.e. imperium, which as argued 
previously was the attention that should be paid to the prevention of the state itself from 
becoming a dominating force in the private spaces
558
.  
 
    In fact a closer examination of all these particular political discourses of the Islamic 
Republic and their relevant constitutionalization and practical provisions, quickly 
reveals a great deficit in the provisions against the state’s potential for economic and 
material domination.  As it will be argued in the upcoming chapter dedicate to a study of 
the Islamic Republic’s institutions, the lack of institutional transparency and 
accountability and a widespread endemic corruption together with the significant deficit 
in viable procedures of checks and balances have all transformed this main theme of 
social justice in Iran into an actual instrument of socio-political domination and 
oppression.  In any case one could observe that the very foundations of social justice that 
ran throughout Khomeini’s declarations were mainly limited to the economic well-being 
of society and a better access to the resources.  Furthermore, this at times is even 
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completely reversed by subordinating individual private spaces to the otherworldly 
questions of religious ethics.  In addition to this as I have argued, central to the 
republican doctrine was an active and unhindered participation of a self-determining 
civil society of which there is very little acknowledgment in the Islamic Republic’s 
political discourse. 
 
     Thus based on my republican framework of study, one could safely conclude that the 
questions related to the material well-being of society and concerns regarding an 
equitable distribution of its resources could actually be regarded as the by-product of a 
deeper level of domination, as outlined previously.  Furthermore, these objectives do not 
seem to be providing any safeguards against the imperium of the government itself from 
becoming an oppressive force in the lives of the citizens. In other words, an equitable 
access to the resources, although potentially a major step towards the elimination of the 
dominium in the inter-personal social spaces, it marginally if at all makes any 
contributions towards the safeguarding of the private rights of sovereignty and 
individual authority against the domination of the ruling apparatus.  An unfair 
distribution of the material resources before being an unethical or an immoral act, would 
actually signal a deeper level of social malaise of the violation of individual rights 
underpinned in the basic republican principle of non-domination.  In addition to all one 
could highlight the very identification of the true social values worthy of pursuit in this 
school as being the eternal salvation and a prosperous afterlife which could hardly 
justify such a momentous strife to establish a social justice and distributive fairness in 
this world.   
 
     In line with these observations it becomes evident that there is no unambiguous 
endorsement of the people’s right to sovereignty in Khomeini’s entire political discourse 
both before and after the Islamic Revolution.  The prevalent theme of social justice that 
runs through his, and indeed a significant number of the Islamic Republic’s ideologues’ 
political discourse, seems to be based on a very narrow interpretation and partial 
understanding of the true mechanisms of material domination in a modern society. 
Moreover, if one considers the actual political structure devised to promote such 
elements of the social justice in order to, most importantly, establish the rule of the 
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ultimate sovereign on earth; it becomes evident that there will be no space left for any 
principle of individual sovereignty in such a political order.  Hence these could actually 
prove detrimental to most elements of liberty as non-domination central to the 
republican ideology.  
 
     Most crucially, as outlined above, I agree with some scholars’ observations that the 
very claims of social justice and an egalitarian economy have in practice constituted 
integral components of a state-owned economic structure in the hands of the government 
itself to “rewards loyalists and punish the critics”559.  Hence these would in reality 
translate into a certain system of patrimonial frameworks that actually enhance the 
state’s imperium in the individual spaces.  Thus the claims of the social justice instead of 
being directed towards the actual economic empowerment of the citizens, fundamental 
to any system based on the republican sovereignty, have actually resulted in a structure 
of economic governance which has controversially contributed to the regime 
“resilience”560. 
 
     Following my analytical examination of the Iranian political system, I will proceed 
by inspecting the actual steps taken by Ayatollāh Khomeini to create an Islamic rule 
which incorporates numerous principles of popular sovereignty and its practical hurdles 
and complications which would in turn provide us with a more revealing insight into the 
coherence of such a vision of political sovereignty and their implications on various 
republican norms and principles. 
 
IX. Means and Modes of Implementing Sovereignty  
As was demonstrated throughout Chapter 2 and the reflections of such principles in the 
Iranian Constitution in Chapter 3, Islam does not seem to be dedicating a significant 
amount of its teachings to actual means and modes of state politics, let alone details such 
as endorsing a participatory involvement by the citizens.  Indeed the Quran appears to be 
prevalently silent on most government related questions for that matter.  Nevertheless, 
one could encounter consistent references in the political narratives of the state to 
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various Quranic and Hadith exegeses throughout the various formative stages of the 
Islamic Republic
561
.  Numerous scholars within the religious camp have attempted to 
extend few sporadic religious political concepts to include a range of official guidelines 
to address aspects of democracy as I discussed previously.  Nevertheless, while there 
have been heated debates on the true nature of this Islamic democracy or as some have 
labelled it theo-democracy, the extent of the actual public participation and the means 
and modes for implementing and safeguarding such involvement have gone widely 
untreated
562
.  This inherent ambiguity and even silence of any reference to the actual 
form of the government in the entire Islamic doctrines has given rise to various 
speculations and interpretations of the actual political form of an Islamic state and the 
role that Shariʻa should play on the one hand and the citizen’s rights to sovereignty and 
authority on the other.  As discussed previously the Iranian Constitution embodies the 
most prominent collection of such ambiguities and inconsistencies.  Hence the Islamic 
Republic is conceived in such a climate of numerous centrifugal forces of socio-political 
ideology all claiming to be central to the existence of such an unprecedented political 
order
563
. 
 
    We will probably never know what was the exact understanding of the founding 
fathers of the Iranian political system regarding the true nature of various republican 
principles. We will probably know even less about their true and sincere commitment to 
such republican ideas as the rule of people, the equality before law and the separation of 
power, to name but a few.  However, we could certainly find out, with the privilege of 
hindsight, what real practical measures they adopted to promote their convictions and 
evaluate their appropriateness.  Thus following my declared empirical method in the 
introductory chapter, I will proceed to take a closer look at the concrete actions taken by 
the political leaders of the Islamic Republic to implement their ideologies, as it is much 
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easier and more accurate to evaluate the observable actions rather than trying to analyse 
the motivations, in particular when such complex social phenomena are concerned
564
.  
 
     As was mentioned in the previous sections, Khomeini seems to have had a very 
partial understanding of the true implications of the republican concepts, and in practice 
explicitly restricted this to popular participation in the regular national elections only.  
The most prominent instance of such a popular manifestation of consent is undoubtedly 
the presidential elections.  Most interestingly as the main theme of the Iranian revolution 
was centred round the mobilization of the masses and political participation of the 
“oppressed”, the elections perhaps were viewed as a means of legitimizing the rule of 
the religious authorities through the approval of their popular base
565
.  This becomes 
evident when one considers the actual form that the popular elections and the 
referendum took and practices that were included to supervise and direct the electoral 
results in the desired directions.  An interesting example of such a half-hearted 
dedication to the public ballot was the first referendum held in the history of the Islamic 
Republic.  In March 1979, people were asked one simple question: Islamic Republic, 
Yes or No?  The popular answer was unsurprisingly a resounding “Yes”, nevertheless 
there are serious questions regarding the form of this election and the actual content of 
the Islamic Republic put to the public vote. Indeed if one theoretically consider the 
possibility of the “No” answer to prevail, it would have not been clear where such a 
result would have led to.  No efforts were made to elucidate the alternatives, if any, or at 
least to provide an exact definition of the political agenda of the only available option.  
 
     Once again recalling the republican non-domination principle, the domination could 
actually take the form of providing partial or incomplete information or removing some 
of the options that the people have without their explicit consent.  Indeed this constituted 
the idiosyncratic feature of the republican systems as compared to other political 
ideologies including the liberal ones.  In fact from the very birth of the Islamic Republic 
such grave violations of the republican principles could be observed as the entire 
propaganda machinery of the regime seems to have been geared towards promoting a 
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certain type of political system through feeding the public spaces with such incomplete 
information or even direct and indirect coercion. Indeed as Milani has observed:  
 
As soon as Khomeini came back to Iran he shrewdly empowered his network of the 
clerical establishment and created a new network within both the state bureaucracy and 
the newly created revolutionary institution.  He appointed his supports... as the Friday 
prayer leaders...appointed the director of the national television and radio..personally 
selected the member of the secret Council of the Islamic Revolution.  He sent his trusted 
allies to every important decision making organs, accountable only to him, these eyes 
and ears of Imam were more powerful than government authorities.
566
 
 
Moreover, various parallel institutions were conceived whose aim was to undermine the 
official interim government of Mehdi Bāzargān.  For instance, besides the above 
mentioned revolutionary council there were the Revolutionary Guards and the local 
Islamic Komite (Islamic Revolutionary vigilante Committees) which acted in parallel to 
the regular army and the police. This interference was so intense that Bāzargān himself 
famously stated: “in theory the government is in charge, but in reality it is Khomeini 
who is in charge, He with his Revolutionary Council, his Revolutionary Komite, and his 
relationship with the masses”567. 
 
     In addition to this, it appears that Khomeini and his followers undertook all possible 
actions to weaken the elected republican institutions of the Islamic Republic, or 
otherwise to bring them under their complete dominance and influence. Hence it comes 
as no surprise to find out that Ayatollāh Khomeini clearly instructed his closest allies to 
establish a firm grip on such institutions as the Parliament, the Assembly of Experts and 
the Judiciary system
568
.   
 
     To be sure, as highlighted previously, the political philosophy of Ayatollāh Khomeini 
seems to have gone through various phases and was reviewed on numerous occasions
569
.  
Nevertheless what the Iranian Constitution reflects today is his original Najaf version 
that has underpinned the entire layout of the elected and unelected sections of the 
Islamic Republic’s public offices.  As a result, to promote such a prevailing dominance 
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on all public institutions, for instance in the original conception of the executive branch, 
it was divided between the Office of the Prime Minister and the President which seems 
to have been designed to preclude the emergence of a strong presidency that could 
challenge the dominant role of the olamā570.  This went as far as the first president of 
Iran who was not even capable of independently choosing the prime minister of his own 
government and at the end Rajaʻi (1933-1981) was forced on him by the parliament 
dominated by the conservative forces
571
.  
 
     Once more based on this study’s reference republican framework, the domination 
could not only be in the form of actual coercion and obligation, but it could well be 
through invigilation or threat of consequences.  Again with the benefit of retrospection, 
one could observe that a variety of dominating tactics and actual interferences have been 
employed to promote a certain type of political sovereignty which would contain 
considerable amounts of anti-republican dominatory principles.  As I have expounded so 
far this has had fundamental impact not only on the very basic republican fundamentals 
of the Islamic Republic, but also on the very viability and indeed the theoretical 
consistency of such a political order.  Hence these all lead to one simple conclusion that 
all provision in the Iranian political system have been taken to subject numerous 
democratic and participatory elements of the Islamic Republic to the imperium of one 
single figure of the Valiye Faqih with numerous material and military prerogatives 
which effectively turns the entire political system into a type of “Praetorian” dictatorship 
headed by a religious figurehead
572
. This office and its prevailing domination will be the 
subject of my next analysis in the remaining part of this and also in the next chapter. 
 
X. Velāyat-e Faqih and Sovereignty 
The final chapter of the people’s sovereignty in the Islamic Republic of Iran should end 
with the introduction of the figure of Valiye Faqih.  As I have expounded in Chapter 2 
this is a very controversial concept which has caused fierce debates not only in the 
secular circles but also within the Shiʻa religious domains itself.  On the one side there is 
the doctrine of entesāb (appointment) which basically declares the velāyat-e faqih is a 
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divinely appointed figure over which the people have no sovereignty, not even within 
the endorsement and approval procedures.  On the other hand one finds a more moderate 
current of Shiʻa ideologists proposing the so-called notion of entexāb (selection) which 
considers an endorsement role for the population whilst still acknowledging the 
centrality of such a figure in the political layout of the Islamic Republic
573
.  As I 
discussed in Chapter 2, other more secular currents even go so far as to refute the very 
religious and rational foundations of such an institution.  Banisadr for instance, as a clear 
example of a religiously inspired secular figure, who is an eloquent representative of the 
Iranian intelligentsia after the Islamic Revolution dedicated long articles to the refutation 
of the religious foundations of what he deems as an unprecedented concept within the 
Shiʻa school of the political theology574.  Indeed Banisadr appear to be striving to 
provide a new interpretation of the term velāyat by conceptually removing any notions 
of domination from it through the rebuttal of all connotations of power implied by it
575
.  
He even draws clear connections with other regional movements with Islamic agenda in 
which he systematically denounces for lacking any true religious foundations as a result 
of endorsing significant elements of power and domination which he finds to be at odds 
with his interpretation of the Islamic velāyat of the people576. 
 
     Delving beyond these conceptual controversies one would inevitably discover the 
previously elaborated vision of the founders of the Islamic Republic’s ideology on 
seeing people as incapable of distinguishing good from evil, due to their “incomplete” 
rational faculties. This enjoyed no other outcome than being translated into the creation 
of an Islamic Leviathan, a superior wisdom that had the power to supervise the entire 
political apparatus of the country whilst being accountable to God only.  Indeed it 
appears that while the Iranian parliament is theoretically accountable to the people and 
the Office of the President is deemed accountable to the parliament thus indirectly to 
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people, the Leader in theory is only accountable to the institutions whose members are 
directly or indirectly appointed by himself.  
 
     For the sake of comparison, one could examine the constitution of the Iranian 
parliamentary monarchy of 1906 in which it was required for the King to take an oath of 
allegiance in front of the parliament.  Whilst only a symbolic gesture, it was a powerful 
sign of the submission to the people’s will and their representatives.  It is remarkable to 
notice that the Leader of the Islamic republic is not required to undergo such a ritual.  It 
will be instructive to note that in most monarchies of the modern world the 
constitutional sovereigns are bound to undergo the so-called “Coronation Oath” in which 
they usually endorse to serve people and to maintain the laws and customs of the land 
amongst other things
577
.  The provisions at times proved to be forming extremely 
binding contractual relations between the monarch and the subjects to the point that 
some monarchs were occasionally forced to abdicate or were even publically executed 
for having transgressed the established laws and customs, a good example of which is 
King Charles I of England
578
.  This further reiterates that the actual administrative form 
of the state’s political layout does not necessarily rule out the existence of various 
principles of the republican doctrine in particular the principles of popular sovereignty. 
Whereas the Islamic Republic, while officially claiming to be a certain type of republic, 
does not allow for such a powerful symbol of submission to law and the sovereignty of 
the people for the highest authority of the state. 
 
     It is interesting to note that even on the dawn of the introduction of such an 
overarching all powerful institution after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, there were 
fierce debates and opposition in particular by the religious figures like Ayatollāh 
Shariʻatmadāri, to which for instance Khamenei replied: “how can Valiye Faqih become 
a despot, one who acts on God’s behalf is not a dictator”579.   
                                                 
577
 See for instance the British Royal Coronation Oath as reported on the Official Monarchy website at: 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/ImagesandBroadcasts/Historic%20speeches%20and%20broadcasts/CoronationO
ath2June1953.aspx 
578
 See the official website of the British Monarchy at: 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/KingsandQueensoftheUnitedKingdom/TheStuarts/Charle
sI.aspx 
579
 Milani, M. (1992), The Transformation of the Velāyat-e Faqih Institution: from Khomeini to 
Khamenei, Muslim World 82 p.178 
208 
 
     It has to be acknowledged that they very institution of such an office and extension of 
its prerogatives to absolute levels in the framework of Velāyat-e Faqih-e Motlaq 
(absolute guardianship) or more recent emphasis on the concept of Velāyat Fagih-e 
aʻalam (guardianship of the most learned), would paradoxically provide this locus of 
authority with significant reformative power that could potentially revolutionize the 
entire ideological edifice of the Shiʻa political theology in the face of all conservative 
interpretations of such principles. Certain limited application of such reformative 
potentials by means of the previously discussed principles of ejtehād could still be 
identified through the institutions of numerous processes and provisions such as the 
Maslahat Council to which will be addressed in the upcoming chapter.  Notwithstanding, 
a closer examination of these declarations and similar ones by another proponent of 
figure of the Valiye Faqih, namely Ayatollāh Beheshti, and the actual practice of such 
doctrines on the ground would clearly highlight strong anti-modernist tendencies and 
outcomes that could well be observed in all socio-political structures of the Islamic 
Republic.  
 
     Regardless of these observations, the very existence of such an office would 
immediately remind one of the ancient republican concepts of freedom and the threats to 
it.  In the republican framework adopted in this study I cited the emblematic figure of a 
Roman slave who happily declared that he was a free man since he had a kindly master 
who never interfered with his liberty!  Nevertheless, the republican principle of freedom 
as non-domination ruled out such claims to liberty resulting from the lack of actual 
interference or also benevolent interventions of a supposedly kind, or in this case a 
moral authority.  This school identified the domination even in the mere possibility that 
the dominus figure actually occupies a position to be able to command such an authority.  
Thus the republican freedom is waived as soon as there is such a public figure in a 
dominant position capable of enforcing such imperium in the absence of adequate 
structures of checks and balances and without the clear transparent system of consent 
and accountability.  
 
     Hence the figure of Valiye Faqih, regardless of its religious basis and justifications 
and even its actual track record within the Iranian political system, proves to be the seat 
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of power most inimical to the very basic principles of republican freedom.  Even if this 
institution, for a variety of reasons including religious, ethics and virtue might not 
actually interfere with the supposedly transparently elected popular institutions.  The 
very existence of such a repository of power would immediately dissolve the republican 
credentials of the system.  No degree of republican claims could be advanced in a 
system where there is a permanent overarching and all-encompassing seat of authority 
over which the citizens can exercise no significant overseeing power and regulating 
vigilance.  Needless to underline that as I expounded previously the Office of the 
Supreme Leader has proven to be far from a kindly master in the form of a neutral super-
partisan institution dedicated to the moral guidance of the nation.  In fact all evidence 
points to the fact that from the very beginning of the institution of such an Office, the 
Supreme Jurist has actively participated in the day-to-day political affairs of the country, 
from directly disqualifying the presidential elections’ candidates580, to the management 
of the powerful financial institution which under Khamenei’s leadership has resulted in 
what some authors have defined as “neopatrimonial domination”581.  I will provide a 
more detailed analysis of the institutional implications of such an arrangement of the 
sovereign power in the Islamic Republic in the forthcoming Chapter. 
 
     Based on these observations I could reiterate the claim that the very existence of such 
an unchecked repository of public power would be sufficient to undermine numerous 
republican building blocks of such a political system.  In addition, the famous republican 
eye-ball test would not even be applicable to such an overtly anti-republican entity 
which stands beyond any possibility of criticism and accountability.  Indeed it could be 
concluded that this is the highest manifestation of the state imperium which as argued 
previously would render the citizens of such a system unfree under the potestate domini 
of the enslaving powers.  
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XI. Conclusion 
Various aspects of the political sovereignty were examined in this chapter considering 
the constitutional provisions in place to uphold and protect such basic cornerstones of 
the republican liberty.  The analytical approach here pursued a multi-layered objective 
studying the people’s sovereignty over the constitution itself as far as drafting, approval 
and eventual modification of the same document is concerned.  I then examined the 
republican mechanisms in place to enforce the constitutional compatibility and 
eventually considered the possibility of recalling public representatives and authorities.  
This was then followed up by a closer examination of the highest seat of authority in the 
Islamic Republic namely the Office of the Leader.   
 
     As far as the ratification and amendment procedures of the constitution are concerned 
I highlighted the serious shortcomings in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic which 
does not seem to be providing adequate potentials for publically initiated constitutional 
processes.  Furthermore, the only effective supervising commission aimed at the 
verification of the compatibility of the ordinary laws and procedures with the 
constitution does not appear to be a publically elected office lacking the most basic 
criteria of independence and transparency.  Indeed all observations so far point to the 
conclusion that the Council of the Guardians seems to have been devised as an actual 
instrument of domination and protection of the state imperium rather than a republican 
instrument for upholding popular sovereignty. 
 
     These all led to an unequivocal remark that many constitutional provisions when 
observed closely prove to be extremely inadequate as the contemporary history of Iran 
plainly demonstrates.  Thus all evidence point to the conclusions that many of these half-
hearted republican provisions could well be interpreted as authoritarian recombinant 
strategies aimed at providing the resilience of the system from domestic and 
international perspectives.  Other constitutional provisions such as the emphasis on the 
promotion of social justice and the material well-being of the society, although having 
provided some short-lived social benefits such as a higher social mobility or a temporary 
re-distribution of the national resources, seem to be extremely inadequate to produce any 
long-lasting social effects, again as the recent history of the Islamic Republic witnesses.  
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Indeed all empirical evidences support the conclusion that these economic arrangements 
have been devised as the effective instrument of domination by employing the resources 
to promote and reward a specific strand of the politico-religious narrative and their 
supporting social forces.   
 
     Many of these socialist discourses on distributive fairness could easily be classified 
as anti-republican efforts of providing incomplete information through populist 
propaganda or at times even removing some of the options available to the people 
possibly through providing misleading or inadequate information or invigilation and 
threat of consequences, of which one could see significant traces in all domains of the 
Islamic Republic social existence that were examined thus far. 
 
     The prevailing perception of human nature as existentially corrupt and evil lacking 
adequate power of reason, and the definition provided for the principles of the common 
good within this narrative would also underpin the justifications for such an anti-
republican layout of power with momentous normative consequences that I discussed 
above.  
 
     And finally the very institute of the Velāyate-e Faqih proves to be in blatant 
infringement of various republican non-domination principles of individual sovereignty 
underpinned by the principles of the civic humanism.  This semi or even un-elected 
institution, considering the procedures of selection, with little or no public accountability 
and such an extremely significant concentration of public power - both constitutional 
and extra-constitutional, would provide the precise incarnation of the imperium of a 
dominating power in the public domains as conceived by the republican doctrine.  Hence 
at it was demonstrated in this chapter, throughout the doctrinal foundations of the 
structure of power in the Islamic Republic, one seems to be facing an essential deficit of 
the basic principles of republican sovereignty underpinned by the human reason central 
to the entire republican political discourse. 
 
     In any case it should be reiterated once more that these conclusions are essentially 
independent from the actual track record of this institution in the public life of society as 
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the very existence of even a hypothetically benevolent dominus would automatically 
exclude the subsistence of numerous republican fundamental principles.  
Notwithstanding as I will demonstrate in the next chapters, the epistemological 
outcomes of such interpretations of the locus of the political sovereignty within the 
institutional structure of power of the Islamic Republic will also prove to be significantly 
inconsistent with the basic principles of the republican liberty. 
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Chapter 5 - Republican Institutions 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Based on the guidelines set forward in Chapter 1 it becomes evident that the republican 
state does not leave social matters to the mere contractual relations between individuals 
but rather it strives to play a more active role particularly through the republican 
principles of institutionalism
582
.  Thus one of the main components of a republican 
system of government, throughout the history of this school of the political philosophy, 
has been an elaborate project of institution building aimed at reducing various levels of 
domination at individual and state levels.  As I argued previously, the principle 
underpinning the so-called respublica mixta has been at the heart of all state efforts to 
promote and defend various articles of individual sovereignty
583
.  This would obviously 
require constitutional institutions capable of upholding and protecting socio-political 
liberties against the danger of subjections to the unchecked power which was equated 
with servitude
584
.  The specific republican solution for this in order to reduce the 
possibility of the potestate domini of the state or individuals has been in the form of 
extensive efforts towards the distribution of power and provisions of sufficient checks 
on every repository of public power.  This was in order to protect the liberty of the 
republican citizens who were effectively considered the owners of such authorities.   
 
     As I argued before this constituted one of the main points of divergence between the 
liberal ideology - including the liberal republicanism
585
, where the non-interference of 
the state has become an unshakable pillar of the doctrine of state  as compared to  the 
classic and neo-republican’s non-domination principle where not all state interferences 
are regarded as inimical to the individual’s liberty.  Hence in the context of the 
republican political system one could expect extensive efforts towards the institution and 
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promotion of strong public centres of authority with significant power to uphold and 
guarantee republican values
586
.   
 
     Thus the institution building efforts could be considered as one of the main 
preoccupations of republican ideology as it is firmly believed that these could provide 
the necessary guarantees to nourish and promote all republican principles.  Indeed every 
republican principle of power administration could potentially be translated into or at 
least corresponds to a relative public institution of the republican state.  One could safely 
claim that the only practical channel for the execution of the entire republican doctrine 
of sovereignty would be through the public institutions whose correct layout and 
operation could guarantee the very existence of a republican political system.  All 
principles of distribution of power, checks and balances, equality before law and 
people’s sovereignty would become viable only through such a political structure whose 
main pillars are built around efficient, transparent and elected public institutions.  Thus 
to provide a thorough analysis of the republican credentials of a system, one should not 
only consider the effective dispersion and distribution of public power in society, but 
also the efficiency and transparency of publically accountable systems of execution and 
monitoring, which are open and inclusive to all members of society regardless of their 
idiosyncratic belongings.  To use Pettit’s description, the republican institutions act like 
the antibodies in the human body: they do not cause the immunity; they are the body’s 
immunity, which would render the elements of this political body immune to domination 
by providing adequate institutional protection to guard the liberties against the diseases 
of liberty caused by arbitrary interference
587
.  
 
     One small point that needs to be highlighted here is that the institution building 
endeavours of the republican doctrine has proven to be a very complex, gradual and 
incremental process throughout the history of the Republican ideology.  For instance, the 
French republican school had to go through five consecutive constitutions in order to 
arrive at what was finally regarded as a system with adequate republican credentials with 
efficient public institutions to uphold various aspects of the republican principles of 
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freedom
588
.  Thus one needs to consider various historical, cultural and socio-political 
factors to provide a truly comprehensive study of all aspects of republican thought, but 
this would open up an immense field of study that requires adequate space and time to 
be fully addressed.  Notwithstanding by closely examining the republican basic pillars of 
sovereignty and their manifestations within the institutional layout of a political system, 
one could get a relatively accurate idea of the philosophical credentials of any political 
order and the values forming the core guiding principles of such a system.  On the other 
hand again as highlighted in Chapter 1, throughout the treatises of the main ideologues 
of the republican thought, particularly Machiavelli, one could appreciate their detailed 
analysis of the Roman liberty, attributing it to the two main elements of good laws and 
good institutions.  Hence it would prove mandatory to provide an institutional analysis 
for my case study, i.e. to assess the Islamic Republic’s republican credentials, after 
having scrutinized the constitutional provisions of this system in Chapter 3 and 
principles of sovereignty in Chapter 4.   
 
     In this pursuit I will initially start by providing a thorough analysis of the main 
repositories of public power in the Islamic Republic, thereafter proceed with a detailed 
study of the republican credentials of these institutions.  I have already treated in passim 
some of these institutions throughout the previous chapters such as the Office of the 
Leader, Council of the Guardians and others by means of scrutinizing various 
constitutional aspects of sovereignty.  However, here I would like to take a more 
detailed look at the actual institutional layout of these structures of sovereignty within 
the Islamic Republic, by focusing on the implications of such a layout of power on the 
principles of the republican liberty as highlighted throughout the previous chapters.  In 
other words, I would like to examine the actual outcome and the institutional 
interpretations of those ideological foundations of this system discussed thus far, after 
having provided an analysis of the constitutional manifestations of such principles. 
 
     Furthermore all observations have so far lead to the paramount conclusion that a 
republican project has got both political and social dimensions.  In this chapter I focus 
on the political and institutional dimensions of the republican ideology in my area of 
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interest whilst in the final one I will focus on the social projects and their fundamental 
implications within the comprehensive republican ideology of government
589
. 
 
II. Islamic Republic State 
As I briefly mentioned in the previous chapters, Locke and Montesquieu could well be 
credited for being the most prominent ideologues of the separation and independence of 
the government powers.  Hence the magnum opus of the Montesquieu entitled De 
l'esprit des lois (The Spirit of Laws) is unsurprisingly centred around the main theme of 
the separation of power and the importance of the independence and transparency of 
these powers in the state
590
.  Their detailed observations and recommendations for the 
creation of the three main branches of the sovereign authority can still be clearly 
identified in nearly all modern day political orders.  In this section my objective will be 
to study these three principal institutions of government making up the main seats of 
public power in the Islamic Republic, namely the judiciary, the legislative and the 
executive powers.  As I will expound below there are other significant repositories of 
power within the Islamic Republic which are not part of the traditional republican layout 
of government, although nonetheless occupy a prominent role within the hierarchy of the 
state in the Islamic Republic.  As far as the constitutional provisions are concerned in 
Article 57 of the Iranian Constitution one reads:  
 
The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, 
the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the 
absolute velāyat al-amr and the leadership of the ommat, in accordance with the 
forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each 
other.591 
 
This is a very important article of the constitution with an extremely fundamental role in 
defining the structure of power in the Islamic Republic.  At first glance this article 
readily reveals that there would be at least one extra seat of authority within the Islamic 
Republic that falls above and beyond the sovereign powers of the government.  The 
traditional republican trias politica does not seem to be the case in the Islamic Republic 
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and rather one should more correctly be speaking of four main sources of state authority 
in Iran including the Office of the Leader.  Indeed the supervision of the Supreme 
Leader seems to be an overarching power that extends to all political structures of the 
country.  Article 110 of the constitution details various prerogatives of the Office of the 
Leader which clearly underlines the fact that this institution is indeed a forth pillar of 
political power to which all other institutions of the government are subordinated
592
.   I 
have already addressed some aspects of this institution in the previous chapter 
scrutinizing its purviews with regard to the principles of the republican sovereignty; 
Here I will treat the institutional implications of this repository of power as every aspect 
of the political life of the Islamic Republic seems to have been linked to this Office in 
one way or another.   
 
     Another important aspect of Article 57 cited above, is the pronouncement of the term 
“independence” of the powers of the state from each other and not the “separation” of 
these powers.  The separation of powers constitute a fundamental principle of all 
republican systems of politics to which one could seamlessly find explicit references 
throughout the history of this ideology.  For instance as far back as the first French 
Republic, Article 16 of the 1789 French Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly 
underlines the point that any institution which does not implement a clear separation of 
power would be regarded as unconstitutional
593
.  In the case of the Islamic Republic, a 
closer look at each individual power readily reveals that one could not be speaking of 
any clear separation of power.  For instance, the legislative authority’s power to legislate 
is not entirely reserved for the parliament and there are other institutions with significant 
law-making authority which I will return to further below.  For now what is fundamental 
to notice is that a basic esteqlāl (independence) of these powers would at best denote a 
“relative” separation of powers as conceptually there could well be independent powers 
in charge of the same assignment in every theoretical field.  It is evident that in practical 
terms one could not be speaking of a total separation of powers as the practical needs of 
every political system would entail relative interference of responsibilities.  The critical 
issue here would be the definition of the “primary” functions as compared to the 
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“secondary” responsibilities594.  For instance as regarding the legislative authority, the 
secondary functions would concern the capability and indeed the authority in specific 
restricted spheres as compared to the ecumenical law-making power.  Indeed as I will 
demonstrate further below this is exactly the crucial distinction which seems to have 
caused a great amount of bewilderment within the institutional functions of the Islamic 
Republic with other centres of power such as the Expediency Council, or the Supreme 
National Security Council and so on who have extensive legislative power that 
sometimes even overrides that of the Islamic Consultative Parliament.  For now in line 
with the order of the provisions of the Iranian Constitution, I will start my analysis of the 
Iranian political institutions by focusing on the Islamic Republic’s Legislative Power 
which could be regarded as the main building block of every modern day constitutional 
political system, regardless of their ideological orientation. 
  
a. Legislative Power 
One could fairly safely claim that the power to legislate and create laws has been the 
main theme treated throughout the entire history of political thought.  It could easily be 
shown that from Aristotle to modern day republican ideologues, the role that the 
definition of the processes of law-making has played in any system based on the 
contractual social rights, has been of the utmost importance
595
.  Indeed the popular 
power to legislate is regarded as the main manifestation of the transition from the 
ancient system of the divine right of kings to the modern era of participatory politics
596
.  
Besides the very fundamental principle of the rule of law - which some authors might 
interestingly trace back to the Mesopotamian Hamurabi code of 1775 BC, the actual 
form that the legislative power takes in a political system could also have interesting 
implications
597
.  As I argued in Chapter 1 the republican system with its emphasis on the 
superiority of law and equality of the citizens before it, has dedicated a significant 
amount of resources towards the definition and illustration of this fundamental building 
block of popular sovereignty.  Again as argued previously more than the actual contents 
of the laws produced by such a body, the processes by which such an organization is 
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formed in the first place and the mechanisms by which it consequently operates 
constitute the main centre of debate for the republicans.  This has resulted in dedicating 
a particular attention to the mechanisms of devising the right processes based on 
negotiated solutions and compromises rather than focusing on the mere validity of the 
outcomes
598
.   
 
     Furthermore it was mentioned before that the existence of other guarantees such as an 
inviolable bill of rights could be regarded as an essential legislative safeguard against the 
numerous threats that the basic principles of republican ideology face in a modern day 
polity.  I will now turn my attention to a closer examination of these provisions within 
the institutional structure of the Iranian legislative power.  
 
     The Iranian republican structure of the state includes numerous provisions to allow 
for a certain form of public participation, in particular regarding the process of law-
making and legislation.  The Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran acts as a unicameral 
system, down from the former bicameral parliament of the Iranian National Assembly 
and the Senate under the Pahlavi monarchy.  The choice between a unicameral system as 
compared to the bicameral one, customary in many modern day legislations of the 
western world, could be revealing towards the appreciation of the ideological 
foundations of a political system
599
.  As I argued in the previous chapter, the Islamic 
revolution with its strong anti-monarchic and anti-aristocratic agenda has unsurprisingly 
opted for the abolition of the former Iranian Senate and the institution of one single 
legislative body to represent the “oppressed” and the “downtrodden” claiming to be 
making up the majority of the Iranian population
600
.  Now as I stated in Chapter 1 the 
bicameralism could prove to be an efficient element against the domination and 
particularly the paramount danger of the tyranny of the majority as a significant threat to 
all modern day republican systems
601
.  The rationale behind this consideration is a 
simple observation that providing further elements of checks and balances within the 
processes of legislation could provide additional layers of republican institutional 
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protection against the imperium of the potentially ill-considered legislations.  Or 
alternatively that one group or a current of thought turns into a hegemonic ideology in 
the absence of a more reasoned debate that one might expect to arise in a higher 
parliament made up of more specialized experts of the socio-political issues
602
.
  
Most 
importantly the existence of a second legislative body with more stable membership 
rules in the form of longer mandates and the impossibility of dissolution would provide 
an important safeguard for upholding the principles of the constitution in a republican 
system
603
.  The obvious advantages regarding the creation of more moderate and 
balanced laws by preventing potential radical or extreme utterances of the lower camera, 
have long been highlighted by the forerunners of the republican doctrine whose best 
manifestations could be found in the Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws604.  
 
     Thus due to this institutional organization of the Iranian Legislative Power, from the 
outset I could highlight a potential deficit in the parliamentarian structure of the Islamic 
Republic.  It is a well established process by nations characterised by a significant level 
of ethno-religious diversity to adopt multi-layered parliamentarian centres of law-
making
605
.  This is to ensure that the various interests of peripheral groups and 
ideologies would still be accounted for in the core of the legislative power.  It should be 
acknowledged that based on the Iranian Constitution that I examined in Chapter 3, the 
presence of various religious and ethnic groups are relatively guaranteed in the process 
of law-making in the Iranian Parliament
606
.  There are also local assemblies foreseen by 
the constitution which play a small role in extending the power of law-making in 
restricted matters to various ethnic and religious groups in Iran, but these do not seem to 
be playing a significant role in giving a voice to the local realities to fend off the 
potential imperium of the dominant ideology.  I will return to these institutions later in 
this chapter.   
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      The Iranian Majles is an institution composed of 290 members, supervised and 
dominated by the overriding 12 member institution of the Council of Guardians whose 
members are directly or indirectly nominated by the Office of the Supreme Leader.  
Surprisingly the number of Iranian MPs seems relatively low considering the unicameral 
nature of the parliament.  For instance France - a bicameral legislative system, has 
allowed for 577 MPs in the lower house of the parliament, Italy 630, Russia 450, Egypt, 
588 and Pakistan 342 members.  In any case studying the quantitative and demographic 
implications of such an arrangement requires another space aimed at the analysis of the 
social implications of these statistics. 
 
     According to the Iranian electoral law, these members of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly should pass a strict qualification procedure administered by the Council of the 
Guardians.  This vetting process amongst others verifies that every candidate should 
possess a “full belief and commitment to Islam and the sacred principles of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran” and “show a practical allegiance to the constitution and the 
progressive principle of the absolute rule of the Supreme Jurisprudence (Velāyat-e 
faqih)”607.  Unsurprisingly this process has resulted in a considerable domination of the 
parliament by the forces endorsed by the Office of the Leader particularly salient in the 
elections of 2004 and 2008
608
. One important consequence of such an ideological 
orientation has been that in 2008 the Majles passed a law based on which all aspects of 
the Office of the Leader would be exempted from any parliamentary power of oversight 
and accountability
609
.  This is truly remarkable in a system whose constitution explicitly 
claims that “the Islamic Consultative Assembly has the right to investigate and examine 
all the affairs of the country”610.  Furthermore if one considers other external regulating 
bodies aimed at monitoring, obstructing, rejecting and directing not only the processes 
of legislation but also the very acts of the formation of the parliament, the resulting 
image would become a very complex system that provides little protection for the basic 
republican principles of liberty as non-domination.   
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     Thus it becomes evident that the legislative system of the Islamic Republic is geared 
towards promoting and preserving a specific ideology endorsed by a particular class, 
namely the clergy, who appear to have had a systematic presence in various legislations 
of the country.  Paradoxically, the diminishing trend of the presence of the religious 
figures in the quality of the parliamentary members has been attributed to them failing to 
secure a popular endorsement rather than a secularizing trend in the process of 
qualification and selection of the MPs, as the number of the candidates within the ranks 
of clergy seems to be relatively constant
611
.  Indeed as the following table demonstrates 
in 9 consecutive parliaments of the Islamic Republic a persistence presence of the clergy 
could clearly be perceived in spite of its declining trend: 
 
 
Figure 5.1 
      
 
Furthermore as I argued in the previous chapters based on Article 72, 73 and in 
particular 93 of the Iranian Constitution, all laws of the parliament should be sent to the 
Council of the Guardians for approval and that “the Islamic Consultative Assembly does 
not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence”612.  It becomes 
evident that significant potential for the total domination of a specific class of ruling 
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elite has been provided for in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.  Hence the very 
institution that should create laws aimed at protecting the republican values of liberty as 
non-domination itself seems to be strictly dominated by specific group and vested 
ideological interests. 
 
     In spite of these constitutional arrangements of the Legislative System, the 
experience during the three decades since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, 
demonstrates that the interactions between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the 
Council of the Guardians is a much more complicated matter than the simple 
subordinate relationship between a dominant and a dominated entity.  Indeed at various 
junctures within the life of the Islamic Republic various provisions have been added in 
an attempt to resolve the inevitable gridlock resulting from functional and instrumental 
necessities of a modern day society on the one hand and the religious and doctrinal 
imperatives of the dominant school of ideology on the other.  One such solution has 
been the creation of the Expediency Council which proves to be a very interesting 
institution within the structure of the Islamic Republic.  This requires further analysis 
which I will be providing in the relative section, for now I will proceed by taking a 
closer look at the structure of the Guardian Council which I have cited on numerous 
occasions thus far. 
 
i. The Council of the Guardians 
If one had to prepare a list of all the institutions within the structure of the Islamic 
Republic wielding the highest concentration of public authority, the Council of the 
Guardians would probably top the pinnacle.  This organization was created following 
Khomeini’s explicit order immediately after the Islamic Revolution aimed at influencing 
and controlling the formational processes of the Islamic Republic.  To be sure, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, there was a strong precedence for such an organization even in 
the first Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, with explicit guidelines for the 
supervision of all legislative affairs by the theologians to verify their compliance with 
Shariʻa law613.  Immediately following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Council of 
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the Guardians was instituted by 6 faqihs directly nominated by Khomeini who 
unambiguously declared that: 
 
With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order to 
examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be constituted 
for which I have the responsibility to name six faqih from among the pious faqihs 
conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day.
614
 
 
These provisions effectively turned the Council of the Guardians into a powerful 
institution with significant prerogatives in all legislative matters of the country.  Indeed 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the Council of the Guardians has become the sole institution 
with the power to interpret the Iranian Constitution (Article 98), to validate every law 
passed by the parliament and most importantly to supervise the elections of the 
Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the president of the Republic, the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda (Article 
99).  Indeed this institution could well be regarded as the main architect of the 
fundamental political structure of the entire system.   
 
     From an institutional point of view, besides having the power to nullify any piece of 
legislation deemed incompatible with the rules of the Sacred Law, every candidate of the 
Majles - the office of presidency and Assembly of the Experts, should be first approved 
by this council through a process called nezārat estesvābi (approval supervision)615.  
This became even more blatant when in 1995, the parliament under the strong influence 
of the conservatives passed a law aimed at unambiguously extending the prerogatives of 
the council to be “unequivocal throughout the duration of the elections and with regard 
to all matters”616.   All these purviews seem to have turned this institute into an effective 
gatekeeper for all existing elected offices of the system.  For instance in 2004 and 2008 
the Council rejected the candidacy of around a third of the Parliamentary candidates and 
in the presidential elections of 2013, 672 candidates were rejected out of a total 680 
nominees! 
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    The striking aspect of the institutional locus of the Guardian Council is not just the 
extent of its constitutional prerogatives, which one might even find in other comparable 
contexts, whereas it is its compositional structure, its accountability and its transparency 
which one should expect from any repository of power with such significant levels of 
political authority.  As I mentioned above six religious figures from the council are 
directly selected by the Supreme Leader whilst the other six members with legal 
qualifications are proposed by the head of the judiciary system to the parliament for 
endorsement.  Now, the head of the judiciary system himself is in turn appointed by the 
Supreme Leader, which in effect turns the whole Council of the Guardians into an 
extremely powerful tool in the hands of one individual, the Leader of the Islamic 
Republic.   
 
     Therefore it is easy to imagine an immense potential for domination in such a system 
controlled by an omnipotent institution which practically controls the entire republican 
apparatus of the system, on which people have little to no direct control and which is 
only accountable to the Office of the Leader.  This could and indeed has provided for 
various anti-republican elements of unchecked sources of authority with potential for the 
outright elimination of any traces of the popular sovereignty in such a system.  One 
could safely claim that the institution itself could be regarded as the highest 
manifestation of the imperium of the state which as I argued previously, is regarded as 
the most inimical to the basic principles of republican liberty.  Furthermore if one 
considers the complete cycle of the imperium of the dominating ideology in the Islamic 
Republic, the role that the Council of the Guardian plays in it becomes even more 
evident, as this Council is charged with vetting the candidates of the Council of the 
Experts which are theoretically in charge of nominating or even dismissing the Supreme 
Leader.  Thus the highest seat of authority, the Office of the Leader, directly or 
indirectly nominates the members of the Council of the Guardians which in turn 
approves the candidates for the Assembly of the Experts.  In other words the Supreme 
Leader has the final authority in selecting or dismissing himself if he is considered to be 
lacking the necessary qualifications!  It comes to no surprise that some elements of 
popular endorsement in the form of choosing between the approved candidates have also 
been included, but these clear instances of the “recombinant authoritarianism” by no 
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means go anywhere near the republican guarantees against the potestate domini of the 
ruling system.   
     Again a comparison with other republican systems, particularly the French Republic 
whose Fifth Constitution has been used as the blueprint for the formation of the various 
institutions of the Islamic Republic, would be instructive here.  Surprisingly the Council 
of the Guardians itself seems to be providing a comparative definition of its role by 
defining its functions in an analogy with other European Constitutional Courts or 
Councils
617
.  In Chapter 1, I provided a comparative overview of some of these 
institutions, in particular the French and Italian ones, which would lead to the 
unequivocal conclusion that such a comparison by the Council of the Guardians with 
these institutions is fundamentally flawed and misleading due to a variety of reasons 
including: 
 These are not ideologically driven institutions with little to no regard for any 
doctrinal underpinnings of the questions treated
618
; 
 They are meant to be open and inclusive to all members of society regardless of 
gender, religion, ethnic belongings or personal and political beliefs
619
; 
 In most cases their interventions should be triggered by specific authorities 
through predefined constitutional channels 
620
; 
 The area of jurisdiction is restricted to specifically defined constitutional matters 
which could not be easily extended to other socio-political fields, strictly 
refraining from taking overt public political positions;  
 Their supervision is not a comprehensive exercise of authority extended to all 
laws passed by the parliament
621
;  
 All efforts are made to turn these institutions into completely independent organs 
of supervisions and checks, unlike the Guardian Council which is directly linked 
to the unelected Office of the Supreme Leader. 
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Thus it becomes evident that such an institution does not have any resemblance to the 
traditional republican seats of power dedicated to upholding the principles of popular 
sovereignty and republican liberty.  In the previous chapters I discussed the 
constitutional implications of such political arrangements.  In line with those 
observations, here again institutionally, through the gate-keeping functions that this 
organ imposes on all elected offices of the Islamic Republic; it seems to be acting as a 
veritable tool of domination for a certain ideology rather than a republican institution 
guarding against domination and dependence.  Basic considerations on aspects of 
transparency, independence, inclusiveness and neutrality would all lead to the 
conclusion that any analogy between the Council of the Guardians with other republican 
institutions - aimed at upholding republican principles of liberty by protecting the 
constitution and resolving the areas of conflict between the state powers, should be taken 
a pinch of salt. 
 
ii. Other Legislative Purviews 
It is imperative to mention that there are some interesting organizations within the 
structure of the legislative power which deserve particular attention such as the 
Komision-e Asle Navad (Commission for Article 90) and the Divān-e Mohasebat-e 
Kešvar (Supreme Audit Court). These organizations, again clearly based on the French 
model of the Fifth Republic, could play an important role in protecting the rights of the 
individual and implementing an important level of accountability for the governmental 
agents before the people.  As I discussed previously, Article 90 of the Iranian 
Constitution reads as below: 
 
Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the Assembly or the executive power, 
or the judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly.  The 
Assembly must investigate his complaint and give a satisfactory reply.  In cases where 
the complaint relates to the executive or the judiciary, the Assembly must demand 
proper investigation in the matter and an adequate explanation from them, and announce 
the results within a reasonable time.  In cases where the subject of the complaint is of 
public interest, the reply must be made public
622
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Indeed numerous recourses to the intervention of this commission have been solicited 
either by the general public or by other authorities of the Islamic Republic
623
.  The above 
article explicitly mentions that this Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
has the power to investigate all complaints filed against all three state branches.  Hence 
based on this Article of the constitution, this Commission seems to have been endowed 
with two types of authority.  The first is to investigate public complaints and if deemed 
appropriate refer them to the judiciary system to be prosecuted, and the second is to 
inform the public of the proceedings if these prove to be in their general interests
624
.  
Nevertheless there are important aspects of the commission which deserve further 
thought.  Firstly it has been asserted that the complaints filed with this commission 
should concern only the procedures and the modus operandi of the executive and 
judiciary powers
625.  As three decades of the Islamic Republic’s history shows, 
complaints to this Commission would rarely result in any tangible gains for the filing 
parties.  One could seamlessly find numerous instances which demonstrate that the 
function of this commission has been reduced to the initial investigation of the 
complaints and referral to the same organizations concerned, which in most cases have 
simply chosen to ignore or archive them with little to no executive sanctions attached.  
Most significantly these have rarely been reflected in the public domain as the public 
media, and in particular the national broadcasting organization - which is directly 
controlled by the Office of the Leader and the heavily invigilated private media, seem to 
have failed to function as neutral and efficient means of public information and 
awareness
626
.  And finally this Commission does not possess any power over the Office 
of the Leader or other powerful organizations falling under his authority such as the 
Expediency Council or various Bonyāds and revolutionary organizations.  I will treat 
this argument in more detail at the end of this chapter.  
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     Similar considerations could be made regarding the Supreme Audit Court.  This court 
which was established and is administered by the Legislative System based on Articles 
54 and 55 of the Iranian Constitution, has the declared objective of “controlling financial 
operations and activities of all Ministries, institutions, government companies and other 
organizations which in any manner whatsoever benefit from the state budget”627.  
Despite this ambitious and fundamental objective of financial monitoring over the 
operation of all state powers by this institution, in practice it seems to have encountered 
numerous limitations and setbacks.  These have not only been the result of the ambiguity 
of the definition of the scope of authority of this organization, but also from the conflict 
of responsibilities - notably with the Administrative Justice Court and other 
organizational councils in charge of dealing with wrongdoings and irregularities 
628
.  
Therefore serious doubts has been raised against the efficiency and transparency of the 
operations of such financial auditing institutions, particularly in the wake of the 2011 
embezzlement scandal which revealed a striking levels of corruption at the highest 
financial levels of the Iranian establishment
629
.  Unsurprisingly this court does not have 
any constitutional authority either over the Office of the Leader and all the revolutionary 
and financial foundations that fall under the control of that office, which as I will discuss 
further below is said to control over 40% of the entire Iranian economy
630
.  
 
iii. Limits of the Legislative Power 
As far as one can see in the Iranian Constitution, the explicit limits set out for the 
practice of the legislation is that it should not be against the Sacred Law of Islam.  Now 
on closer scrutiny of the various articles regulating this matter, it could be observed that 
two distinct terms are being used to reflect this concept.  Surprisingly it appears that not 
enough attention by scholars of this field has been dedicated to these subtle details of 
these important pronouncements of the Iranian Constitution.  In certain places one 
encounters the term entebāq (be compliant with) the Islamic laws (in Articles 4 and 94) 
and in another the text read as adame moqāyerat (not to be against) the Islamic Codes 
(in Articles 91 and 96).  As one could well imagine this could be a potential source for  
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misunderstanding in the interpretations of the Articles and the role that these institutions 
could play in producing and monitoring the ordinary laws of the Islamic Republic.  It is 
evident that an article of law might not be montabeq with the Islamic Shariʻa as the 
Sacred Law might be silent in that matter, as it often is, but this does not automatically 
entail that it is against Shariʻa Law.  Consider for instance the traffic law or the laws 
regulating import and export for which one could not find any precedence in the 
religious doctrine.  Therefore it is obvious that the boundaries of the legislation in Iran 
and the scope of the oversight of the Council of the Guardians on all laws passed by the 
parliament, still contain various points of ambiguity which could result in a dangerous 
potential for domination as the Council of the Guardians is also endowed with the power 
to interpret the ambiguities of the Iranian Constitution.  
 
     Unsurprisingly the parliament faces many other constraints as well.  As I discussed 
previously, the Islamic Consultative Assembly no longer has the power to investigate 
unelected institutions, such as the Council of the Guardians and the Office of the Leader.  
Furthermore any inquiry into the functioning of any organization falling under the 
control of the Supreme Leader such as the state-controlled media, requires his explicit 
authorization
631
.  In any case these restriction most strikingly extend to the very process 
of law-making as well. 
 
     In practice the Majles has faced numerous restrictions on the exercise of its 
legislative mandates with other institutions enjoying similar rights to legislate in certain 
matters.  These include the Supreme Council for National Security, the Expediency 
Council, the Guardian Council itself, the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution and 
the Office of the Supreme Leader
632
.  For instance Article 176 of the Iranian 
Constitution explicitly mentions that “The decisions of the Supreme Council for 
National Security shall be effective after the confirmation by the Leader” which indeed 
provides this institution with the power to legislate and promulgate binding laws
633
.  I 
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will take a look at the operation of the Expediency Council further below but for now 
what is interesting to underline is that the Office of the Leader has been given the power 
to issue the so-called “state orders” which would have the same effect as the normal 
laws although in the absence of any legislative debates and proceedings
634
.  This could 
be regarded as the most blatant violation of the republican principles of popular 
sovereignty in the legislative matters which I will treat in further detail in the 
forthcoming section relating to the Office of the Supreme Leader.  As an example I can 
only cite the state order of the Supreme Leader in 2012 to drop the parliamentary 
investigation into the performance of the then President of the Islamic Republic, 
Mahmud Ahmadinejād which was immediately obeyed by the members of Majles as the 
decrees of the highest seat of authority in the Iranian political system
635
.  
 
     Thus all analysis on legislative power leads to the conclusion that whilst there is 
interesting potential - such as the direct popular participation in selecting members of 
parliament or the existence of interesting organs such as the Commission for Article 90, 
there are significant limitations imposed on the power of these fundamental republican 
institutions.  Direct checks and invigilation by the Council of the Guardians, not only on 
all processes of law-making but also on the very formation of the Majles, seem to have 
turned this institution into a simple tool in the hands of the dominating ideology to 
promote and legalize its doctrinal convictions.  This would in turn leave very little power 
and space for the promotion and preservation of the principles of individual liberty and 
sovereignty.  Therefore the legislative system as the cornerstone for any republican 
ideology based on buoni leggi (good laws), seems to be facing significant limitations 
and shortcomings in Iran and a persistent influence of powerful unelected institutions 
whose overriding power would leave the Majles with little authority to fight the 
imperium of the state in the lives of the people.   
 
     Furthermore, one of the basic fundamentals of the republican doctrine was to enable 
the political system to formulate reasonable and measured legislation by soliciting 
opinions from all interested parties and not just a specific dominant ideology and its 
                                                 
634
 See for instance http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/parliament  
635
 See for instance the news of this at: http://khabaronline.ir/detail/259196/ 
232 
 
proponents
636
.  To be living in a republican state, as argued in Chapter 1, would entail 
that “the body politic is never moved to act except by the will of the citizen body as a 
whole” regardless of their individual belongings and any other idiosyncratic 
considerations
637
.  This is a basic legislative principle which seems to have been 
systematically disregarded within the entire apparatus of the Iranian Legislative 
machinery that seems to have been geared towards the promotions and protection of one 
particular interpretation of the principles of sovereignty.   
 
b. The Judiciary Power 
The next state power in the order of nomination by the above cited Article 57 of the 
Constitution is the judiciary power.  As I mentioned previously the judiciary system and 
its socio-political relevance has always played a fundamental role throughout the history 
of the republican thought.  Indeed without an efficient system of administration of 
justice, the entire edifice of the republican ideology would prove baseless in the absence 
of a centre for recourse against the dominium of individuals who wish to dominate and 
impose their will on others, and the imperium of the state itself with its potentials for 
arbitrary interference.  This could indeed be regarded as the materialization of the 
previously mentioned republican objective to create an “empire of law and not of 
men”638.   
 
Article 157 of the Iranian Constitution states that the Supreme Leader: 
 
shall appoint a just mojtahed well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence 
and administrative abilities as the head of the judiciary power for a period of five years 
who shall be the highest judicial authority
639
       
 
In other words, the highest seat of authority within the judiciary system of the Islamic 
Republic is reserved for a religious figure with certain doctrinal qualifications who is 
directly appointed by the Office of the Leader.  The head of the judiciary system is then 
responsible for the appointment of the head of the Supreme Court, the Chief Public 
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Prosecutor and the creation of the entire judiciary machinery of the Islamic Republic 
according to Articles 156, 158 and 162 of the constitution.   
 
     Based on my republican framework of analysis, this would immediately ring 
numerous alarm bells both concerning the inclusiveness and accessibility of such a 
position to all, and also most importantly, the independence and impartiality of a system 
created by such a figure with various potential group and ideological vested interests.  
As it was shown above the head of the judiciary system, himself nominated by the 
Supreme Leader, has the authority to nominate half of the members of the all-powerful 
Guardian Council; the other half is directly nominated by the Leader himself.  Hence it 
becomes evident that, as with the Legislative Power, there seems to have been 
meticulous efforts in designing this fundamental power of the state in such a way to be 
in complete compliance with one specific dominant ideology pertaining to one specific 
seat of authority, namely the Office of the Leader.  
 
     Again some examples from other republican systems would be useful to illustrate the 
existential conceptual differences.  In France the Autorité Judiciaire is meant to be a 
completely independent power which interestingly has no jurisdiction over the executive 
and the legislative powers, which are said to take their legitimacy from direct popular 
mandates.  Thus in such a system, any seat of power whose authority emanates from the 
direct popular vote is accorded a higher level of political legitimacy
640
.  It appears that 
significant efforts have been made to make these institutions open and inclusive to all 
member of society at all levels.  Such high administrative councils as the French Conseil 
Supérieur de la Magistrature or the Italian equivalent Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura are manned and headed by members who are directly or indirectly chosen 
by the people or who originally entered the organization on the basis of their legal 
knowledge and reasoning skills which is tested through publically administered open 
national selection and placement contests.  The counterpart of these Councils in the 
Islamic Republic, šowray-e Aliye Qazāʻei (the Supreme Judicial Council) is comprised 
of the chief jurist of the Supreme Court, the chief public prosecutor - both of whom must 
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be Shiʿa mojtaheds, and three other clergy chosen by religious jurists641.  It is evident 
that unlike the Iranian High Judiciary Council, the Italian and French systems allow for 
all members of society with the adequate knowledge and qualifications to participate 
regardless of their gender, religion, and personal or individual beliefs and belongings
642
.   
 
     Another aspect worthy of mentioning is that since the Islamic Revolution, women’s 
presence in the quality of primary judges has been banned in the judiciary system of 
Iran.  Indeed the law on Qualifications for Appointment of Judges enacted on 4
th
 May 
1982 states that judges should be chosen amongst the male applicants who have "faith, 
justice and practical commitment to the Islamic principles and loyalty to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran" and who have reached the level of ejtehād 643.  If the number of 
mojtaheds is not sufficient, judges can be chosen from amongst the graduates of law 
schools, faculties of theology or the religious seminaries who have not yet reached the 
level of ejtehād644.  By any standards, let alone the current republican framework of 
study, this would represent a considerable source of domination by a system whose legal 
institutions are meant to be the primary port of call for all citizens against the private 
dominium and public imperium.  
 
     Indeed the entire Iranian judiciary system under the Islamic Republic appears to be 
more centralised under one source of authority and less independent than even the one 
under the previous monarchic regime.  For instance during the totalitarian rule of Reza 
Shah (1878-1944 ) the judiciary system went as far as condemning the Shah for having 
taken land illegitimately, something which was remarkable considering the time and 
setting of those pronouncements.  The authority of this legal power seems to have 
continued unabated both since the coup d’état of 1320 and under Mohammad 
Mosaddeq’s (1882-1967) government645.   
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     In a similar vein to the legislative power, here again parallel considerations could be 
made regarding the actual independence and provisions for the separation of powers in 
the Islamic Republic.  Most Surprisingly, Article 160 stipulates that the minister of 
justice will be elected from among the individuals proposed to the President to the head 
of the judiciary branch.  This would generate yet another source of republican concern 
with regards to the independence of state authorities.  For the sake of 
comprehensiveness, I could analyse the issue of independence from both an institutional 
and functional point of view.  All the above evidence demonstrates that the institutional 
independence of this system does not appear to have been guaranteed with the head of 
the institution being appointed by the Supreme Leader. To this one I have to add that the 
power to grant amnesty or to pardon criminals have also been left to the discretion of the 
Office of the Leader. 
 
     Other reflections on the day-to-day operational aspects of the judiciary system 
demonstrate that one could note numerous top-down interventions to implement and 
promote a specific judiciary doctrine within the entire system.  These could all be 
regarded as blatant violations of the functional independence of this authority.  For 
instance the Leader’s explicit stance regarding the newspapers or the need to punish 
those participating in the 2009 electoral unrest in Iran
646
, are just a few of the explicit or 
implicit practical instructions passed down to this system by the Office of the Leader 
that would violate even the most basic principles of the independence of the system of 
administration of justice in Iran.   
 
     All this would lead to the basic conclusion that serious concerns could be raised 
regarding the independence and the openness of the Islamic Republic’s judiciary system 
to administer justice and uphold individual principles of liberty regardless of their 
personal diversities.  Despite this there still seems to be some interesting republican 
provisions in place within the Islamic Republic’s judiciary structure that allows for a 
certain level of the administration of justice.  These could potentially provide an 
interesting level of protection against the violations of individual liberties - particularly 
by the executive power, the most important of which are the Court of Administrative 
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Justice and the General Inspection office which deserve further consideration that I will 
now provide. 
 
i. Administrative Justice Court 
Article 173 of the Iranian Constitution contains instructions for the Legislative Power to 
create an institution called Divān-e Edālat-e Edāri (Administrative Justice Court) “in 
order to investigate the complaints, grievances, and objections of the people with respect 
to the government officials, organs, and statutes”647.  This institution is again strongly 
inspired by the French Conseil d’état and the administrative tribunals, hence 
unsurprisingly the original name of the relevant legal disposition before the Islamic 
Revolution was the State Council Law
648
.   
 
     Throughout the western history of political philosophy, the idea of an independent 
institution with the power to oversee all operations of government and act as the 
judiciary organ in cases where the rights of the people have been trampled upon by the 
state administration itself, has been one of the main identifying features of the 
Republican pattern of state building
649
.  In contrast for the sake of comparison I could 
cite the Anglo-Saxon model in which legal experts such as Albert Dicey (1835-1922) 
strictly rejected the idea of a specialized administrative tribunal.  This was claimed to be 
on the grounds that having a specific court for treating the cases related to the operation 
of the administrations would violate the principles of the separation of powers due to 
interferences of the judiciary power into the executive affairs, and also undermine the 
basic elements of equality before the laws
650
. Hence in such a system all judiciary cases 
were proposed to be processed in one type of judiciary court of justice which treated all 
cases regardless of the nature of the plaintiff and the defendant
651
.  Nevertheless this 
principle has now been widely adopted in the form of a special court dedicated to the 
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administrative offences which in most cases are separate from the judiciary power of the 
state
652
.  
     In the Islamic Republican system, as seen in the above cited article of the 
constitution, the organization is part of the Judiciary system with ample power to 
investigate complaints brought forward by the people primarily against the Executive 
Power.  It is evident that the exact definition of the “claimants” and the “defendants” 
subject to these constitutional provisions is of prime importance towards the correct 
functioning and indeed the effectiveness of this important institution.  With regards to 
the claimant, it is interesting to note that there has not been a clear interpretation of the 
term “the people” as three decades of Divān’s history has shown.  The debate still seems 
to be wide open between those who consider the “plaintiff” of these provisions to be the 
legal personalities (natural and judicial persons), or alternatively the state organizations 
and institutions themselves as well.  In fact one could find some interesting examples in 
this regard where the ambiguity seems to have induced the Administrative Justice Court 
itself to handle cases in which the “claimants” have actually been other administrative 
entities rather than “the people”653.  In any case the rights of the people in the sense of 
persona iuris to initiate a lawsuit through this institution are guaranteed in the above 
mentioned constitutional article.  
 
     The second aspect of any lawsuit is the clear definition of the defendant and indeed 
the potential violation of laws by them.  As one could note in Article 173, this would 
denote “government officials, organs, and statutes”.  Article 10 of the law regulating the 
Court of the Administrative Justice, states that all government entities such as the 
ministries, organizations, institutions, local councils, national welfare system and all 
revolutionary organizations and their related institutions would be under the purview of 
this court.  Nevertheless, it immediately underlines in note 2 that all courts and other 
judiciary sources, the armed forces, military courts and judges would not be subjected to 
the jurisdiction of the Divān.  And finally in Article 12 all the decisions and judgements 
of the judiciary power, the Council of the Guardians, the Expediency Council, the 
Assembly of the Experts and the Supreme National Security Council are explicitly 
excluded. 
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     Hence it becomes evident that the main subject of the prerogatives of the Court of the 
Administrative Justice is the executive power, and it has little to no power over the other 
two powers of the state, let alone the Office of the Leader which is not even mentioned 
throughout the entire legal charter of this court.  Indeed in an explicit ruling by the 
Council of the Guardians following a query by the head of the judiciary system in 
November 2004, the council in the quality of the sole interpreter of the Iranian 
Constitution ruled that the term “government” used in Article 170 denotes exclusively 
the executive power
654
.  Thus once again a potentially powerful republican institution for 
the protection of individual rights against the imperium of the state seems to have been 
designed in such a way to exclude the highest repositories of state power, namely the 
Office of the Leader and all organizations and institutions that fall directly under his 
control.  Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of this remains in the exclusion of other 
state powers from this supervision, particularly the judiciary system which in practical 
terms leaves citizens with no alternative course of appeal against the potential 
administrative domination of this powerful institution, other than certain subordinate 
organs of this institution itself.   
 
     Furthermore one could underline an operational limit of the Divān whose 
headquarters are based in the capital and seems to have been significantly overwhelmed 
by the sheer volume of complaints brought against various functions of the executive 
power.  Most curiously during this study it was observed that the government of 
President Ahmadinejād seems to have consistently taken advantage of this momentous 
limitation and significant backlog of work at the Court of the Administrative Justice, by 
passing quick government decrees to make significant financial gains through 
inappropriate levies, taxation and financial penalties
655
.   In any case in a total absence of 
any impartial transparent system of monitoring and reporting, one would never be able 
to unravel the true scale of efficiency or also abuse of the loopholes and bureaucratic 
overheads of such a system. 
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ii. General Inspection Office 
Article 174 instructs the creation of a specific office to supervise “the proper conducting 
of affairs and the correct implementation of laws by the administrative organs of the 
government”.  Indeed this could be a very interesting organ of monitoring and control 
over all government institutions in particular in relation to the correct application of the 
laws of the State and the use of the public resources.  The law seems to have given 
ample power to this office to investigate and inspect every aspect of the State’s use of 
public power.  Article 2 of the constituting law of the General Inspection Office details 
the jurisdiction of this office which is extended to any organization or institution which 
is a beneficiary of state budget together with all revolutionary organizations and military 
and judiciary sectors.  It is also underlined that this inspection could be either in the form 
of a continuous supervision or triggered at any moment by the Supreme Leader, the head 
of the judiciary power, the President, the Commission for Article 90 of the Parliament, 
the chairman of the concerned administrative organization or in any other cases where 
the chairman of the General Inspection Office deems appropriate
656
.  The internal 
regulatory charter nominates the Supreme Leader as the authority whose inspection 
orders would have the highest priority of execution
657
. 
 
     While the general objectives of this Office appear to be extremely important and 
fundamental towards the correct functioning of all state machinery, the very fact that this 
organization belongs to the Legislative Power could by itself create significant issues 
arising from the interference of state powers.  Furthermore the head of the General 
Inspection Office is directly appointed by the head of the judiciary system, himself 
directly nominated by the Office of the Leader.  This again could cause some concern 
regarding the impartiality and neutrality of the procedures and judgments which is yet to 
be fully studied.   
 
     And finally as with most supervision and public accountability organizations within 
the Islamic Republic, I noticed that the last clause of Article 2 of the law regulating the 
jurisdictions of this Office, explicitly exempts all organizations directly supervised by 
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the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, the armed forces and even the same 
judiciary power from being subject to any legal prosecutions arising from potential 
wrongdoings as detailed in this law
658
.  Once again the function of a crucial republican 
organization that could play a vital role in keeping other state institutions in check seems 
to have been severely undermined not only due to special privileges accorded to specific 
political repositories of public power but also due to a blatant lack of clarity of its scope 
of jurisdiction and even the definition of its very basic pillars of conceptual 
significance
659
.   
 
iii. Other Judiciary Considerations 
In this final section dedicated to the institutions belonging to the judiciary power, I 
would like to highlight an important observation made during my analysis of various 
aspects of the legal administration system in Iran.  It is evident that one important 
section of any country’s judiciary system, namely the law attorneys, plays an important 
role in materializing the rule of law in that system and indeed makes the system of 
justice work
660
.  Undeniably in a modern day society based on the division of labour and 
ever more specialization of tasks, lawyers play a fundamental role in communicating the 
legislation through advice to private clients so that they can act within the limits of the 
law and constitutional boundaries.  Obviously the informed clients would also be 
enabled to recognize their civil and legal rights in order to reclaim them when there is a 
danger that these are violated or ignored not only by other individuals but also by the 
state.  
 
     Nevertheless throughout the history of the Islamic Republic’s judiciary system, 
numerous instances have been identified in which the independence, the instrumental 
utility and even the intellectual capabilities of this specific judiciary guild have been 
systematically undermined by various official elements of the Judiciary Power.  For 
instance, whilst the previous law regulating the conditions of the attorneys participating 
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in the Administrative Justice Courts prescribed that the barristers need to be qualified 
lawyers from amongst the official attorneys registered with the Iranian Bar Association, 
the later updates to this law included amendments removing the need for having 
formally trained legal attorneys as a simple authorised representative could represent the 
case in the court to be processed
661
.  This trend seems to have been pursued in numerous 
other procedural laws and legal guidelines
662
.  It went even as far as officially banning 
the presence of attorneys “during the evidence collection” processes of criminal court 
cases, if a judge decided that this would entail potential for corruption or pose a threat to 
the principles of national security
663
.  Even people with little legal knowledge could 
readily appreciate the hidden pitfalls in these provisions as the stage of evidence 
collection and building the case would obviously have significant bearings on the 
potential final legal rulings.  Other attempts include the provisions to subvert the 
independence of the Iranian Bar Association which on numerous occasions seem to have 
been the active objective of the judiciary system with predictable results on the 
independence and the autonomy of this important source of legal assistance and public 
awareness in the society
664
. Undoubtedly this could lead to an important potential for 
depriving the people of their rights to employ qualified legal experts that could inform 
them of their basic rights and the ways to guard against possible individual and state 
dominatory laws and procedures.  
 
     My personal suspicion is that this unfavourable judicial environment and restrictions 
against the professional practices of the legal representation and advice could well stem 
from the lack of religious endorsement for any notions of legal delegation which might 
turn this practice into a subversive or even anti-religious professional exercise in a 
theological framework.  Indeed the Islamic Shariʻa appears to allow only a limited 
number of admissible elements in a religious court of justice.  Other than the presence of 
the defendant and the plaintiff, these restrictive religious provisions seem to foresee only 
the possibility of the participation of potential witnesses with eventual recourse to the 
                                                 
661
 See Article 17 of the Administrative Justice Court at http://www.divan-edalat.ir/show.php?page=law 
662
 The judiciary system reform act Articles 333 and 334 were also good examples of fact that were 
dropped by the Court of Cassation removing the need for the presence of academically trained  and 
official lawyers in all criminal justice cases.   
663
 See Article 128 of the criminal procedural law of the Islamic Republic at 
http://edalatjooya.com/spip.php?article5 
664
 See an interesting article in this regard by Farid Nickpay in the Tehran Bar Association magazine dated 
4
th
 July 2009. 
242 
 
individual oath of the parties involved.  Hence it might not be wrong to claim that the 
Attorney At Law’s profession and their legal representation functions does not appear to 
have any resonance within the Islamic guidelines for the administration of justice which 
might in turn explain all the professional restrictions imposed on this fundamental legal 
profession.  
 
     To all this I need to add another important reflection that I perceived in analysing 
various legal and juridical texts and resources.  There seem to be a fundamental 
conceptual ambiguity throughout the entire juridical system of Iran in every aspect of 
legal administration to the degree that there does not seem to be even a clear definition 
of such terms as law, regulations, decrees, circulars and so on.  I found confusing use of 
these fundamental terms throughout the legal sources of the Islamic Republic with 
contradictory terms being used interchangeably in various texts and by different 
authorities
665
.  This could be yet again another source of uncertainty and maybe even 
domination as the principles of the sovereignty of law implicates that these need to be 
laid down in clear terms with predictable connotations and results applicable to all 
indistinctively, unambiguously and in equal terms
666
. 
 
c. The Executive Power 
The main emblematic manifestation of the republican institutions could probably be 
considered to be the executive power.  Continuing with the institutional analysis of the 
structure of power in the Islamic Republic, in this section my objective would be to 
critically analyse the republican credentials of its executive power, scrutinizing its 
institutional standing with respect to the protection of the basic republican principles of 
liberty. 
 
     Interestingly, on the first layer of analysis, the Islamic Republic’s Executive Power 
seems to possess all the necessary criteria to qualify for a typical republican presidential 
system.  All seats of power within this institution appear to be elected offices with 
limited mandates subject to various layers of checks and balances on their exercise of 
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the institutional power.  The president of the Islamic Republic is selected by universal 
adult suffrage with a regular four-year frequency whose mandate could not be extended 
for more than two consecutive terms
667
.  This institution has also been placed under 
strict supervision of other state powers in particular the parliament which at times has 
even rejected or impeached the nominated cabinet ministers
668
.  Most cabinet decisions, 
regulations and pronouncements are regularly made public and accessible throughout 
numerous state owned media, although a great level of inadequacy is felt in that sense, 
which I will discuss in the forthcoming chapter.  For now let’s focus on the 
constitutional role of this seat of authority which as the Iranian Constitution affirms, is 
the second highest official in the country (Article 113).  Moreover Article 115 of the 
Islamic Republic Constitution reads as below: 
 
The President must be elected from among religious and political men possessing the 
following qualifications: Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative capacity and 
resourcefulness; a good past-record; trustworthiness and piety; convinced belief in the 
fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the 
country 
 
This is a very eloquent article which clearly sets apart the criteria for the presidential 
candidates whose credentials need to be approved by the Council of the Guardians 
(Article 118).  Thus from the outset one notices that this seat of power is actually 
reserved for male applicants belonging to one specific current of thought with firm belief 
in the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic only.  The word rejāl (men) 
clearly mentioned in this article has been at the centre of numerous controversies and 
diverging interpretations with some scholars reading it as “statesmen” including both 
genders
669
.  This has curiously resulted in the presence of defiant female applicants duly 
showing up at the registration bureaus for presidential candidates throughout the 
years
670
.  Nevertheless three decades of the electoral history of Iran demonstrates that 
the Guardian Council in the quality of the sole interpreter of the Iranian Constitution and 
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the watchdog authority of the electoral procedures has systematically rejected the 
candidacy of women on the grounds of gender
671
.  
  
    It goes without saying that the criteria of being a pious believer in the “official 
religion of the country” would automatically exclude a section of society which might 
not be Muslim or pious for that matter with a “firm belief in the principles of the Islamic 
Republic”.  Most importantly the verification of such qualifications is entrusted to the 
Council of the Guardians which as I argued above is far from being an impartial 
transparent and open institution.  Thus all potential candidates are initially vetted by the 
unelected institutions of the Council of the Guardians which decides who can run for all 
elected offices.  As I demonstrated above this council is not only directly or indirectly 
nominated by the persona of the Supreme Leader but also the Leader appears to exercise 
direct influence and at times explicit instructions on this vetting and filtering process
672
.   
 
     This crucial arrangement has resulted in the expected outcome that the majority of 
Iranian Presidents during three decades of the Islamic Republic have been from the 
ranks of the clergy with only three laymen within the same dominant religious circle.  
Interestingly I have noticed that the duration of the presidency of the three laymen 
presidents has been significantly shorter than the clergymen, 114 months as opposed to 
336 months respectively
673
.  Thus these numbers clearly demonstrate that the conditions 
imposed on such a fundamental republican institution has made the occupancy of this 
office more adapted to a specific class of society - namely a subset of the Shiʻa clerics; 
see figure 5.2.   
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Figure 5.2:  Months of presidency for clerics and laymen 
 
One important aspect of the executive power that needs to be considered in Iran is that 
due to various constitutional arrangements the actual power of this office has been 
significantly reduced and subjected to other seats of authority within the Islamic 
Republic’s structure of power.  In the next section I will detail the prerogatives of the 
Office of the Leader and its systematic intrusions into the executive branch with which it 
has a long history of conflict of interests.  Indeed as I mentioned in the previous Chapter 
and could be seen from the affirmation of the first Iranian president Banisadr in our 
interview, this conflict has been endemic in the Islamic Republic throughout its three 
decades of existence.  Banisadr highlighted the fact that Khomeini had institutional 
conflicts with him and Khamenei after him.  He even cited the interesting confessions by 
Khamenei who claimed that he used to go to the rooftop to “cry in silence” due to his 
institutional conflicts with Khomeini
674
! Once Khamenei was in the vest of the Supreme 
Leader the same pattern was repeated between him and Rafsanjani and later Khatami 
and even the hardliner Ahmadinejād, who was initially endorsed and sustained by the 
Leader himself
675
.   At various junctures of the Islamic republic’s history one could 
identify the signs of this institutional divergence which at times seems to have been 
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turned into open conflict with significant reflections on the public domains.  One such 
example was when Ahmadinejād, following the example of Khatami before him, set up 
the Hayʻat-e Nezārat bar Ejrāy-e Qānun-e Asāsi (Council to Safeguard the Provisions of 
the Constitution) which he himself has originally abolished when elected to the office.  
This was an attempt to counter-balance the power of the Legislative System to oversee 
all laws passed by the government which was unsurprisingly duly declared illegal by the 
Guardian Council in February 2012
676
.   
 
     These all lead one to an important conclusion to which I have hinted at on numerous 
occasions; which is that the underlying conflict here is an existential incompatibility 
between two incongruent institutions. On one hand there is a republican repository of 
power which has been elected, to some degree by the people and on the other there is the 
unelected seat of religious authority rooted in the principles of the dominant political 
theology. This in turn is a manifestation of a much deeper doctrinal incompatibility of 
the principles of popular sovereignty with the legitimacies rooted in the eschatological 
authorities.  As demonstrated so far, various attempts seem to have been made within the 
Islamic Republic to resolve this institutional conflict.  However, all these seem to have 
followed a systematic pattern of subordinating all elected office of the system to the 
hegemonic domination of the Office of the Supreme Leader and all its dependent 
organizations.  Even with these persistent efforts to solve the institutional conflicts in all 
sectors of the political authority, one could still raise serious doubts over the success of 
such efforts and the actual viability of a system feeding upon such fundamental 
structural inconsistencies.    
   
d. The Office of the Leader 
It should come to no surprise to conclude at this stage that all roads in Iranian politics 
seem to lead to the Office of the Supreme Leader.  As I demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, the Iranian Constitution has accorded ample privileges and prerogatives to this 
seat of power and actually subordinated all other powers of the state to this authority.  
Indeed whilst the constitution provides for numerous elected and unelected institutions 
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within the Islamic Republic such as: the parliament, the presidency, the Council of the 
Guardians, the Expediency Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Supreme National 
Security Council - the Supreme Leader directly or indirectly dominates all of them.  He 
is indeed vested with the authority to appoint or oversee the appointment of individuals 
to each of these offices and institutions.   
 
     I have already cited Khomeini’s efforts for institutionalizing his authority by creating 
parallel organizations following the Islamic Revolution, such as creating his own loyal 
Pāsdāran (revolutionary guards), his own Dādgāh-e Enqelāb (revolutionary tribunals) 
and even his own Komite Enqelāb and Basij (police and militia forces).  This extensive 
effort also included the creation of a comprehensive network of mosques and seminaries 
and most importantly numerous revolutionary organizations and bonyāds which were 
accountable only to him personally
677
.  Surprisingly this trend seems to have been 
exacerbated after Khomeini’s death with the new amendments to the Iranian 
Constitution, even though the second Leader of the Islamic Republic did not seem to 
possess a fraction of the charisma or even the religious credentials of the first one
678
.   
 
     The constitutional reforms of 1988 ensured a stricter centralisation of authority 
within the judiciary and the executive powers bringing such important institutions as the 
state media under the Leader’s direct control.  According to the provisions of the 
Fundamental Law, The Supreme Leader is constitutionally empowered to set forth the 
general policies of the state, supervise the execution of these policies, command the 
state’s armed forces, declare war and peace, determine the suitability of the president, 
and appoint and dismiss key officials including the supreme judicial authority, the 
various military commanders, members of various governmental bodies, and the head of 
the state media
679
.  Indeed the prerogatives of this office, some of which stated in Article 
110 of the Iranian Constitution appear to be so vast that if one decides to scrutinize them 
in details, they would open up an unmanageably vast field of inquiry by themselves.  It 
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is not overstating it to say that this institution is vested with unlimited political and 
social power, as some authors have rightly noted
680
.  
 
     I also underlined the self-limiting move by the Iranian Parliament dominated by the 
conservatives to exempt all aspects of the Office of the Leader from its complete 
political and financial supervision.  The judiciary power, as I discussed above, itself 
manned and directed by the Supreme Leader, has also conditioned any enquiry into the 
affairs of the Leadership Office to the Leader’s explicit permission.  Notwithstanding, it 
would be interesting to further consider an outline of the actual track record of this 
repository of power throughout the history of the Islamic Republic.   
 
     A closer inspection of over three decades of this institution’s track record readily 
reveals that it has been far from playing only the nonpartisan role of a neutral seat of 
moral guidance to the system.  Indeed the very existence of the concept of Velāyat-e 
Faqih which I discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and 4, with its limitless purviews, entails 
a comprehensive involvement of such an authority in every single aspect of socio-
political life of the country. Interesting observations could be made on the numerous 
socio-political and even religious implications of the introductions of the principle 
absolute rule of the jurisprudent (Velāyat-e Motlaq Faqih).  The introduction of this 
concepts not only appears to an ideological revolution by itself in the Shiʻa politics of 
state, but also most interestingly appear to have had remarkable implications towards the 
inclusion of more raison d’état as compare to the pure ideological principle of the 
political theology
681
. Nevertheless the experience has unequivocally shown that these 
pervasive prerogatives have not only failed to result in any tangible reformative trends in 
the religious ideological foundations of the systems, but also unsurprisingly have 
enhanced the imperium of this seat of power. It is unsurprising to notice that this 
unchecked institution has persistently exercised its full potential on the selection and 
formation of all elected and unelected offices and directions of the policies of the 
country and even actively interfered with the day-to-day functioning of every one of 
these subordinates.  As mentioned before Article 4 of the Iranian Constitution declares 
that all laws of the land and all articles of the Constitution itself should be compliant 
                                                 
680
 Ibid 
681
 Interesting elaborations of such points could be found in Axworthy, M. ibid 
249 
 
with the Islamic Shariʻa and the Council of the Guardians is the one to judge them in this 
matter. Thus once the members of the parliament are elected or the president of the 
Islamic Republic chosen, all their laws and regulations and policies would still be 
actively monitored by the Office of the Leader through its direct nominees at the 
Council of the Guardians.  It is even sometimes claimed that during the reform era of the 
late 1990s a staggering 90% of the laws proposed were nullified for “being in violation 
of the Islamic principle of state”682.  The same holds true for the presidency.  I 
previously cited the institutional incompatibility which inevitably entailed direct 
confrontation between these institutions, but this seems to have been settled by a 
significant domination of the Office of the Supreme Leader.  Hence it should come as no 
surprise to observe that the Leader has on various occasions directly meddled with the 
affairs of other powers, particularly the executive branch, where for instance on 
numerous occasions the Leader’s preferred ministers have been forcefully imposed on 
the president of the Republic
683
.  Other more streamlined fields such as delineation of 
foreign policy, particularly in such areas as the negotiations with world powers 
regarding the controversial nuclear issue, and many areas of domestic socio-political 
affairs, such as the appointment of the chairman of the national TV etc, are 
constitutionally included in the exclusive area of supervision of the Supreme Leader.  
Hence it is unsurprising to notice that the entire policies in those fields and the modality 
of the executions are defined in details by him.  
 
     Thus it becomes evident that within the power structure of the Islamic Republic, the 
Office of the Leader enjoys a momentous accumulation of authority combined with an 
insignificant level of public accountability.  There is no need to reiterate that the 
members of the Assembly of Experts in charge of supervising the Leader’s performance 
and abilities are vetted by the Council of the Guardians.  Furthermore there seems to be 
extensive evidence that this vast repository of unchecked authority has actually been 
wielded and employed to the full to impose and maintain the imperium of a specific 
class of society who seem to be enjoying a disproportionate access to all state’s socio-
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political and economic resources.  In particular the extreme concentration of wealth and 
financial resources have been one controversial aspects of this comprehensive potestate 
domini whose claims over ethical guidance and leading a pious life of spiritual devotion 
and moral rectitude sound ironical once all aspects of the economical and financial 
practices of this institution are considered.  
 
i. Revolutionary Organizations and Bonyāds   
Inevitably another important section of the Iranian institutions is composed of various 
non-governmental public institutions and organizations.  As I briefly mentioned before 
the majority of these organizations were created by Khomeini himself immediately after 
the Islamic Revolution in order to promote parallel institutions aimed at managing the 
conspicuous economic funds left from the previous regime and also to create dependable 
forces to promote certain ideological views and ensure their total dominance in the early 
1980s
684
.  These organizations have shown an unabated growth in a favourable 
environment of the Islamic Republic with a consistent trend of supportive legislations 
and patronage of the highest seats of authority
685
.  It is of prime importance to study 
such a consistent sector and other related socio-cultural frameworks to analyse the 
conceptual principles of the Islamic Republic’s interpretation of the state’s role and its 
prescriptions regarding the means and mode of its access to the country’s resources.  
 
     This study proves challenging from the very outset as strikingly there seems to be 
numerous concurrent definitions for the very concept of “non-governmental 
organizations” within the Islamic Republic686.  It is obvious that the term “government” 
clearly implies the entire state apparatus of the Islamic Republic and not just the 
executive power.  However, even in the light of this interpretation this definition would 
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not be adequate as most of these organizations fall under the prerogatives of the Office 
of the Leader which as I discussed above does indeed constitute an overriding pillar of 
the state.  This very observation seems to have been at the heart of various legislative 
conflicts within the Islamic Republic; with some sources insisting on subjecting these 
organization to the supervision of various monitoring institutes of the state which were 
cited above, and some others insisting on their independence and accountability to their 
only constitutional supreme authority i.e. the Office of the Leader
687
.   
 
     Nonetheless, in practical terms these important public institutions have enjoyed 
absolute freedom in managing their resources which not only is composed of their 
exclusive access to certain sectors of the economy but also at times made up of a 
consistent amount of the public funding amounting to 50% or higher of their entire 
budgets.  Indeed a closer examination of the economic foundation of the Islamic 
Republic - with its slogans for social equality and the refutation of the basic principles of 
western capitalism and liberal economy, readily reveals that it appears to have 
spectacularly failed in this very subject
688
.  Like most government managed economies, 
the beneficiaries of such an economic arrangement would prevalently include certain 
classes from the political strata which have direct links to the centre of power and 
management of the resources, with an inevitable decline in the overall level of financial 
transparency
689
.  Indeed the Islamic Revolution seems to have failed one of its principal 
founding slogans centred on social justice and a Marxist style classless society at the 
heart of all founding father’s propaganda690.   In Iran this new bourgeois class commonly 
referred to as āqāzādehhā (sons of the masters) are unsurprising result of such a 
prevailing distributive injustice which has enabled certain social classes - particularly 
those related to the clergy or the Islamic Revolutionary organizations, to dominate 
various sectors of the national economy
691
.   
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     The endemic corruption and social injustice inherent to the system has reached a 
point that even the ruling system has decided to somehow curb the influence of these 
unchecked elements connected to the numerous islands of power within the economic 
structure of the Islamic Republic.  Various legislations which have been publically 
announced particularly following some astounding corruption cases that shook the 
Islamic Republic’s very foundations, could be regarded as instances of these efforts692.  
The so-called “law to promote administrative health and fight corruption” was a direct 
result of such legislative efforts to bring this widespread malaise under control or at the 
very least officially distance the state from it
693
.  Most interestingly this law was rejected 
by the Council of the Guardians for not being compliant with the rulings of the Shariʻa 
and was only approved by the Expediency Council three years later following the public 
unravelling of such blatant cases of corruption involving various authorities of the state 
itself
694
.  
 
     Therefore once again these observations underline the existence of a significant level 
of material domination within the economic sections of the Islamic Republic whose 
basic claims paradoxically include fundamental notions of social justice and distributive 
fairness.  A significant body of evidence, some of which I have cited throughout this 
Chapter, clearly demonstrates that these Revolutionary Organizations and Bonyāds - 
which are said to hold no less than 40% of the entire Iranian economy, have actually 
been the promoting engine for such disparity in the distribution of wealth, leading to 
such remarkable levels of material domination
695
.  All evidence analysed here concurs 
with the historical republican admonition against the accumulation of unchecked power, 
authority and wealth in certain repositories of the state which is thought to be the most 
inimical to the basic republican principles of freedom as non-domination.  In this case 
the economic domination of certain social strata and a subsequent imbalance in the 
opportunities to access the resources of the state would obviously undermine or even 
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cancel out the presence of the most basic principles of the republican ideology as set 
forward in Chapter 1. 
 
ii. The Expediency Council 
This Chapter could not end without the examination of an organization which I find to 
be the most intriguing institution in the entire layout of power of the Islamic Republic. 
Ayatollāh Hashemi Ranfsanjani (b.1934), currently head of the Majmaʻ Tašxis-e 
Maslahat  (Expediency Council) has provided interesting insights into the raison d’être 
of this institution by providing an illuminating introduction to a comprehensive work 
under the same title published in 2010.  Within the lines of his considerations on the 
underlying principles of this institution, he echoes what Khomeini regarded as the most 
important priority of the Islamic state; i.e. the preservation of the Islamic Republic
696
.  
As I will expound below this apparently innocuous affirmations prove to have the most 
groundbreaking ideological implications for the entire Islamic Republic’s political 
theology. 
 
     The Expediency Council has proven to be crucial towards resolving important issues 
and gridlocks arising from the Council of the Guardian’s rejection of the Parliament’s 
law decrees on the grounds of their incompatibility with the Islamic Law or the 
Constitution.  In a report published by the Expediency Council on the fifth anniversary 
of its establishment, it was announced that no less than 145 laws originally rejected by 
the Council of the Guardians have been reviewed by the Maslahat Council.  
Furthermore 46 cases of the general policies of the state have been studied; tens of other 
regulations and enquiries have also been reviewed including the cases in which the 
Leader directly sought the advice of the council on important state issues
697
.  The 
important Islamic Laws of Taʻzirāt (Islamic punishments) was amongst the main corpus 
of the legal provisions approved by the Expediency Council with significant 
implications on the authority and the power of the judges.  This would, for instance, 
require them to pass rulings based on the predefined legal norms rather than based on the 
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considerable amount of discretion and independence that they enjoyed throughout the 
entire history of the Islamic jurisprudence
698
. 
 
     I have already briefly presented the idea of maslahat (expediency, necessity) within 
certain currents of thought in the Shiʻa doctrine of state in Chapter 2.  What is 
remarkable to underline here is the emphasis that Khomeini places upon the 
maintenance and practical viability of the structure of the political authority. This 
coupled with significant authoritarian potential of the concept of Velāyate Motlaq Faqih 
seems to have been promoted in spite of the fundamental implications that these 
principles could have on the centrality of even the most basic principles of Islam
699
.  He 
even goes as far as stating that the preservation of the Islamic Government and the 
ensuing maslahat would have priority even over basic pillars of faith such as the prayer, 
fasting and haj (Mecca pilgrimage)
700
.  Reading through the details of his argumentation 
in this regard, it comes as no surprise to observe that he is still using rigorous religious 
debate and counter-examples to demonstrate that the necessities of a modern political 
could take precedence even over all fundamental principles of the Sacred Law
701
.  He 
even goes as far as claiming that the authority of the Valiye Faqih is the same as the 
Prophet and the Imams whose rulings would override the specific pronouncements of 
the Shariʻa.  Unsurprisingly he is quick to rectify that these rulings based on the 
principles of reason and rational deliberation would be “temporary provisions” of the 
Islamic state and do not constitute permanent principles
702
.  Although in another letter in 
December 1988 he again states that “the decisions of this Council are permanent as long 
as the maslahat persists”703.  Interestingly in this important letter he continues by giving 
“fatherly advice” to the member of the Council to give priority to the preservation of the 
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Islamic Government as "the theoretical (religious) discussion which belongs to the 
theological schools could never be resolved and will take us nowhere"
704
.   
 
     Rafsanjani on his introduction to the treatise on the principles of the Expediency 
Council further expounds on these inadequacies of the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in 
managing a modern day state with all its complicated and specialized intricacies.  The 
emphasis he places upon the priority of the principles of reason as compared to what he 
calls fiqh-e hokumati (Islamic governance laws) is truly striking.  It is not difficult to 
imagine that these pronouncements would indeed pose a fundamental challenge to even 
the most basic professed principles of the Shiʻa faith regarded as eternal and immutable.  
This could well explain, in my view, the fact that Khomeini preferred to pass on the 
instructions to amend the constitution to officially institutionalize this significant 
religious controversy towards the end of his life.  This might well have been his final 
attempt to discard the responsibility of admitting the failure of the most fundamental 
pillars of his political agenda based on the doctrine of the adequacy and 
comprehensiveness of the Divine Law to address all aspects of a human’s life at all 
times. 
 
     Therefore by closely analysing the correspondence that Khomeini undertook with all 
relevant organizations and the way he chose to put these into practice, together with a 
thorough consideration of the unequivocal outcomes of instituting such an organization, 
One could not avoid reaching the evident conclusion that Khomeini himself seems to 
have arrived at the outright understanding that the principles of the political theology he 
had been promoting would at best be inadequate to address the practical realities of a 
modern day polity
705
.  Furthermore if one considers some of the pronouncements of the 
Expediency Council - which at times have preferred the “un-Islamic” laws of the 
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parliament, such as the equality of blood money between the Muslims and non-Muslims, 
these would all make this controversial conclusion even more compelling
706
.   
 
     Thus I would like to end this comprehensive chapter on the Islamic Republic’s 
institutions with this note that clear connections could be drawn between the final 
conclusions of the late Ayatollāh Khomeini with other secular proponents of the 
republican ideology that I cited throughout the previous chapters.  Although through 
different argumentations and by means of separate narratives, they all seem to be hinting 
at the same existential incompatibility of a political doctrine underpinned by the alleged 
divine or metaphysical legitimacies with the practical and normative necessities of a 
modern day state resulting from the human rational political activity. All aspects and 
actual outcomes of these deliberations considered, the final conclusions might not 
actually be as different as it appears at the first sight! 
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III. Conclusion 
The important passage in Chapter 1 reflecting Machiavelli’s considerations on the nature 
of the republican institutions would be insightful to close this Chapter with: 
 
Machiavelli believed that in order to maintain liberty proper republican institutions were 
essential. Furthermore if these institutions were to support liberty, they necessarily had 
to be inclusive and open to the many different interests found within the public so that 
vibrant public debates could take place
707
 
 
In the light of these reflections, throughout this Chapter, I have attempted to provide a 
critical analysis of the Islamic Republic’s institutions scrutinizing their republican role in 
safeguarding and promoting the basic republican principles of liberty as non-domination.  
My objective has been to provide a thorough overview of the most important 
repositories of power within this system whilst being at the same time mindful of not 
opening an unmanageably vast field of inquiry.  
 
     Detailed observations were made regarding the mains pillars of the public power in 
Iran with a critical analysis of the scope of their authority, their openness to public 
participation and most importantly the transparency and neutrality of the checks and 
balances in place in each case.  At various junctures significant shortcomings were 
highlighted in institutions whose basic republican role should include the protection of 
various principles of liberty and individual sovereignty.  It was argued that the majority 
of these institutions are formed in such a way as to provide exclusive access to specific 
strata of the Iranian society failing to perform as real republican open and inclusive 
institutions.  These considerations not only held true of the unelected sections of the 
Iranian political system but were also true of the elected ones through the existence of 
powerful gatekeeping institutes such as the all powerful Council of the Guardians. 
 
     Furthermore based on these detailed analysis, one could certainly claim that the level 
of the separation of powers within the structure of the Islamic Republic is certainly not 
adequate to qualify with the minimum requirements of a republican system. This is not 
only due to the fact that all three powers of the state are in one way or another subjected 
to the unaccountable, unelected and non-transparent Office of the Supreme Leader, but 
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also due to significant institutional and functional uncertainty within the boundaries and 
scope of their authorities. As a blatant example of such jurisdictional confusion, I could 
still cite the authorities with the power to annul the government’s decrees within the 
Islamic Republic.  Indeed there appears to be numerous seats of power capable of 
interfering with such a process and even invalidating these provisions altogether.  One 
such organization capable of annulling the government’s law and regulation is the 
previously discussed Court of the Administrative Justice.  However, this right is also 
reserved for the head of the parliament as all internal circulars and regulations need to be 
sent to him for approval (Article 138).  Furthermore even the ordinary judges could 
refrain from obeying such regulations if, based on their personal judgments, were found 
against the principles of the Constitution or the Islamic Sharʻia (Article 170).  And 
finally the Leader himself can directly invalidate any state laws or regulations through 
the powerful arbitrium of the ahkāme hokumati (state orders).     
 
     Moreover one fails to identify significant institutional guarantees for the participation 
of the minorities and weaker classes of society, something which would raise serious 
concerns for the potential of such a system to degenerate into a state sponsored tyranny 
of the majority.  The republican stance on this point was the firm conviction that “the 
republic should not be the rule of the numbers, it should be the rule of rights” 708.  These 
rights whose basic manifestations should be captured in an inviolable bill of rights in 
any republican system, seems to have been systematically undermined by all these 
momentous constitutional and institutional inadequacies.  
 
     The systematic failure of the institutions of the Islamic Republic highlighted here to 
provide the minimum republican guarantees for open inclusive repositories of power 
with adequate level of public participation and supervision has critically undermined the 
few true republican provisions in such a system.  All these observations would lead to 
the conclusion that, from an institutional point of view, this political arrangement by 
providing exclusive access to all main seats of power and resources to a certain stratum 
of the religious elites or the connected revolutionary organizations, has effectively been 
turned into an authoritarian hierocracy. 
                                                 
708
 The famous affirmation by the French politician George Gurvitch as cited by Roussillon, H. (2011) p.1 
259 
 
Chapter 6 - Republican Citizenry  
 
 
I. Introduction 
This final chapter of this study is dedicated to the concept that could be regarded as the 
most fundamental pillar of the republican project, that of creating and empowering the 
citizens. This indeed constitutes the main ideological nucleus of the civic republicanism 
reposed on the fundamental principles of the humanist philosophy. If one had to identify 
one single distinctive feature of the republican ideology which sets it apart from all other 
political doctrines of state, the notion of republican citizenry would probably be the 
main one to highlight.  It is easy to observe that throughout the entire history of 
republican thought the state’s active intervention aimed at forming “high spirited” 
members of society as opposed to the “dull minded” states of being, have been of prime 
importance to any strand of this  school of thought
709
.  As it was expostulated in Chapter 
1 this constitutes one of the core arguments put forward by the fathers of the republican 
ideology particularly Machiavelli, who defined the principles of the vita activa centred 
on systematic prescriptions to create the materia umana deemed indispensable to any 
republican project.  It could be argued that possibly one of the main reasons that 
Machiavelli initiated his political treatises with The Prince to move up then to a 
republican political agenda in his consequent works, has been this utmost concern for 
creating and forming the citizens first which form the building block of any notions of 
the republican vivere libero
710
.  
 
     Subsequent republican ideologues further developed these fundamental notions in 
particular as they all regarded the education and formation of the republican citizens to 
be the republic’s most imperative mission.  This could substantially be viewed as the 
essence of a certain form of eudaimonia (human flourishing) at the heart of all 
republican social construction efforts as the republican doctrine was conceived as a 
political and social project
711
.  The most intense and systematic of these efforts could be 
observed in the French republican school, in particular the so-called “radical 
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republicans”, where the citoyens (citizens) were defined as those aware of their civil and 
political rights and exercised them “actively” in the society712.  These set forward 
extensive educational projects following the common sense observation that the 
republican citizens do not come to being with a pre-existing awareness of their 
republican privileges due to various inherited social conditions.  The republican 
principles of citizenship based on building an “empire of reason” had to be inculcated to 
enable the sufficiently empowered citizen to cast off the chains of domination and 
servitude
713.  It is even argued that this extensive process of “regenerating the people” 
took the French Republic one hundred years and five consecutive constitutions to 
complete and was only successful as a result of extensive schooling and public education 
which managed to inculcate the republican values in the society and create the right 
republican citizens
714
.  These ideologues even went as far as claiming that the people are 
nothing but what the state, in this case the republican state, creates of them
715
.  
 
     This would obviously have significant implications on the various discourses 
regarding the “natural rights” to sovereignty versus the acquired rights of a citizen that is 
yet to be created.  An interesting observation to make here on philosophical grounds is 
that on a deeper level of analysis these egalitarian interpretations of the republican 
ideology do not seem to confer any natural rights to the citizens.  All these would 
intriguingly remain contractual rights rooted in the principles of equality before law 
without any concessions towards the concept of natural liberty
716
.   Importantly I need to 
highlight the fact that any notion of rights seems to be generated within the republican 
state which is both the source and the protector of an individual’s political liberties717.  
This is yet again a natural consequence of the civic humanist outright refutation of any 
transcendental and immutable truth and social values. This would in turn once more 
highlight the importance of the republican institutions and state sovereignty firmly 
grounded in the existence of actively engaged and participatory citizens.   
 
                                                 
712
 Berstein, S. & Rudelle, pp.27,32,197 
713
 See Ch.1 for more details 
714
 Berstein, S. & Rudelle, pp.11, 64 
715
 Ibid p.69 
716
 See for instance Grange, ibid  p.179 
717
 Ibid p.34 
261 
 
     Thus it is easy to imagine that the republican agenda contains multilayered projects 
aimed at, on the one hand generating the citizens, and on the other subsequently 
empowering these adequately informed members of society to actively register their 
opinion and interests within the republican institutional frameworks.  Hence the 
legitimacy and indeed the viability of the entire republican project seems to corroborate 
with this basic prerequisite of the contestatory citizenship.  The institution of the civic 
virtue within the society, underpinning all Machiavelli’s works, could be regarded as a 
direct result of such proactive and indeed interventionist republican agenda.  This would 
primarily be against the danger of “corruption” which was said to be constantly eminent 
in a society where the umori (self-interests) as Machiavelli calls them, takes precedence 
over the common good of the society
718
. This would highlight once more the role and 
the centrality of the republican education aimed at forming and informing these private 
interests to enable them to pursue their objectives without arbitrarily dominating others.  
This was indeed the core principle of guarding against dominium which enables the 
republican citizen to make successful life choices through a framework of civic virtue 
and the common medium of citizenship.    
 
     One final aspect highlighted in Chapter 1 in this regard was the importance of 
diversity and pluralism in the republican state.  Indeed many authors see this republican 
potential for harnessing and utilizing the significant potential for inevitable civic discord 
as the marked departure of the republican ideology from other competing social 
ideologies and indeed its point of strength
719
.  In my specific case study of Iran - 
particularly considering the existence of a significant amount of ethno-cultural 
diversities, this aspect of the republic, i.e. the pluralism of dissent, becomes a 
fundamental point to address as its success or failure could determine the fate of the 
entire republican project with various potential for domination.   
 
     Consequently in order to provide a practical framework for the current chapter I will 
treat the fundamental republican principle of vita activa by dividing it into two main 
sections.  As a point of departure, I will analyse the Iranian educational system, to 
evaluate its republican credentials for generating informed citizens by encouraging them 
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to be aware of their basic republican rights and duties.  The second pillar of active 
citizenship would inevitably consist of empowering these citizens and providing 
republican channels of expression and participation to play an active role in their own 
non-domination, what Machiavelli called vivere politico.  In this regard I will attempt to 
critically study the existing participatory channels of the state trying to evaluate their 
effectiveness with regard to the forums and tribunes essential to the entire republican 
political discourse. 
 
II. Republican Education 
All this conceptual observations lead to a thorough appreciation of the fundamental role 
that the state plays in inculcating the republican values of active socio-political 
participation and various means and modes that it should foresee to this end.  As I 
argued previously the republican state appears to be far from neutral in this respect with 
assertive interventions to educate the individuals to recognize their citizen rights and 
duties and be able to cast their ends in a non-dominating manner.  In light of this, the 
role of state public education becomes significant as this would naturally provide an 
accessible and inclusive channel to procure large scale opinion formation projects aimed 
at spreading and instilling republican values.  Thus from the outset I can recognize two 
important aspects of this argument, namely the accessibility and actual contents of these 
educational projects. 
 
     The Islamic Republic, as one might expect of any post-revolutionary ideological 
system, has shown an interesting track record with regards to fighting illiteracy across 
the country. The success has been so spectacular that due to this UNESCO regularly 
ranks Iran higher than many developing countries such as Brazil and Mexico, although 
with underlying issues regarding the gender disparity
720
.  It is said that the youth literacy 
in Iran stands at about 99% which makes it comparable to any developed countries of 
the western world, see figure 6.1
721
.   
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Figuer 6.1 
 
All this could potentially provide interesting grounds for the diffusion of a republican 
culture leading to a wider public appreciation of individual rights and civic duties.  In 
particular the important trends in the social mobility which one could expect following 
socio-political revolutions, was actively encouraged and underpinned by extensive 
projects of national literacy and education over the years following the Islamic 
Revolution
722
.   
 
     Nevertheless as I will expound below the actual content and objectives of this public 
administration of literacy have been far from strictly pursuing the republican desiderata 
of empowering the citizens to recognize and resist domination on any level.  In any case 
the real audience and indeed the support base of the res publica are inevitably composed 
of the middle and the upper middle classes with higher levels of education than basic 
literacy
723
.  The underlying reason for this does not seem to be purely due to the fact that 
the middle classes have a better availability of the financial resources to access the 
education, as compared to the lower classes of society for instance.  As stated above one 
of the main objectives of the republican state should be the provision of accessible 
public education for all in an equitable manner.  The real reason could be found in the 
simple observation that the middle classes might prove to be more prone to losing 
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everything due to their unstable intermediary position, if the republican project fails its 
mission
724
.  Hence the real formative battleground seems to be centred on both the 
content of these state sponsored education system and also the higher and more 
specialized level of the provision of public education.  
 
     The study of Iran’s higher educational system appears to be more complex and filled 
with defining historical and contemporary events.  The Islamic Revolution, in which the 
student movement played a significant role, unsurprisingly launched a structural 
overhaul in the entire educational system of Iran.  The 1979 revolution ended up being a 
radical departure from the previous secularizing process of the state towards the 
traditionalism of religion, unlike comparable trends in all known modern revolutions.  
This inevitably had extensive implications particularly for the public higher education
725
.  
Indeed the universities labelled as “the nest of spies” were shut down for three years 
post-Revolution and consequently underwent a systematic purge to Islamise the 
curriculum and the staff, a process that became known as the Cultural Revolution
726
.  
Various bodies and organizations were set up to implement the pervasive provisions of 
this cultural overhaul on all levels, the most prominent of which could be identified with 
the High Assembly of Cultural Revolution which is even empowered with the purview 
to legislate in certain cultural matters with obvious institutional implications. The 
normative prerogatives of the Assembly would enable this institution to ratify laws and 
decrees which at times prove to have overriding priority even over the laws passed by 
the parliament in certain matters.  
 
     This practice closely resembled the extensive ideological agendas of the post-
revolutionary communist and fascist experiences of the preceding centuries in which 
momentous state resources were mobilized to create and inculcate the defining values of 
the ideology underlying the social upheavals
727
.  In Iran this process was not only aimed 
at a systematic revision of the entire universities’ subjects and texts, but also to purge the 
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politically unfavourable teaching staff and banning the critical minded students from 
entering into higher education
728
.  This process seems to have been continued unabated 
throughout the political life of the Islamic Republic particularly after the 2009 contested 
presidential election which has resulted in hundreds of university professors being 
forced into early retirement and a controversial practice known as “starring the 
students”729.  This in practice meant marking the politically adverse active students with 
a ranking from one to three stars denoting their level of undesirability to the higher 
education system.  
 
     Thus the obvious conclusion one could draw from these observations is that from 
accessibility point of view to the public education - at least at the higher more 
specialized levels, one would fail to identify republican inclusive entitlement to 
education for every member of the society regardless of their political or religious 
beliefs.  Indeed the state has actually put in place a quota system (sahmiye) to favour its 
supporters and in particular those belonging to the ranks of Basij (the Islamic militia) to 
access higher education on a preferential basis, even when their qualifications prove to 
be inferior to that of ordinary candidates
730
.   Furthermore in recent years there have 
even been talks of imposing limits on the number of women entering the Iranian 
universities as they appear to overtake the male university graduate population
731
.  Thus 
the republican inclusive and indiscriminate access to the higher education does not seem 
to have any centrality in an ideologically driven educational system which seems to be 
failing on numerous accounts to comply with what one would expect from a republican 
system of public training aimed at enabling the citizens to recognize and enjoy even the 
basic conditional rights that the Iranian Constitution itself has guaranteed for the 
majority of the citizens
732
.  
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    Furthermore I encountered significant challenges when it came to the actual content 
of the national education curricula with a momentous imposition of dominant ideology 
running throughout the entire system.  The aforementioned Cultural Revolution process 
also included an active censorship of all books, films, radio, television, newspapers and 
even dress code to root out what was deemed as the manifestations of Western culture in 
Iranian Society
733
.  It has to be acknowledged that these could paradoxically be regarded 
as expected outcomes of the ideological delineation of the educational system with the 
prevailing religious underpinnings.  Nevertheless the republican validity and efficiency 
of these educational policies should still be analysed with regard to their success in 
educating the people to recognize their basic rights as citizens of a republic whose 
constitution endorses various elements of popular sovereignty and individual liberty
734
. 
 
     As mentioned in Chapter 3, basic principles of republican liberty are echoed in the 
international universal charters of human rights, portions of which have been 
incorporated into the Islamic Republic Constitution as a signatory of various 
international conventions and charters.  In 2010 an interesting research conducted by a 
group of researchers in Iran critically analysed a significant body of the school materials, 
particularly in the field of social sciences, in order to determine their efficiency and 
comprehensiveness in including basic public training on the principles of human rights 
as reflected in the Iranian Constitution
735
.  This exceptional research provided a very 
interesting insight into the effectiveness of the school curricula to include essential 
public education on the important constitutional rights and duties.  The outcome of this 
comprehensive survey is extremely revealing in unravelling the actual content of the 
curricula of the Iranian public school with regard to their sensitivity to including various 
republican principles as expressed in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. see figure 
6.2
736
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Figure 6.2 (number of times subjects treated)  
 
This very eloquent piece of academic evidence clearly underlines a significant 
deficiency within the Iranian public education system to propagate various principles of 
constitutional liberty which, as argued above, should be the fundamental role of a 
republican educational system aimed at promoting and instilling the basic public 
knowledge on freedom as non-domination.   
 
     Indeed it is not difficult to observe a systematic failure of the Islamic Republic’s 
educational system to raise public awareness regarding the basic elements of civic virtue 
and citizen’s rights.  Strikingly it appears that a significant amount of resources have 
instead been devolved for the promotion of religious doctrine.  This includes, amongst 
others, such powerful institutions as the Authority to Promote the Prayer, the Islamic 
Propaganda Organization and the overarching Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance
737
.  Various binding laws and directives have been released in the Islamic 
Republic which are directly aimed at promoting the Islamic culture at all societal levels 
including all public organizations of the system.  For instance the law for the Promotion 
of the Culture of Prayer passed in April 1997, the law to Promote the Culture of Chastity 
approved in July 2005 and Cultural Ministry’s guidelines on public culture are but a few 
examples of these comprehensive state efforts towards the inculcation of the Islamic 
                                                 
737
 See for instance the portal of the authority to promote prayer on: www.namaz.ir 
Constitutional Rights 
Soc. 
Sci.3rd 
elem. 
Soc. 
Sci.4th 
elem. 
Soc. 
Sci.5th 
elem. 
Soc. 
Sci.1st 
Sec. 
School 
Soc. 
Sci.2nd 
Sec. 
School 
Soc. 
Sci.3rd 
Sec. 
School 
Soc. 
Sci.1st 
High 
School 
Soc. 
Sci.2nd 
High 
School 
Soc. 
Sci.3rd 
High 
School 
Pre-
university Total 
Freedom of occupation  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
Freedom of movement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freedom of justice 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 7 
Freedom of expression 0 0 2 1 0 1 4 0 2 1 11 
Freedom of religion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freedom of Press 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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values and culture at all public and private spaces of the society
738
.  These provisions 
entail that every single means of public communication and social media including any 
published materials to be approved by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
with inevitable result of a systematic exclusion of any alternative socio-cultural and 
obviously political views
739
.  The official objectives of this Ministry, as reflected in its 
founding charter, include the promotion of Islamic revolutionary values as perceived by 
Khomeini and the “upholding of Divine Laws and enhancing Islamic ethics and human 
virtues...” amongst others740. 
 
     All these compelling observations lead one to conclude that whilst the educational 
system of the Islamic Republic should be credited with momentous efforts aimed at the 
promotion of literacy across the country, it has systematically failed on numerous 
expected republican objectives in any system advancing republican claims.  The first 
point of concern regards the actual inclusiveness and openness of this system to all 
members of society without factoring in discriminatory criteria such as gender, religious 
beliefs or socio-political orientations.  As I demonstrated above the Islamic Republic, 
with its overriding religious doctrine would in principle leave no space for any ungodly 
or un-Islamic sources of societal convictions.  In practical terms, with some minor 
exceptions - such as various openings to some religions and a good track record on 
higher female education, due to other factors, such has been the case as there seem to be 
structural barriers and ideological obstacles in place which make the realization of any 
inclusive republican educational system extremely difficult if not downright impossible.   
      
     At the second level of analysis concerning the actual content of the Islamic 
Republic’s educational system, as I showed above, the situation seems to be even more 
unsettling with respect to the inclusion of the republican principles of civic virtue and 
constitutional liberties.  It appears that all resources of the state have been directed 
towards the promotion of one single socio-political vision of the dominating elite, which 
has resulted not only in a spectacular failure in providing fair and equitable access to the 
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societal resources for all members of the public, but also seems to have itself been the 
engine of a momentous amount of imperium of the dominating state ideology.  This 
would constitute a damning conclusion towards the most basic republican credentials of 
the Islamic Republic which appears to have systematically ignored the elementary 
principles of public formation to create active republican citizens. A closer examination 
of this essential element of the contestatory citizenry will constitute the subject of the 
final section of this research project. 
 
III. Contestatory Citizenry 
As I have mentioned on numerous occasions, the republican civis (citizen) denotes 
someone in possession of his own liberty and not in potestate domini of unchecked 
powers
741.  I also echoed the famous republican conviction which argues that “to have 
republican freedom means living in a state in which the body politic does not move 
except by the will of the people”742.  Indeed the entire ontological essence of the human 
societies was deemed to be an exclusive result of the active participation of human 
rational activity.  Hence this original reading of the civic republicanism heavily reposes 
on the fundamental importance of the active participation of the citizens in all civil and 
political affairs of the polity, which is the fundamental message of the vivere libero 
principle of republican ideology
743
.  It is evident that the republican insistence over the 
existence of good laws and proper institutions could not be materialized and sustained in 
the absence of this “human material” which forms the basic building block of all their 
theoretical provisions.  As Pettit, with good reason, wrote “without widespread 
participation in the public forums, civic virtue and civility on a personal level, arbitrary 
interference cannot be minimized”744.  Indeed some scholars have even gone as far as 
claiming that the central questions of the modern political philosophy have shifted away 
from having a good government towards having a good society
745
.  Hence the obvious 
question that ensues here would be: how would these politically active agents register 
their views and interests within the republican state?  What channels of representation 
are needed to be made available to them to make their voices heard and protect them 
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from being subject to the arbitrary interference which was equated with servitude?  In 
order to provide a detailed analysis of these socio-political dispositions for the vivere 
civile and vivere politico, I will divide the argument into two main categories of “public 
forums”, which I take to mean the actual rights to public participation and contestation 
in the form of interest associations and political organizations, and “public tribunes”, 
which I interpret as the actual means” and channels of socio-political mass 
communication and expression.   
 
a. Public Forums 
The most salient aspect of the republican constitutionalism, as I argued in Chapter 3 was 
its strive to embrace and encode basic principles of individual rights and principles of 
public sovereignty.  These objectives were said to materialise through the provision of 
unambiguous laws with unconditional guarantees for the republican fundamental 
elements of liberty as non-domination.  Hence two aspects of these constitutional 
provisions and their practical manifestations deserve further scrutiny in a system 
claiming to be feeding upon the republican values.  These would encompass theoretical 
provisions and their practical implications on the republican society to uphold and 
protect the aforementioned concepts of politically and socially active citizenry.  I will 
discuss these under two broad umbrellas of normative provisions and political parties to 
provide a clear image of the prominent aspects of these social forums central to the 
republican ideology. 
 
i. Normative Provisions 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the important section of the Iranian Constitution concerning the 
“rights of the people”, in which numerous principles of individual liberty have been 
reflected
746
.  As I expounded there, fundamental principles of individual freedom seems 
to have been systematically conditioned to such general and vague notions as “not being 
against the principles of Islam” or “not posing danger to the national security”747.  
Considering the fact that the sole interpreter of the Iranian Constitution is the Guardian 
Council whose republican credentials were discussed in the previous chapter, it comes as 
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no surprise to observe that the various dominating provisions, decrees and legal 
dispositions have been foreseen to regulate and even waive these basic rights.  If one 
adds to this the fact that the judiciary system, as demonstrated previously, is heavily 
controlled by the imperium of the dominant ideology, the end results would be the 
obvious potentials and indeed effective violations of the principles of the individual 
liberty.  This would extend to all forms of political action that might pose any threat or 
even question the principles of the Islamic Republic.  In some cases the penalty of the 
transgressors could be raised to the capital punishment for such crimes considered as an 
instance of apostasy
748
. 
 
     Following the observations in Chapter 3 and 4, it has to be highlighted once more that 
one fails to identify any unambiguous normative endorsements of freedom of expression 
throughout the entire legislative dispositions of the Islamic Republic.  It is evident that 
the simple recognition of being free to “hold a certain belief” would not suffice to 
guarantee the actual right to express those beliefs publically without any fear of 
consequences
749
.  The previously discussed republican eye-ball test would most certainly 
fail on every level in such a comprehensive state of domination.  Furthermore other 
basic principles of toleration of dissent fundamental to a pluralist republican system such 
as the entitlement to hold peaceful manifestations or membership of political parties 
appear to have all been systematically circumvented around the numerous “red lines” of 
the system with a considerable amount of ambiguity hence a significant potential for 
arbitrary interference
750.   The Islamic Republic’s laws seem to be extremely inadequate 
and at times even hostile to various principles of liberty and non-domination.  Indeed by 
conditioning various basic articles of individual liberty to the potestate domini of 
prevailing hegemony of an overriding ideological doctrine, this has been turned into an 
actual vehicle to extend and consolidate the imperium of a state which has demonstrated 
a will to aggressively seek to dominate any diverging ideologies.  Examples of such 
dominating legal provisions include various laws against “blasphemy” and “spreading 
corruption on earth” which also include acts of criticizing the regime or publishing 
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material deemed to be non-compliant with the Islamic standards, which I will address in 
more detail in the forthcoming sections
751
.  
 
ii. Political Parties 
It goes without saying that the political parties are one of the most palpable catalysts of 
public participation in the society’s political life.  The history of the modern political 
philosophy highlights the fundamental importance of these channels of social 
participation throughout the process of democratization of various nations
752
.  From a 
teleological standpoint, in extended countries like Iran - with a high level of social 
stratification and various ethnic, religious and of course politico-economic interests, the 
existence of representation channels capable of reflecting these numerous interests, 
becomes even more significant.  In spite of this pressing need for pluralist political 
representation in Iran, numerous regulations and restrictions have resulted in the 
objective reality that few political parties throughout the history of the Islamic Republic 
were actually established and able to survive the extremely unfavourable environment 
for political action.  Even the so-called “loyal opposition” parties such as the Kargozāran 
party, the Islamic Republican Party and Mošārekat Party all failed to obtain considerable 
success and popular base through mass adherence and conscription
753
.  Other more 
secular parties such as the Jebheye Melli (Iranian National Front) or the Nehzate Azadi-e 
Iran (Freedom Movement of Iran) the former of which could be traced back to the 
Mosaddeq period and Iranian anti-Imperialist movements, were either completely 
outlawed or their activities were severely restricted and controlled
754
.    
 
     Various reasons have been cited to account for the inefficiency and lack of success of 
the political parties within the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Most importantly these reasons 
include the historic-cultural deficit of the political partisanship and group associations 
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and other organizational shortcomings
755
.  Interestingly this feeds precisely into the 
prevailing theme of this Chapter and indeed as I have argued on numerous occasions, 
one of the preoccupations of the republican state would be to inculcate, promote and 
instil principles, means and culture of political involvement of the citizenry.  Political 
parties, interest groups, professional and economic organizations and guilds are all part 
of the republican vocabulary to return the principles of sovereignty to the people 
themselves.  This observation once more highlights the validity of the republican 
prescription for promoting the vivere politico particularly for the marginal and minority 
sections of society who would alternatively be at the mercy of the imperium of the 
dominant factions and groups. 
 
     The Islamic Republic’s record on this account does not seem to be very satisfactory. 
That is: not only the state does not create, encourage or promote the culture of political 
involvement of the citizenry, but also it actively prevents and dissuades various forms of 
popular manifestation of views and grievances, if these are not strictly in line with the 
guidelines of the dominating ideology.  Even the state sponsored congregations and 
supporting organizations do not bear the name “party” due to the significant negative 
connotations that have been attributed to this term by the prevalent political 
narratives
756
. 
 
     Most strikingly even non-partisan participation in various interest groups or protest 
movements for various socio-political causes seems to have been highly unwelcome by 
the system.  Even the right to sustain any cause publically seems to have been 
systematically violated by the Islamic Republic, something shown particularly after the 
2009 elections with state crack downs on predominantly peaceful protest manifestations.  
Even the most basic public expressions of views or grievances have been harshly dealt 
with, the most prominent instances of which could be seen in the treatment reserved for 
the Labour Association Organization
757
, the One Million Signature Movements for the 
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Abolition of Discriminatory Laws against Women
758
 and the Reunion of the Families of 
the Executed Political Prisoners of Iran
759
 
760
.   
 
b. Public Tribunes 
Unquestionably societies of the modern world are much more complex entities as 
compared to the ancient republican polities in which the means of communication and 
representation were limited to some public tribunes and forums which were made 
accessible to those who could claim to have citizen rights.  Modern means of 
communication provide for a conspicuous potential for expressing individual views and 
concerns to a wider audience to which one might not be able to have physical access 
otherwise.  In Chapter 1 the republican maxim of audi alteram partem (listen to the 
other part) was cited which was said to be one of the guiding principles of the so-called 
communicative reason in a democratic state based on the republican values.  Traditional 
and modern means of mass communication would obviously form an indispensible 
channel for such basic procedural republican principles based on the negotiation of ideas 
and strive to arrive at compromised solutions to accommodate at times diverging 
viewpoints
761
.  It goes without saying that the public means of communication 
undoubtedly play a fundamental role in this respect. 
 
     Traditional paper-based journalism in Iran has faced numerous challenges as one 
would expect to be the case in a developing country
762
.  Nevertheless in the case of the 
Islamic Republic due to hegemonic dominance of an exclusive worldview this seems to 
have taken a further dimension of active persecution and invigilation that the journalists 
have been subjected to in the three decades of the Islamic Republic
763
.  The recent 
figures show that Iran tops the world’s list of exiled journalists fleeing for work-related 
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persecutions preceding countries like Somalia, Ethiopia and Syria
764
.  This bleak outlook 
extends to other means of mass communication such as radio and TV which are heavily 
monitored and frequently obscured if their contents are deemed hostile to the values and 
interests of the Islamic Republic
765
.  All this amounts to the clear evidence of an 
unsupportive environment in which the basic international principles of the free flow of 
information seem to have been systematically ignored and violated.  In Chapter 3 an 
overview of the relative articles of the Iranian Constitution was presented which in line 
with the international conventions and declarations, allow for a certain amount of press 
activity and free access to information.  Nevertheless to reiterate what I mentioned 
previously, these basic rights have again been interpreted and conditioned to vague 
notions of not being detrimental to the interests of the Islamic Republic which once 
more has allowed for ample space for interpretation, in this case restrictive ones.  One 
basic example of such violations of even the most constrained form of press freedom 
endorsed by the Iranian Constitution is a total disregard for the guidelines that the 
political and press offenses should be tried openly and in the presence of a jury in courts 
of justice.  In the course of the current research on this matter, significant and persistent 
violations of this right by nearly all Iranian courts of justice were observed. In some 
cases extremely harsh verdicts appear to have been handed out even in the absence of 
the legal representatives of the journalists on trial
766
.  This is even more aggravated by a 
nearly total blockade of foreign journalists and media sources and most importantly the 
human right watch organizations with the prevailing accusation of them being agents 
and spies of the “world arrogance” (western countries in particular the USA)767.   
 
     Modern media seems to be subjected to the same or even higher level of invigilation 
and control as a recent report on this matter demonstrated
768
.  Various laws and decrees 
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and numerous official and unofficial practices have been employed to stifle the access to 
the Internet and all related media contents.  Several organizations, task forces and 
committees have been established to enact the parliamentary law of 2010 entitled 
“Computer Crime Law” which lay down detailed guidelines to confront all internet 
related acts of subversion or “diffusion of falsehood” in particular against the authorities 
of the Islamic Republic
769
.  The authorities in charge of the executions of such norms 
include the Ministry of Communications, the High Council for Cultural Revolution, 
Islamic Republic’s Official Broadcasting Organization, Ministry of Intelligence and 
various other cyber police and watchdogs with extensive functional and executive 
prerogatives.  Appendix IV demonstrates the complexity of the apparatus in place to 
monitor and invigilate the flow of web-based information and contents
770
.  It has to be 
underlined that the government of President Rouhani in numerous occasions has 
promised to remove parts of these prevailing state control and invigilation over all 
means of mass communication and information, nevertheless the practical and tangible 
results of such public declarations are yet to be perceived in Iran.   
 
     Furthermore, besides these monitoring techniques and extremely violent legal 
punishments, the Islamic Republic seems to have pursued easier means of restricting 
access to electronic public information simply by limiting the bandwidth or completely 
blocking the access to unofficial sources of news and information.  The above 
mentioned Computer Crime Law even states that those trying to use a higher bandwidth 
than the authorized one to access the Internet from inside Iran, or from outside in, could 
be punished by one to three years imprisonment, financial penalties or both
771
.  In the 
run-up to the 2009 and 2013 presidential elections the Iranian Minister of 
Communications officially acknowledged that the access to the internet has been 
deliberately restricted through limiting the speed to Internet connection resulting in Iran 
being placed in 172
nd
 place out of 184 countries in 2013 for “Household Download 
Index
772
.  This has effectively stifled the private access to the sources not officially 
                                                 
769
 See the content of the relative law at http://peyvandha.ir/0-8.htm 
770
 The graph was prepared by the Iran Media Program and can be consulted at:  
http://www.iranmediaresearch.org/en/research/pdffile/1296 
771
 Article 24 of the Computer Crime Law which can be consulted at http://peyvandha.ir/0-8.htm 
772
 See relative reports at: http://persian.iranhumanrights.org/1392/05/communications/ and 
http://www.netindex.com/download/allcountries/ 
277 
 
endorsed by the Islamic Republic authorities.  In the recent years there have even been 
attempts to create an isolated “National Internet” to completely eradicate the 
circumvention techniques that the resourceful Iranians have devised to access the desired 
sources of information around the world
773
.  All these would obviously constitute 
instances of arbitrary interference by either removing the available options or imposing 
punishments for certain choices which were all said to be blatant manifestations of 
domination inimical to numerous principles of the republican liberty
774
.  
 
    During my research I also encountered a significant amount of auto-censorship and 
“anticipated reaction” by the Iranian journalists to comply with numerous red lines set 
out by the government for the fear of potential consequences
775
.  This appears to be the 
exact instance of an anti-republican practice of invigilation or indirect threats that waive 
basic principles of contestatory citizenry even in the absence of any actual interferences.  
In Pettit’s words which I cited in Chapter 1 the instances of state imperium include:  
 
burdening the choice of the option with a penalty or wrapping my capacity for reasoned 
choice or giving me misleading information….I may be subject to the alien control of 
others without their actually interfering with me; if I think that the absence of 
interference in such a case means the presence of freedom, then I am deluded
776
 
 
All these instance of invigilation, intimidation, actual intervention and severe 
punishment would underscore my remarks on the extreme violation of the republican 
principles of active citizenship that seem to have all but annihilated in the dominant 
political narratives of the Islamic Republic.  It is easy to observe various levels of 
domination and state imperium in all aspects of the socio-cultural and of course political 
domains of the Islamic Republic accompanied by numerous potential and indeed actual 
instances of arbitrary interference in the lives of the citizens.   
 
     Thus the overall conclusion of all analytic observations in this chapter broadly 
confirm the claims put forward in the previous one that this system indeed presents all 
elements of an overarching hierocracy, or a Theoarchy (clerical oligarchy) as I would 
like to call it.   
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IV. Conclusion 
All this empirical evidence and theoretical consideration would naturally lead to one 
simple conclusion, namely that within the constitutional, institutional and most 
importantly ideological structure of the Islamic Republic, not enough space has been 
foreseen for the existence of active participatory citizens.  The republican principles of 
vivere civile and vivere politico seem to be in outright conceptual incompatibility with 
the prevailing political discourse with its exclusive claims to sovereignty.  This has even 
resulted in a total prohibition of any form of peaceful manifestations of opinions with 
the common pretext that these could pose dangers to the fundamentals of the Islamic 
Republic or accusations of collusion with foreign powers - all customary strategies of all 
totalitarian states throughout the history
777
.  Pervasive levels of invigilation, threats and 
actual physical confrontation and punishment have made even the restricted citizen’s 
rights to participation and contestation – some of which are guaranteed in the Islamic 
Republic Constitution, cum permissu - that is conditioned to the discretionary will of 
specific dominating groups in the Islamic State with their pervasive political imperium.  
 
     Unsurprisingly one is left to conclude that the citizen’s right to active participation in 
the political life of the society and the ability to actually dissent and contest the state’s 
actions, have been systematically waived and trampled upon by the dominant ideology 
of the state and its exclusive doctrines of sovereignty.  Hence the centrality of the 
politically active contestatory republican citizen does not seem to have any 
epistemological resonance throughout the normative and socio-political interpretations 
of the principles of the individual rights in the Islamic Republic.  This would obviously 
form yet another significant shortcoming which poses a fundamental challenge to the 
very validity of every republican claim of a system whose most basic building block, i.e 
the politically active citizenry is systematically undermined or accorded with a 
negligible public voice. The significance of the public in res publica, denoting the 
“public” affair, seems to have been emptied of all its connotations in a system whose 
centre of allegiance is perceived to repose beyond and above the comprehension of the 
“subjects” of the divine rule!  
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Final Conclusions 
This research project was meant to provide an innovative constructivist framework to 
evaluate the republican credentials of a political order with overriding religious 
underpinnings throughout its normative and institutional political doctrine of the state.  
Various comparative and analytic prospects were deployed to shed a better light of 
understanding into the complex and multi-layered mechanisms of interactions between a 
divine source of sovereignty and other locus of rights and legitimacy reposed on the 
civic republican humanist principles.  
     Chapter 1 proved to be the backbone of the entire research project as it provided a 
systematic attempt at mapping out the main principals of the republican ideology which 
could be regarded as the unifying thrust behind various modern day manifestations of 
this school of thought.  Principal ideas of the prominent schools of the republicanism 
were scrutinized through an extensive research into the main theoreticians’ written and 
oral utterances to provide a comprehensive overview of the basic principles that made up 
the foundations of the current republican framework of analysis.  The entire normative 
and institutional principles of the freedom as non-domination were said to be 
unambiguously captured by the republican notions of imperium and dominium which 
were extensively deployed in a comparative political framework of study.  These were 
served as the guiding line and theoretical threshold for the entirety of this project, 
keeping an eye open for the inevitable divergences between the “ideal” and the “real” 
manifestations of a representative republican democracy. 
     From there I proceeded by providing a diachronic and synchronic overview of the 
prevailing religious narratives within the dominant Shiʻa political philosophy in order to 
scrutinize their implications and congruencies with the basic principles of the republican 
doctrine of state.  In this attempt I strived to capture various viewpoints from across the 
religious and secular spectrum of the Iranian political establishments, the most 
prominent instance of which was the exclusive interview with Abolhasan Banisadr, the 
first President of the Islamic Republic and indeed the first person to occupy such a 
position in the entire Iranian history. 
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     Unsurprisingly various principles of divine sovereignty, as presented by the 
prevailing political theology, were proven here to be at odds with the basic republican 
notions of individual liberty, if not a fortiori incompatible.  Although a great number of 
the Shiʻa modernists have tried to accommodate numerous articles of sovereignty of the 
people in their political narratives, one could still trace a significant amount of 
inconsistency, resulting from a systematic failure to provide a clear and coherent 
conceptual discourse on these, at times mutually exclusive, sources of legitimacy.  In 
any case as far as the Islamic Republic is concerned, it was empirically demonstrated 
that the dominant Shiʻa doctrine of the state would undoubtedly prove existentially 
incompatible with numerous republican notions of liberty.  
     Most strikingly, as it was highlighted in Chapters 2 and 4, it appears that even the 
republican ideologues of the Islamic Republic did not seem to possess a thorough 
understanding of various implications of the principles of republicanism and a sound 
understanding of all socio-political repercussions of such doctrines with regards to the 
religious principles. 
     After this initial process of defining the two sides of the ideological and theoretical 
components of the Islamic Republic, in line with the republican notion of the imperium 
of law and legal guarantees of equal rights and distributive fairness, the Islamic 
Republic’s Constitution was analytically examined from various normative points of 
view. This was prevalently a comparative study by analogy to other political systems 
around the globe bearing the name “Republic”.  It was demonstrated that numerous 
articles of the Iranian Constitution, - whilst providing for basic notions of the individual 
liberty and popular sovereignty, appear to have conditioned and subordinated these to 
other overriding sources of sovereignty which are predominantly unelected, with little 
accountability, over which the population does not wield much effective power of 
supervision.  All fundamental republican principles seem to have been left out or 
reinterpreted in the light of this prevailing normative supremacy of the religious dogma.  
This was clearly reflected in the first Article of the Iranian Constitution which reduces 
the role of the people to raʻye mosbat dādan (cast a positive vote) to the already 
established transcendental truth of the eschatological sources of the fundamental laws of 
the state. 
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     Furthermore various stylistics aspects of the Iranian Constitution were shown to be 
interesting to consider as well. These provided an intriguing insight into the main 
theoretical convictions behind the articles of the Fundamental Law.  Furthermore a 
considerable amount of ambiguity and even conceptual inconsistency within the Iranian 
Constitution and its manifestations in the ordinary laws was highlighted, which shed a 
serious shadow of doubt over the epistemological validity of such provisions with an 
insufficient level of predictability, clarity and impartiality of application.  In addition 
numerous discriminatory laws underpinned by the religious dogma were identified, 
which violate a considerable amount of the individual and collective liberties as 
promulgated by all relevant international laws and conventions.  These seem to have 
ipso facto undermined the basic values of equality before laws or subjected them to 
other ideological convictions promoting gender disparity or other discriminatory 
prescriptions particularly against the followers of other religions and beliefs.  
Consequently the final conclusion in this Chapter was an objective consideration that 
from a normative point of view, the Iranian Constitution, and many ordinary laws 
inspired by it, fail on numerous levels to unambiguously encode and uphold all 
principles of the republican liberty by guarding against the dominium of individuals or 
groups and imperium of the state itself over the republican citizens.  
     As regarding the theoretical and conceptual principles of popular sovereignty, 
Chapter 4 highlighted numerous shortcomings regarding the effectiveness of the popular 
sovereignty over the constitution itself in a pervasive lack of such rights as the 
constitutional abrogative sovereignty and the power of recall.  It was argued that whilst a 
considerable number of the principles of social justice have been indeed incorporated 
into the political narratives of the leaders of the Islamic Republic, other basic theories of 
the common good and republican sovereignty seem to have been systematically 
subjected to the eschatological interpretations of the ultimate and absolute good as 
perceived by such ideologies.  This again posed serious questions regarding the very 
viability and indeed conformity of the basic principles of popular sovereignty and 
republican liberty in the Islamic Republic, due to their prevailing rational procedural and 
negotiable nature as compared to the claims of metaphysical or divine perpetual truth. 
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     Next a thorough analysis of the Islamic Republic’s institutions was provided with 
regards to their teleological principles and actual records in upholding and protecting 
various principles of the republican liberty.  This proved to be a very challenging and 
extensive project implicating numerous aspects of the layout of power in Iran and their 
theoretical and practical operations towards guarding against the imperium of the state 
itself.  The significant body of evidence presented there supported the claim that the 
Islamic Republic state itself seems to have become a source of domination and imperium 
instead of providing the necessary protections against this danger.  This irrefutable body 
of evidence was not only observed in the so-called trias politica or the traditional three 
powers of the state, but most manifestly in the overarching Office of the Leader with its 
pervasive prerogatives that extend to all aspects of the public and private spheres of the 
society.  This repository of power with privileges of a primus inter pares authority 
seems to have been endowed with unlimited arbitrium to not only fully dominate all 
other powers of the state, but also to effectively control all means of public domination 
together with all socio-cultural elements of hegemony.  
     I further expounded that the very existence of such a layout of power would suffice to 
waive various principles of the republican doctrine on conceptual and epistemological 
grounds.  Notwithstanding, the actual track record of such institutions readily reveals not 
only significant instances of  tangible arbitrary interference by the state, but also cases of 
auto-censorship or the anticipated sanctions, which were said to be constituting instances 
of liberty cum permissu of the dominant authority.  Hence all evidence presented here 
would unequivocally prove that the interference of the potestate domini in all socio-
political affairs of society have gone way beyond the conduct of a benevolent master 
refraining from wielding his authority, which by itself was said to provided sufficient 
grounds to dissolve the very basic elements of the republican liberty.  
     I also agreed with some authors’ views that in such systems, holding periodic 
elections and other limited republican institutions of the existing resilient 
authoritarianism, would also be better explained in light of the various concessions that 
the recombinants authoritarian systems have to make to justify and legitimize their total 
domination on all political spheres of the society.  Moreover various manifestations of 
the institutional imperium of a dictateur collectif of a specific ideological group were 
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highlighted, which seem to be constantly spilling into a system of dictateur militaire 
with a variety of overt instances of the employment of the coercive forces of the state to 
promote these exclusive ideological convictions.  Hence as demonstrated herein, any 
institutional analogy endorsed by the advocates of the Islamic Republic state with other 
modern day republican institutions and seats of public authority, notably the western 
democratic ones, should be taken cum grano salis! 
     And lastly I treated the most salient element of the republican desiderata i.e. the 
people themselves and their contestatory and participatory rights.  As demonstrated 
there, numerous normative provisions of the Islamic Republic, systematically undermine 
basic rights of reclaiming and registering interests and views in a system where the most 
fundamental elements of republican forums and tribunes are either missing or have been 
subordinated to the comprehensive purviews of unelected sources of authority.  An 
almost total lack of any impartial monitoring organs such as the independent auditors or 
native human rights watchdog institutions would all add to this momentous deficit of 
adequate public tools of checks and balances which would seriously undermine the 
efficiency of popular control over all seats of power.  Furthermore various practices of 
invigilation, threats of consequences and of course actual imposition of violence were 
highlighted in this system that leave little doubt that the most basic principles of the 
republican ideology in reality do not subsist on any actual grounds in such a politically 
unfavourable exclusive environment. 
     All these theoretical and practical observations and examinations of various 
normative, constitutional and institutional credentials of the Islamic Republic would 
support the original assumption that this specific interpretation of the religious dogma 
would prove to be existentially incompatible with all principles of the republican liberty 
as non-domination.  I hope to have empirically demonstrated in this specific context as 
well, the validity of the original assumptions of the humanist republican ideologues 
underpinned by the rebuttal of any metaphysical and eschatological sources of 
legitimacy that fall beyond the human reason.  As it was critically evaluated, numerous 
fundamental republican narratives of the civic republicanism, in particular the notion of 
the liberty as non-domination, would prove to be at complete opposing polar ends with 
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respect to the claims of centrality of the transcendental eschatological assumptions of 
truth.      
     Thus my initial hypothesis seems to have been essentially validated in the light of the 
empirical observations that that the res pubblica of the Islamic Republic seems to be 
utterly devoid of any notions of publica which seems to have been systematically 
subordinated to the professed practices of the ontological priority of the divine 
sovereignty. This by itself provides sufficient grounds to conclude that the system 
subject to this research project is instead a Theoarchy as argued above.  As demonstrated 
here, all means of the state seem to have been appropriated by a small college of the 
religious elites with measurable results, rather than by the collective rule of the Shiʻa 
theologians, which in turn justifies the coinage of such a new terminology.  Thus other 
hitherto utilized terms such as Constitutional Theocracy or simply Theocracy by some 
predominantly western scholars do not seem to be able to adequately capture all 
conceptual and institutional aspects of such a political order. 
 
     And finally it is my utmost hope that this framework of analysis could inspire similar 
projects on other political contexts in an attempt to comparatively scrutinize various 
aspects of compatibility of all defining principles of the religious ideologies, in 
particular the Islamic ones, with the most fundamental elements of the popular 
sovereignty.  Wider Arabic and Islamic geo-political contexts would provide interesting 
grounds for relative field works based on an academic approach of analysis similar to 
the one devised in this research project.   
 
     I would like to close this project by returning again to Machiavelli and his subtle 
assertion in the seminal Discourses treatise concerning the centres of the political 
allegiance that: one could be a good republican and religious but not a good religious 
person and a republican, which still seems to be providing food for thought for all 
theoreticians of the political science centuries after their pronouncement. Hence various 
socio-political implications of the ecumenical narratives of the political theology still 
remain to be adequately examined as the relationship between the state and the religion 
in the 21
st
 century seems to perpetually be as controversial as it appeared to the early 
political philosophers of the classical republican ideology. 
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Appendix I Transliteration Table 
Persian 
Alphabet Letter  Modern letter Example  Transliteration 
ا A بسا Asb 
آ Ā نادابآ Ābādān 
ب B ربب Babr 
پ P رپ Por 
ط ت T  اهنت  /یسوط tanhā / tusi 
ث ص س S   بیس / نوباص / هرمث sib / sābun / samara 
 ش Š رهش Šahr 
ج J ناوج Javān 
چ C بوچ Cub 
ح ه H  اوه /ترسح havā / hasrat 
خ X بوخ Xub 
د D رد Dar 
ر R زمر Ramz 
ژ Ž هلاژ žāle (h) 
 ذ زظ ض Z  کشرز / بوذ /ررض / رفظ zerešk / zob / zarar / zafar 
ء  ع  ʻ  یلع / ءارآ / لؤسم / هئارا   ʻali / ārāʻ / masʻul  / erāʻe 
غ ق Q  اضق /ملاغ qazā / qolām 
ف F ابیرف Faribā 
ک K لامک Kamāl 
گ G مرگ Garm 
ل L هللا Lāle 
م M ردام Mādar 
ن N نان Nān 
و V کنو Vanak 
و W  دروم /حیضوت mowred / towzih 
ی Y رای Yār 
  ا E ماهلا Elhām 
  ا O دیما Omid 
یا I ناریا irān  
وا U  تسود Dust 
286 
 
Appendix II Interview with Banisadr 
Transcript of the Interview with first President of the Islamic Republic Abolhasan 
Banisadr.  
Paris November 2012 
 
VNP: Mr Banisadr thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to discuss with you a few subjects 
of interest.  You Mr Banisadr were one of the main ideologues behind the concept of the Islamic Republic, 
and one of the leading theoreticians who strived to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and Shariʻa 
with republican notions - even before being elected as the first President of the Islamic Republic, and 
indeed the first president in Iranian’s entire history.  My first question would be to ask you to illustrate for 
us, which Islamic laws and ideologies you sustain, to be compatible with the republican ideologies? 
Banisadr:  Well I have to correct you there in that I was not an ideologue of the current Islamic Republic, 
I was an ideologue of the revolution.  My real interest in this subject started when the London School of 
Economics asked me to deliver a lecture on the relationship between democracy and Islam - although I 
could not participate in the conference due to the complications of obtaining a VISA for the UK; this 
became the start of my research which went on for about 20 years, the result of which is a treatise on 
democracy.  The terms I have used for democracy or the republic is demokrasiye šowraʻi (consultative 
democracy).  The first volume is concerning the totalitarianism, since also in the west the democratic 
discourse started with a critique of totalitarianism, I mean from the Renaissance onwards.  The second 
volume is concerning the guidelines for democracy and the pillars of democracy.  In the first section 
regarding the Demokrasiye šowraʻi the focus is on human beings as the main pillar of study.  What it is to 
be human, what are the rights of this human, are these rights innate?  When we talk about “republic” the 
main question would be whether the citizens of such a community are entitled to participate in the 
administration of the state based on their hoquqe zati  (natural rights) or based on contractual rights?  To 
which I answer that this is based on innate rights.  This is based on the assumption that based on the 
principles of hoquqe zati no one should dominate another person or have any superiority in the form of 
such things as velāyat etc.  Therefore the republic is the realization of certain ideals which entail the 
disappearance of others.  However as we stand now the humanity is very far from this ideal, it might be 
that this is only achievable in the paradise!  As it stands now, people decide for each other.  But how could 
this decision making be regulated?  The guidelines are that the main priority is given to the protection of 
humans and human rights, hoquqe zāti of course.  Additionally the second principle would be that 
amongst these basic human rights, two of them are more fundamental compared to others: these two are 
independence and liberty.  A republic would not materialize if the citizens of a society do not have the 
independence in their decisions and the freedom in the choice of the type of decisions they make.  The so-
called xodangixtegi (autonomy) is the main pillar, the autonomy of a human being.  I have provided 12 
principles of independence and around 20 principles for liberty, of course only the main principles, those 
which are supposed to be observed in common democracies of today, something which is obviously not 
always the case.  If you study in the UK I know that in England they call this independence “negative 
liberty”.  Which means being independent from the state.  However it is not only the state from which the 
citizen needs to be independent, this could be extended to anything that could influence his decisions, 
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hence to be able to decide and to be able to choose the type of decision.  Another two pillars of a republic 
are haqqe ešterāk (the right to share) and haqqe extelāf (the right to dissent).  Because if all human beings 
do not agree that they should all have an equal right in running the state, then the participatory democracy 
could not materialize.  Therefore ešterāk (participation) is necessary.  Furthermore if the right to extelāf 
(dissent) is not observed and a group or ethnicity declare to have exclusive rights on the making of 
decisions which others need to obey; then a republic cannot be realized either and we will fall into a 
dictatorship.  Hence the haqqe ešterāk and haqqe extelāf are very fundamental.  In a republic these rights 
would translate into the means of mass communication.  However, the question of how these means of 
mass communication should be organized so that all these four principles of the republic could materialize 
is a question which has not yet been resolved in the human societies.  These means are mainly at the 
service of the centres of power, which could be financial power, political parties etc. so the fact that the 
citizen of the republic is able to participate in three processes of thought andišehā (ideas) , dānešha 
(knowledge) and ettelāʻāt (information) is not happening now.  As these have been turned into specialized 
tasks and those in charge of them follow certain guidelines to inculcate certain ideologies, this could be 
very well observed during the elections.  However as we said it is the human beings who need to hold the 
reins of these processes.  In Iran both previously during the Shāh and we are experiencing this too now.  
They used to use the term: Rādio Bāzār-e Banisadr (Banisadr’s market Radio) which had to transform into 
a mouth to ear system! This has always been my proposal that each Iranian should feel the obligation to 
break through the censorship. 
VNP: You mentioned various currents of thought and political elites who collaborated with you during 
the revolution; which obviously included both religious ideas and secular ones; my question is do these 
currents within the Iranian Revolution and later Islamic Republic had different understandings of these 
republican principles you just outlined? -  Principles such as popular sovereignty.  What were the 
different perceptions? 
Banisadr: All others were against these concepts.  Our problem back then was that those who believed in 
velāyat jamure mardom (popular sovereignty) were a very small minority!  I prefer to use the term 
dominion (velāyat) instead of sovereignty as the word sovereignty contains the notion of power, but the 
term velāyat does not contain such connotations.  It denotes equality, fraternity, liberty etc. 
VNP: Based on these affirmations how does it happen that you were still hopeful to combine these two 
opposing perceptions?  (Belief in and rejection of popular sovereignty)  The ideas seem to have existential 
incompatibilities.  When you refer to Khomeini’s treatise since the time of Najaf for instance, he clearly 
delineates his perception on the repositories of sovereignty.  Through such notions as velāyat-e faqih, he 
clearly delineates where is the repository of sovereignty in his proposed political system based on the 
Divine sovereignty.  Therefore how were you and other republican ideologues of the Iranian Revolution 
hoping to bring together these existentially different ideologies? 
Banisadr: The hope was there and endorsed by the Iranian nation.  And for our part we went around the 
country and tried to illustrate these notions.  Concepts like the importance of freedom, the principles of a 
republican system, the need for their constant participation and that without such participation a tyrannical 
system could materialize in the country.  Furthermore I have to underline that Mr Khomeini has changed 
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his views on the velāyat-e faqih no less than five times.  The version which was declared in France and 
was the one taken as definitive by us, had nothing of the velāyat-e faqih in it, it was indeed the velāyat of 
the people.  Also please bear in mind that he was not the first theologian to advance such ideas (people’s 
sovereignty).  During the Constitutional Revolution; three main marjaʻ of the time namely Ayatollah 
Khorāsani, Mirza Rašti and a third one, I think was Māzendarāni, who sent a telegram to Mohammad Ali 
Shāh declaring during the Greater Occultation that the velāyat belongs to the people.  And this was the 
exact term they used: “velāyat motaʻalleq bā jomhure mardom ast” (dominion/sovereignty belongs to 
people).  Mr Khomeini was against this doctrine initially.  You can see this in the Ayatollah Montazeri’s 
memoires in which he states that when the Ayatollah Motahhari and I went to visit him, he declared that 
he is against the velāyat-e faqih.  But in Najaf he used to teach velāyat-e faqih.  I went to Najaf back then 
to bury my deceased father and went to see Khomeini and told him that the idea of velāyat-e faqih that you 
have put forward would instil the Shāh’s regime forever in Iran.  This city of yours (Najaf) which has been 
a centre of Shiʻa thought for centuries, is so filthy and badly organized that no one would accept to risk his 
life to remove the Shāh and replace him with a religious figure based on this model.  To which he replied 
that he only mentioned this concept of velāyat-e faqih so that the people like me and Motahhari would 
come up with a solution for Iran.  Then I asked him to put this in writing and he did which we later 
published in Europe.  So in France we were talking about the velāyat of the people.  In fact the 
constitutional draft that we prepared was exactly based on this idea of people’s dominion.  But then in the 
Majles Xobregān (Assembly of Experts) he played a trick.  He inserted the nezārate faqih (supervision) of 
faqih, which I have to add, was not pushed through easily and we put up serious resistance.  But in the end 
we convinced Ayatollāh Montazeri to accept only the oversight of faqih.  But then they did a coup d’état 
and in particular after the Iran-Iraq war he advanced the idea of velāyat-e faqih.  So originally he endorsed 
the popular sovereignty and even told the Spiegel newspaper, in clear terms that the only criteria is the 
popular vote: mizān raʻye mardom ast, and that we want a republic like the French Republic. 
VNP: But even in the moderate ideas you mentioned like those put forward by the likes of Khorāsāni and 
Nāʻini, the people are never declared as being the true holders of sovereignty?  These scholars regularly 
used the terms such as sultan Jaʻer and similar notions which at best need to be supported during the 
Occultation, as long as they do not act against Shariʻa laws. 
Banisadr: Those ideas belong to the era before the Constitutional Revolution.  Constitutional Revolution 
means you should not tolerate these things.  As I said during the Constitutional Revolution they clearly 
told Mohammad Ali Shāh that he does not count and that the sovereignty belongs to the people. Otherwise 
what is the point in having a Constitutional Revolution at all? But even back then there was a group 
Noxbegān who believed in the sovereignty of the experts, but in that telegram that I mentioned, these three 
scholars clearly declare that the dominion belongs to the people. 
VNP: To wrap up this question can I confirm that in your opinion there is a section of the religious camp 
who truly sustain that the religious principles are completely compatible with the republican concepts or 
at least tolerate the republican ideas? 
Banisadr: If you refer to the Quran, because my idea of participatory democracy is actually a research 
through the Quran, there you would not find even a single word regarding hokumat (state), dowlat 
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(government), saltanat (monarchy) etc. there is not even one single verse there in this regard.  Some 
scholars sustain that it could not be reasonable that the religion has been so silent regarding the most 
important human affair which is government and state.  However in practice this is the case.  So they have 
gone after various hadith and ravāyat to justify their ideas. 
VNP: but there are indirect references such as to ololamr or “to establish God’s rule on earth” which are 
very general terms of course 
Banisadr: No they cannot use those concepts either.  They have only used those two hadith which they 
attribute to Imam Sādeq.  So what we have in the Quran is the principles of demokrasiye šowraʻi 
(consultative democracy).  There we have the principle of democracy, the principle of human rights, 
which is one of the most complete lists of human rights.  I have carried out a research on this as well.  And 
also a philosopher who lives in the UK has carried out a complete comparison of the human rights articles 
in the Quran with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and he too has come to the conclusion that 
those reported in the Quran are much more complete, which is indeed the case.  In particular the human 
rights mentioned in the Quran are innate rights of the human but those reported by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are mainly contractual rights such as the right to private ownership.  All the 
previous rights that I mentioned are in the Quran.  And in addition to this there is also the notion of šowrā 
(consultation) which means the popular participation in decisions.  So if you think in that primitive 
society, the first society, if you consider only the written history as they say, there might have been such 
examples in other ancient societies too such as Indian, Persia, Rome, Greece etc.  But the only truly 
documented one is the one in the Quran and the information we have on the Medina society which has 
such a system in place, based on the Quran, even the Prophet himself is an elected figure.  He did not say 
that I am a prophet therefore I have velāyat over you.  He is indeed an elected figure.  In the assemblies 
wherever there was a divergence of opinion, others asked him whether this was his personal idea or God’s 
words, and if he replied that it was his personal idea then the majority rule was considered. 
VNP: But do you accept that many of the Islamic principles and ruling of the Shariʻa are in contradiction 
with the principles of independence and freedom that you mentioned before?  For instance gender 
equality, the laws of heritage, testimony or the minority rights which all seem to be in open contradiction 
with the republican principles you outlined? 
Banisadr: One thing is what we have in the Quran and one thing is the actual evolution of the Islamic 
ideology throughout history.  For instance Islam has mutated multiple times.  Once for example as a result 
of the influence of the Greek philosophy, Islam has lost its identity.  Which means it has tried to adapt 
itself with the current discourse on power of the time with those dominant ideas, and the latest example of 
such an adaptation is the Iranian Constitutional Revolution in which it has tried to adapt itself to western 
liberalism.  But before this it has adapted itself multiple times with Aristotelian philosophy, with Plato’s 
philosophy.  If you read the works of Nezāmolmolk, there is nothing Islamic in it, it is all Greek 
philosophy.  So what we have in practice is a version of Islam which has been deprived of its essence and 
adapted to power relations of the time and this version is obviously not compatible with any notions of 
liberty.  However, the version of Islam based on the Quranic guidelines and the rights it has considered for 
human beings and the consultative systems it has advocated - which has been what the Prophet has done in 
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his lifetime as well, has not been seen in any human society since, unfortunately.  And I am not sure if it 
will ever be realized in any society, but the principles are there.  The instances you mentioned such as the 
gender inequality etc, do not exist in the Quran.  There is only the quality of rights.  There are now recent 
researches in genetics which have demonstrated that men and women are genetically different.  As one is 
naturally made for being a mother and the other for being a father.  This fact has been endorsed by the 
Quran too but it considers certain privileges for women such as the superiority for being a mother, which 
is something (being a parent) that is present in the opposite sex too but stronger in women.  So there are 
fazilat (privileges) for being a mother in women and privileges for being a father in men and when these 
two combine an ideal setting for the growth of a human being is created.  By human beings we mean the 
independent, free and powerful human.  But in this relation if we have the interference of power then these 
gender privileges will not be able to work.  There might be a family but the foundations are based on 
power relations hence both men and women lose their privileges.  Therefore the Quran is very sensitive to 
the presence and the lack of this power relation between individuals.  The Quran is always watchful so 
that this relation of power does not materialize in any type of human relations. 
VNP: But there are numerous other incompatibilities such as the rights of other religious minorities? 
Banisadr: The Quran explicitly mentions “lakom dinakom va liya din” (your religion for you and my 
religion for me). 
VNP: However, minorities for instance are required to pay the religious tax of jaziya, imposed on non-
muslims. 
Banisadr: Jaziya is only for wartime, when there is a winner and a loser. 
VNP: But our problem here is that all these concepts are clearly reflected in the Iranian Constitution as 
well. 
Banisadr: We did not have these in the first draft of the constitution. 
VNP: But these are reflected there anyway and also that the only dignified role considered for women 
seems to be that of motherhood.  But it does not consider women as an individual with equal rights 
independently from the role she plays within the family. 
Banisadr: As I explained before, if there is a relation of power, then motherhood will be turned into a 
duty. Whereas based on the Quranic teachings this is a fazilat (privilege) and not a duty.  It is a right and a 
privilege.  But if you impose this on them: that since you are a mother you need to stay at home and 
refrain from participation in society and follow my decisions, then this is something we do not have in the 
Quran.  Indeed it is quite contrary.  The Quran says that since she has these privileges, there should be 
certain rights associated with these so that these potentials are realized without being subject to various 
pressures.  You mentioned heritage.  In the Quran, women inherit more than men.  But it has formally 
mentioned men taking two shares to one compared to women, but if you look closer here we are not 
talking about the men and the women, we are concerned with the family.  Since based on Quaranic law 
men should pay the nafaqa (maintenance) hence he has to receive for himself, for the wife and for the 
children.  In the Quran women have no duties.  That is the portion of heritage she receives she does not 
have to spend any of it.  Therefore considering everything she receives more and in addition she has all the 
guarantees, plus the fact that if she works at home she can claim compensation for it.  Even if she works 
291 
 
outside as well, she can claim a compensation for milking the babe, or doing the housework.  Now how 
many other societies do we know in which women have all these rights?  So all these arrangements are 
provided so that there is no domination for men against women.  But then this Islam which has been 
turned into a relation of power in all of today’s societies does not have any compatibility not only with a 
consultative democracy but even with the most basic forms of republics.  For instance in the Sunni Islam 
they say you always need to obey the ruler, as you also mentioned.  But in Shiʻa this is not acceptable.  
And the sultan jaʻer (unjust ruler) should not be obeyed. But these days we see that the Sunni countries 
have done contrary to this conviction.  And all the uprisings there are actually against their religious 
teachings.  As they always believed that they had to obey the unjust ruler as God has decided so. 
VNP: So in Shiʻism in your view there are parallel convictions then.  And in Iran, we have a version 
based on the power relation as you defined which has got a very specific definition of power relations 
could you elaborate more on this please? 
Banisadr: This is actually a Greek ideology, based on the Aristotelian philosophy, to be exact it is a 
mixture of Aristotle and Plato’s philosophies.  These ideologues have defined a concept of velāyat-e faqih 
in which they consider an absolute velāyat for one individual which is actually denying the existence of 
God.  Even Ayatollāh Montazeri, very recently though, declared that the absolute guardianship of the 
velāyat-e motlaqeye faqih (jurist) is actually heresy, the denial of the existence of God.  As Mr Khomeini 
talked about velāyat-e motlaqe (absolute), so if we suppose that God has given this right to this person, 
that He has given him the right to monopolize the power, because all the rights allocated to the leader in 
the Iranian Constitution are exclusively useful in the employment of power, and this is something that 
Iranians usually neglect, for example the use of the armed forces of Pāsdārān, it is obvious that Pāsdārān 
could only be used to employ force, or the right to appoint the head of the judiciary system, which means 
that the judges who need to be independent, are now subjected to one person who has all the powers, yet 
another means of employing the force. 
VNP: you gave a very eloquent example there, if for instance we consider the history of Islam the position 
of the judge has always been monopolized by the religious figures, it is said that the prophet himself was 
also not only a head of the state but also acted as a judge etc, but one of the most basic principles of 
republicanism is the separation of power and in particular the independence of the judiciary system which 
has been significantly highlighted by all theoreticians of the republican thought. 
Banisadr: As I said before one part of my research has been dedicated to the legal system in the Quran.  I 
have found twenty principles in the Quran which need to be observed in the process of judgment.  In 
today’s legal systems maybe 6 or 7 of these are observed.  And in the Islamic societies none of these are 
observed!  So there is a book (the Quran) which the Muslims do not use unless in their funerals or 
marriages, only for formalities I mean.  But if they decide to work based on these guidelines they need to 
observe these principles.  And of course the independence of the judges is one of those principles. 
VNP:  Based on these observations what is your definition of an Islamic Republic? What are the 
differences, if any, with the secular Republic then? 
Banisadr: I never employed such an expression, this was a term coined by Khomeini.  Because I believe 
that the religion can never come together with power.  If in a system we have the combination of religion 
292 
 
and government, this would result in the corruption of both the religion and the government.  This is an 
obvious conclusion.  In fact as I mentioned the Quran never talks about government.  Religion should only 
define the liberty and independence.  If a religion was turned into the proclamation of independence and 
liberty it would be incompatible with the definition of power.  Therefore there could not be a dowlate dini 
(religious government) and on the other hand you can not have a dine dowlati (government religion); both 
these are unrealizable concepts.  Mr Montazeri for instance once said that our objective was to have a 
religious government but what we got was a government religion!  This comes as no surprise as the 
government means power but religion is an ideology.  And if this ideology is in the hands of a 
government, it obviously exploits it to achieve its own ends, this is obvious. 
VNP: Do you think then there is a similarity between the current system in Iran and the medieval 
religious systems in Europe? 
Banisadr: Back then there was complete totalitarianism.  Church was a totalitarian system.  In Iran 
although they wanted to they could not establish such a system.  Conceptually the notion of velāyat-e 
faqih is the same totalitarian idea.  The same Pharaoh system that the Quran rejects.  But luckily the 
Iranian culture and the modern day societies did not allow the establishment of such a system in Iran. 
VNP: I would like to find out about your practical problems in advancing republican ideas.  We know that 
you encountered numerous obstacles in performing your duties as the first elected Iranian president.  A 
position which would have entailed numerous presidential functions and duties which were hindered in 
various ways.  Could you tell me which practical problems you encountered acting as the head of the 
executive system of the government? 
Banisadr: In my research entitled totalitarianism, one section is dedicated to the pillars of a totalitarian 
system and another section to the actual experience we had in Iran.  A totalitarian system could have up to 
18 pillars of power, based on the level of totalitarianism.  So in Iran we employed many provisions to 
remove these pillars so that the government turns into a lawful government, grounded in laws.  Hence in 
every step of the way we were hindered by them.  For instance the means of mass communication is one 
of those pillars.  If these are controlled by people and there is a freedom of information and exchange of 
thoughts, then a totalitarian system could not materialize.  But if these are controlled by the dominating 
power then it becomes possible.  And this was a daily struggle for us, and at the end they closed down 
everything and made a coup d’état! 
VNP: Were there any systems/concepts that you managed to successfully put in place? Were there any 
ideals, concepts or institutions that you actually managed to achieve back then? Ideas which you think 
still persist in the Iranian society today? 
Banisadr: One such thing is the freedom of public debate, which has become a lasting practice in the 
Iranian society.  Another one is the mass participation in the flow of information and ideas.  And that for 
the first time in the Iranian history, the pillars of power have been identified, and in order to achieve a free 
society these pillars need to be removed and replaced by the rule of law.  This was unprecedented in 
Iranian society.  Things like the judiciary system, the means of mass communications, national budgets 
and financial issues, political parties and political organizations in the society etc, and the fact of 
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identifying the pillars of power, and what to do to tackle these issues, some of which were what we 
actually experienced back then. 
VNP: As you mentioned you had a daily struggle as the representative of the republican section of the 
Islamic Republic to advance your ideas which eventually ended in actual physical clashes and 
consequently the elimination of one section of the ruling system.  In recent years we still see such conflicts 
going on.  In fact even the formal president who is selected and accredited by the religious authority itself 
finds it difficult to exercise the very limited authority he has got as the head of the executive system.  What 
is your opinion of this? 
Banisadr: The incompatibility between republican principles and the velāyat-e faqih are not resolvable.  
As they have granted this office of valiy-e faqih some absolute authorities and he is not accountable in 
front of anyone. All these authorities are exclusively useful for the employment of power.  Now this 
president has some authorities to do something beneficiary for the people, these two would obviously be 
in conflict with that authority. Even if Mr. Khamenei himself one day becomes the president of Iran - that 
is being the president and holding the Valiye Faqih position at the same time, he can not do much as this 
will cause an internal conflict. As in the quality of the president he has to look after various social issues 
and be in charge of such things as internal and external policies, social policies etc, but at the same time in 
the quality of Valiye Faqih he has to stop himself from having these authorities.  For instance if one has 
said to Khomeini that you have the right to express your opinions freely, this was not anything significant 
and could have been done even without a constitution, but if one had told him that you are entitled to 
control all the mass media in the country, this is problematic as the mission of the public mass media is 
free flow of information without censorship but if he is in charge of such an organization this means that 
the mass media will be subject to censorship.  Because he should have considerations for his regime as he 
is the protector of the current system.  So whatever he finds to be against the system he bands through 
censorship.  Now imagine that there is a president who wants to give some information on the actual 
situation of the country.  The leader will order the president not to release such information and he must 
obey.  We heard recently that the president (Ahmadinejād) has announced that he wants to visit the 
prisons, the Valiye Faqih  stops him, whereas this is a right of every ordinary citizens to be able to go and 
visit the prisons to see if human rights are observed there as every individual should have sovereignty in 
his own country.  Whereas here we see this right is denied even to the president.  So it is not accidental 
that throughout the Islamic Republic’s history, Mr Khomeini had conflicts with me, after me he had 
conflicts with Khāmenei then the president of the country.  Khāmenei reportedly said once that he used to 
go to the rooftop of his house to cry in silence as a result of these conflicts with Khomeini.  Of course he 
did not have the courage to stand up to him.  Then after this the leader had conflicts with the next 
president Hashemi Rafsanjāni, then with the successor Mr Khātami, and now with this last one 
(Ahmadinejād) who has been appointed by himself and he cannot yet tolerate him.  This is due to the 
existential incompatibility that there is in this system.  President of the republic, even an unlawful one, has 
to deal with the affairs of the people.  Now there has even been proposals to remove the office of the 
presidency altogether and create a parliamentarian system.  But even that will not resolve the conflict.  
Let’s suppose a prime minister was chosen by the parliament, the title is not important, so if the parliament 
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chose an individual in that quality, will he be able to perform his duties?  Of course he will still have 
conflicts with this Valiye Faqih .  So the only solution is the elimination of velāyat-e faqih. 
VNP: If the concept of velāyat-e faqih is removed from the Iranian Constitution and politics, do you think 
there could be a solution to the problems and conflicts of the Islamic Republic? 
Banisadr: What do we mean by the elimination of the velāyat-e faqih? The elimination needs to address 
the issues I explained before.  That the human rights are endorsed in the Constitution, the right to popular 
sovereignty needs to be inserted in the Constitution.  So first there should be a popular sovereignty, and 
the entire Constitution to be based on this pivotal rule, then yes we could have a democracy.  It will 
become a republic as it is customary in the world.  It might not be completely in line with our ideals, but 
our ideals are there to indicate the direction or the path.  Those ideals might not be even practical today 
but those are there as a pattern and a guiding light. 
VNP: In your discussions you referred to the current social uprising in the region, the so-called Arab 
Spring.  What similarities and differences do you see?  There again we have on the one side a religious 
camp some of whom with strong religious convictions, such as the Salafies and on the other hand we have 
the democratic forces who seem to be in a frontal conflict.  Are there any similarities here with the Iranian 
situation? 
Banisadr: There are major differences and a few similarities such as the fact that these are all popular 
uprisings but even here they are not as extensive as the Iranian Revolution.  There in Iran we had a 
common social conscience which guided the revolutions based on the principles of independence and 
freedom.  These concepts are still unknown in the Arabic world.  Based on their religious teachings 
(Sunni) they are used to obey whoever holds the reins of power.  So they are still unaware of the concept 
of independence in the process of decision making in their collective conscience.  So it will be extremely 
easy to rebuild the tyranny there.  In our case our government has moved forward as compared to theirs.  
Previously the local tyranny was based on three internal pillars and one external pillar.  The first pillar was 
the monarchy and tribal systems and the army, the second was the clergy and the religious institutions, as 
in our system the religious institutions are not controlled by the government and have independence.  The 
society has always undertaken the costs of the clerical system to keep them independent to be able to use 
them as the protectors of their rights against the tyranny of the ruling system to limit its aggressiveness.  
The last internal pillar was the great land owners in the villages and bāzārs in the cities.  So out of these 
three main pillars, the last one (landowners) was removed by the Shāh’s regime, the monarchy itself was 
removed by the Iranian Revolutions.  So only one internal pillar is left that is the clergy - which is not a 
homogenous class as the traditional clergy do not approve of the current religious system.  The external 
pillar is its international relations, conflict or peace relations with the West and with China and Russia.  So 
in reality it is a single pillar regime.  And the regimes which are based on one single foundation are not 
stable ones.  They will collapse sooner or later, the strongest example of such a system was the Russian 
Empire which underwent the same process.  It eliminated the church, removed the great landowners and 
removed the monarchy as well then it turned into a political party heading the bureaucratic system and the 
army, against the religious institutions.  So although it was an empire and strongly dominating, it 
collapsed.  This is the process that western countries have undergone too.  But in the west the assumption 
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has been that they rely on popular sovereignty.  Therefore they are based on a republican system which is 
a stable system because it is thought the people are indestructible. 
VNP: Based on these observations you will predict then that we will be moving towards a system in which 
the popular sovereignty will be gradually prevailing? 
Banisadr: Definitely this will be the case. 
VNP: But all the examples at hand show a return to the basics and in many cases the loss of the very 
limited freedoms they (Arabic countries) have obtained in these years. 
Banisadr: Yes this is true, in my view they need to experience beforehand lots of things before 
appreciating the value of certain ones.  If you think about it these have been the societies who did not have 
a guiding ideology and this is very important.  One could not establish a republic without having a proper 
definition of the concepts.  It requires its specific guidelines.  You see now this shortage in Egypt, in 
Tunisia etc.  I do not trust the religious factions who have come to power in Egypt.  As these have only 
one perception of power from Islam which as I said has nothing to do with the Quran.  All these years they 
have only thought about seizing the power.  This is true for the Muslim Brotherhood, we do not even talk 
about the Salafists.  These have never thought about the independence and freedom of human beings.  
They have only thought about power.  But these are well organized.  These were not the ones who made 
the revolutions, but others did not have a guiding ideology, an alternative, and an organization.  Therefore 
they lost the game to these groups, which was not unexpected.  During these uprising I had an interview 
with the news channel France24 who asked me if I had a message for these countries.  I replied that 
Egyptians and Tunisians need to immediately come up with their political alternatives.  If not, the vacuum 
is always filled with power.  This has been the rule since eternity.  The vacuum is always filled with the 
oppressing power.  So if they do not have a political alternative for the collapsing regimes; their regimes 
will fall but they will not gain sovereignty.  So now Mr Morsi has substituted Mubarak.  He would either 
go down the path leading to where the religion’s place should be that is only inside people’s heads and not 
in government, or alternatively if religion enters the government it becomes a tool in the hands of the 
government which will follow the Iranian experience. 
VNP: A trend of socio-political scholars such as Arvand Abrahamin sustains that in Iran the real conflict 
is not between the religious ideology and republican notions.  What we have there is the actualization of 
populist ideologies disguised in religious vest. 
Banisadr: I have dedicated a chapter of my research to the idea of populist propaganda.  There is no doubt 
that Khomeini had used populist strategies to deceive the people.  But the important question will be when 
did he use this populist deception?  When he was here in France he could not use the populist language.  
Paris is the crossroads of intellectual ideologies and international information.  If he attempted to use such 
strategies they would have immediately unveiled his deception.  So his populist strategies were handy in 
Tehran because it is accompanied by a stick there.  If someone ever denounces the populist deceptions he 
will be hit on the head by that stick.  But in France if he dared to use such language and strategies he 
would be publicly ridiculed and have to stay in France forever.  Here he only emphasized on the notion of 
freedom.  There is nothing of populism in declaring that the sovereignty belongs to the people. This is 
only affirming a right.  When he was explicitly asked about the nature of the republican system that he had 
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in mind, he replied that it would be a republic like France.  Here there is no deception as a Frenchman 
knows what a republic is and how the French Republic is.  But in Tehran things changed.  The first 
practical challenge was the question of the hejāb (women’s Islamic veils).  I went to see him and said that 
you mentioned in France that the women are free to choose their clothing?  He replied: that was a 
maslahat there (precautionary dissimulation).  I replied this is a Machiavellian strategy, even Machiavelli 
did not act like this.  Machiavelli said that you have to act covertly, as if you have not done anything.  Not 
this way that you said something yesterday and today you say something completely contrary.  Like his 
other discourse which is available online in which he regrets not having acted in a “revolutionary manner” 
and executed all the opposition members in prison.  These are of course populism and he can be sure that 
no one can reply back saying: “if you had said these things the first day, they would have taken you to a 
psychiatric hospital instead of making you a leader”! But of course no one dares to say so as the club-
wielders of the regime would silence them immediately.  So populism is not a language that you can use 
anywhere.  Of course it could be used even in the west such as the extreme right in the French elections 
used such a language, and other parties too.  But here it was critically analysed.  I am not saying that this 
criticism completely removed the effects of that populist demagogy, but it certainly reduced the effects.  
We saw that in the US elections Mr Mitt Romney used this language a lot, but in the end he was not 
elected.  So the more a democracy is effective, the more the populism become inefficient.  Populism has 
been shown to work more effectively when the society is in a certain difficult situation and needs quick 
forceful solutions.  Such as during Hitler’s time when Germany has lost the previous war and there was 
high inflation and many social problems, so he needed to create an imaginary enemy in the form of the 
Jews and promise to resolve all problems.  So in a free society when things work properly the populism 
can not work.  So the conclusion is that yes Khomeini used populist strategies.  By the way it is also true 
that even their version of traditional fiqh could still be compatible with democracy, as I mentioned the 
Quran has nothing to do with their version of fiqh which is based on the Greek philosophy and the 
language is the language of power.  But yet it will not interfere with the democracy as in order to interfere 
with the republican ideas it should deny any free will by the human beings and deny him all powers of will 
and decision making.  Imagine a Stalinist system which believes in the historical predestination declaring 
that human beings could at most act in line with the predetermined historical destiny.  By these 
declarations you can effectively turn the proletariat party into a stick with which to hit others on the head, 
but the traditional fiqh would not be compatible with this. 
VNP: Thank you very much Mr Banisadr for your time and extensive replies to my questions   
 
 Vahid Nick Pay, Paris November 2012 
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